ftikM
■^#^
...•^;
m^
IP'
r^/
:u\v\U C-^ ^cSJ-^^ ^^-^
2. I> V
a
c.
THE
DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA
THE CAUSE, HISTORY, AND EFFECT OF THE
MATABELI WAR.
Copyright. Entered at Stationers' Hall,
vxv
\»
.> ^Vv
\ J V
*<•
THE
DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA
THE CAUSE, HISTORY, AND EFFECT OF THE
MATABELI WAR.
Bv W. A. WILLS ami L. T. COLLINGRIDGE.
With Contributions by
Major P. W. FORBES, Major SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, Barf.,
Mr. IL RIDER HAGGARD, Mr. F. C. SELOUS, F.Z.S.,
ami Mr. P. B. S. IVREY, A.M. Inst. C.E.
LONDON :
"THE AFRICAN REVIEW" OfI'ICes, io, Basinghall Street, E.G.; and
SiMPKiN, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, and Co., Ltd.
SOUTH AFRICA:
The Argus Comi-any, Ltd., Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Salisbury, and
buluwayo.
I
B192G3
LONDON :
PRINTED BY W. H. AND L. COLLINGRIDGE,
148 & 149, ALDERSGATE STREET, E.C.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE WAR page i
By Frederick Courtenay Selous.
The downfall of Lobengula — Struggle between civilisation and savagery— One of the
boldest enterprises — A tribute to the brave — The war forced by the Matabeli —
The little England party — Mining capital lying idle — Mr. Richmond's Mashona
boy killed — Mashonaland abandoned, or Lobengula's power broken — Memorial
drawn up by Mr. Philip Wrey — Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson organise the force —
Diversion caused by Colonel Goo'd-Adams' column — Khama's desertion unjustifiable
— Gambo disheartened — The effect of the war— Plenty of room for Englishmen-
Picturesque natives — Dutch or British in Matabeliland — Development of the country —
Trains to Buluwayo — Power broken of military despotic rule — Supremacy of British
power in South Africa.
CHAPTER n.
MATABELILAND UNDER MOSELIKATSI pa^e 14
The Greeks and Africa — Vasco da Gama at Cape of Good Hope — The expedition in 1890 —
A Dutch trek — Moselikatsi natives across the Drakensberg— Early Matabeli military
training — Murder of Boers — Battle at Vechtkop — Kruger's first fight — Defeat of the
Matabeli— Mosehkatsi driven further north — Lobengula condemned to be strangled —
Saved by Umcumbate — Policy of extermination — Death laws — Death of Mosehkatsi —
Succeeded by Lobengula in 1868.
CHAPTER III.
THE DAWN OF CIVILISATION page 22
Lobengula preserves the old traditions — Every inch a king — Cruelty tempered with humanity
— His personal habits — Strength of the Matabeli army — Matabeliland coveted by the
Boers — Rival missions— Mr. C. D. Rudd and Mr. Rochfort Maguire win for Mr. Rhodes
— Effective occupation — Organising the pioneer force — Selous as pioneer — Lobengula's
opposition — Pioneers arrive safely at Salisbury — Early day troubles — Boer filibusters
retire before " Maxim " — Dr. Jameson administrator.
vi Contents.
CHAPTER IV.
THE FOUNDERS OF THE HINTERLAND EMPIRE page 29
Cecil Rhodes and General Gordon— South Africa or Khartoum — The Consolidation of the
Diamond mines — The belief in Mr. Rhodes' resources —The Cape to Cairo idea — Dr.
Jameson's career — The direction of the Chartered Company — The Duke of Abercorn —
The Duke of Fife— Lord Gifford— Sir H. B. Farquhar, Bart.— Mr. A. Beit— Mr. G.
Cawston— Mr. A. H. G. Grey — Mr. R. Maguire— Mr. Herbert Canning— Dr. F.
Rutherfoord Hariis— Mr. B. F. Hawkesley— Mr. C. D. Rudd -Mr. F. C. Selous—
Mr. P. B. S. Wrey.
CHAPTER V.
THE COLLISION AT VICTORIA page 58
By p. B. S. Wrey, A.M.I.C.E.
Matabeli impis cross the border— Mashonas' fear of the Matabeli— Dr. Jameson remonstrates
with Lobengula — Telegraph wires cut at Gomalla's kraal— Lobengula claims the right
to raid the Mashonas— An impi at Victoria, Sunday, July 19th — Dr. Jameson arrives
at Victoria — Loath to take active measures — The indaba— Lobengula breaks his compact
— Young Matabeli warriors beyond control — The impi ordered to leave in an hour, or
be driven out — Threats of the colunists to leave the country.
CHAPTER VI.
ORGANISING THE FORCES page 63
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Declaration of War — Major Forbes to take command — Dr. Jameson arranges for starting to
Buluwayo— The Matabeli fighting strength— Military stores at Salisbury — Lack of horses —
Organising the Salisbury Horse — Selecting the officers — The conditions for volunteering
— The Victoria Column— Buying the horses —Leaving Salisbury — Practicing military
manoeuvres — The Tuli Column delayed — The Matabeli reported massing at Sbangani
River — Dr. Jameson reviews the Salisbury Horse at Charter — Ammunition— Forming
laager — Manning the waggons.
CHAPTER VII.
LEAVING MASHONALAND FOR THE FRONT ... page 83
By Major P. W. Forbes.
The Salisbury Column advance from Charter— Crossing the Umniati river— In Matabeliland—
— A scouting party — Halt at Iron Mine Hill— Recovering cattle— First sight of the
Matabeli— Captain Campbell shot— The Victoria Column join us— Formation of their
laager— Their strength and officers— Difficulties with the Victoria Artillery overcome—
Arrangements for the combined march— The realities of war— Native guides.
Contents. vii
CHAPTER VIII.
FROM SIGALA MOUNTAIN TO THE SHANGANI ... page 97
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Advance of the Combined Columns — A false alarm — Finding gold — Insukameni kraal deserted
— Somabula Forest — Matabeli scouts— E. Burnett shot— Crossing the Shangani River —
Capturing cattle— Arranging pickets — The eve of the first battle— The first attack —
Quested's natives driven in — Plucky advance of the Insukameni regiment — Driven
back by the Maxims — Captain Heany's skirmishers nearly cut off — The enemy routed —
Strength of the Matabeli — -Maiabeli inferior to the Zulu — Effect of fire upon the oxen —
The Colunms advance — Captain Williams cut off and lost — A threatened attack —
Sighting the Matoppo Hills — Captain Heany burns Enxna kraal.
CHAPTER IX.
THE OCCUPATION OF BULUWAYO page 118
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Scouts sent to reconnoitre Buluwayo — News of Lobengula — Umsingweni kraal burnt by the
natives — An anxious march — The battle of Imbembesi — The horses stampeded — The
picket surprised — The Matabeli within 300 yards — Attempt to surround the laager —
Plucky advance of Captain Delamere's dismounted men — The enemy retire — The Imbezu
beaten by a lot of boys — The Matabeli power broken — Heading straight for Buluwayo —
Kraals deserted — Buluwayo blown up — Letter from Burnham and Eairbairn — Buluwayo
occupied — Short of supplies — News of the Southern Column — A messenger sent to
Lobengula — Capturing the king's peacocks — Lobengula's reply: "Where am I to live?"
— The first church parade at Buluwayo — Despatches for England.
CHAPTER X.
THE PURSUIT OF THE KING page 135
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Preparations for attackmg Umhlangeni — The royal kraals deserted — News of the king on
the Bubye river — Messengers sent to Lobengula and the Imbezu — Captain Raaf
objects to advance — A consultation — The patrol to retire to Umhlangeni — Imbezu cattle
captured by our Mashonas, driven off by the Matabeli, and again recaptured —
Further messages sent to the king — Heavy rain storms — Retire to Shiloh — Arrival
of reinforcements — The second advance — Lobengula's message to Dr. Jameson — Dividing
the force— Following the king's spoor — The Matabeli tired of fighting — Finding the
king's bath chair and two waggons.
vlii Contents.
CHAPTER XI.
THE LOSS OF THE WILSON PATROL page 153
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Close upon the king — An anxious time for the scouts — Preparations for an attack — The
king's camp deserted — Major Wilson sent to reconnoitre — Preparations for a dash for the
king— Messengers sent back to Major Forbes — Captain Borrow sent with reinforcements
— Heavy firing across the river — The column attacked — The sole survivors of Major
Wilson's party — Burnham's account of the disaster — To retire up the river — Short of
ammunition — News sent to Dr. Jameson — A deluge of rain — Mr. Howard's plucky swim
across the river.
CHAPTER Xn.
THE RETREAT FROM THE SHANGANI RIVER .. page 173
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Down the river's bank — Horses falling off fast — Short of food— Capturing the royal cattle —
A skirmish in the bush — A heavy rain storm — The men depressed — The last of the
horses done up — A sudden attack — The gun carriages left behind — Captain Raaf
addresses the force — The first night march — Tired out — Horse flesh flavoured with
garlic — A fight while on the march— The Matabeli now behind us — Mr. Selous brings
tidings of food — Back to Umhlangeni and Buluwayo— Disbanding the force — Pegging
out farms — Death of Captain Raaf — A parade of all forces before Mr. Rhodes— Rumours
of Major Wilson's party — How Englishmen can die.
CHAPTER XHL
CROSSING THE BORDER page 189
By Major Sir J. C. Willoughby, Bart.
The Victoria incident — The state of public feeling — The organisation of the Volunteers —
Correspondence with the High Commissioner — The Southern Column — The start of
the Columns — Our rival allies — Crossing the Border — Junction of the Salisbury and
Victoria Columns.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN page 203
By Major Sir J. C. Willoughby, Bart.
The surrender of Indunas — Major Forbes instructed to pursue Lobengula — The Shangani
reached — Major Wilson sent on ahead — The party surrounded and cut off— The last
stand — A relief party organized — The retreat of Major Forbes' patrol — Hardships
on the way— Submission of the Matabeli — The duties of the British South Africa
Company's Police and the Bechuanaland Border Police — Messrs. Dawson and Riley's
mission — The death of Lobengula — The final settlement of the country.
Contents. ix
CHAPTER XV.
WITH THE SOUTHERN COLUMN page 215
The diversion of a part of Lobengula's army — 8,000 men under Gambo sent to intercept
Colonel Goold-Adams — Mr. Dawson's mission — The indunas arrested — Mantuse and
Inqubo, in attempting to escape, are killed — Major Sawyer's inquiry — Commandant
Raaf joins the Column— Meet Chief Khama at Shashi River — The plans of the march —
Scarcity of water — The Matabeli in force in front — The waggons attacked — The
Matabeli rush the rearmost waggons — Mr. Selous wounded — Driven off by the Maxims
— Small-pox breaks out amongst Khama's men — lie decides to return home — Sub-
mission of Makalaka chiefs — News of victories of Major Forbes' Column — At
Buluwayo.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE PATTERSON EMBASSY TO LOBENGULA ... page 227
By H, Rider Haggard.
{Being a N^ote on the ciraimsiances attending the Deaths of Captain R. Robert Patterson,
Air. J. Sargeannt, and Air. Thomas in Matabeliland in September, 1878.)
CHAPTER XVn.
IN MEMORIAM page 234
The effect of the war — Its causes — The vassals of the Matabeli — The cost of the campaign —
A story of heroes — The last stand — A hallowed circle — The national regret — The
memorials at Buluwayo and Zimbabye — The conduct of the expedition — Major Allan
Wilson — Commandant P. J. Raaf, C.M.G. — Captain H. J. Borrow — Captain A. L.
Campbell — Captain F. Fitzgerald — Captain Greenfield — Captain Judd — Captain A. B.
Kirton — Captain C. F. Lendy, R.A. — Captain O. G. Williams, and the others.
CHAPTER XVHI.
THE RHODESIAN ROLL CALL page 276
The character of the troops — Their esprit de corps and stamina — The Administrator — The
Commanding Officer — Sir J. C. Willoughby, Bart. — Major Hamilton Browne — Captain
Finch — Captain Heany — Captain Spreckley — Captain Moberley — Captain Kennedy —
Adjutant Kennelly— Captain Bastard — Captain Napier — Captain Delamere — Captain
Reid — Captain White — Captain Donovan — The other officers.
X Contents.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF MASHONAIAND page 301
By p. B. S. Wrey, A.M.I.CE.
A land of promise — A succession of gardens— Climatic conditions — The question of markets —
A comparison with Johannesburg in its early days — Labour and fuel — The native
population — The administration — A final conclusion.
THE
ZAMBESIA
CHAPTER XX.
SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
PH^ 30S
The extent of our latest territorial acquisitions — Xorthern Zambesia — The gold areas— The
value of real estate — The terms of settlement with the Colonial Office — Mr. Rhodes'
views on the fiscal policy of the Empire — Railways, telegraphs, and coach services. —
Col. F. W. Rhodes — Mr. James Dawson.
ERRATA.
Page i6, line 6, for "contumelious" read "contumacious.' Page 25,
line 13, for "A." Maguire read " R.'' Maguire. Page 80, line 32, for
"flanking" read "left flanking," Page 81, line 14, for "to place his
men" read "to his place." Page 91, line 23, for "taken" read "recovered."
Page 94, line 4, for " two " read "four." Page 176, line g,for "before " read
"below." Page 195, line 22, before "bank" read "south." Page 211, line
24, for " Mapondein " read " Umpandine." J^or " G\vynyd " (Captain
Williams) read "Gwynydd"; and for "Raaf" (Captain) read "Raaff," wherever
occurring.
of those — whether commissioned or otherwise — who lost their lives in
protecting their Mashona dependants, their hard-won interests, and in
providing for their own safety, which was threatened by their fierce and
intractable neighbours. This information has necessarily been difficult
to obtain, and the chapters devoted to the subject are still incomplete.
It is hoped, however, that relatives or friends will, before the next
edition, enable the deficiencies in this respect to be remedied by for-
warding biographical particulars and portraits.
At the outset it was not intended that this Volume should take so
comprehensive a character. The announcement of its forthcoming
publication, however, and the march of events, brought forth such a
number of valuable contributions, and such a mass of important
information of various kinds, that the limits originally proposed were
PREFACE.
It has al\va\'s been felt to be a matter of ^^leat regret that so ver}'
few, if indeed an)-, reasonablj^ comprehensive and authoritative histories
of any of the numerous campaigns fought between -the European
colonists and the warlike native tribes of South Africa have been written.
That which is recorded on the following pages has the undeniable
advantage in that the story of the war is told by the commanding
officer of the forces engaged. It has further a special feature — and
one which will be considerably amplified in subsequent editions — in
the form of two chapters in which a brief biographical reference has
been made to most of the officers of the expedition, and to nearly all
of those — whether commissioned or otherwise — who lost their lives in
protecting their Mashona dependants, their hard-won interests, and in
providing for their own safety, which was threatened by their fierce and
intractable neighbours. This information has necessarily been difficult
to obtain, and the chapters devoted to the subject are still incomplete.
It is hoped, however, that relatives or friends will, before the next
edition, enable the deficiencies in this respect to be remedied by for-
warding biographical particulars and portraits.
At the outset it was not intended that this Volume should take so
comprehensive a character. The announcement of its forthcoming
publication, however, and the march of events, brought forth such a
number of valuable contributions, and such a mass of important
information of various kinds, that the limits originally proposed were
xii Preface.
insensibly but largely exceeded. The occasion may be taken to
record our obligations to members of the British South Africa
Company's forces and others for much vahiable aid ; notably to Major
P. W. Forbes, who has furnished a complete and careful account of the
operations of the columns under his command. Originally it was
intended to print Major Sir John Willoughby's account also in full, but
as it came to hand somewhat late for that purpose, and as it was in a
large measure practically identical with that of Major Forbes, it was
finally decided to publish only such portions as referred to the origina-
tion of the war, to the tragic but splendid incident which marked its
close, and to the circumstances under which the pacification of the
country was carried out. Thanks are also due to Mr. H. Rider
Haggard, who has related all that is known, or reasonably conjectured,
as to the murder by Lobengula of Captain Patterson's Embassy ; to
Mr. F. C. Selous, who has traced, in his own graphic style, the causes of
the war, and alluded to its results ; to Mr. P. B. S. Wrey, who has dealt
with " the Victoria incident," and the prospects of the new South
African colony; to Captain C. H. W. Donovan, Mr. Cecil R. Batley,
Mr. J. Murray Gourlay, Mr. R. T. Coryndon, Mr. W. Hacker, and
numerous others who have assisted with much valuable information,
and a number of notes, sketches, and photographs which have been
utilised in the body of the book. Finally, it should be said that in the
ensuing pages stress is naturally laid upon the services of those volun-
teers who formed the advancing columns. At the same time it is hardly
necessary to say that those volunteers and burghers who stayed behind
to garrison the forts at Salisbury, Victoria, Charter, and Tuli, and to
forward supplies to their comrades at the front, formed an important
and indispensable portion of the volunteer army, and that their services
demand grateful recognition by the Rhodesian community.
W. A. WILLS.
L. T. COLLINGRIDGE.
lo, Basinghall Street, London, E.G.
20/// Aiii^ust, 1894.
Photo by Elliott &= Fry, Baker Street.~\
THE HONOURABLE CECIL J. RHODES.
{Premier of the Cape Colony ; Founder and Managing Director of the British South Africa
Company. )
THE DOWNFALL OF LOBENGULA.
CHAPTER I,
INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE WAR.
By Frederick Courtenay Selous.
The downfall of Lobengula — Struggle between civilisation and savagery — One of the
boldest enterprises — A tribute to the brave — The war forced by the Matabeli —
The little England parly — Mining capital lying idle — Mr. Richmond's Mashona
boy killed — Mashonaland abandoned, or Lobengula's power broken — Memorial
diawn up by Mr. Philip Wrey — Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson organise the force —
Diversion caused by Colonel Gould-Adams' column — Khama's desertion unjustifiable
— Gambo disheartened — The effect of the war — Plenty of room for Englishmen —
Picturesque natives- Dutch or British in Matabeliland — Development of the country —
Trains to Buluwayo — Power broken of military despotic rule— Supremacy of British
power in South Africa.
The year 1893, most fateful in the history of British enterprise
in South Africa, has passed and gone ; but the events of that year,
culminating as they did in the conquest of Matabeliland and the
downfall of Lobengula, will never be forgotten by the colonists of
Mashonaland, who will ever look back upon the Matabeli war with
feelings of pride mingled with sorrow. Sorrow for the comrades who
have fallen in the struggle between civilisation and savagery ; pride,
not alone in the valour of those dead comrades, but also in the steadv
courage and strength of purpose which marked the conduct of the
whole campaign.
As a detailed account of the war will be found in the pages of the
book to which this little sketch is a prelude or preface, I shall not touch
upon the conduct of the campaign ; except to say that, successful as
it was, it was yet one of the boldest enterprises ever undertaken by
B
2 • The Downfall of Lobengiila.
our adventurous race. A slight reverse at the commencement might
easily have led to a grave disaster, and that no reverse occurred until
after the white men were in occupation of Buluwayo is due, I think,
at least as much to the absolute want of generalship displayed by the
Matabeli, as to the care and skill of the whites. The luck seems to me
to have been all on our side. However successful though this enterprise
has been, the conquest of Matabeliland has cost the colonists of
Mashonaland dear. In number, the lives that have been lost are com-
paratively few, but it is a regrettable fact that amongst the fallen are a
large proportion of the best men in the country — men like Allan
Wilson and Henry Borrow, whose places none can fill. On the day
that these two splendid specimens of the British race fell fighting side
by side — Allan Wilson the Scotchman and Henry Borrow the Engh"sh-
man — there fell with them their thirty follower'^, a picked band from
a body of brave men. But sad though the death may be of these
gallant fellows, and wide-spread as must be the grief amongst relations
and friends at their untimely loss, the sorrow and grief must be in some
sort mitigated by the manner of their death and the knowledge that
their splendid spirit of comradeship and true nobility of character
have embalmed their memory in every true man's heart wherever the
English language is spoken. Amongst the others who have fallen in
this brief campaign are many to whose memory I would fain pay a
tribute of regard. Poor Ted Burnett, by whose side I have lain for
months at a time beneath the stars which look down upon Mashona-
land, without ever a cross word ; and Gwynyth Williams, untimely
slain in his early manhood, beloved by all who knew him, and as gentle
and kind and brave as any Bayard ; and Lendy, soldierlike and hand-
some, and as kind-hearted as he was brave; and poor Raaff, too, and
Eustace Forbes, who, like Lendy, both lost their lives after the cam-
paign was over, but were none the less the victims of the war. These
men were all my personal friends, and there are others whom I did not
know so well whose loss will be deeply mourned, not alone by their
relations in this country, but also by their friends and fellow colonists
in Mashonaland. Great, how^ever, as has been the price paid in noble
lives for the conquest of Matabeliland, I am one of those who think
that the war was an absolute necessity, and the crushing of the
Introductory Review of 4 he War. 3
Matabeli power at any cost the only possible means of maintaining the
supremacy of our race on the plateau of Central South Africa.
Was the war against the Matabeli justifiable or not ? In
Mashonaland there has never been but one opinion on the subject ;
an opinion, be it noted, which was not only held by every
white man who had gone to the country with a view to bettering
his condition in life, but which was also fully shared in by every
member of every religious denomination in Mashonaland with one
single exception, that exception being Mr. Douglas Pelly, a member
of Bishop Knight Bruce's mission. This gentleman, who, save for a few
days spent in the hospital at Salisbury before the outbreak of the war,
had been stationed in Manica, and who therefore could never have seen
a Matabeli in his life, or had any opportunity of studying the character
of these people, or of knowing the paralysing effect on the enterprise of
the colonists produced by their encroachments in the district of Victoria,
seems to have been somewhat rash and presumptuous in the expression
of opinions so adverse to his fellow-countrymen, as that " the war was a
most unjust one, and was forced on the Matabeli by the Chartered
Company." However, unjust as such an opinion undoubtedly is, it is as
well that it should be recorded, if only that the colonists should know
their enemies. With this single exception all the members of the
different religious denominations in Mashonaland — Wesleyans, Church
of England ministers, and Roman Catholic priests — were in complete
accord that the war with the Matabeli was a necessity, and was forced
on the colonists by the action of the Matabeli themselves. In this
country, however, there is a small and contemptible class of men, a part
of whose political creed it appears to be to discredit the actions of
British colonists in all parts of the world, and these men have not only
been constant in their denunciations of all that has been done by their
countrymen in Mashonaland during the last four years, but have been
particularly venomous in their criticisms concerning the cause and the
conduct of the Matabeli war. Mr. Labouchere has, by his constant
attacks upon the dead and the living alike, won for himself the
reputation of being the most unscrupulous, dishonest, and virulent
enemy of the colonists in Mashonaland, and his lead has been followed
by some of the press in this country, who, curiously enough, seem to
B 2
4 • The Downfall of Lobcngula.
believe that they are serving the political ends they have in view by
calumniating indiscriminately a large body of their fellow-countrymen
in South Africa.
Mr. Labouchere has summed up his opinion concerning the origin
of the war in a sentence which I quote from the number of Truth for
November the i6th, 1893. This sentence runs: — "The Mashonaland
bubble having burst, a war was forced by the Company on Lobengula in
order to get hold of Matabeliland." My answer to this charge was
lately given in the course of a lecture before the members of the Royal
Colonial Institute, and ran as follows : — ''What exactly Mr. Labouchere
means to convey by the expression, ' the Mashonaland bubble having
burst,' I don't know; but if he means that Mashonaland had been
proved by this time to be worthless as a field for British enterprise, and
that the officials of the Chartered Company had therefore made all the
preparations necessary for a war of aggression against the Matabeli,
then I say that Mr. Labouchere states what is absolutely untrue, for
what are the facts? In July, 1893, when the Victoria district was
devastated by the Matabeli, and the settlers' servants were killed within
sight of the houses ; when their cattle were driven off, and their farm-
steads destroyed, there were only thirty-eight horses in the whole of the
Victoria district, and less than 150 in the whole of Mashonaland. At
this time the first half of the dry season had already passed,
and I ask if, given this absolute state of unpreparedness so late
in the dry season, it is possible to suppose that at this time — the
time of tlie Matabeli invasion of the Victoria district of Mashonaland —
an aggressive war against the Matabeli could have been in contemplation
by Dr. Jameson and the officials of the Chartered Company.'' Now for
the assertion that the ' Mashonaland bubble had burst.' "
In this connection I have been authorised by Mr. Philip Wrey, the
mining engineer of the Mashonaland Agency, a gentleman who has
spent nearly three years in Mashonaland, and who is one of the best,
because one of the most experienced, authorities upon mining work in
that country, to state that the working capital represented by the
different companies floated in London early in 1893 for the purpose of
fully developing Mashonaland amounted to between ^^300,000 and
;^400,ooo. Now, as the people who subscribed this large sum of money
Introductory Review of the War. 5
must have been more or less in the confidence of the directors of the
British South Africa Company in London, is it to be supposed that they
would have subscribed this amount of capital if a war with so powerful
a nation as the Matabeli — a war which at that time must have seemed of
very doubtful issue — had been in contemplation ? Owing to the
breaking out of the war the greater part of this capital has never been
utilised. At the very time when the raid took place in the Victoria
district, in July, 1893, there were 120 natives working at Long's Reef in
the employ of the Mashonaland Agency, all of whom had been brought,
at a great expense, from the east coast, and 100 more were actually on
their way to Victoria from Inhambane. At the same time something
like 300 men were at work on the " Cotopaxi," one of the properties
belonging to the " Gold Fields of Mashonaland," whilst other large
gangs were working on reefs belonging to Willoughby's Syndicate, the
Zambesia Exploring Company, and many other mining syndicates in
Mashonaland. Indeed, in July, 1893, so far from the Mashonaland
bubble having burst, as Mr. Labouchere has so often asserted, I fail to
see in what way the men who were interested in the development of the
country could possibly have shown their belief in its value in a more
tangible form than by undertaking the works of development upon
which they were engaged in all the mining districts.
And what, I would ask, is occurring now that the Matabeli power
has been crushed and Matabeliland lies open to European enterprise ?
Have the mining operations in Mashonaland been abandoned ? Have
the men whom Mr. Labouchere calls greedy adventurers, border
ruffians, riff-raff, marauders and murderers, abandoned the burst
bubble of Mashonaland en masse, and flocked, to use another of Mr.
Labouchere's choice similes, like vultures to the fresh-killed carcase
of Matabeliland } Not at all. In every district of Mashonaland mining
development work and every other enterprise has now been resumed »
and that fact is, I think, the best refutation of the false assertion, that
war was made on the Matabeli without just cause, in order to raise
money, because " the Mashonaland bubble had burst."
As to the actual circumstances which led to the war, I cannot
recapitulate them at length here, but the raid by the Matabeli into the
Victoria district in July, 1893, is a matter of history; and if that raid
6 The Downfall of Lobengula,
itself was not a sufficient justification for the war which was subse-
quently undertaken against the Matabeli, I fail to see how any war
that has ever taken place can be justified. It is true that no white
man was murdered by the Matabeli during the prosecution of this
historical raid ; but, short of this, everything was done to stir up the
bitterest feelings of exasperation in the hearts of the colonists. More
than 400 Mashona men, women, and children were killed in the
neighbourhood of the township of Victoria. This, Mr. Labouchere
tells us, ought not to have been resented by the settlers, as
Lobengula was acting within his rights in slaughtering Mashonas
at his pleasure. Probably the colonists in Mashonaland would
not have been very strongly moved had they heard of the
slaughter of native tribes by Lobengula at a distance from
their settlements. But the killing of natives in the immediate
vicinity of Victoria created a panic throughout the district, and not
only put a stop to all mining development work in the country, but
brought every other description of industry and enterprise to a stand-
still. Besides this, not only were many natives killed by the Matabeli
close to the houses forming the little township of Victoria — so near, in
fact, that their bodies had to be buried for sanitary reasons, by the
white men — but in several instances, personal servants of white men
were killed before the eyes of their masters. Amongst others who
have made sworn affidavits to this effect, are the Rev. Mr. Sylvester,
the English chaplain at Victoria, and Mr. Richmond, a prospector.
The latter having been summoned to Victoria by Captain Lendy,
in common with all the white men who were living at the various mining
camps in the outlying districts, was coming in with all his worldly goods
packed on a donkey. This donkey was being led by a Mashona lad,
Mr. Richmond walking behind. A party of Matabeli being encountered,
the Mashona boy let go the donkey, and ran and clasped Richmond
round the legs. The Matabeli dragged him shrieking and assegaied
him to pieces before the eyes of his master. Richmond, although I
believe he had a rifle with him, was afraid to use it ; but he
remonstrated strongly with the murderers of his servant, when one of
them, placing his hand on his arm, said, " You keep quiet, white man ;
we have been ordered not to kill a white man wo\n,\>\x\. yotir day is
IntrodiLctory Rcviciv of the Wai\ 7
coming." This same threat was made to other white men. Concern-
ing the murder of this boy, Mr. Richmond, as I have said above, has
made a sworn statement before Dr. Jameson and the magistrate at
Victoria, whilst Mr. W. B. Harris and others saw the boy lying dead
in the road. A party of Matabeli also visited Mr. Napier's farm near
Victoria and completely wrecked his homestead, destroying everything
in his house. The throats of all his fowls were cut, and the dead birds
left lying on the ground. All his goats were killed and skinned and
the carcases left, whilst all his cattle were driven off, and three of his
cattle herds murdered. Altogether between three and four hundred
head of cattle belonging to white men were driven off by the Matabeli
in the course of this raid. Now these murders of white men's servants,
the wreckage of homesteads, and the stealing of large herds of cattle
belonging to the settlers, are not fictions, but facts, which can be sworn
to by between 400 and 500 Europeans, and such being the case, there
could be no further safety for white men in Mashonaland until the power
of the Matabeli was broken. It was absolutely necessary, if the work
of colonisation was to be carried on in Mashonaland, to assert the
supremacy of the white race at once and for always. No middle course
was possible. Either Mashonaland had to be abandoned, or Matabeli-
land conquered, and the military organization of Lobengula broken up.
Had the colonists of Mashonaland been the mean, sordid, and
cowardly wretches that Mr. Labouchere has asserted them to be, then
they would have abandoned the country rather than embark on such a
hazardous enterprise as the invasion of Matabeliland. But such a
course was never dreamt of, for the men who to-day are fighting for the
supremacy of their race on the borders of our Empire in Africa never
forget that they are the countrymen of Drake and Raleigh and
Frobisher, and of Clive and Warren Hastings ; and so they did even
as those bold Englishmen would have done in similar circum-
stances. Their success is their crime with those degenerate Englishmen
in whom the spirit of adventure has been killed by a life of soft luxury
and self-indulgence. Such men seem to consider that the word
adventurer is a term of reproach to an Englishman, forgetting that it is
adventurers who have made the British Empire what it is. From the
time of the raid on Victoria, the settlers in Mashonaland determined on
8 The Doivnfall of Lobeugtda,
war with the MatabeH, and in a memorial drawn up by Mr. Philip
Wrey, and signed by every white man in Victoria, they called upon the
British South Africa Company, under whose auspices they had come
into the country, to protect their interests in the only possible way in
which those interests could be protected, by at once supplying them
with horses and everything else necessary for an immediate march on
Buluwayo. Luckily at this supreme moment, when the supremacy of
the British race in South Africa trembled in the balance, there were two
such men in the country as Mr. Rhodes at Cape Town, and Dr.
Jameson in Mashonaland. All that money and energy and strength of
will could do in Cape Town was done by Mr. Rhodes. Although,
owing to the severe drought and consequent want of grass, the season
was a most unfavourable one for sending any kind of livestock for long
distances over the burnt-up country, some 800 or 900 horses were bought
and sent up to Mashonaland, and over 300 men were recruited in
the Transvaal to assist their fellow-countrymen in the coming struggle.
In Mashonaland itself Dr. Jameson was untiring in his efforts to organise
and equip his small force as efficiently as possible. In this he was
most ably and zealously assisted by Sir John Willoughby, Major
Forbes, Major Allan Wilson, and all the officers and men under their
command. Thus, by the end of the first week in October, 1893, Dr.
Jameson's little force of 670 white men, supported hy a small native
contingent, were ready to advance in two columns from Victoria and
Charter. These two columns met at the head of the Tukwi river, and
then travelled together to Buluwayo. Luckily this combined force,
though small, was thoroughly efficient and was especially strong in
artillery, all the guns being in charge of first-rate artillerymen, such as
Captains Lendy and Biscoe, and Lieutenants Reid and Llewellyn.
Another point, too, which must not be overlooked in considering the
great success of the invasion of Matabeliland from the east, and the
dispersal of a tribe so well armed and organised as the Matabeli by
such a numerically small force of white men, is the fact that the country
lying between Mashonaland and Buluwayo is for the most part
of the character of open grass land, and therefore most favourable for
the operations of mounted men, supported by artillery. Had eastern
Matabeliland been a broken, hilly country covered with thick forest, I
Introaudory Review of the War. 9
think that a very much larger force would have been required than that
which actually scattered the Matabeli at the Shangani and the Imbem-
bisi, and took possession of Buluwayo after a campaign that had lasted
for less than a month. To the colonists of Mashonaland, to Dr.
Jameson, and the officers and men of the Salisbury and Victoria columns,
is due the lion's share of whatever laurels may be bestowed on the con-
querors of Matabeliland , but they themselves will, I think, be the last
to refuse to recognise the great assistance rendered them by Colonel
Goold-Adams, and Commandant Raafif, and their officers and men, who
by a simultaneous invasion of Matabeliland from the west, through a
most difficult and dangerous country, diverted quite half the military
forces of the Matabeli nation from taking part with their comrades
against the white men who were advancing on Buluwayo from the east.
Nor ought the part played by Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner
for South Africa, in the late war to be forgotten by the colonists of
Mashonaland, or by any Englishman who is loyal to his race. In the
earlier phases of the disputes between the colonists and the Matabeli,
Sir Henry Loch did everything in his power to bring about a peaceful
solution of the difficulties that had arisen ; but when he found that war
was not only justifiable but inevitable, he exerted himself to the utmost
to do all in his power to assist his countrymen, and thus Colonel Goold-
Adams, with a small but most efficient force of 200 men of the Bechu-
analand Border Police, was ready to advance upon Buluwayo from the
west, simultaneously with Dr. Jameson's force that was marching from
the east. Colonel Goold-Adams' little force was supported by 200 men
recruited in the Transvaal, and commanded by Commandant Raaff, a
man than whom there was not in all South Africa anyone who had had
a greater experience in native warfare. At Tati this little force of 400
white men v/as joined by Khama, the chief of the Bamangv/ato, and
nearly 2,000 of his people under the command of his brother,
Radi-kladi, and his son Sikumi. Khama and his men were present
at, and took a conspicuous part in, the fight with the Matabeli on the
Sangezi River, near the kraal of Impandin ; but two days later
they left Colonel Goold-Adams near the Mangme Pass, and returned
home. This action of Khama's naturally excited a great deal of
adverse criticism, and was strongly commented on in the colonial
!0 The Doiujifa// of Lobcngiila.
press. Looked at from a European point of view, Khama's
action was certainly most unjustifiable, and might have been disastrous
to Col. Goold -Adams' small force, which was thus left without support
in a very difficult country, and in the face of a large force of Matabeli
under Gambo, Lobcngula's son-in-law. However, as things turned out,
no harm was done ; as Gambo, disheartened by the defeat of that portion
of his forces which attacked Col. Goold-Adams at the Sangezi river on
November 2nd, and receiving the news almost immediateh' afterwards that
the Mashonaland columns had broken the Kind's best regiments on the
Impembisi river and were marching on Buluwayo, abandoned the strong
position he was holding at Mangwe Pass, and disbanded his forces,
thus leaving the road to Buluwayo from the west, which leads through a
most difficult and broken country, open and undefended. In Khama's
defence, I will say that I do not think he was able to take the same view
of things as his critics. He and his people were tired of the campaign,
and as the season for ploughing had arrived, they were all most anxious
to get home. On the evening of November 3rd, tw^o of his men were
taken ill of smallpox (which at the time was rife amongst the Matabeli).
and this, causing as it did a scare amongst his people, decided him to
leave his white allies and return home. It is unfortunate that he should
have arrived at such a decision at such a time, but I entirely deny that
unfriendliness to the white men, or disagreement with Col. Goold-Adams,
had anything to do with it, and I trust that in any future dealings with
Khama and his people, his conduct on this occasion will not be
remembered against him, or allowed to outweigh the consistent friend-
liness he has always shown towards the British in South Africa, and the
great assistance he rendered us at the time of the occupation of
Mashonaland in 1890.
As to the effect of the war, I will state my view of it in the
words of the lecture which I delivered upon this same subject,
under the auspices of the Royal Colonial Institute. The first
and broadest general effect of the conquest of Matabeliland
is that a large tract of plateau land, well ^vatered and fertile,
lying at an altitude of 5,000 feet above sea level, and with a
climate that will compare favourably with that of Southern Europe,
is now in the hands of Englishmen, for thousands of whom there
Iiiti'odiictory Review of the War,
II
is plenty of room, as well as for the natives, instead of being
exclusively occupied by a savage and barbarous race. Savages are
doubtless more picturesque than British settlers, but looking at the
question of the conflict between savage and civilised races, which has
been continually going on in the world from time immemorial, from the
broadest point of view, and recognising it as a law that, when savages
come into contact with an advancing civilisation, causes of friction
must arise, which always end in the subjugation of the inferior people ;
and knowing, moreover, that in this particular case the military organ-
isation of the Matabeli was certain to be broken either by the Dutch
or the British in South Africa, I think it is a matter for congratulation
and not for sorrow that it is the British and not the Dutch who have
secured Matabeliland. It has been said and it will be said again, that
neither Matabeliland nor Mashonaland are worth having ; that there is
no gold in these countries, that nothing will grow there ; and that no
one can live there, and so on. Let it be remembered that forty-five years
ago the British Government was induced to give up the Orange Free
State, then the Orange River Sovereignty, very much against the will of
the bulk of its inhabitants by the expression of exactly the same sort of
pessimistic opinions as are now from time to time published by ignorant
and prejudiced people concerning Mashonaland. The same kind of
things were said, too, of the Transvaal many years ago ; yet both the
Transvaal and the Orange Free State are now rich and prosperous
territories ; and so will Matabeliland and Mashonaland become during
the first decade of the next century. The power of the Matabeli having
been broken, the development of the gold industry in Mashonaland can
now be carried on without any further fear of interruption. In all the
different districts of the country where payable reefs are found, a
European population will be established and townships will be formed ;
and these centres of population will afford markets for the farmers who
will take up the land in the neighbourhood of the gold-producing areas.
The resumption of enterprise, and the successful and continuous
development of both Mashonaland and Matabeliland will be the direct
effect of the Matabeli war, for all enterprise had been paralysed by the
action of the Matabeli just previous to the war In time townships will
arise in Matabeliland as they have done in Mashonaland ; the telegraph
12 The Doivnfall of Lobcngula,
wire, which has been already advanced to Tati, will be carried on to
Buluwayo, and from there to Victoria or Charter ; railway lines will,
too, creep gradually into the country. The Beira railway will be carried
on to Umtali and to Salisbury, and from thence along the watershed
past Charter to Buluwayo, with a branch line to Victoria. The Silati
line, too, will be carried on to the latter place, and the Mafeking
extension will also eventually reach Buluwayo by way of Palapye and
Tati. All this enterprise will not be undertaken and completed in a
day, or a month, or a year, or five years ; but it will infallibly come to
pass within the next twenty years. There may be, and there will be,
checks and hesitations in the future as there have been in the past ; but
the tide of civilization will advance steadily northwards in South Africa
as it has travelled westwards in America. All this enterprise, which I
may live to see, on the plateaux of Central South Africa will have been
called into vigorous life by the effect of the Matabeli war. Nor can I
see cause to grieve at the change which is about to come over the
country. As an unbroken military power, the Matabeli were an
insolent, cruel, and overbearing people, undeserving of the sympathy of
the most quixotic of philanthropists. Their power having been broken,
the countries over which they ruled, directly and indirectly, have been
opened up to British enterprise, and in these countries there will be a
field for the exercise of the energy and intelligence of many young
Englishmen. And such fields are required ; for this country is teeming
with young men, full of energy, intelligence, and integrity, whose best
qualities are dwarfed and stunted in the struggle for existence in the
overcrowded towns of England.
In conclusion, I will say that the political effect of the conquest of
Matabeliland will tend to secure the eventual supremacy of the Anglo-
Saxon in South Africa, for the Dutch states are now completely
surrounded by British territory except to the east of the Transvaal, on
which there is no outlet for immigration. In the Transvaal itself, every
year the power and influence of the European element (which is chiefly
British) is increasing, and it cannot be many years before this British
element will have a fair share in the legislation of the country ; whereas
the Dutch settlers, who will probably trek into the British South Africa
Company's territories in considerable numbers during the next few
Introductory Review of the War.
13
years, now that the military power of the Matabeli has been broken,
will gradually lose the hatred of British rule which their forefathers
carried with them from the Cape Colony into the northern Transvaal,
and their children will live as happily under the British flag as do the
Dutch of the Cape Colony and Natal. Had Mr. Cecil Rhodes not
secured Mashonaland and Matabeliland for the British, these countries
would have infallibly fallen to the Dutch, and British enterprise would
have been hampered in those territories, as it has been in the Transvaal
during the last i^w years. Briefly, the effect of the Matabeli war,
though it may have been prejudicial to the happiness of the military
caste in Matabeliland, has been distinctly beneficial to every other
native race in Central South Africa ; whilst what is of far more import-
ance, it has regained for Englishmen the prestige that was lost amongst
both whites and blacks when Sir Evelyn Wood was ordered to make
peace with the Boers after the defeat at Majuba Hill ; has insured the
peace and security of Mashonaland, and reduced to a certainty the
eventual supremacy of the British race as the dominant people in
South Africa.
CHAPTER II.
MATABELILAND UNDER MOSELIKATSI.
The Greeks and Africa — Vasco da Gama at Cape of Good Hope — The expedition in 1890 —
A Dutch trek — Moselikatsi natives across the Drakensberg — Early Matabeli military
training — Murder of Boers — Battle at Vechtkop — Kruger's first fight — Defeat of the
Matabeli — Moselikatsi driven further north — Lobengula condemned to be strangled —
Saved by Umcumbate — Policy of extermination — Death laws — Death of Moselikats —
Succeeded by Lobengula in 1868.
It was Herodotus who first described Africa as '' the land of
surprises." The famous Greek, of course, was referring to the monu-
mental magnificence, the unique geographical characteristics, and the
bizarre customs of a country where, as a much later writer has well
said, paradox seems rooted in the soil. But though lacking the
cultivated and historic splendour of the Africa known to the ancients ;
though steeped in original barbarism and the cruder forms of sin instead
of boasting a completed civilisation which literally carries back to the
dawn of history, the southern portion of Africa has not altogether
failed to maintain the established reputation of the Dark Continent for
the novel and surprising. It is, of course, its extraordinary industrial
career which, above all else, marked out South Africa for the wonder
of mankind. Nevertheless, it is to be said, that though comparatively
commenced but yesterday, Afrikander history includes many chapters
rich in colouring and incident. And there, too, as in Old Egypt, it is
the unexpected that has most frequently happened. ■
Since the days when Vasco da Gama first sailed the Portuguese
galleons round the stormy Cape poetically named " of Good Hope,"
there have been no more surprising and stirring contributions to South
African history than those of which Mr. Rhodes has been the principal
author. The occupation of Mashonaland in 1890 by a hastily organized
column of five hundred men was freely characterised at the time as an
Matabeliland under Moselikatsi. 1 5
nstance of politico-commercial audacity which ranked with the exploits of
Clive and Hastings. If that be so, what shall be said of the boldness
which prompted the same small number of men to attack a powerful
and well-organised nation of warlike savages, believed to muster some
15,000 fighting men, armed with rifle and assegai, amply munitioned,
on their own ground, and on the eve of the deadly rainy season ?
And what tribute of praise can be too high to those who carried so
dangerous and difficult an enterprise to a splendidly successful issue,
with an expenditure of life and money which has stamped it as unique
among our " little wars " ?
It must not be supposed that Mr. Rhodes was alone in realising
the climatic and commercial importance of the South Central-African
plateaux. Indeed, but for the secresy and rapidity with which the
preparations for effective occupation were made, it is now generally
recognised that Matabeliland and Mashonaland would have been
acquired by a large and well-organised trek of Dutch colonists from the
Cape Free State and Transvaal, a dissatisfied portion of whom did, in
fact, endeavour to effect a forcible entry into Mashonaland in the following
year. Fifty years, however, before these incidents took place, another
" occupation of the hinterland " had been effected, under quite
other auspices. Umziligazi, or, as the Dutch call him, Moselikatsi, and
his impis, defeated by the Transvaal voortrekkers, had fled across the
Limpopo, and, in looking around for a new home, had selected the
country now called Matabeliland as the healthiest, the most fertile, and
the best watered of all the vast stretches of prairie land and forest lying
between the Zambesi and the Limpopo.
Umziligazi and his followers, the Amandabeli (as the Matabeli
race were then called), originally formed a portion of the various Ama-
Khosa tribes consolidated by the military genius of Chaka into the Zulu
nation. L'mziligazi, who must have possessed considerable abilities,
was one of Chaka's most trusted generals, and achieved a reputation as
a warrior and ruthless exterminator of human beings which extended
far beyond the confines of the Zulu kingdom. Like many men who
have " arrived," however, the chief of the Amandabeli began to consider
that he might with impunity take liberties with the powers that were.
It was in 18 17 that, after a raid or foray, successful as usual, in
1 6 The Downfall of Lobengtda.
which great numbers of men, women, and children were mercilessly
assegaied, and much loot in the shape of cattle and grain obtained,
Umziligazi omitted the usual formality of forwarding the booty to his
liege. Chaka was one of the last men to overlook presumption of this
sort, and immediately despatched a strong impi, or army, to annihilate
the contumelious chief and his followers. Umziligazi, however,
received warning of the king's intention, and at once fled across
the Drakensberg, followed by his men, who were animated with
the strongest devotion to his person, and who knew that to expect
mercy from Chaka was as sensible as to put faith in the humane
instincts of the lion or the hyaena. These considerations considerably
expedited their flight, and the Matabeli were soon across the Vaal River
and in the territories now belonging to the South African Republic.
Here both reasons of state and natural tendencies induced Umziligazi
to carry out a policy of extermination against the less warlike tribes
by which he was now surrounded. Still fearful of the vengeance of Chaka,
he resolved to place between that monarch and himself a desert which
no Zulu army could cross. Over and above that, the impulse to
destroy human life was even stronger among the Zulus than it usually
is among savage tribes. It must not be supposed, however, that the race
was destitute of what all men have agreed to consider as ennobling
traits. Ferocious, cruel, and treacherous, they undoubtedly were ; but
on the other hand they possessed the prime virtues of courage, and the
capacity of work. The mental faculties of the Zulus are also by no
means contemptible. To considerable powers of organisation and
habits of discipline, they at various times displayed great capacity for
planning and carrying out a settled and continuous policy. Among the
Zulus of Chaka's time, absolute contempt of death and the habit of
strict and unquestioning obedience to the chiefs were established as
common to the whole nation. Among the women chastity was enforced
by terrible penalties, the infliction of which were, however, seldom or
never necessitated. The rigid military training to which the young
Zulu warriors were subjected, had the natural result of bringing the
national physique to a very high standard ; and no more striking
instance of their"military qualities need be cited than the Zulu War of
1880, in which the natives, armed with assegai and shield, inflicted
V/
7
Matabeliland imder Mosdikatsi. i?
heavy losses upon English and colonial troops, splendidly armed and
completely equipped as these were.
Before such invaders the unwarlike Makatese and other natives
dwelling north of the Vaal fell like wheat before the scythe,
and Umziligazi soon succeeded in his object of placing a howling
wilderness between himself and Chaka. The local tribes were soon
almost exterminated, and only the comeliest girls and some of the
youths were spared ; the former as wives for the victors, the latter as
slaves for purposes of transport and agriculture. Throughout the
country military kraals on the Zulu system were established, and
from these centres foraging or raiding impis were despatched in all
directions. Entire tribes of the Bechuana nation were practically
annihilated, and in one way or another Umziligazi and his followers
found their new surroundings entirely congenial and satisfactory.
But a change was soon to come over the spirit of their happy
dream, and they were about to meet in close quarters a foe against whom
even their disciplined valour would be of no avail. In 1836, the Boers of
the Cape Colony, animated with old restless longings for independence,
the same impatience of British misrule, and the same weariness of the
trammels of modern civilisation which had always characterised them,
trekked into the Transvaal, carrying with them their wives and children,
their cattle, and their effects. They soon came into collision with the
Matabeli, who signalised the occasion by immediately murdering all
but two members of an isolated hunting party. The survivors
escaped and rode for their lives to the nearest party of the voortrekkers,
who fortunately were only distant a few hours' ride. Mr. Theal, in his
admirable " History of South Africa," proceeds thus : " They obtained
the assistance of eleven men, and were returning to ascertain the fate of
the others, when they encountered a division of the Matabeli army, and
turned back to give notice to those behind. The families furthest in
advance had hardly time to draw their waggons in a circle and collect
within it, when the Matabeli were upon them. From ten in the morning
until four in the afternoon the assailants vainly endeavoured to force a
way into the laager, and did not relinquish the attempt until fully a third
of their number were stretched on the ground. Of thirty-five men within
the laager, only one, Adolf Bronkhorst, was killed, but a youth named
c
1 8 The Downfall of Lobengula.
Christian Harmse and several coloured servants, who were herding
cattle and collecting fuel at a distance, were murdered. Another party
of the Matabeli had in the meantime gone further up the river, and had
unexpectedly fallen upon the encampment of the Liebenbergs. They
murdered there old Barend Liebenberg, the patriarch of the family, his
sons, Stephanus, Barend, and Hendrik, his son-in-law, Johannes du Toit,
his daughter, du Toit's wife, his son Hendrik's wife, a schoolmaster
named Macdonald, four children, and twelve coloured servants; and
they took away three children to present to their chief. The two
divisions of Matabeli warriors then united and returned to Mosega for
the purpose of procuring reinforcements, taking with them large herds
of the emigrants' cattle."
Following this, a series of important battles took place. Most
notable was the fight at Vechtkop (Battle Hillj in the country now
known as the Orange Free State. The Matabeli attacked the laager
of the voortrekkers with the greatest determination. President
Kruger, then a mere stripling, who took part in the fighting on that
memorable day, says that the Matabeli impis charged right up to
the muzzles of their rifles no less than three times, in the face of a
withering hail of bullets. In many respects this, the first campaign
against the Matabeli, resembled that which has just taken place, nearly
sixty years later. The natives, after fighting most bravely, retired with
very heavy losses. Of the small force defending the laagers, only a
very small number — two — were killed, and twelve wounded, while the
severity of the attack was instanced by the fact that 1,113 assegais
were afterwards picked up in the circle of the Boer camp. Umziligazi (the
name means, appropriately enough, " a track of blood,") then retired to
the Marico district, in the western Transvaal.
The voortrekkers now decided to assume the offensive, and a small
force of 107 mounted Dutch colonists, 45 mounted Griquas, and 60
natives on foot, at once pushed forward. The Matabeli were surprised
at dawn on January 17, 1837, ^-i^d were routed with considerable loss.
Later on in the same year, a brief campaign of nine days was brought
by the farmers to a similar successful conclusion. This brought the
Matabeli war of 1836- 1837 to an end. Umziligazi completely resigned
all hopes of holding his own against the Boers, but his troubles were
Matabeliland tinder Moselikatsi. 19
not yet ended. Shortly after the campaign, he was attacked by an impi
sent by Dingaan, Chaka's successor, to recover the royal cattle. The
Matabeli suffered even more at the hands of their kinsmen than they
had from the Boers. Umziligazl, broken and dispirited, gathered
together the remnants of his men and cattle, and trekked northwards
across the Limpopo. Fixing his headquarters in the neighbourhood of
Thaba Induna, where he left the bulk of his tribe, he started off towards
the north-west with a picked body of men, partly with the object of
looking for traces of a previous Zulu emigration under a chief named
Umpezane, and partly to capture cattle. Umziligazi appears to have
been absent on this expedition for about three years, and his indunas,
thinking that the king and his impis must have met disaster and been
killed, elected his eldest son by his " royal " wife to take his place.
Hardly was the ceremony completed when, to the general horror,
Umziligazi re-appeared. Explanations were of no avail, and Umziligazi,
after listening in dreadful silence, ordered the indunas who had con-
ducted his affairs during his absence to be put to death. Next came the
turn of the king's two chief wives, who had acquiesced in the election,
and lastly, his son Kuruman, a lad of fifteen, and his younger brother
Lobengula were condemned to be strangled, following the Zulu custom
that royal blood should not be spilt. Contrary rumours notwithstanding,
ithere seems no doubt but that this sanguinary edict was fulfilled with
regard to Kuruman. Zulus and Matabeli are not all, however, incar-
nations of cruelty, for Umcumbate ventured, at the risk of his own life,
to disobey Umziligazi and save the younger scion of the royal house,
■whose name, not inappropriately, as it seemed at that time when he
was born, signified " Driven by the Wind." Later on, in a milder mood,
Umziligazi acquiesced in this arrangement, and formally recognised
Lobengula as his heir. The story is very picturesquely told by Mr.
Dennis Doyle, who knew Lobengula well, and resided for two years at
the royal kraal.
Umziligazi established his sovereignty throughout the countries now
•somewhat loosely termed Matabeliland and Mashonaland. The Maka-
lakas, Balotsi, and Banyai, all numerous tribes, were quickly subjugated.
According to some authorities, most of the tribes already inhabiting these
•countries were subjected to a policy of extermination ; though in some
c 2
20 The Dow7ifall of Lobcngula.
cases, Umziligazi appears to have been satisfied by a profession
of submission and the payment of tribute by the vassal tribes.
At any rate, fixing upon the magnificent plateau now known as
Matabeliland as a centre for his military kraals, he extended his
sphere of influence between the two great rivers mentioned, to the
Portuguese frontier on the west, and to the borders of the Gaza country
on the east. The tribe, or certain portions, no doubt deteriorated in
physique and in other respects from intermarriage with the women
captured on its raids, but maintained, on the whole, its Zulu charac-
teristics— the contempt of danger and death, the love of battle, the
military organisation, and the ingrained aversion to agricultural labour,,
which distinguished the splendid legions of Chaka. In course of time,.
Umziligazi waxed fat and flourishing. Matabeliland, watered by per-
petual springs and streamlets, timbered like a vast English park,
and healthy from its high altitude above the sea, was soon covered with
enormous herds of cattle captured from the subject tribes. The "sour
veld " gave place to that " sweet " herbage which clothes the cultivated
parts of South Africa, and which renders the country lately acquired
by "Mr. Rhodes's young men "/so valuable for pastoral purposes.
Meantime, the old system of raiding, murder, and pillage was diligently
continued by Umziligazi's warriors, either as training for the young
braves who had not yet dipped their assegais in blood, or for what may
be called strictly business purposes — namely, the acquisition of cattle
and other loot upon which the Matabeli supported a happy existence.
The formula applied was both simple and invariable. At break of day,
the Matabeli impi would rush upon the liapless kraal selected for their
operations with terrible shouts. All who came within range of the formid-
able stabbing assegai were at once exterminated. Old men and young,
matrons and maids, children, and babes at the mother's breast — all would
be sacrificed to the horrid Zulu lust for bloodshed, save a few young women,
who would be carried as the spoils of victory, in the fashion of the Greeks
with which we have been familiarised in the epics of Homer. A few
young men and boys, too, would be occasionally taken alive as slaves, to
act as porters and cattle herds. Instances might be cited ad infinitum ;.
but here it will be sufficient to say that this picture is by no means
overdrawn, and that it is founded on the published experiences of the
Matabeliland under Moselikatsi. 21
imembers of the European missions which have come into actual contact
with the MatabeH. Among these, Mr. Selous mentions that veteran
missionary the Rev. Robert Moffat, and the Revs. S. H. Edwards,
€. D. Helm, W. A. Elliott, John Mackenzie, and M. Jalla, of the Paris
Missionary Society. The European travellers through Matabeliland,
too, have had the same story to tell. Mr. Selous, chief among these,
has recited his experiences before many of the learned societies of this
kingdom. His testimony is especially valuable, since he bears in South
Africa the reputation of being a cool and careful observer, and an
unexaggerative and, of course, absolutely reliable witness.
But, indeed, it is not only against other tribes that the Matabeli
■were guilty of gross cruelty and insatiable bloodthirstiness, which has,
for the matter of that, characterised all other South African tribes before
the establishment of white rule. The state of affairs in Matabeliland was
no worse than that which obtained in Pondoland at the beginning of
March, 1894, prior to Major Elliott's mission and the annexation of that
fair and fertile province. There, as in Matabeliland, no subject of the
barbarian despots was at any time safe from mutilation, or death under
torture, for the most trivial and imaginary offences. Under Umziligazi
and his successor, nothing was more certain to attract the king's wrath
and summary vengeance, than the report that an induna or petty chief
was growing too rich, too popular, or too powerful. Emissaries would, in
the usual course, at once be sent to scatter the unhappy chiefs brains
with a knobkerrie, or to decree him to the more honourable method of
■execution with the assegai. To do them justice, the doomed men
almost invariably suffered death with firmness, or even tranquility, and
without attempt to evade the royal displeasure by escape. Ready as
they were to inflict, the warriors of Matabeliland were no less ready to
meet it with what, among more humane nations, would be called heroic
fortitude.
In 1868, Umziligazi's careerof rapine and bloodshed was brought to
a natural close. Kuruman, the former heir apparent, had been
*' removed," and Lobengula, a younger son, was elected to reign in his
stead, after a brief interregnum during which the nation was governed by
a council of indunas.
CHAPTER III.
THE DAWN OF CIVILISATION.
l.obengula preserves the old traditions — Every inch a king — Cruelty tempered with humanity —
Champagne and luxury — Strength of Matabeli army — Matabeliland coveted by the Boers —
Rival missions — Mr. C. D. Rudd wins for Rhodes — Burying the concession — Effective
Occupation — Organising the pioneer force — Selous as pioneer— Lobengula's opposition —
Pioneers arrive safely at Salisbury — Early day troubles — Boer filibusters retire before
"Maxim" — Dr. Jameson administrator.
King " Driven by the Wind " faithfully followed in the footsteps of
his forefathers. The military and social traditions of the Zulu race
were carefully observed, and the royal authority was exercised and
maintained throughout the vast areas subject to his influence in the
usual sanguinary manner. But there was, at any rate, one redeeming
feature in Lobengula's character. With a single exception (that of
Captain Patterson, who, according to Mr. Rider Haggard, was foully
done to death by the Matabeli king's orders) he treated individual
white men with consideration, kindness, and in cases not a few, in a
manner which may almost be called chivalrous and humane. Many
Europeans who have held intercourse with him, speak of Lobengula
with something of admiration and even strong personal liking. In
figure Lobengula was tall — almost six feet two inches in height —
broad and muscular, though as he grew old he inclined to that obesity
which is common to almost every native chief in South Africa. His
mien and manners have always been described as majestic. Mr. C. D.
Rudd, who knew him well, and who owed his life on one occasion to
Lobengula's firmness, says that the royal Matabeli looked " every inch
a king." His features were those of a remarkable man, and his
expression was, according to the last authority quoted, somewhat sphinx-
like and very varying — now appearing to indicate extreme good nature,
and again diabolical ferocity and cruelty. Several alleged photographic
representations of Lobengula have appeared in the press from time to
The Dawn of Civilisation. 23
time ; but in point of fact, Lobengula never, on any occasion, permitted
himself to be sketched or photographed, the native superstition being
that the process involved the stealing of the soul of the person so
pictured. There seems to be no doubt that he possessed considerable
force of character, and abilities of no common order. Mr. Selous says
of him that he possessed a native shrewdness which w^ould not have
shamed a European statesman. He appears to have been possessed
of many of the attributes of a successful ruler, and in particular to
have been a good judge of his fellow men. His partiality for white
men (especially for individuals, among whom Mr. E. A. Maund was a
great favourite of the old king) was well known, and it will always
redound to his credit, that on the outbreak of the late war he gave
formal notice to all the whites resident in his country full per-
mission to leave in safety. Still more honourable was the fact that
amid the fierce excitement and sanguinary passions aroused by the
incidents of the campaign, although he detained the two white traders
— Usher and Fairbarn — at Buluwayo, he protected them against the
rage and fanaticism of his " majaghas," threatening to assegai with his
own hand anyone who should harm them. It is not too much to say
that the colonial forces, on their arrival at the royal kraal, were
astonished to find these two alive and unhurt ; and probably there is
not another chief in South Africa — Khama excepted — who would have
acted with such generosity under similar circumstances.
Among other royal characteristics, it may be recorded that
Lobengula was, in a primitive way, decidedly a bon viveur. He Avas
particularly fond of Kaffir beer, and was wont to wash down his
enormous meals of half-cooked meat with copious draughts of that
beverage. Even the disturbing incidents of the flight from Buluwayo
did not cause the king to forget his luxurious tastes, the writers being
assured by an officer of Major Forbes' patrol that the spoor of the royal
w^aggons from Inyati could almost be traced by numerous bottles.
Somewhat vague ideas were held, at the date of the Pioneer
occupation, upon the subject of the numerical strength of the Matabeli
nation. The best authorities seemed inclined to fix the number
of fighting men at about 15,000, to which have to be added the old
men, women, and children. Some of the regiments, notably the
24 The Downfall of Lobengula.
Imbezu and Ingubo, prided themselves upon possessing the pur sang
of the old Zulu stock. Most of them, however, contained an admix-
ture of the local tribal element — in the shape of the offspring of
captured Mashona and Makalaka women. Occasionally, too, male
children from the raided districts would be adopted, so to speak, and
brought up in all respects like the pure-blooded Matabeli. These half-
breed regiments were called Amaholi.
The story of the occupation of Mashonaland forms one of the
most interesting and picturesque chapters of South African history,
Lobengula's country, covering, say, some 100,000 square miles, had for
a great many years been coveted by Boers, especially of the northern
Transvaal, by whom it was regarded as their particular " hunting veld,"
and their proper ultimate area of expansion. They had, in particular,
cast envious eyes upon Matabeliland proper, a high plateau lying from
4,000 to 6,000 feet above the sea-level, and to whose climatic, agri-
cultural, and pastoral advantages they were fully alive. Its attractive-
ness was not lessened, naturally, by its reputation of being highly
auriferous. In the " scramble for Africa," into which the Great
Powers had plunged with so much eagerness^ Matabeliland had
either been overlooked entirely, or left alone as the natural hinter-
land of the British dependencies. Up to the beginning of 1888, it
was, with the exception of the huge Mohammedan sultanates behind
the French and Turkish possessions in the Mediterranean littoral, the
only portion of Africa which had not been taken formally under the pro-
tection of a civilised or semi-civilised government. It was therefore ripe
for occupation, and in 1887 or 1888, the organisation of a "trek," to
number some 2,000 members, v/as mooted among the Boers of the
Zoutpansberg district. Fortunately, in the early part of 1888, a treaty
was made whereby Lobengula established friendly relations with Great
Britain. Prior to this, however (in the beginning of 1888), Mr. Rhodes
had, in conjunction with Mr. Beit, sent a Mr. J. Fry to Buluwayo to
obtain a concession from Lobengula, the said concession to be of as
wide a character as possible. Mr. Fry, who had much experience of
the natives, and was well known as a hunter, reached Buluwayo in due
course, but severe illness (cancer) prevented him from carrying out the
object of his expedition, and in about June, 1888, he returned to
The Dawn of Civilisation. 25
Kimberley and died. A second expedition was organised in London
under the auspices of the Exploring Company (specially formed for
that purpose), which despatched a deputation, under the charge of
Mr. E. A. Maund, to negotiate, if possible, a land and mining
concession from Lobengula. The objects of Mr. Maund's expedition
were announced to the Colonial Office in May, 1888. But a still
more successful mission was, upon the death of Mr. Fry, despatched by
Mr. C. J. Rhodes, who had for many years meditated the acquisition,
in British interests, of the vast areas lying between the Zambesi and
the Limpopo, regarding them as the natural hinterland of the colony
of which he is the elected head. Mr. Rhodes induced Mr. C. D. Rudd
(with whom he had been closely associated in the Diamond Fields since
1870) and Mr. A. Maguire, M.P., to undertake a mission to Lobengula;
these gentlemen being accompanied by Mr. F. R. Thompson.
They obtained from the king — somewhat to the general surprise — a
concession ceding the mineral rights to the whole o{ his territories. This
was formally signed on November 30th, 1889. Hurrying back with this
priceless document, bearing Lobengula's mark and the famous elephant
seal, Mr. Rudd was lost in the veld. After burying the concession and
leaving written instructions as to its whereabouts, he lay down, as he
thought, to die, overcome by hunger, thirst, and fatigue. He was how-
ever, discovered by some of Khama's Bamangwatos, and by them
nursed back into health. Mr. Maund also received certain encourage-
ment from the king, and the two interests were subsequently fused into
one group, the proportions bsing defined in the Central Search Company.
The latter subsequently became the United Concessions Company,
which was in turn absorbed by the Chartered Company. Meantime, steps
were being taken to obtain a charter and to place the newly-acquired
concessions upon an adequate financial basis. A scheme for the
development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the more northern
territories was submitted to Her Majesty's Government on 30th
April, 1889. Later on, on 13th July of the same 3^ear, a petition was
presented praying for a charter. This resulted in the granting of the
latter on 29th October, 1889, on which date also this bold enterprise
was incorporated as a joint-stock concern with a capital of a million
sterling.
26 The Downfall of Lobengula.
So far all had gone smoothly. But now the formidable task of
efifective occupation— to use the Foreign Office term— had to be faced.
It was universally believed at the time that the Matabeli could not
be trusted to fulfil their bargain, and recognised authorities expressed
the opinion that it would be impossible to enter into possession of
Mashonaland without a force of at least 5,000 men. This opinion,
however, was not shared by Mr. Frank Johnson, who afterwards
became a Major in the British South Africa Company's military
service. He knew the country well, and had acquired a reputation for
exceptional daring and resource. His view was, that a force of 500
men would be ample for the purpose ; and on being invited to do so,
tendered to carry out the military occupation for ^^90,000. This
extremely novel offer was accepted, and Major Johnson immediately
set about the formation of the historic Mashonaland Pioneers, a corps
d'elite of Englishmen and colonists, all expert shots and horsemen, of
all trades and professions, and numbering 192 men. At the last
minute it was also decided that two troops of armed police should
be enrolled, and the supreme command was entrusted to Lieutenant-
Colonel Pennefather, of the 6th Dragoon Guards. The comm.and of
the Intelligence Department was entrusted to Mr. F. C. Selous,
whose knowledge of the little-known regions to be traversed was
unique ; and that of the transport department to the late Mr. E.
Burnett, who was killed in one of the earlier skirmishes in the recent
campaign. The force was accompanied by 300 picked colonial natives,
and the equipment included 800 waggons, 1,600 head of trek-oxen, two
seven-pounder guns, three machine guns, and an electric search light
as a precaution against night attacks. Every care was taken to
ensure a successful and permanent occupation. Fortunately this was
effected without fighting, but it afterwards transpired that the Matabeli
had, as anticipated, intended to dispute the advance of the occupying
force. Their plans, however, were all upset by the extraordinary
celerity with which the Pioneers traversed the country and made good
their position. The advance-guard left Kimberley on March 19th,
1890, and the whole force reached Salisbury on the I2th September.
This speed is little short of marvellous, when it is remembered that 2 50
miles of the track, from the Macloutsie River to Salisbury, a distance
The Dawn of Civilisation. 27
of 460 miles, had to be literally chopped through the dense bush, as
the Pioneers, led by Mr. Selous, went along.
This brilliant march was followed by a " rush " of improvident
independent trekkers, who effected an entry into the country
without complying with the Chartered Company's regulations as
to stores and supplies. The company, though adequately provisioned
for the needs of its own men, had not, of course, made preparations to
provision the large number of trekkers who came in. During the
rainy season which followed the occupation, therefore, the food supplies
ran short, and the general distress was aggravated by fever and the
want of proper nursing, shelter, and drugs. Unhappily, some splendid
young Englishmen and Afrikanders succumbed under the very terrible
privations endured, but which, unfortunately, are almost invariable con-
comitants of pioneer enterprise. During the next dry season all this
was remedied, and since then the high veld of Zambesia has proved
itself to be as healthy as any other part of South Africa.
The second initial batch of difficulties attending the northward
expansion were thus grappled with and overcome. And now a new
trouble arose, compared with which Colonial Office complications,
Matabeli menaces, and the privations of the pioneers, seemed com-
paratively unimportant. For this time the danger that threatened was
that of civil war between two jealous Afrikander populations. The
great Boer trek, to which reference has already been made, was at
last brought to a head under the auspices of Colonel Ferreira, C.M.G.,
and a Mr. Adendorff, and it was freely stated at the time that it had
the warm though unofficial support of General P. J. Joubert — "the
farmer who beat us at Amajuba." Mr. Rhodes' influence with the
Afrikander Bond and Sir Henry Loch's prompt and determined action
with the Transvaal Government prevented the trek from assuming the
large proportions which originally appeared inevitable ; but in spite of
official proclamations issued by the High Commissioner and President
Kruger, a formidable body of well-armed Boers reached the Limpopo
drifts, where they were met by the Chartered Company's forces, sup-
ported by the Bechuanaland Border Police, and armed with machine
guns. Fortunately, bloodshed was averted at the last moment. The
trekkers or " filibusters," who were solemnly warned that they would
28
The Downfall of Lobengiila.
be fired upon if they attempted to cross the drifts, lost heart before
taking the irrevocable step. One man alone galloped into the stream,
but seeing that a Maxim gun was being trained upon him, turned
round and fled. The trek then broke up in confusion. Part of the
farmers entered the country under the Chartered Company's regu-
lations, and the rest returned to their farms.
From the day when the Pioneers first entered Mashonaland to the
present time, the development of that country has progressed with rapid
strides. Townships have been laid out, a number of important goldfields
have been developed, the Cape telegraph system has been extended to
Salisbury, and communication has been opened up with the Mozambique
coast. From the fine harbour of Beira, a railway line has been constructed
for a distance of seventy -five miles inland. When completed it will span
the coast belt ravaged by the deadly tsetse fly, which entirely prohibits
annual transport. In face of enormous difficulties, the administration in
the capable hands of Dr. Jameson had established law and order
throughout Mashonaland. Justice is now meted out, and commerce
fostered, just as in the older provinces of South Africa.
^A1I\E Ma^HOnA WOKK
^r,. o.;<.«. .l/»o. at II a ^
CHAPTER IV.
THE FOUNDERS OF THE HINTERLAND EMPIRE.
Cecil Rhodes and General Gordon' — South Africa or Khartoum — The Consolidation of the
Diamond mines — The belief in Mr. Rhodes' resources-^The Cape to Cairo idea — Dr,
Jameson's career — The direction of the Chartered Company — The Duke of Abercorn —
The Duke of Fife— Lord Gifford— Sir H. B. Farquhar, Bart.— Mr. A. Beit— Mr. G.
Cawston — Mr. A. H. G. Grey- — ^Ir. R. Maguire — Mr. Herbert Canning — Dr. F.
Rutherfoord Harris--]\rr. B. F. Hawkesley— Mr. C. D. Rudd— Mr. F. C. Selous-Mr.
P. B. S. Wrey.
The personalities of Cecil Rhodes and his associates in the extension
of the South African frontier have had such intimate relation
to the success of that Elizabethan enterprise, that it would be
inadvisable, or even impossible, to avoid detailed allusion to their
individual action therein. Of Mr. Rhodes himself, who is generally-
acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable Englishmen of the day,
it may be said that he has originated systems of statesmanship and
finance which are wholly his own, and like no others. The story of his
career forms one of the most interesting chapters in what may be called
the romance of South African trade.
Mr. Cecil John Rhodes, who is the fourth son of the late
Rev. F. W. Rhodes, vicar of Bishop Stortford, Herts, was born at
that place on July 5th, 1853, and is therefore just over forty
years of age. He was educated at the local school, acquitting himself
there one is told creditably. Thence, the state of his health being a
matter of some concern, he left England to join his eldest brother,
Herbert, who was planting in Natal. On the discovery of the River
Diggings in Griqualand West, Mr. Herbert Rhodes took part in the
"rush," and was shortly afterwards joined by his young brother. Not
long after this, Mr. Cecil Rhodes determined to try for a University
degree. He accordingly managed, while carrying on work on the
fields, to do some reading, and to spend enough of each year at home —
at Oriel College — to qualify for his degree. One occasionally meets- —
in South Africa — people who remember Mr. Rhodes in this chrysalis-
like stage of his career. The general estimate of him at this time appears
•iQ The Downfall of Lobengula,
to have been, " A nice young fellow enough, and a hard-working —
but a dreamer." However, he worked on, and dreamed on ; and here
and there, at any rate, were found people who were sufificiently dis-
criminating to detect the latent existence of those rare powers since
so fully displayed. Among these, at a considerably later period, was
" Chinese " Gordon, who was accompanied by Mr. Rhodes on the
mission to Basutoland which resulted in the annexation of that country
by the Cape Colony. The two men, with strong fundamental
similarities and divergences, could not fail to be attracted by each
other, though they were not the kind of men to share opinions upon
each and every topic. Now and then, doubtless, discussion would wax
warm. " You are the sort of man," the General impatiently said to Mr.
Rhodes on one of these occasions, " who will never approve of anything
you don't arrange yourself" One interesting little reminiscence was
related by Mr. Rhodes to the Chartered Company's shareholders on
liis last visit to England. Alluding to the terms that were sometimes
applied to his acts and his nature, he said that he had, for instance,
been called an adventurer. Well, when he was at the Bank of England
the other day he noticed that the charter for that institution had been
granted to *' adventurers." Similarly he was occasionally described as
a speculator. He did not deny that charge. He remembered asking
General Gordon why he had declined the chamber full of gold offered
to him by the Emperor of China for his splendid services. Gordon
replied by a counter question, " Would you have taken it ? " " Certainly,"
replied Mr. Rhodes, " and three more rooms full if I could have got
them," for, he explained to his audience, "one cannot carry out one's
ideas, however good they may be, without wealth at one's back. That
is the reason why I have always tried to combine the commercial with
the imaginative, and that is the reason why I have not failed in my
undertakings."
The hero of Khartoum appears to have had a liking for and
a high opinion of Mr. Rhodes, and before he started on his last
mission to the Soudan, wrote to Mr. Rhodes asking the young politician
— Mr. Rhodes was then in the Legislative Assembly — to join him as
private secretary. One cannot help speculating upon what the position
would be to-day had Gordon quelled the Soudanese rising, and been
The Founders of the Hinterland E7npire. 31
left to throw his abilities and his fame into the Cape-to-Cairo movement,
and the civilisation of the dark interior. However, Gordon has passed,
with firm steps, the grim frontiers of an unknown " hinterland," and his
" young friend " must find another coadjutor in the difficult and
dangerous problem which incidentally involves what he himself has
lightly called "squaring the Mahdi." /
Mr. Rhodes is one of a family, of whom seven are sons. The
eldest, Mr. Herbert Rhodes, was killed while elephant-hunting in the
Shire district. The rest are nearly all soldiers, the second son
being Colonel Frank W. Rhodes, D.S.O., who was educated at Eton,
and until recently was in command of the ist (Royal) Dragoons. He
was late Military Secretary to the Governor of Bombay, and took
part in the Soudan campaign under Sir Herbert Stewart, who
described him as " the best aide-de-camp a general was ever fortunate
enough to have." Colonel Rhodes was chief of the staff to Sir Gerald
Portal on his Uganda Mission, and has just returned from a short
visit to Matabeliland and Mashonaland, where he will shortly take Dr.
Jameson's place as administrator during the latter's approaching visit to
Europe. The third son is Captain Ernest Frederick Rhodes, R.E. ; and
the fifth is Captain Elmhirst Rhodes, D.S.O., of the Royal Berkshire
Regiment. The sixth is Mr. Arthur M. Rhodes, who is farming near
Buluwayo ; and the youngest is Captain Bernard M. Rhodes, R.A.
It is barely a quarter of a century since Mr. Rhodes landed in
the Cape. Those who only know South Africa as she is to-day would
find it difficult to realise the absolute commercial stagnation which
ruled supreme before the discovery of diamonds in 1867. When Mr.
Rhodes arrived, he entered a country sunk in a veritable Slough of
Despond, from which, however, the Kimberley mines were soon to
extricate her. At the very outset of his Kimberley career, he
made the acquaintance of, and formed a lasting friendship with
Mr. C. D. Rudd, an old Harrovian and a Cambridge man, whose
health had broken down in training at the University, and who had
determined to try the virtues of the South African climate. The two
friends purchased a tiny interest — a quarter-claim each in " Baxter's
Gully," The partners prospered exceedingly, their first success
being a remunerative pumping contract in De Beers Mine, and their
32 - The Downfall of Lobengula,
half-claim grew and grew until, in course of time, it had become in
1888 a powerful company controlling the whole of De Beers Mine, while
Mr. Rhodes had become a millionaire. Simultaneously, the example of
consolidation had been followed in the Kimberley INIine, resulting in a
strong corporation known as the Kimberley Central Diamond Mining
Company. In 1888, these two great concerns fused to form the colossal
venture known as De Beers Consolidated Mines, Limited, and the
diamond trade was placed upon an assured footing by placing the world's
supply under a single control. It was the reconciliation of the
innumerable rival and divergent interests which originally existed in the
various mines at Kimberley which made for Mr. Rhodes a European
reputation as a financial diplomatist of the first rank.
It is only fair t o say that Mr. Rhodes emerges from the somewhat
sordid milieu of Kimberley finance with the reputation of a man of
incorruptibility, whose promise is a bond that will be strictly fulfilled to
friend or opponent. As a co mpany promoter and a director he has
splendidly rewarded the trust reposed in him by his shareholders.
Throughout South Africa Mr. Rhodes has a vast Pretorian Guard of
young colonists, who look upon him with something like personal
devotion, and among the rank and file of the Dutch and English
Afrikander populations the confidence in him is well-nigh unlimited.
When a difficulty arises, the prevailing sentiment seems to be, "Oh,
leave it to Rhodes ; he'll manage it somehow." When the Matabeli war
broke out, and the columns marched for the front. South Africa felt a
lively dread that the task of her young men was be}-ond their strength;
but they took comfort in the belief that "as Rhodes was going up
himself to Salisbury, it would be all right." This all-pervading article
of faith is quite one of the features of South African life, and has been
wittily alluded to by two lady writers who visited Mashonaland (Miss
Blennerhassett and Miss Sleeman). In an interesting book upon their
adventures the authoresses mentioned that the "fly belt" was not
causing very much anxiety, since it was generally believed that Mr.
Rhodes would " somehow " find means of " squaring the tsetse fly."
It is this belief in Mr. Rhodes' never-failing resources of mind and
money that kept the Zambesian colonies alive and progressing in
face of the stupendous difficulties encountered from '90 to '94 ; and
The Foimdei's of the Hinterland Empire. 33
it can hardly be denied that the thousand and one things left to Mr.
Rhodes' resourceful management have been ultimately accomplished.
In due course Mr. Rhodes entered the Cape Legislative Assembly
as the representative of a Diamond Fields constituency, and in 1890,
on the resignation of the Sir Gordon Sprigg's Ministry, accepted the
premiership. His success as a statesman has been complete. Perhaps his
really most important political achievement has been the unification of
the interests and sentiments of the Franco-Dutch and English colonists
at the Cape. This desirable consummation was effected by enlisting the
all-powerful support of the Afrikander Bond, led by Mr. Hofmeyr,
whom his followers variously compare to Bismarck and Parnell. The
Rhodes Cabinet at present has a voting power of two to one upon party
questions, and upon some points, notably the expansion of the frontier,
— for the Cape Colonists are anti-Little-Englanders to a man — carries
practically the whole House with him. Mr. Rhodes' current ambition
— or one of them — is the unification of Anglo-Dutch South Africa,
including the Cape Colony, Natal, the two Dutch Republics, and
the British Crown Colonies and Protectorates, including Cis- and
Trans-Zambesia. There are those who believe that, when that is
accomplished — and of its own inherent political gravitation it is
inevitable — Mr. Rhodes contemplates the fusion of the whole of the
British territorial and political interests in the Continent. The first
step towards this end, they say, has taken the form of a telegraph
line, which is being constructed in great measure at Mr. Rhodes' own
expense, from Capetown to Cairo, and which has already crossed
the Zambesi.
It is hardly necessary to point out that Mr. Rhodes is well known
to be a strong Imperialist, though an equally strong believer in the
justice and advisability of self-government for the larger colonies. The
circumstances which would tempt him to advocate political independence
for South Africa cannot be conceived. That, however, affords no reason
why Her Majesty's Government in this country should needlessly and
unwisely interfere in strictly Colonial affairs, as they have done on too
frequent occasions in times gone by. In spare moments of his political
life, Mr. Rhodes has given his keen attention to the development
of the Witwatersrand goldfields. By the formation of a powerful
34 '^h,e Downfall of Lobengula.
joint-stock company — the Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa,
Limited — he has acquired for himself and those associated with him in
the venture, immensely large and important interests in the celebrated
Main Reef Series, and has taken a prominent part in the opening up
of the deep-level areas.
Mr. Rhodes is perhaps, however, best known to the general
public of this country as the subject of Her Majesty who has added
nearly three-quarters of a million square miles of valuable territory
to the Empire. In these days — perhaps it has been so in all
times — it is the fashion to belittle contemporary reputations, and
to regard none as "great" upon whom that epithet has not been
bestowed by posterity. Perhaps the tendency is a creditable
and conservative characteristic. Still, there are many — especially
in South Africa — who regard Cecil Rhodes' genius and his patriotic
ambitions with undisguised admiration, and who will be much
surprised if he does not leave "footprints on the sands of time,"
and another famous name to add to the roll of those who have
extended the imperial horizon — a roll which bears the names of
Raleigh, Clive, and Hastings; and which, but for a wilfully blind
Home Government, might have numbered that of Washington amongst
the others.
No more striking illustration of Mr. Rhodes' accuracy of judgment
in gauging the capabilities of his lieutenants need be adduced^^than the
selection of Dr. L. S. Jameson to fill the important post of Administrator
of territories covering a larger area than France, Germany, Austria, and
Italy combined. No ordinary abilities would have sufficed to deal with
the innumerable and thorny questions periodically presenting themselves
in the government of a mixed population such as that of Rhodesia, and
no ordinary constitution was required to stand the wear and tear of
business added to the strain of a rough life in a frontier settlement.
Not only had the Company's affairs to be conducted with due regard to
its commercial character, but an immense native state in immediate
contiguity had to be watched and tactfully handled ; a rough, determined
white population, mainly consisting of miners, had to be controlled ; the
country's unknown resources had to be developed, and last, but not
least, the relations of the Company with the Imperial Government had
Dr. L. S. JAMESON.
(Admmisirator of the British South Africa Company's Territories.
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire. 35
to be at all times carefully considered. A medical man, in full practice,
and absolutely without any sort of experience of public or private
administrative business, Dr. Jameson was about the last man who
would have been selected by the Colonial Office to solve such a
number of delicate and difficult problems. Nevertheless his appoint-
ment has been the one point upon which Mr. Rhodes' wisdom has never
been questioned, even by his most fanatical opponents.
Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, a Scotchman, born in Edinburgh on the
9th of February, 1853, is the youngest son of the late R. W. Jameson,
Writer to the Signet, a well-known politician of half a century ago ; his
mother being a daughter of Major-General John Pringle. The family
subsequently settling in London, Dr. Jameson, after distinguishing
himself at school, both as a student and an athlete, studied for
medicine at University College Hospital. There his career was a
brilliant one. He obtained silver medals for medicine, surgery,
anatomy, and pathology, besides a surgical scholarship, and graduated
in 1875 at London University, obtaining the gold medal for medical
jurisprudence. Everything promised him a successful and lucrative
practice in the highest walks of the medical profession in London ;
but his health gave way under the strain of over-work, and after a
short health tour in America he accepted, in 1878, a partnership with
Dr. Prince, in Kimberley. His reputation grew rapidly, and he was
soon recognised as the chief authority in South Africa in every
department of medicine. For instance, the Free State Parliament,
by special resolution, requested his attendance on the late President
of the Orange Free State, Sir Henry Brand, at Bloemfontein. To a
thorough knowledge of his profession, industry, and a conscientious
sense of the responsibility of his work, Dr. Jameson added an
amount of tact and keen sympathetic insight into human nature
which gave to his society a charm for which he has become so well
known, and which has been so useful in his official career.
Among the host of firm friends made by Dr. Jameson during his
residence in Kimberley, Mr. Cecil Rhodes stands out prominently ; and at
the time when the amalgamation of the diamond mines was in process,
and the extension of British influence northward was still a dream of
the future, their life was one of intimate association. At this period
D 2
o
6 The DoivJifa/I of Lobeng2ila.
Mr. Rhodes was only beginning to be known, and was regarded even
by his friends as somewhat over- sanguine, and Dr. Jameson was
possibly the one man who gauged his powers and his plans correctly.
With an enthusiasm which equalled Mr. Rhodes', and with a generosity
of spirit b}' which he has always been distinguished, Dr. Jameson saw
the greatness of his friend's schemes, and the possibility of their realisa-
tion. Henceforth, his one desire was to assist Mr. Rhodes in carrying
them out ; and with what loyalty, tenacity, and intrepid daring he has
adhered to his purpose, the record of his connection with the British
South Africa Company from its inception will testify.
In 1888 it became necessary for Mr. Rhodes to send a trustworthy
agent to Buluwayo, to carry out the various and delicate negotiations
connected with the development of the concession granted to himself
and Mr. Rudd. Mr. Rhodes, after much careful consideration, selected
Vi'L. Jameson ; and he, with a complete disregard of personal and
pecuniary considerations, immediately sacrificed the most lucrative and
extensive medical practice in South Africa to undertake this difficult
and dangerous task. He persuaded Mr. Doyle and Major Maxwell, both
skilled interpreters, to accompany him to the King's kraal, and re-
mained three months with Lobengula, whom he meanwhile cured of an
attack of gout. Before he left he acquired great influence with Lobengula
and his principal councillors, and his mission was completely successful.
The Charter was formally recognised, and full permission was given
for the advance of a pioneer force into Mashonaland. Having com-
pleted his mission. Dr. Jameson returned to his practice in Kimberley.
Difficulties arose at Buluwayo after his departure, however, and at Mr.
Rhodes' request he again returned there, and once more succeeded in
persuading the King to agree to the proposals made on behalf of the
Company. Dr. Jameson remained in Buluwayo in communication with
Mr. Rhodes, and the Pioneer Expedition started on its road up country.
Ultimately Dr. Jameson joined the columns, and accompanied them to
Salisbury as the representative and attorney of Mr. Rhodes. The next
task was originated by Dr. Jameson himself, and was an exceedingly
arduous one. Recognising the necessity of a shorter and less expensive
route to the coast than the long overland journey from the south which
they had accomplished, Dr. Jameson, accompanied by Major Frank
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire. ^1
Johnson, left Salisbury, and traversed the country to the east down to
the Pungwe, striking that river at about seventy miles from its mouth.
The two adventurous explorers proceeded down the river in a portable
boat, brought with them in sections by native carriers, and successfully
reached the steamer waiting for them in Pungwe Bay, after which Dr.
Jameson proceeded to Capetown to give an account of his expedition
to Mr. Rhodes. The ultimate result of this hazardous journey was, of
course, the establishment of the Beira Railway Company.
Shortly afterwards, believing that Dr. Jameson could best carry
out his plans with regard to Mashonaland, Mr, Rhodes requested him
to return there as his representative, and in the latter part of 1890 Dr.
Jameson again returned to Salisbury. After a short stay there, utilised
in furthering the interests of the Chartered Company, and In stabili-
tating much that had already been done, he determined, on the occasion
of a visit to Manica, close on the Portuguese border, to proceed to the
Gaza country — ruled over by the Zulu Chief, Gungunhana — with the
object of securing that vast territory for the Chartered Company. The
year 1890 91 was memorable in the interior by reason of its ex-
ceptionally heavy rains, the entire country towards the coast being
under water, and the rivers flooded,' for which and other reasons the
journey he proposed to make was not lightly to be undertaken. Yet,
taking with him Messrs. Doyle and Moody, and totally unprovided
with comforts, or even the bare necessaries for such a journey, he
pushed across the veld to Gungunhana's chief kraal, and arrived there
in spite of innumerable difficulties— sleeping by day or night as and
when he could, drenched to the skin by the heavy rains, marching
knee-deep in water, crossing broad and raging rivers with no better
means than paddling across on frail pieces of bark — and so penetrated
what at that time was believed to be one of the most fever-stricken
districts south of the Equator.
On arriving at Gungunhana's " Great Place," both of Dr, Janieson's
companions being prostrated with fever, he found the King surrounded
by Portuguese officials, who had with them a strong following of
Portuguese native troops. But in the face of all this, the expedition
resulted in a complete success in so far as concerned the negotiations
with the King, who freely invited the occupation of his country by
38 The Downfall of Lobengula.
the British South Africa Company. As, however, this concession was
made the subject of negotiations between the two Governments then
discussing the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, the expedition did not result
in an accession of fresh territory to the Chartered Company. This
fearful march to the Limpopo left Dr. Jameson on his return to Cape
Town in a very debilitated condition, and the victim of repeated and
severe attacks of malarial fever. About this time Mr. Colquhoun
announced his desire to resign office as Administrator of Mashonaland.
Mr. Rhodes pressed the appointment upon Dr. Jameson. The position
in Mashonaland was then exceedingly difficult. The Company had
been incurring enormous expense in administering the country, while at
the same time the Boers of the Transvaal were organising treks to
invade and take possession of a portion of the territory, with a view to
establish a new Boer Republic ; and in addition to all this, the white
population was in a condition of much discontent. But Dr. Jameson,
ill though he was, at once consented to face all these difficulties, and,
receiving full power from the High Commissioner to deal with the Boer
trek, set out for Mashonaland as Administrator. He immediately took
steps to meet the most pressing danger. On the banks of the Limpopo,
supported by a troop of the Bechuanaland Border Police, he found
himself faced by a large body of armed Boers preparing to cross the river.
An error in judgment might have precipitated a war between the English
and Dutch elements, but fortunately the new Administrator was equal
to the occasion, and the Boers were persuaded to give up their
enterprise and return to their homes.
Still suffering from fever, Dr. Jameson went on to Salisbury, where
he conciliated the discontented colonists, very materially reduced the
costs of administration, and in twelve months was able to show a
financial statement in which the revenue and expenditure almost
balanced. The splendid tact of Dr. Jameson in reconciling, wherever
they conflicted, the interests of the Company, of the colonists, and of
the blacks, became a matter of universal comment and congratulation ;
all united in almost affectionate approval of the Administrator — all
recognised that he was doing his best in the general interest.
In this brief sketch Dr. Jameson's professional ability, the kindly
disposition which has obtained for him the goodwill of everyone in
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire. 39
British Zambesia; his unselfish devotion to the cause which he has taken
up with such splendid spirit, and his skill in the management of men,
have been chiefly dwelt on. Further pages in this volume will point to
his equally rare capacity for organisation ; his tactful adaptation of
means to the end required ; his power of infusing into those under him
the same confidence of success which he himself possesses, and the
foresight which enabled him to declare before starting, almost to a day,
the time when the British South Africa Company's conquering forces
would arrive at Bulu^vayo, the Matabcli army having been crushed, and
the King either a prisoner or a fugitive. Future history will assign
Dr. Jameson a prominent place among those who have been called the
" makers of the Empire," and his name is, and always will be, associated
with recollections grateful to the colonists of British South Africa.
While arrangements were being made for the formation of a
company on a royal charter, to develop and maintain civilised govern-
ments throughout the new territories of the empire, it was stipulated
that three members of the Board of Direction should be nominated by
Her Majesty's Government. In due course the Duke of Abercorn, K.G.,
the Duke of Fife, K.T., and Mr. Albert Grey joined the Board,
the first in the capacity of president. The other members of the Board,
who represent the commercial element of the administration more
fully than the Dukes of Abercorn and Fife and Mr. Albert Grey
(who may be said to act as trustees for the nation), are Lord
Gifibrd, V.C., Sir Horace Farquhar, Bart., Mr. Alfred Beit, Mr.
George Cawston, besides, of course, Mr. Rhodes, the managing
director, who is represented on the Board by Mr. Rochfort
Maguire, M.P.
The president of the company, James Hamilton, second Duke of
Abercorn, and one of the best-known members of the Upper House,
takes a strong personal interest in the affairs of the Chartered Company
and devotes a large portion of his time to the conduct of its affairs.
He was born in 1838, and succeeded to the title in 1885, his father
being a former Viceroy of Ireland. He was educated at Harrow and
Christ Church, Oxford. His Grace, who is one of the two Irish Dukes
in the peerage, is very popular among all ranks and classes on
both sides of St. George's Channel. He has filled several offices,
40
The Downfall of Lobcngiila.
amongst others, that of Lord of the Bedchamber to the Prince of Wales,
and Groom of the Stole. From i860 to 1880, as Marquess of Hamilton,
he represented Donegal in the Conservative interest, and is now
Lord-Lieutenant of that county, and Hon. Colonel of the 5th Battalion
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. He holds an immense number of titles,
Photo by Russell &" Sons.2
The Duke of Abercorn, K.G., P.C.
being C.B. (1885), P.C. (1887), and K.G. (1893), and married, in
1869, Lady Mary Anna Curzon, daughter of Lord Howe, and has five
children. The Chartered Company was exceedingly fortunate in
securing his services as a director ; and by the large amount of his
time and attention which he has devoted to its management, the
Duke of Abercorn has again shown how deeply at heart he holds the
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire.
41
welfare of Greater Britain, and the importance of opening up new fields
for the expansion of the race, and the widening of England's commercial
frontiers.
The same may be said of the vice-president, who has greatly
assisted and added to the prestige of our modern John Company
Photo by IV. d-^ D. Downey.1
The Duke of Fife, K.T., P.C.
by taking a seat — his sole directorship — upon its Board. His Grace,
Alexander William George Duff, K.T., B.C., first Duke of Fife,
was born in 1849, ^"^d succeeded to his titles in 1879. In 1889
he married H.R.H. the Brincess Louise of Wales, and has a
daughter, the Lady Alexandra Duff. The Duke of Fife is Lord
Lieutenant of Elginshire, Deputy Lieutenant of Banffshire and
42 The Downfall of Lobcngiila,
Aberdeenshire, Hon. Colonel of the Banffshire Volunteers, and
Member of the Council of the Royal Duchy of Lancaster. He
takes the opposite side in politics to the Duke of Abercorn, having
represented Elgin and Nairn for five years in the Liberal
Unionist interest. He is head of the great banking house of Sir
Samuel Scott and Company. It may be said, without any sort of
exaggeration, that the British South Africa Company was unusually
favoured in his having accepted a seat upon its board, seeing that
it is his sole and only directorship. Those who have attended
the annual meetings of the Company cannot have failed to be
impressed by his acquaintance with, and mastery of, the details of
its business. He holds statesmanlike views upon the leading South
African questions of the day, and it is not unfortunate for British
Zambesia that it has the benefits of his political prestige, influence and
common-sense views upon the problem of African development under
British auspices. He is a good debater and a fluent speaker, and taking
a strong personal interest in the aims and work of the Company, has
taken a leading part in directing its policy and shaping its destinies.
Another prominent member of the Board is the Right Hon. Edric
Frederic. Lord Gifford, who holds the coveted and honourable distinction
of the Victoria Cross, won during the Ashanti War. He was formerly
Major in the Middlesex (Duke of Cambridge's) Regiment, and on the
staff of Viscount Wolseley, when Governor of Natal. Lord Gifford
took part in the Zulu War as well as the Ashanti Campaign. He was
Colonial Secretary of Western Australia from 1879 to 1880; a member
of the Legislative Council from 1 880 to 1883. From that year till 1 888 he
acted as Colonial Secretary at Gibraltar. He was born in 1849, 3-"<^ suc-
ceeded his father, the second Baron Gifford, in 1872 ; and in 1880 married
a daughter (Miss Sophie Catherine Street) of General J. A. Street, C.B.
The other directors are Sir H. B. Farquhar, Mr. A. H. G. Grey, Mr.
A. Beit, Mr. George Cawston, and Mr. Rhodes, of whom Mr. Alfred Beit,
a member of the great house of Wernher, Beit and Co., of London, Johan-
nesburg, and Kimberley, is not the least widely known. The firm is the
leading house in the Kimberley diamond trade, and is also by far the
largest mine and land owner in the Transvaal. Mr. Beit, who bears the
reputation of being one of the most far-seeing men of business in the
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire.
43
commercial world, is an intimate friend of Mr. Rhodes, having taken a
very active interest in most of his schemes, and he is also one of the
Life Governors of De Beers Mines. When the Zambesian Hinterland
idea was first brought forward, Mr. Beit's firm at once took a most
prominent part in the movement, and he accepted a seat upon the
Lord Gifford, V.C.
Boards of the British South Africa, United Concessions, and Exploring
Companies. Mr. Beit is also a member of the Board of the New Jagers-
fontein Diamond IMining Company, the Robinson Gold Mining Company,
and a few other similar concerns of the first rank. Mr. Rhodes alone
excepted, there is no one who is so largely interested in, or who exercises
a more invigorating and healthy influence upon, the commerce and
44
The Doivnfall of Lobengiila.
industries of South Africa. He has thrown himself vigorously into the
development of the country's unique resources, and has actively sup-
ported all schemes having that object. He was born in Hamburg in
1853, and went out to South Africa when quite a young man. From
the first he displayed a genius for business, and his determination of
Mr. Alfred Beit.
character and earnestness of purpose soon resulted in the achievement
of a great position. From 1875 to 1888 he was engaged in the diamond
mining business in Kimberley, and in the latter year came home to
share the management of the London house with an immense fortune,
and — what is not quite so common a thing— the reputation of being
honourable to the verge of Quixotism in all his dealings.
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire.
45
Sir Horace Brand Farquhar, Bart., is one of the partners of the
Duke of Fife in the great banking firm of which the latter is the head.
He was born in 1S44, is J. P. for the County of Middlesex, and
a leading member of the London County Council. His father, the first
Baronet, was a Governor of the East India Company.
Photo by I!'. &^ D. Downey. \
Sir Horace Brand Farquhar.
Mr. Albert H. G. Grey, who was born in 185 1, is a son of the
late General the Hon. Charles Grey, M.P., and is nephew and heir-
presumptive to Earl Grey. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity
College, Cambridge, and holds the degree of B.A. In 1878 he was
elected M.P. for South Northumberland, but withdrew. Some two
years later he was re-elected, and represented that constituency until
46
The Downfall of Lobeiigula.
1885, when he became Member for the Tyneside Division. He is also
J. P. and C.C. in the County of Northumberland. He married Miss
Alice Holford in 1877, ^"^ ^^^ four children.
Mr. George Cawston is the senior partner in the well-known
firm of George Cawston and Co., and is a leading member of the
Photo by J . Worsnof, Rothsay.\
Mr. Albert H. G. Grey.
London Stock Exchange. As previously stated, he took early and, at
first, independent action in the Hinterland question. He first addressed
the Colonial Office on the subject in a letter dated May, 1888, stating
that it was his intention to send an expedition to Matabeliland. This
was the foundation of the Exploring Company. Mr. E. A. Maund took
charge of the expedition, the fortunes of which have already been
The Founders of the Hi ■iter hind Empire.
47
followed. Ultimately the two groups fused, and the Central Search
Company was formed to define the respective interests. From this
again arose the United Concessions Company, recently absorbed by
the British South Africa Company. Mr- Cawston, who takes a keenly
active part in the conduct of the Com.pany's affairs, was bom
Photo by ran dc \i''cyde. Regent Strcet.l
Mr. George Cawston.
in 1851, and is the son ot the late Mr. S. W. Cawston, of Balham,
Surrey. He became a Member of the Inner Temple, and was
called to the Bar in 1882. He takes a deep interest in geographical
questions, is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, and
recently read an excellent address dealing with Matabeliland affairs
to the Fellows of the Imperial Institute. He married a daughter of
48 The Downfall of Lobengula.
the late Mr. Richard Haworth, of The Argoed, near Shrewsbury. Mr.
Cawston, besides being a director of the British South Africa Company,
is chairman of the South-West Africa Company, and a director of the
Exploring Company. The former is, next to the British South Africa
Company, the most important territorial concern in South Africa, and
embraces within its scope of operations some sixty thousand square miles
of land, while the Exploring Company holds immense and varied
interests in Zambesia. Mr. Cawston is thus deeply concerned in the
development of the less known portions of South Africa.
Of the three who proceeded on behalf of Mr. Rhodes to Buluwayo
to obtain the great concession from Lobengula, Mr. Rochfort Maguire,
the present member for West Clare, has had a peculiarly interesting
and varied career. He was a first-class man of Merton College, Oxford,
and passed for the Indian Civil Service ; but having obtained a fellowship
at All Souls', he entered for the Bar. Subsequently, he became private
secretary to Sir George Burn, the then Governor of Hong Kong. He
then returned to Oxford, where he received an invitation from his friend
and college contemporary, Mr. Cecil ^Rhodes, to join him in South
Africa. His selection for the dangerous and important mission with
which he was entrusted was decidedly a happy one. Mr. Maguire bears
the reputation of possessing a sang froid which knows no variations of
temperature under the extremest conditions of danger and difficulty.
It is said that he became a great favourite with Lobengula, possibly
winning his way to the royal favour by that imperturbable demeanour
which is so much in vogue among savage tribes, and which is one of
Mr. Maguire's characteristics. Mr. Maguire spent a lengthy period in
Matabeliland, and carried out his mission effectively and completely.
Not only did he secure important concessions for his own party, but he
contrived to keep all competing candidates for the royal favours away
from Lobengula's person. Ultimately he won his way almost too com-
pletely into the King's good graces, so much so indeed, that he found
some difficulty in getting away from the royal kraal. This he ultimately
did, however, and returned to England with a comfortably holding of
shares in the Chartered Company, and went into Parliament as a sup-
porter of Mr. Parnell. He is a quiet speaker, given to argument and
not declamatory abuse, and during the Laboucherian attack upon
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire.
49
the Chartered Company, defended his friends in one or two moderate and
convincing speeches. He represents the managing director on the
London board of the Chartered Com.pany as his alternate.
The secretarial duties connected with the business of the British South
Africa Company are almost as important as those of the directors.
Photo by Dehenhain, Ryde, I. /F.]
Mr. Herlert Canning.
and are so closely associated with the latter that this, perhaps, is the
most fitting place for reference to them. Chartered companies are
not merely trading associations. In them are vested all the functions
of government, from the levying of taxes, the infliction of capital
punishment, to the carrying on of war. It is hardly necessary to
say that so much falls upon the secretary, that it is imperative that he
E
50 The Doivnfall of Lobengula.
should possess high abilities, unflagging industry, never-failing tact,
and great business experience. Up to the present, the Chartered
Company has been well served in this direction. The first secretary
was Mr, C. H. Weatherley, who was for several years chief of the staff
of Messrs. Cooper Brothers and Co., the well-known firm of account-
ants. Mr. Weatherley, whose capacity and geniality soon made him a
prominent and popular figure in African circles, retired to accept a
partnership in his old firm. He was succeeded as secretary by his
friend, Mr. Herbert Canning, who had filled similar positions. Following
such a predecessor, much was expected from the new secretary, who
took office about a year-and-a-half ago. Those expectations have not
been disappointed. Mr. Canning, whilst being earnest and energetic, is
patient, thorough, and diplomatic; he has discharged his functions,
at times exceedingly onerous — notably during the war — with con-
spicuous success and remarkable tact, and above all, he has contrived
to comfortably cope with the immense volume and various kinds of
work which have thrust themselves upon him since he accepted the
important position offered to him by the Chartered Company. It is
no mean tribute to Mr. Canning's power of utilising time profitably
to say that while posted up both in the broad lines and in the important
details of the Company's administrative and commercial business, he
even contrives to digest the immense mass of English and Colonial
newspaper literature relating thereto ; the business in London of the
African Transcontinental Telegraph Company and of the Bechuanaland
Railway Company is also conducted by him.
The secretary of the British South Africa Company in South
Africa, Dr. F. Rutherfoord Harris, M.L.A., is, like the Administrato r, a
medical man. He went to the Cape originally in search of health, and
soon feeling the benefit of the climate, established a good practice as a
doctor at Kimberley, where he became intimate with Mr. Rhodes. When
in 1889 Mr. Rhodes was looking about for a suitable staff to carry into
effect his scheme for the settlement of the Zambesi regions, he offered to
Dr. Harris the position which he now so ably fills. At the beginning
of this year (1894) Dr. Harris was elected to the Cape Legislative
Assembly as one of the four representatives of Kimberley. Dr. Harris
is a man of great energ)', possesses administrative and business
The Foiuiders of the llinterlayid Empire.
Si
talents of a high order, and has amply justified his selection to carry
out the onerous and responsible duties of his office. Some idea of their
extent may be gathered when it is stated that the ordinary mail letter
of the Cape Town Office deals with an average of twenty-five subjects,
ranging from administrative matters of the first importance to purely
formal details.
Dr. ¥. RUTHERFOOKD HARRIS, M.L.A.
No reference to the administration of the Chartered Company
would be complete without allusion to the active share taken in the con-
duct of its affairs by Mr. Bourchier F. Hawksley, of the firm of HoUams,
Son, Coward, and Hawksley, who are the Company's solicitors. The
Company is practically an amalgamation of an immense number
of separate interests, and in many cases the titles have been of a
E 2
52
The Downfall of Lobcngula.
complicated nature, involving an amount of knowledge, research, and
inquiry which has rendered the post of solicitor to the Company
unusually responsible and laborious. This may be seen by tracing
Mr. Hawksley's connection with it throughout its successive stages of
development, at each of which agreements of no ordinary character had
Mr. BOURLIIIIiR F. ILWVKSLEY.
to be drawn up. Mr. Hawksley was born in 185 1, articled at Bristol
in 1866, admitted in 1872, and has ever since been connected with his
present firm, in which he became a partner in 1889. He was solicitor
to the old De Beers Company, and to the De Beers Consolidated Mines.
He was also solicitor to the Exploring Company, and it was no doubt
in some measure owing to his connection with the rival groups that
Mr. CHARLES DUNELL RUDD.
The Founders of the Hinterland Empire. 53
arrangements were concluded, by the formation of the Central Search
Association, for uniting the former company's interests with those of the
Rudd-Rhodes' concession. Mr. Hawksley drew up the Royal Charter
which was applied for by the Central Search Association, and also the
Deed of Settlement,and acted throughout these difficult negotiations. The
acquisition of all the competing interests which Lord Salisbury required
should be merged also entailed arduous labour upon Mr. Hawksley. In
1889 the Association was taken over by the United Concessions Com-
pany, involving more complicated agreements, followed by others
under which the Charter was extended to embrace the British area
across the Zambesi. Then followed the creation of the British
South Africa Company. Quite recently difficulties arose with the
"Ochs group," and on the occasion of the meetings called to
sanction the amalgamation of the Chartered Company and the
United Concessions Company it was found advisable to explain the
whole position from its legal aspect. This Mr. Hawksley under-
took to do, and in a masterly speech, of which the delivery occu-
pied some seventy minutes, lucidly set the whole facts before the
shareholders, and relieved them of all anxieties as to the issue.
Subsequent legal proceedings, in which Mr. Hawksley acted for the
company, amply justified his remarks on that occasion. Mr. Hawksley
acts for the numerous offshoots of the Chartered Company — such as the
Transcontinental Telegraph Company, the Beira Railway Company,
and the company which is constructing the trunk line through Vryburg
and Mafeking, as well as numerous mining concerns,
Mr. C. D. Rudd, the leader of the concessionaire trio, is an old
Harrovian and a Cambridge man, whom a breakdown of health in
training sent out to South Africa to recuperate. This was in 1865.
from when to 1868 he occupied his time in shooting in Zululand and
other parts of the country. In 1870, he took part in the first great " rush "
to the diamond fields, where he met Mr. Rhodes. The two young men
went into partnership, from which rose, as is elsewhere explained, the
gigantic scheme culminating in the De Beers Mines (Limited). When
the Witwatersrand goldfields were discovered, Mr. Rudd went up to the
Transvaal to represent the Rudd and Rhodes Syndicate, out of which
ultimately arose the Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa, Limited.
54 ^/^^ Downfall of Lobengula.
Of this powerful and successful company Mr. Rudd became co-
managing director with Mr. Rhodes, and it is largely due to his
prescience that that concern has achieved such conspicuous success, and
acquired such gigantic interests at so low a cost. Mr. Rudd is not a
politician, although he entered the Cape Parliament in 1884. That,
however, was only with specific objects — namely, the passing of the
Compound System, the Illicit Diam.ond Trade, and the Liquor Question
— all matters connected with the diamond industry, with which Mr. Rudd
was intimately associated at the time. The desired objects were
attained in 1889, and at the next election Mr. Rudd did not re-offer
himself to the constituency.
Among those who are largely responsible for the occupation of
Zambesia must also be mentioned Mr. Frederick Courtenay Selous. As
a hunter in South Africa, he stands first and foremost among those
v^hose names have become household words amongst all lovers of
sport, and also as a keen observer of the ways of savage races and
wild animals. Even at the age of twelve, when at Rugby, he had
a better collection of birds' eggs than any other boy ; and the keen-
ness for obtaining any coveted specimen was not damped by swimming
rivers at midnight, when his rivals were snug and warm in bed. At
the age of nineteen he w^ent to South Africa, fired by the accounts
— then much more meagre than now — of a hunter's life under the
southern sun, the favourite of those books being Gordon Cumming's
" Five Years' Hunting Adventures in South Africa," which probably
fixed his mind more than any other. Upon a small capital of about
;^300 given to him by his father, he started upon the " Hunters'
Wanderings," so graphically described in his first book. For years
Mr. Selous, in his quest for rare and valuable animals, wandered
many times over and thoroughly explored the Mashonaland plateau ;
and when the scheme for forming the Chartered Company was in its
infancy — although there were many stories about the glorious country
lying between the Limpopo and Zambesi Rivers — it was to Mr. Selous
that Mr. Rhodes looked for accurate information which enabled him,
with his great political and financial resources, to develop a scheme for
the effective occupation of Mashonaland. The work which fell upon Mr.
Selous' shoulders was by no means light, for his duty as the "Pioneer"
Mr. F. C. SELOUS, F.Z.S.
{Pioneer, Hunter, and Chief of the Intelligence Department of the .Southern Colu/nn.)
The Founders of tJie Hinterland Empire. 55
was not only to head the force, and to cut the road for the numerous
waggons, but to scout for miles round the line of march, as although
Lobengula had signed the concession, it was well known that he had
been urged very strongly by his young warriors not to allow
the white man to settle in Mashonaland, which at that time was the
chief raiding ground of the Matabeli. Throughout the whole of
the trials and hardships of the expedition, the unanimous opinion of
those who formed the advance party was that they could not have
had a more capable leader, nor one who had so much thought for
their comfort ; and it was the enthusiasm which he infused into the
work that enabled the Pioneers to reach Salisbury in so short a time.
Mr. Selous remained in Mashonaland until the latter part of 1892,
during which time his aid in exploring the country was invaluable, and
returned to England on 17th December for a well-earned rest, leaving
behind the townships of Salisbury and Victoria busy and hopeful of the
future. Gold was being found in payable quantities, various companies
were formed, money and mining materials were brought into the country
— in fact, everything looked promising. Lobengula certainly v/as not to
be depended upon ; but he was receiving subsidy of ;^ioo per month, and
there appeared no reason to expect anything of an outbreak from him,
when news came of the eventful Sunday (July 9th) when the Matabeli
under the charge of two old indunas, Manyou and Magan, and the
young induna Ingna, appeared at the township of Victoria, indis-
criminately murdering the Mashona servants, but contemptuously sparing
the white men, saying, " We have been ordered not to kill you — yet, —
but your day is coming."
Mr. Selous was at that time in England, but with that prompt-
ness and decision which is one of his characteristics, at once decided
that his duty was to return and contribute his share to the downfall
of Lobengula. The Victoria and Salisbury Columns were already on
the march ; but he lost no time in getting to the front, and at special
request joined Colonel Goold-Adams, commanding a force of 225
men of the Bechuanaland Police, and 225 volunteers recruited in the
Transvaal under the command of Commandant Raaf. During this
march, Mr, Selous' knowledge of the country and the natives
was of the greatest possible value to Colonel Goold-Adams — in
56 The Doiuufall of Lobengula.
facl", he has been called — and very rightly so — " the ears and
eyes of the force." At the battle near the Sangezi River, when
they were attacked while on the march by the Matabeli under
Gambo, Mr. Selous, who was with the rear-guard, showed he was
as expert with his rifle as a military weapon as when using it for
sporting purposes. He was unfortunately wounded by a bullet during
this engagement, but he probably owes his life to this circumstance,
as Dr. Jameson would not allow him to accompany Major Forbes in his
pursuit of Lobengula; for had he gone, with his knowledge of the
country and love of adventure, he would almost certainly have gone
forward with Major Wilson's party. There is a melancholy interest in
speculating whether, had this been so, the chance of capturing the King
would have tempted him beyond the bounds of discretion, or whether
his experience and counsel would have saved any or all of that band of
brave men. To all lovers of sport and adventure Mr. Selous' books
are well-known, but his last, " Travels and Adventures in South East
Africa," in which he has given a most graphic account of the occu-
pation of Mashonaland and in which he anticipated the events of
the last few months, showed clearly that the young Matabeli warriors
must sooner or later insist upon a trial of strength with the white
settlers.
Since his return to England, he has given a very interesting lecture
before the members of the Royal Colonial Institute, upon the " Cause
and Effect of the Matabeli War," in which he very stoutly defends his
fellow comrades from the calumnious attacks of the Little England
Party headed by Mr. Labouchere, His defence was not composed of
empty words, but of absolute facts, all of which he has verified ;
Mr. Selous is a man who will take infinite trouble to master the
truth of a story, and thereby had made for himself a reputation
amongst both white men and natives as one whose word can
be absolutely relied upon. Mr. Selous, should he ever return to
Matabeliland, will see a vast change round his old haunts — changes
which are, no doubt, improvements upon the old scenes of savage revelry
at Buluwayo, but which as a hunter he will often, perhaps, be tempted to
regret. Mr. Selous has recently married Miss Gladys Maddy, daughter
of the Rev. Canon Maddy, Rector of Down Hatherley, Gloucestershire.
The Founders of the Hinterland Enipi7'e. 57
One of the best known of those who have thrown in their lot
with the Rhodesia movement is Mr. Philip Bourchier Sherard Wrey,
Assoc. M.Inst. C.E., who is second son of Sir Henry Bourchier Toke
Wrey, Bart, (tenth of the line), of Tawstock Court, Barnstaple,
Devon, and a descendant of the Sir Philip Bourchier Wrey, whose
name occurs so frequently in the records of the attempted invasion
by the Great Armada. Mr. Wrey, who has kindly contributed two
chapters to this book, was born in 1858, and was articled to Mr.
James Henderson, C.E., from 1876 to 1879. In the latter year he
left for South Africa, and until 1881 was engaged professionally
at Kimberley.. From that year until 1885 he was employed as a
government surveyor in the Cape Colony, and, among other things,
undertook the delineation of the Walfish Bay territory. In 1886 he
went up to the Transvaal Goldfields, where he acquired a considerable
practice as a mining engineer. When the occupation of Mashona-
land was effected, Mr. Wrey accepted the offer of the post of consulting
engineer to the Mashonaland Agency Company, a concern closely allied
to the Chartered Company and the Consolidated Goldfields. In that
capacity he has taken a very prominent part in the mining affairs of
Rhodesia ; and, as he himself recounts on other pages, was actively
engaged in the development of his company's properties when the
war broke out. He travelled down with the Administrator from
Salisbury to Victoria, and was with him throughout the " indaba " with
the Matabeli indunas. Mr. Wrey has recently returned to Mashonaland,
to which country he holds that the motto of his family, " Le bon temps
viendra," is peculiarly applicable.
CHAPTER V.
THE COLLISION AT VICTORIA.
By P. B. S. Wrev, A.M.I.C.E.
Matabeli impis cross the border — Mashonas' fear of the Matabeli— Dr. Jameson renionstrates
with Lobengula — Telegraph wires cut at Gomalla's kraal— Lobengula claims the right
to raid the Mashonas — An impi at Victoria, Sunday, July 19th — Dr. Jameson arrives
at Mctoria — Loath to take active measures — The indaba— Lobengula breaks his compact
— Young Matabeli warriors beyond control — The impi ordered to leave in an hour,
or be driven out— Threats of the colonists to leave the country.
Mr. Selous, in his lecture at the Royal Colonial Institute, March
13th, has ably described the policy pursued by Lobengula, of harassing
the white man, and seeing how much annoyance he really would stand.
The commencement of this was undoubtedly the killing of the chief
Lomaghondi, in the latter part of 189L That chief was under the
protection of the Chartered Company, and Dr. Jameson remonstrated
very strongly. Lobengula professed extreme regret, stating that it was a
mistake. The following year, however, Matebeli impis were sent across
the recognised border in defiance of the agreement with and promises
made to the Company, and commenced raiding in the Victoria
district.
It was then, for the first time, we fully realised how damaging to
work and industry was the unsettled state of affairs caused by these raids.
A large impi passed through the camp of the Mashonaland Agency,
situate about fourteen miles from Victoria, at the time we were em-
ploying about 150 natives; these were absolutely paralysed with fear
and announced their intention of leaving directly. It was only with
great trouble and persuasion that they were induced to remain, and our
position was a most false one ; for, as the natives very plainly said, " When
you white men came into Mashonaland, you promised that if we worked
for you, you would prevent the Matabeli from raiding us. Here we are
The Collision at Victoria. 59
working for you, and here are the Matabeli killing our wives and
children, and raiding our homes." Dr. Jameson, still desirous of main-
taining peaceful relations, contented himself with again remonstrating.
Lobengula's answer was to the effect that he had merely sent his men
to collect some arrear taxes and tributes owing before the granting of the
concession. Dr. Jameson pacified the people as best he could, and all
this time was most particular not to break his promises to Lobengula,
and most stringent instructions were given to prevent any prospector
from crossing the border to look for the gold reefs known to exist within
a few miles of the boundary, x
In April, 1893, occurred the incident of the cutting of the
telegraph wire at Gomalla's kraal, followed by the imposition of a
fine, and the payment of same in cattle, which were afterwards
stated to belong to Lobengula. There can be no doubt the cause of the
cutting of the wire was the dissatisfaction of the chiefs at the present
state of affairs. Natives do not understand diplomatic remonstrances,
and their natural argument was : If the Chartered Company do not
punish the ]\Iatabeli for raiding us last year, they must be afraid of them,
and it is only a question of time when the white men will be killed, and
we shall again be raided and murdered worse than before. On this line
of argument, instead of having any feelings of awe and respect for the
white man, they despised him, and showed their feelings by committing
an offence they knew to be a very grave and serious one.
Matters reached a climax in July. Having met with no resist-
ance from the Chartered Company on the raid of 1892, Lobengula
sent a far larger and picked body of men, with instructions to raid in the
neighbourhood of Victoria ; at the same time writing to Dr. Jameson,
that "he made no excuses for so doing," but, in defiance of all
treaties and promises, "claimed his right to raid when, where, and
whom he chose." His instructions to the indunas were that no white
men were to be killed, but that they were to particularly direct their
operations to those Mashona tribes who had been, and were, working for
the white men. There can be no doubt but that, from the death of
Lomaghondi to this time, the system of harassing and annoying the
white man had been gradually increased and magnified in proportion to
the pacific remonstrances made by the Chartered Company, and I am
6o The Downfall of Lobengtda.
absolutely confident that in 1893, had not the company taken the action
they have done, the orders to the indunas would have been, not to
harass and annoy the white men, but to kill every one of them in the
country.
The actual climax was reached on Sunday, July 9th, and the follow-
ing days of that week, when the impi, carrying out their instructions,
commenced killing every Mashona they could find near Victoria. In
many cases these atrocities were committed in the presence of the mas-
ters of some of the men, and the only answer given to them when they
tried to save the lives of their boys was, " Stand on one side, your time
has not come yet." The effect was, of course, to paralyse all work and
enterprise, and it is not easy to describe the feelings of exasperation of
the colonists. Meetings were held at which the very strongest language
was used, at what was termed the weakness of the Chartered Company
in trying to deal in a conciliatory manner with Lobengula, and at which
the company was called upon to take some decisive measure.
Meanwhile Dr. Jameson was hurrying down from Salisbury ; and as
I travelled with him during the last section of the journey, I can most
emphatically state that, even after having heard the fullest details of how
serious the aspect of affairs was, he was most loath to take offensive
measures, could he have seen any other way out of the difficulty.
It may be thought by some that the events above mentioned were made
the excuse for the taking of Matabeliland for the sole object of acquiring
fresh ground. Such is not the case. All Dr. Jameson decided on was,
that it was imperative that the impi then surrounding Victoria should at
all costs be driven away and made to cross the border, and that, when
that was accomplished, Lobengula must be dealt with according as he
explained his action in deliberately breaking his agreements.
On arrival at Victoria, Dr. Jameson summoned the head indunas,
in number about twenty ; and as I was present at the indaba, I shall be
glad to correct an error that many have fallen into, namely, that the impi
was given one hour to cross the border, a distance of thirty miles.
The conversation was a very brief one. Dr. Jameson, after telling
the head induna that Lobengula had distinctly broken his compact in
sending this impi over the border, asked him if it was a fact that he
could no longer control his young men. The answer was " Yes." —
The Collision at Victoria.
6i
"Very well then," he said, "You go back with those whom you can
control, and leave me to deal with your young men. Go," he continued.
" back to your men, and tell them that they must instantly leave for
the border." Then he told them how long he would wait.
Pointing to the sun, he said, " Wa bona ilanga " (Do you see
the sun?); then, pointing lower in the horizon, he said, "When the
sun is there, if you have not cleared (ta^a ivena at ga suka), you'll be
driven out. I shall send out my men, and those of you who have not
left I shall drive over the border." The indaba then ended. I am
sufficiently acquainted with the language to understand the speech as
interpreted by Mr. Napier, and I am certain the Matabeli indunas
understood it as I have written it. That this is so, indeed, was proved
by the fact that the majority of the Matabeli started there and then,
and crossed the border that night or early next morning, whereas the
minority, consisting of some 300 to 400, waited for the patrol, and
were actually raiding a small kraal when Captain Lendy and his men
arrived. These were the only
men on whom he fired. Next
day a patrol was sent
out, and found evi-
dences of the rapid
departure of the --
main body o
the impi. All
the men in th
patrol were
anxious then
and there to
follow them
and revenge
these out-
rages ; but
Captain Lend}
stated most em-
phatically that
his orders from Dr. Jameson Holding the Indaba at Victoria.
62
The Doivnfall of Lobengula.
Dr. Jameson were most positive ; namely, that he should satisfy himself
that the impi had crossed the border, and that he should on no account
take offensive measures if they had crossed until after Lobengula had
been communicated with.
Feeling in Victoria was running very high at this time, for every-
one felt if no further action was to be taken, Lobengula would again
;make excuses and promises, and the following year, if not sooner,
things would be much worse. Capitalists openly spoke of withdrawing
capital. Farmers and traders threatened to trek out of the country,
and "a very strongly wprded address was presented to Dr. Jameson,
with a request that it might be forwarded to the High Com-
missioner, to the effect that, unless the Com.pany settled this
question, once and for all, in the only way it could be done, namely,
by breaking up the Matabeli power, they were determined to do one
of two things : leave the country, or — undertake the settlement of
the question themselves.
These facts should prove very clearly that, instead of the Chartered
Company having forced the war on the Matabeli, they used every means
to avoid any collision with them, and that the latter by breaking every
agreement and promise, and by the most brutal atrocities, clearly brought
a just punishment on their own heads. Further, that the colonists of
Mashonaland were simply actuated by a feeling and desire to obtain
some sort of security for the property and possessions for which they
had worked so hard and so patiently.
Photo hy Salmon, /\eadi}ig.'\
MAJOR PATRICK WILLIAM FORBES.
{Commanding the British South Africa Company's Forces in Maiaheliland.)
CHAPTER VI.
ORGANISING THE FORCES.
By Major P. W. Forbes. '
Declaration of War — Major Forbes to take command — Dr. Jameson arranges for starting to
Buluwayo — The Matabeli fighting strength— Military stores at Salisbury— Lack of horses —
Organising the Salisbury Horse — Selecting the officers — The conditions for volunteering
— The Victoria Column — Buying the horses — Leaving Salisbury — Practising military
manceuvres — The Tuli Column delayed — The Matabeli reported massing at Shangani
River — Dr, Jameson reviews the Salisbury Horse at Charter — Ammunition — Forming
laager — Manning the waggons.
The events at Victoria in July, 1893, which rendered the recent MatabeH
war a necessity, have been fully described ; and it will be enough for me
to say that on the 19th of July, the day after the Matabeli had been
driven out from Victoria, Dr. Jameson, the Administrator of Mashona-
land, decided to make such arrangements, that, should it prove necessary
he would be able to break once and for all the power of the Matabeli,
and his plans announced that day were carried out with but little
addition or alteration.
At that time I was, and had been since the occupation of
Mashonaland three years before, Magistrate at Salisbury, and was
also in command of the Salisbury Volunteer Corps. I knew, and
was known to, almost everyone in the district, and being an Imperial
Officer, and having served for five or six years among the Zulus, was in a
better position than most to judge of our chances of success in a
conflict with the Matabeli.
On the morning of the 19th July, as I have said, the programme of
the Expedition was drawn up. Mr. Duncan, a retired naval officer (the
senior official of the Company in the absence of Dr. Jameson), and
myself, were sent for that morning to the telegraph office to talk to
the Doctor, who was at Victoria. When we arrived there the Doctor
64 The Downfall of Lobengula.
began. The clerk was writing down what the Doctor said, and Mr.
Duncan was reading it to himself as written. He suddenly turned to
me and said, " You have to go to Buluwayo." This made me take
more interest than I had been doing in what was being said, and he and
I read the message together. The Doctor said that the events of the
previous day had shown him clearly that if we wished to remain in
Mashonaland, and not to sacrifice all that we had gained in the previous
three years, we must settle the Matabeli question once and for all. He
went on to say that he had thought it all out, and his plan was that
250 men should advance from Salisbury, Victoria, and Tuli respectively,
the former under myself, those from Victoria under Captain Lendy, an
Imperial Artillery Captain, at that time Acting Resident Magistrate at
Victoria, and those from Tuli under Captain Raaf, Resident Magistrate
of Tuli, while I was to assume command of all the Company's forces
when joined. (Captain Raaf had had a considerable amount of
experience in native warfare in South Africa, and was said to be a very
good man.) The Doctor further said that his idea was that the whole
force should be mounted, should start simultaneously from the three
places, and march on Buluv/ayo. We were to take no waggons, but to
carry three or four days' food on the horses, after which we would live
on native produce; 100 rounds ammunition per man, and, he added, he
counted on our reaching Buluwayo, having done all that was required,
before Christmas. He then asked if I was willing to go. I, of course,
agreed at once, and the expedition was then and there determined on.
The Doctor told me to let him know that evening what I should require
in the way of horses, arms, equipment, clothing, etc., to complete the
Salisbury Column, and then went off to consult with Mr. Rhodes, who
was at Cape Town.
In accepting the responsibility of invading Matabeliland with
750 men, I was doing Avhat many thought was a very rash thing, more
especially as one of the greatest military authorities on South African
native warfare had only three years before stated that he would require
7,000 men to take the country ; but I always looked upon the
Matabeli as being over-rated, and thought that with the material we
had, both as regards men and arms, we ought to be successful ; in
addition to which I knew that Dr. Jameson had had considerable
Oi'gamsiug the Forces. 65
experience in Matabeliland, and that if he was satisfied it was safe, I
was. Although the Doctor had sketched out his plan and authorised
me to make arrangements accordingly, the whole affair had to remain in
abeyance for some time. There had not been sufficient time for the
Imperial authorities to go thoroughly into the question, and it was
doubtful whether His Excellency Sir Henry Loch, Governor of the Cape,
would see how vital the question was and allow the Doctor to take
action ; but the time was so short before the rains came on that the
Doctor thought it advisable to make all arrangements, so that in the
event of permission being given later on, we could move at once. I
immediately saw Major Browne, at that time Staff Officer of Volunteers
in Mashonaland, and previously Adjutant of the Diamond Fields Horse
in Kimberley, and who had had considerable experience in native
fighting both in New Zealand and South Africa, and asked him if he
would go in with me as Staff Officer. I told him the programme, and
he at once agreed. We then set to work to take stock of the military
stores in Salisbury, and that evening I was able to wire to Dr. Jameson
that I required nothing but 250 horses to complete the Salisbury Force.
I asked for the full number of horses, as at the time there were very few
in Salisbury, and I knew that we should lose some of those purchased
on the way, and others would probably not be fit for much when they
arrived. I also said that, if procurable, fifty swords would be useful, as
there were a considerable number of ex-cavalry men in Mashonaland.
I thought that one troop could be armed with them, and I knew from
experience in Zululand what a horror the natives had of mounted men
who could gallop them down.
" Truth," and some other papers that took a pleasure in vilifying
the Company, had talked of Mashonaland as a place where the people
were starved, where there was no military organisation and no means of
defence ; and yet in Salisbury alone I was able to raise, fully arm, and
equip a force of 250 men, providing them, too, wath machine guns, and
all this from the stores that the Company had had on the spot for the
last three years ; and they were able to do the same both at Victoria
and Tuli.
Although I had agreed at once to Dr. Jameson's plans, I knew as
soon as I came to think it over that there was one alteration that must
F
66 The Downfall of Lobengiila.
be made, and that was on the question of transport. We should require
more ammunition than he had allowed for, viz., lOO rounds per man ;
and it would also be necessary to carry food for the horses. They had
to be bought in the Transvaal or Free State, driven at least 600 miles
fast, at a time of year when there was little if any grazing, and then
would have to do a long and tedious march immediately on arrival.' I
did not think that there would be much trouble about feeding the
troops, as we could arrange our advance so as to pass kraals most of the
way, and could get sufficient grain there for food, while we could drive
oxen for meat. The other two points were, however, so important that
I at once calculated out the least number of waggons that would carry
what I required, and found that I could manage with twelve. As soon
as Dr. Jameson returned to Salisbury, about a week after the first
arrangement had been made, I spoke to him and he agreed at once-
In addition to the advantage of carrying reserve ammunition and grain,
twelve waggons would form a small but compact laager, in which all the
horses could be put, and would save our having to construct a strong
scherm (bush fence) every night.
Immediately after my talk with Dr. Jameson, on the 19th July, I
set to work to organise the corps which I called the Salisbury Horse.
My first intention was to have four mounted troops of fifty men each,
making up the remaining fifty men by gun detachments. I proposed
to take two Maxim guns on galloping carriages, one one-pounder shell
Maxim and one Gardner gun. This would leave in Salisbury for
defensive purposes one seven-pounder gun, one Maxim, two Nordenfeldt,
and one one-pounder Hotchkiss, the three latter having been taken from
the Portuguese in Manica in 189 1. I found, however, that there would
be some difficulty in raising four troops mounted, and eventually
changed it to three mounted of fifty men each, two of which had, in
addition, a galloping Maxim with an escort of ten men, one dis-
mounted of fifty, and the different gun detachments. As the one-
pounder Maxim was a very clumsy gun I took the seven-pounder
instead, and also one of the Nordenfeldts. The first question was the
officers to command the three Troops, and in this there was rather an
" embarras de richesses." All the officers commanding troops in the
Mashonaland Horse, i.e., the Salisbury Volunteer Corps, thought that
Organising the Forces. 67
they should be the first selected, and there was consequently some
little dissatisfaction about my selection from among them all. The
three that I selected first for the three Troops were Messrs. M. Heany,
H. F. Hoste, and A. Eyre. The former had served in America, and
had had considerable experience of native warfare ; he had also been
one of the firm of Johnson, Heany, and Borrow, who had brought up the
Pioneer Force in 1890, and had been Captain of the senior Troop in
that Force. In addition to having large interests in the country he was
a large employer of labour, and one of the most popular men in the
country. He at once accepted and placed himself at my disposal, and
from beginning to end assisted me in every possible way. Mr. Hoste
had also been a Captain in the Pioneer Corps, and before that had
commanded one of the U.S.S. Company's ships. He had had a good
deal of experience with natives, and was well known and liked in the
country. He agreed at first, but appears to have been under a mis-
apprehension as to the number of waggons I intended taking, and at
the last moment objected to come unless I took considerably more than
twelve. Mr. Eyre had been in the Pioneer Corps, but I knew nothing
of his soldiering abilities, and my reason for selecting him was, that
he had shortly before been elected by the Salisbury Burghers — i.e.,
all adults who were not volunteers — as Commandant ; and as the
Burghers comprised about one-third of the population of Salisbury
and the district, I thought to secure some of them through his
appointment. He agreed to come, but at last followed Captain
Hoste's example.
I have not mentioned the conditions upon which men were
asked to volunteer, but the principal ones were as follows : — (i) Pro-
tection on all claims in Mashonaland until six months after the war
was finished. (2) A farm of 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), free of
occupation. (3) Twenty gold claims. (4) Share of all cattle taken,
half of which was to go to the Company, the other half to be
equally divided among all members of the Expedition, share and
share alike.
On Messrs. Hoste and Eyre's withdrawal I gave the two Troops
B and C to Messrs. Borrow and Spreckley, both of whom had been
officers in the Pioneer Corps, and were well known and very popular in
F 2
68 The Downfall of Lobengttla.
the country, and I do not think that any selection could have given
more satisfaction. Captain Borrow was at the time Local Managing
Director of Frank Johnson and Co., and Captain Spreckley Acting
Mining Commissioner in Manica.
For the command of all the Artillery I selected Captain Moberley,
an ex-Imperial Artillery Officer, who was thoroughly conversant with
the working of all machine guns, and I also placed the dismounted men
under his command. These were to have been fifty, but I could only
eventually get about twenty-five. For the two galloping Maxims I
selected Messrs. Tyndale-Biscoe and Llewellyn, both ex-Naval
Officers, the former of whom had distinguished himself in Egypt,
receiving a D.S.O. for service there, and had been in charge of one
of the Maxims of the Pioneer Corps ; the latter had had considerable
experience of machine guns on the coast. Mr. Tennant, who had
previously served in South Africa as an artillery officer, had charge
of the seven-pounder gun. Mr. F. E. Lockner, who had three years
before successfully negotiated the Barotse treaty, but who was not
in very robust health at this time, undertook the duties of Com-
missariat Officer or Quartermaster, but afterwards handed them over
to Mr. J. H. Kennedy, the Company's Accountant in Mashonaland,
who was able at the last minute to get away, and Mr. Lockner then
joined Captain Heany's Troop as junior lieutenant. The officers were
as follow : —
Personal Staff. — Mr. C. M. Acutt, Interpreter and Guide ; Mr. P. L.
Chappe, Veterinary Surgeon and Trumpeter; Mr. J. H. Kennedy, Quarter-
master ;' Mr. T. E. Tanner, Orderly Officer and Galloper.
A Troop.— Captain Heany, with Messrs. Bodle and Lockner as Lieutenants,
and Lieutenant Biscoe in charge of Maxim attached.
B Troop.— Captain Borrow, with Messrs. Snodgrass and Reid as
Lieutenants, and Lieutenant Llewellyn with Maxim attached.
C Troop.— Captain Spreckley, with Messrs. Laing and Christison as
Lieutenants.
Artillery and D Troop.— Captain Moberley, with Mr. Tennant in
charge of seven-pounder gun as Lieutenant.
Remount Officers.— Captain Finch and Mr. J. Garden.
Ordnance Store Officer. — Captain J. A. L. Campbell, late R.A.
Medical Officers.— Dr. H. Edgelow and Dr. J. Stewart.
Organising the Forces. 69
Mr. J. W. W. Nesbitt volunteed to raise a force of Colonial natives
and Coolies, several of the latter of whom had expressed their wish
to go in, and as I was doubtful whether I could get my full number
of 250 white men, I authorised him to raise them to the number
of sixty. This he did, and they were of the greatest assistance to us.
He had the rank of captain, and applied for Mr. Papenfus as lieutenant,
which appointment I made.
There were several gentlemen in Salisbury who did not wish to
join troops, but were willing to go into Matabeliland, and to make them-
selves generally useful, so I formed them into a Scouting Section for
special duty ; this consisted of Captain O. Gwynyth Williams, Messrs-
Ifah Williams, Gerald Paget, and J. Murray Gourlay.
The only difficulty in providing equipment was over the saddlery.
Although the Company had a large number of saddles in store, most of
them were in bad repair, and it was very hard to obtain sufficient
material to repair them. However, by using all I could get in the shape
of serge, flannel, etc., and by collecting different articles of saddlery all
over Salisbury, I was able to complete sufficient.
The Company had a large stock of M.H. rifles in store, and
each volunteer was in possession of one, and I was able to arm the
whole force with them ; I allowed anyone who had a private rifle or
carbine that carried M.H. ammunition to take it. The Coolies were
armed with combination guns, one barrel carrying M.H. ammunition,
the other twelve-bore cartridges loaded with loupers.
The supply of sword-bayonets was not sufficient to complete
all round, but all the dismounted, and about seventy-five per cent.
of the mounted men were armed with them, and 150 revolvers
were also given out, which, with private ones, gave almost
everybody one. One hundred rounds of M.H. ammunition was issued
to each man, and twenty rounds revolver ammunition to all who
had revolvers.
There was not sufficient clothing to issue a complete set to every-
one, and the majority preferred wearing their own clothes. Each man
had a khaki tunic, pair of gaiters, bandolier, and haversack issued to
him, and those that required them Bedford cord breeches and hat, and
each man had a waterproof sheet, and either a cavalry cloak or cape.
yo The Doivnfall of Lnbengula.
and was allowed to take two blankets ; and private kit not to exceed,
with the blanket, twenty pounds in weight.
While I was making my preparations in Salisbury, Dr. Jameson was
doing the same in Victoria. He had told me soon after the first
arrangements were made that Captain Lendy had declined to take in
the Victoria Column, and he had therefore entrusted it to Captain
(afterwards Major) Allan Wilson, than whom no better man could
possibly have been found. Captain Wilson had seen a considerable
amount of service in the native wars in the Colony, and was at this time
in command of the Victoria Volunteers. He was exceedingly popular,
and had an extraordinary power over his men.
The raising of the number of men required was not effected without
some slight difficulties. Many of them wished to know more particulars
of the plan of campaign than could be given them, and several wished
for different terms ; and in addition to these difficulties there were several
men who did their best to persuade others not to come. However, none
of these difficulties did very much harm, and by the time I required
them I had my full number of men.
As soon as Dr. Jameson had decided on his plans, he sent down at
once to buy horses. He ordered altogether about i,000, a good number
of which were to be purchased by Captain Raaf, and some by Messrs.
Zeederburg and Kirton, and towards the end of August they began to
arrive up country. It was decided that the Salisbury Column should
meet the horses at Charter instead of waiting at Salisbury for them, as
this would save the horses sixty miles, and it would be a more con-
venient place to start from, as we should avoid all the thick bush and
broken ground which we should have had to go through if we had gone
by the direct road from Salisbury to Matabeliland ; and on the 28th of
August, I sent off" my first party under command of Mr. Alan G. Finch,
late of the ist Life Guards, to whom I gave the rank of Captain, and
who was to receive the horses at Charter and get a camp ready for us.
With him were Mr. Carden, as assistant remount officer, and four others,
including two farriers. I sent three waggons with them, carrying all the
saddlery and some ammunition, besides entrenching tools, etc. The
date that had been given me by Dr. Jameson as the earliest that he
could have all the horses up and we could make a forward move was the
Organising the Forces. 71
15th of September, and I therefore arranged to march from Salisbury
on the 5th September, and orders were issued to march at 2 p.m. on
that date (Tuesday). On the Sunday we had a full church parade,
which nearly everyone attended, and Archdeacon Upcher gave us a
short farewell address. I may say that the clergy of all denominations
had supported the movement from the first, realising its necessity, and
how impossible the tenure of Mashonaland was while the Matabeli
power was unbroken.
At 1.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 5th September, the whole of the
Salisbury Column, with the exception of those who had already gone on
to Charter and a few who could not get av/ay for a day or two, but were
to follow by the next post-cart, paraded, and at 2 p.m. were ready to
move off. Unfortunately, although the waggons had all been loaded
some time before, the oxen had not come in, and we were delayed
nearly an hour by them ; however, at 3 p.m. we moved off. Mr. H.
Bezeidenhout had been given a contract to supply twelve waggons, each
complete with driver and leader and sixteen oxen, at £\a^ a day for the
twelve, and at the last moment I engaged two others from Messrs.
Tuck and Papenfus at the same rate ; and in addition, both Captains
Heany and Borrow volunteered to take in their own waggons to carry
extra stores for their troops. These v/aggons and oxen were guaranteed
against loss, and the drivers and leaders paid by the Company. As the
number of waggons to be taken had increased, I found that I could take
a month's rations for the whole force, and I arranged before leaving
Salisbury that in the event of my being delayed longer than I had
expected at Charter, further supplies should follow, so as to enable me
to leave Charter with a month clear. I was very much gratified at
seeing the way in which the force marched out of Salisbury. Although
we were leaving for an indefinite time v/ith a dangerous venture in front
of us, and the good-byes that had to be said were many, and as anyone
who knows life in South Africa knows each good-bye generally entails a
parting drink, there were only five out of the total strength who were
reported absent. -;t All Salisbury turned out to see us off, and cheered us
heartily, while several photographers, amateur and professional, " shot "
us from different points.
As we were to meet our horses at Charter, nearly the whole force
72 The Downfall of Lobengtila.
was on foot, only the few that had private horses being mounted, (All
private horses taken in by their owners were valued and guaranteed by
the Company.) We did a hot and dusty march to the six-mile spruit,
and then as we had taken a short cut had to wait till dark for our
waggons. I had arranged with one of the Salisbury butchers to take
out a day's meat, to be ready for us there, and he was also to carry a
day's bread ; he failed to arrive till nearly midnight, and everyone came
off rather short that night. We went on to the Hanyane River at daylight
and crossed without difficulty, although we had to double-span most of
the waggons ; marched about six miles that evening. The following
day, Thursday, we did about twelve miles, and on Friday about the
same, laagering across the Umfuli on that night. I began to practise
laagering as soon as we left the Hanyane, as it takes some time for both
the drivers and the oxen to get accustomed to it. The following day,
Saturday, we did five miles in the morning, but in the afternoon got into
very heavy sand, and to my great disgust a considerable number of the
oxen knocked up. We managed, however, to do about five miles,
but had to double-span most of the waggons for the last mile, and did
not get them all to the camp till after dark. As we were now within
about eight miles of Charter, I rode on there at daylight, leaving Captain
Heany in charge, with instructions to move on as soon as the oxen had
sufficiently rested ; and sent back the three spans which had previously
come down to Charter. The Column got in just before dark, and
laagered on the north bank of the stream.
I found when I got to Charter that Captain Finch had selected a
very good site for a camp, on the south bank of the stream, and had
cleared sufficient space of bush, marked out horse lines, etc. I also
found that he had only received fifty-nine horses, which had arrived on
the 7th September. They were a very good stamp of horse, averaging
from 14 hands to [4*1, and strongly built, but in poor condition, and a
good many suffering from horribly sore backs. These were in most cases
caused by the gross carelessness of the men who had been sent up in
charge of them from Victoria, who were most of them men who did not
know a horse from a cow, and who had picked out what they were told
were the easiest to ride, and had ridden them quick right through, quite
regardless of the fact that the saddles, which were badly stuffed, had
Organising the Forces.
n
rubbed their backs, and in several cases the iron arch had cut right into
their withers, making wounds some of which took a month to heal, and
one of which was not healed, nor had the horse even had a saddle on
him up to the time that we arrived in Buluwayo two months later.
Mr. Chappe, my trumpeter, who had
had to do with horses all his life, had
kindly offered to act as veterinary
surgeon, and had gone down to
Charter with Captain Finch.
He was doing all he could,
and barring the worst of the
" backs," soon got the horses
fit for work.
On Monday morning
the Force moved across the
stream and I formed camp.
The waggons, sixteen in
number, were laagered in
the centre, and the Troops
put up rough shelters out-
side— A Troop on the right,
C in the front, and B on the
left, while the dismounted Troop and the Artillery remained in the
laager, the horse lines being in rear. As there were now enough
horses to mount one Troop I started mounted drill each morning,
one Troop at a time ; Troops being forty-eight file, drilling in single
rank and forming a squadron, and in a short time all of them had had
some practice in skirmishing, outpost duty, etc. I also started rifle
and revolver practice, and each Troop went through a short course
of the former. I had sent all the oxen to some good grass, five or
six miles away, as soon as we arrived, hoping that by the time we
moved forv/ard they would be fit to travel. I would have got others
to replace them had I been able to, but there were none procurable at
the time.
Although the 15 th September was originally put down as the day
on which we were to leave Charter, it was evident as soon as we got
VIr. Chaite, Bugler to the Salisbury Horse,
Calling in the Horses.
74 The Dozvnfall of Lobcng^ila.
there that we should not get away till some time after that date.
Owing to the difficulty of purchasing good horses quickly, and tlie
distance they had to travel, it was not till the 14th September that our
large lot of horses arrived at Victoria. One hundred and seventy-one
had left Tuli, of which only 136 eventually arrived at Victoria, and
this number was further reduced to 109 before arrival at Charter,
the remainder having had to be left along the road, sick or
knocked up.
As soon as I heard that this lot was at Victoria I sent Captain
Finch with a small party to meet them. He was to send them on with
my men from wherever he met them, going on himself to Victoria to
bring on the next lot. The 109 horses arrived at Charter on 22nd
September, and were an extraordinarily good lot. They were in very
fair condition, and a very good stamp, with scarcely a bad one amongst
them. The arrival of these horses cheered everyone up ; time had been
hanging very heavy on our hands and we were all keen for a move. I
was now enabled to mount the three Troops entirely, and fitting and
altering saddlery, etc., kept everyone busy for a few days. By this time
Dr. Jameson and Major Wilson had got the Victoria Column pretty well
ready on much the same lines as mine, and they were only waiting for
their horses and 150 men, whom Dr. Jameson was having sent up from
Johannesburg.
Dr. Jameson went to see the Tuli Column before they made a
move. On arriving he found that Captain Raaf had not yet returned
from buying horses, and he had to wait some days for him, and it
was not till the 23rd September that Captain Raaf returned, and
Dr. Jameson found that he had failed him in a large number of
horses. I still required about eighty or ninety to complete, and Dr.
Jameson could not find me any more. I wired to Mr. Duncan, at
Salisbury, and he at once commandeered all the horses there, and
much to my surprise and gratification, managed to send me forty.
These were nearly all good salted horses — private ones, which the
owners had not cared to sell when I started. In commandeering them
the Company and the owner fixed a price, and if they could not agree,
put it to arbitration. Captain Finch managed to get eighteen more
from Victoria, all of which belonged to my two previous lots, but had
Organising the Forces. 75
either been left on the road, or had had to go back with the men who
had brought up the first lot, and with these I had to be content.
I had been in daily communication with Dr. Jameson by wire,
and the two points that I always impressed upon him as being, in my
opinion, most important, were: (ij That each column should be
absolutely complete in itself, and not in any way dependent on either of
the others for anything ; and (2) That ample provision should be made
for supplies to follow us in ; I had had an experience in 1890-91 of this,
and was anxious to avoid a recurrence of it. Dr. Jameson quite agreed
to the necessity of both of these, and made the necessary arrangements.
The Salisbury and Victoria Columns were arranged on the same lines,
only that Salisbury had about 250 whites, and Victoria 400, but the
Tuli Column was to go in without waggons, carrying ammunition on
pack-horses, and living on the natives. This was Captain Raaf's wish,
but before the time came to move he had changed his mind and taken
waggons.
My idea was for the three Columns to act entirely separately,
and to go straight for Buluwayo from their three starting points,
clearing the country on both sides of them as they advanced so as to
leave no danger in the rear. I thought that the effect of the three
Columns coming from three different directions would serve to
demoralise and break up the Matabeli, and should they fall back and
concentrate on Buluwayo we could join forces in that neighbourhood.
I was quite satisfied that a Column such as mine was quite safe against
attack, as with the rifle and machine-gun fire that I had, I knew no
natives could get up to the laager, and my only fear about the success
of the Expedition was that the Matabeli might fall back before us and
take up a strong position somewhere in the bush, out of which, with the
limited time at our disposal before the rains, we might not be able to
turn them. I always hoped, however, that being so confident of their
own strength, they would attack us on the road, and so give us an
opportunity of breaking them up before we got to Buluwayo, and this
hope was realised. I have said that I wished the Columns to go in
separately, but the Victoria Column were very anxious to join us,
and Dr. Jameson considered it advisable. It was therefore arranged
that we should start about the same dates from Charter and Victoria,
76
The Downfall of Lobengula,
and join at the " Iron Mine " Hill. This was a small bill on the
edge of the high veldt, about eighty-five miles from Charter, according
to the map, and one hundred from Victoria. We received very few
reports as to the movements of the Matabeli during this time, and
nothing very definite. Lobengula was reported to be massing his
forces on the Shangani River about where the combined columns would
cross it, and small parties were reported to be along the border. The
Umniati and Shasha Rivers, which formed the border of
Matabeliland proper, were about thirty-five and thirty miles
from Charter and Victoria respectively, but it was known
that there were no Matabeli kraals for a considerable dis-
tance further, although the country was largely populated
with Maholi (Matabeli slaves), whose attitude towards
us was doubtful.
I had asked Dr. Jameson to come and see the
force at Charter, as I knew that all the men would like
to see him, and that he would be able to tell them
various details, which up to then had had to
be kept quiet. Although it was very incon-
venient to him, he agreed to come, and
havmg seen the Tuli Force ready to start,
drove right through in the post-cart
)i and arrived at Charter on the
morning of the 30th September,
accompanied by Sir J. Willoughby.
The latter had come out from
rland when he heard of
the disturbances, and
was accompanying Dr.
Jameson as his friend
pure and simple, so I
understood, but in reality
as his military adviser.
This I did not know until
WAITING FOR THE ORDER TO ^^g^^g^^^ ^^^r thc wholc businCSS
Advance,— A Mess at Charter-^bI^^^^^^^^^^" ^^^^ o\QX, and I can
Organising the Forces. jy
safely say that he never advised me in any way. I had a parade of
the whole force for the Doctor, marching past at a walk, then the
Mounted Troops cantering past (and considering that they had never
done it before, they did it extraordinarily well), and an advance
in line, after which the Mounted Troops did some skirmishing
practice. The Doctor expressed himself much pleased with the
efficiency of the Force, and promised to meet the men at a smoking
concert to be held that evening. After the parade the Doctor and I
discussed several details that had yet to be settled, and he then walked
round the camp to see the men. At the smoking concert he spoke to
them and thanked them for the way in which they had come forward
to help Mashonaland, and assured them of his complete confidence in
our success. He also informed them, and this cheered up any who
were inclined to hesitate, that the Bechuanaland Border Police with a
large force of Khama's natives would advance via Tati at the same
time as we began our advance ; and he also told them that although we
could not begin the actual advance into Matabeliland for a few days
more, as some of the preparations for the other Columns were not quite
complete, yet we could leave Charter and move slowly forward pending
orders to advance.
Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby left the same evening to return
to Victoria, and Mr. Duncan, who had come from Salisbury to meet the
Doctor, returned the following morning.
While we were at Charter, Bishop Knight-Bruce, Bishop of
Mashonaland, had ridden across from Umtali to see us, and expressed
a wish to accompany the Column. He saw Dr. Jameson and arranged
to go with us, but had first to return to Umtali upon business ; however,
he said that he would catch us up. It was Saturday when the Doctor
left, and on Monday, 2nd October, the Salisbury Column marched.
Our strength on leaving Charter was as follows : — Whites, 258 ;
Natives, 115 ; Horses, 242.
The order of march which I arranged then, and which was followed
until we joined the Victoria Column, was as follows : — One mounted
Troop furnished the advance guard and right flanking party ; half a
troop, i.e., twenty-four file, forming each. The constitution of each
troop was one Captain, two Lieutenants, one Troop-sergeant-major,
78 The Downfall of Lobcngnla.
two Sergeants, four Corporals, one trumpeter, and forty-two rank and
file ; each troop formed a squadron of two troops of twenty-four file
divided into six sections, each one of which was a unit in itself, and as
far as possible the section system was carried out all through. The
advance guard consisted of an advance party of three sections (twelve
file) in extended order, and a support of three sections with a galloping
Maxim drawn by four mules. The right flanking party consisted of
three sections in single file on the outside, and a support of three
sections inside. Another mounted troop with a Maxim furnished the
left flanking party and rear guard, which were disposed in the same
way as the advance guard and right flanking party. The third mounted
Troop remained in reserve with the Column.
The waggons, sixteen in number, marched in a double column
about fifty yards apart, a private Scotch cart belonging to Mr. Acutt
heading the right column and opening the spoor, the seven-pounder gun
with ten oxen leading the left, while the Gardner gun with six oxen
followed in the rear of the right column. The Nordenfeldt gun, which
had no limber, was carried on the artillery waggon which followed the
seven-pounder gun at the head of the left column. The waggons in the
two columns were as follow : —
Right Column.— Staff ; A Troop; A Troop ; Hospital; C Troop; Com-
missariat ; Commissariat ; D Troop.
Left Column.— Artillery ; B Troop; B Troop; Commissariat; Com-
missariat ; Commissariat ; Commissariat ; Forge.
Each waggon carried a certain amount of M.H. ammunition, and
two boxes (2,000 rounds) were always kept open at the front of each
waggon.
The ration scale was as follows :— Meat (fresh) li lbs., (tinned) i lb.;
Meal, U lbs. ; Tea, \ oz. ; Coffee, i oz. ; Sugar, 3 ozs. ; Vegetables
(preserved) i oz.
On leaving Charter we had about forty days' full rations for the men,
including meat which we drove, and three days' mealies for the horses,
and I counted on getting another three days' mealies at Mr. Dawson's
cattle post about twenty miles on the road. We had at starting 242
horses, all told, and 276 oxen.
The ammunition that we carried was 176.000 rounds of M.H., of
Organising the Forces.
79
which about 15,000 were carried by the men, each mounted man carry-
ing 100 rounds, fifty in his bandoHer and fifty in his wallets ; 16,000
Gardner, 150 rounds seven-pounder gun, and 4,000 special Maxim ammu-
nition. The Nordenfeldt gun fired M.H. We had also about 5,000 rounds
revolver ammunition. I also had with me two dozen socket signals,
which we found most useful, seven dozen one-pound signal rockets, and
two dozen magnesian lights. The latter, which had been given me by
Mr. Markham shortly before leaving Salisbury, had been specially made
for him for shooting lions, and, although I never had an opportunity of
trying them at an attack, I am sure that they would have been most
useful. They burn very brightly for about a minute, and throw a brilliant
light for about 200 yards all round. I am sure that this brilliant light
would have had a great effect on the Matabeli, and four men were told
off daily to hold them, one in the centre of each face of the laager. I
also had sufficient entrenching tools.
On leaving Charter I commenced forming laager regularly, and
this form was adopted by me
during the whole of the Expedition,
and was found to be very conve-
nient. It could be formed when on
the march in from two to three
minutes, and when bushed was very
strong. It provided room for all
the men and horses inside ; the
oxen were all picketed in front of
the right, left, and rear faces. Each
driver was provided with two three-
feet steel posts, and immediately his
waggon was driven into its place,
he unhooked the whole span of
oxen, and took them clear of the
waggons, and as soon as the side
was complete, fastened both ends
of his trek-tow down, and then
tied the oxen up to it. The oxen t,,^^^^^ showing formation
when crowded close into the waggon, Salisbury Laager.
8o The Downfall of Lobengiila.
took up very little room, and formed a most efficient obstacle. If
time allowed, a thick thorn bush fence was always put outside them,
and all the waggons not covered by oxen were protected by thorn bush
pulled under them. It was found that in bush country the whole laager
could be completed and bushed up in about ten to fifteen minutes.
The duties when on march were distributed as follows : — A captain
and subaltern of the day were told off daily. One mounted troop came
on duty at guard-mounting (6 p.m.) daily. This troop found the out-
lying white pickets for that night, and the pickets the following day.
The night pickets consisted of three double white and three single
native pickets, posted at regular intervals, not more than 200 yards
away from and round the laager. The white pickets consisted of one non-
commissioned officer and six men, and the native pickets of one non-
commissioned officer and three men. Each white picket furnished two
patrolling sentries, and each native one stationary sentry, and the white
sentries patrolled continually to the native on each side of them, so that
there was a continuous moving circle of sentries round the laager,
These were relieved at daylight, when the day pickets were posted.
The day pickets consisted of one section each (the No. i of each section
being in charge), and were posted immediately on halting by the
captain of the day. Their number varied according to the nature of
the country ; but, as a rule, two or three were sufficient to command
all the surrounding country, and to enclose a large enough space for
all the animals to graze inside them. This troop also furnished the
advance guard. Another mounted troop formed the inlying picket for
the night, and slept at the end of the laager. This troop was always
available for any special duty during the night, and in case of an alarm
had to immediately saddle up its horses. It formed the reserve troop
durine the march the following day, and when the Column was spanned
out in^the middle of the day, always kept a certain number of horses in,
and grazed the remainder within easy distance of the laager. The
third mounted troop formed the rear-guard and flanking party on
the following day. The dismounted troop and the artillery always
furnished the main guard, consisting of one non-commissioned officer
and three men at first, and later, of two non-commissioned officers and
twelve men.
Organising the Forces. 8i
As long as the smaller guard was sufficient, it was posted at the
left rear corner of the waggon, and furnished one sentry. The only
entrance into the laager when it was completed was in this corner, and
was made by the Maxim being drawn back into the laager. It was the
duty of the non-commissioned officers of the guard to have the Maxim
pushed into its place at " last post," thereby completely closing the
laager. When I found it advisable to have a larger guard, a non-
commissioned officer and six men were posted at each Maxim, and a
sentry was furnished for each side of the laager. Each sentry's beat
was along the outside of his face, communicating at the corners with
the sentries of the other faces.
As soon as the horses were fastened up and fed each evening
the general parade sounded, and everyone in the laager was told
off to place his men in case of an alarm. Each waggon was manned
with eight men, and any that were to spare were told off to the
front face. A Troop always occupied the right, and B Troop the
left face, except when either of them was inlying picket, and its
place was then taken by C Troop. Each man slept as near his post as
possible. All natives, except a few good grooms who slept in the
laager, and whose duty it was in case of alarm to remain among the
horses and keep them quiet, were divided equally, and slept outside
each end of the laager, with orders to come inside to man the front and
rear faces in case of an attack.
In addition to the natives who had joined the Native Contingent
before leaving, there were a considerable number of private native
servants whom I had allowed to accompany their masters, provided
they were passed as efficient by the officers commanding troops ;
and on consideration of the Company feeding them, they were
available for any duty, and took their turn on the roster for night
pickets. All these, as well as all the waggon-drivers and leaders, were
armed. I found that the natives were thoroughly reliable for picket
duty at night, and only one native during the campaign was found
asleep on his post. As a rule I think that the whole of the native
picket remained awake all night from fear, but no false alarm was ever
occasioned by them. Their hearing and eyesight are both so superior
to a white man's, especially at night, that I consider them very useful
G
82 The Doimifall of Lobengula.
in this capacity so long as they feel that they are in touch with and
supported by white men.
The horses were fastened up to picketing lines pegged down at
each end, and their saddles placed close behind them. I with my
staff always slept under or near the " Staff" waggon, and I had a
socket for socket signals permanently fastened on the front of the
waggons, and also had some one-pound rockets in readiness each night,
besides the four men already mentioned who were posted, one in the
centre of each face with magnesian lights.
Although we had been delayed at Charter for three weeks, and the
delay had been very irksome and trying to everyone, the discipline of
the force had been extremely good. There had only been two
aggravated cases for orderly room — Belburn and Carroll— and they
had both been discharged at once ; and during the whole campaign I
think that there was only one other white man brought before me.
The force was enlisted under the Cape Mounted Rifles Act, and
officers commanding troops had power to punish for any trivial offence.
Two men took their discharge from Charter- — Trooper L. T. E.
Llewellyn and Corporal W. Keppel Stier. The former was suddenly
recalled home by very pressing business, and left via Beira, he told
me what the business was, and I advised him to go. Keppel Stier went
to Victoria, where he was given a commission as a subaltern by Major
Wilson.
INTS TO BULUWAYO.
\pass.
J?orx Charter
Buluwayi
To Ml
COLLlNGRIDGt , LI^HO. LONDON
'.Oct., 1893.
^ct., 1893.
I-*
6 E. Burnett's Grave.
9 E, Burnett shot, a:ird Oct., 1893.
19 Trooper Thompson's Grave, killed in action at M. Bembesi.
^S Graves 0/ Troopers Gary and Siebert, shot at M, Bembesi.
17 Calcro/t's Grave, shot at M. Bembesi.
10 Capt, Williams lost at Jingen, atth Oct., 1893.
16 Cattle captured by patrol under Alajor Forbes, iSt/i Oct., 1S93.
Sia'^B Country covered -with bush.
The Downfall of Lobengula. plan i.
Sketch Map, showing Route taken by the Salisbury and Victoria Field Columns, from their Starting Points to BULUWAYO.
Total distance from Fort Charter to Biihiwayo, 220 miles by Trocheameter. Bearings taken by Prismatic Compass.
^am f>e^L
Water
Buluwayo, izM Nccz'., 1893.
To Major SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY, Bart.
Preparedly D. TYRIE LAING,
Lieut, C. Troop,
Salisbury Horse,
..--5/,sa vie R
Sabc ti'ccteT^ S/ved
■;OLLiNGSIDC-t
J'HO ^ONOO-.
m Fort Cltarte^ to Buluzvayo.
I Iron Mine Hill to Buluwayo.
^ Foute o/thl Saliii'Ury Column/,
♦■++.t ++ Himie 0/ t/u Victoria Column fro
■— -^ — * Rivers and running Streams.
"~---" Probable course oj Ri-ners.
r^ Battle 0/ Shangani. ^stli Od., 1893.
rt <A> Jiatlle o/M. Bembesi, \st Nov., 1893.
<f ^ Capt. IVhite's scouts skirmish killed 7 Matabeli, -itnd Oct. , i8g3.
3
O ff. Sucameni Regt. Kraal destroyed by fatrol under Major Wilson, 2ul Oct.,
C Kraal destroyed by C. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. Sprecklcy, s^rd Oct., 181
e Kraal destroyed by B. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. Borro7it, 24//; Oct., 1S93.
10 Jingen Kraal destroyed by A . Troop, Salisbury Horse, Caft. Heaney, ^ith Oct., 1893.
11>> Jingen skirmish with Matabeli— C Troop, supported by B. Tj oop, killed 07ier 40 Matabeli, eTth Oct. , 1 89
12 Eu.xta Kraal shelled by Victoria t-pounder and destroyed by A. Troop. Salisbury Horse, 28M Oct., 1893.
13k C. Troop skirmish with strong/orce 0/ Matabeli in hills ") ,„< Oct., 1S93.
13^ Victoria Horse skirmish with strong force 0/ Matabeli in hills) Sir John Willoughty present.
\^ C. Troop, Salisbury Horse, Capt. IVhite's scouts skirmish with Matal'eli, yd i^ov.. 1893.
X Capt. Campbell' s Grax'e,
2 Capt. Campbell shot, x^th Oct., 1893.
6 /- ■ Burnett's Grave,
9 E, Burnett shot, 3ird Oct,, l%9i.
19 Trooper Thompson' s Grave, kllUd in action at M. Bembesi.
^Q Craves 0/ Troopers Gary and Siebtrt, shot at M, Bembesi.
17 Calcro/t's Grave, shot at M, Bembesi.
10 Capt. Williams lost at Jingen, atth Oct., 1893.
16 Cattle captured by patrol under Major Forbes, sitk Oct., 1S93.
"^Jt Country coz'ered with bush.
CHAPTER VII.
LEA VING MASHONALAND FOR THE FRONT.
By Major P. W. Forbes.
The Salisbury Column advance from Charter — Crossing the Umniati river — In Matabeliland
— A scouting party — Halt at Iron Mine Hill — Capturing cattle — First sight of the
Matabeli — Captain Campbell shot — The Victoria Column join us— formation of their
laager — Their strength and officers — Difficulties with the Victoria Artillery overcome —
Arrangements for the combined march— The realities of war— Native guides.
The Salisbury Column left Charter on Monday, October 2nd, and
were to move quietly forward until I got orders to commence the main
advance. Although our waggons were not heavily laden — the heaviest
load being less than 5,000 pounds — the sand was very deep and our
progress slow ; the first water was six miles away, and we had to reach
it that night ; this we managed to do by dark, but did not get some
of the waggons in till nearly midnight.
On leaving Charter, we followed the alternative road from Salisbury
to Buluwayo for about twenty miles ; this leads almost due west over
a high sandy plateau, bare of bush, with the exception of a few small
patches here and there. About twenty-five miles from Charter, and on this
road, there are the Intabas Insimbi Hills — a large square of bushy kopjes,
about 400 feet high, covering eight to ten miles square of country. In
these there are several small Mashona kraals, and before leaving Charter I
had sent Captain Williams' scouting party to see if they could get any
information about the movements of the Matabeli. They were unable
to get any at the kraals, and pushed on about ten miles further to the
drift on the Umniati River, but without seeing any signs of an enemy.
t The following morning (the 3rd) we marched again at daybreak,
but had to leave two waggons that had not arrived till late at night, to
follow us after the oxen had rested, and got to a disused cattle post of
Mr. Dawson. Mr. Dawson has a farm marked out there, but there was
G 2
84 The Downjall of Lobengula.
no one in occupation. As there was good water and fairly good
grazing, I determined to wait there for a day.
The next morning, 4th, I rode back to Charter with Captain Finch
and Dr. Edgelow, to have a final talk on the wire with Major Wilson and
Mr. Duncan. Major Wilson told me that the last of his people were
leaving that day, and we agreed to meet at the Iron Mine Hill on the
14th. I got a message from Dr. Jameson, saying that he hoped to be
able to send rne final instructions to move on the following day; we then
rode back to camp, getting there just at lunch-time. While at lunch I had
suddenly to turn the whole camp out, to put out a grass fire. The grass
had been accidentally lighted about a mile up wind, and burnt down on
us at such a pace that it was with difficulty we extinguished it. We
remained at this camp during the next day, and on the morning of the
6th marched again ; we did five miles in the morning march, all through
deep sand, and went on again at 3 p.m., doing six-and-a-half miles to
Mr. Dawson's other cattle post. The road was very heavy and the
oxen all tired before we arrived, which was just at dark; the leading
waggon drove into a mud hole and stuck there, and we had about two
hours' hard work to get it out. From this point we were to leave the
road and strike out our own line ; I had originally intended following
the road until after we had crossed the Umniati, but as this would have
entailed going in amongst the kopjes and through some thick bush, I
thought it best to keep to the open country as much as possible. As
there was a stream to be crossed about two miles on. over which a drift
had to be made, I sent Major Browne on in the morning with a fatigue
party, and rested the oxen until the afternoon, and then moved across
the drift. I did not wish to get too far from Charter, as the message
from the Doctor which I was expecting every minute had to be brought,
and so determined to wait where we were until it arrived. It came about
9 a.m. the following morning, and was to the effect that we could push on.
The Doctor also said that Colonel Goold-Adams was leaving with the
Bechuanaland Border Police, and would have the Tuli Column under him
until they reached Buluwayo. I spanned-in at once, and did a short
trek of two miles, still through deep sand and over high, open ridges,
and went on five miles in the afternoon. The distances were taken by
a tracheometer, which I had borrowed from the Hon. Maurice Gifford,
Leaving Mashoualand for the Front. 85
and which generally worked all right, although it sometimes got caked
with dust and refused to register. That evening we had some slight
rain, sufficiently heavy to show everyone how desirable it was to get our
work done before the regular rains began. There were no tents procur-
able in Salisbury, and I had provided the force as far as possible with
canvas to make shelters, it was double width (6 feet) canvas, and when
cut off in lengths of 7^ feet, with buttons and ropes sewn on, made a very
good protection. One piece stretched between two trees with its back
to the weather made a good shelter for four men, and two pieces
fastened together made a very good patrol tent. Captain Heany had
also provided a large amount of limbo (white calico) for his Troop^
and with these and the buck sails, of which each waggon had one, the
whole force could keep fairly dry.
The following morning we reached the Umniati River. This was a
boundary river between Mashonaland and Matabeliland, and we might
expect opposition at any point after crossing it.
The Umniati is a wide sandy river, with at that time of the year
very little water in it. We had to cut the bank away a little to get down to
it, but had no difficulty in crossing, and laagered about half-a-mile from
it. The Native Contingent were divided into two parties, and always
went in advance of the two columns of waggons, cutting the bush and
making drifts where necessary.
As we were now actually in Matabeliland, I issued a special order
warning every one to be on the alert ; and after this I allowed no game
shooting along the road. Game had been very plentiful across the flats
from Charter, and most of the messes had been able to supplement their
rations with buck meat or birds. We moved on the same afternoon three-
and-a-half miles, and had to make a drift over a small tributary of the
Umniati, on the west bank of which we laagered. The first few miles
after crossing the Umniati took us through large granite kopjes with
patches of bush. The ground, although dry at that time of the year, is
very soft in the wet season.
The following morning, loth October, I sent out two parties of
scouts — one under Captain Williams was to follow the Umniati down its
west bank to the waggon road, along that about twenty miles towards
Buluwayo,and then strike due south to cut our spoor. They were to be
86 The Doivnfall of Lobengula.
absent about three days. I had always had in mind the possibility that
as we were keeping so far to the south, the Matabeli might make a
counter-attack on Salisbury, keeping to the waggon road. I knew that
they could not keep much to the north of it, on account of the " fly,"
through which they could not drive their slaughter oxen, upon which, as
being their sole food supply, an impi is entirely dependent. The other
scouting party, one furnished by A Troop, I sent forward, giving them
what we were told by one of our natives who had previously hunted in
the country was our general direction, i.e., slightly to the N. of S.E., and
instructing them to push on if possible to the Iron Mine Hill, and return
as fast as possible to guide us. This morning we marched six miles and
laagered across a considerable sized stream, over which we had
to make drifts, and went on in the afternoon, doing four miles. We
were in open country most of the day, crossing high pebbly ridges with
small streams between them. During the afternoon march we crossed
a high ridge, from which we got a very good view, and our natives
pointed out the whereabouts of the Iron Mine Hill.
The next day, i ith, we marched as usual as soon as possible after
daylight, and after going two miles came to the Sebaque River. This
was a wide sandy river with steep banks which we had to cut away, we
crossed it without difficulty and were delayed a few minutes only. I
had provided before starting two pieces of rope, about thirty feet long,
with a hook at the end of each, and these were hooked into the end of
the trek-tow of each waggon in turn when they got into heavy ground,
and twenty or thirty men soon pulled them out. While we were making
the drift we saw a troop of sable antelope about i,ooo yards to our left,
and I gave Mr. Murray Gourlay permission to try and shoot one, which he
succeeded in doing, securing a young bull. Shooting had been prohibited
after crossing the border to avoid a false alarm being given. We went
about two miles beyond the Sebaque, and laagered on a small stream.
Just after laagering Mr. Acutt found a large bull roan antelope that had
been recently killed by a lion. One hind-quarter and intestines only had
been eaten, so we took the rest of the meat. We were now in bushy
country, mostly Segusi and Machabel, without much undergrowth, and
this continued almost up to the Iron Mine Hill. Large open " laagtes "
(glades) ran down between the bush and along the streams ; in these
Leaving Mashonalaud for the Front. 87-
there was fair grazing. We did five miles in the afternoon and came to
a large river, of which the natives did not know the name, but we found
out afterwards that it was the Umvumi.
The following morning, 12th, we found a good drift where no work
was required, and as there was good grass we laagered on the west bank,
going on in the afternoon five miles. That evening the A Troop Scout
ing party returned about 9 p.m., bringing two natives as guides whom
they got from a kraal near the Iron Mine Hill, They reported that
they had not actually been to the Hill but had seen it from the kraal
from which they had got the " boys," and that it was not more than
twelve miles awa}^ The natives reported that there were no Matabeli
about, that they had heard nothing of my column, but that they heard
three days before that there were white men at Chilimanzi's, about sixty
miles to the south, coming from Victoria and going into Matabeliland.
The scouts also reported that except at the kraal where they had got the
guides they had seen no trace of any natives.
The following morning, 13th, we moved on at daylight, and after
going about three miles, came to the best patch of grass that we had
found anywhere on the road. As we had no grain for the horses, I
thought it advisable to laager there, although we had come such a short
distance. The guides gave us to understand that it was only about six
miles to the Iron Mine Hill, so we started at 3 p.m., hoping to get there
by dark. I rode on with them, leaving the waggons to follow, but when
we had gone six-and-half miles they told me that the hill was as far
again as we had come, consequently I gave up all hopes of getting
there that night, and laagered on the head waters of the Bembeswane.
We started at daylight the next day, 14th, and had scarcely gone a
mile when we saw a small kopje in front of us, covered Vv''ith workings.
We concluded that this was the Iron Mine Hill, or Sigala, as the natives
call it, and found on asking the guides that it was. We were glad to
find that we were first at the place of meeting, and that we were up to
time. We laagered close under the kopje, which is right at the head
waters of the Tokwe, and on the watershed between the Zambesi and
the Limpopo, and which, although a small and insignificant landmark
from the north, stands out well from the south, where the country falls
rapidly away. A picket was posted on the top of the kopje, and they
88
The Dozvnfall of Lobengula.
found a pen-
cilled note
stuck on a
tree there,
which had
been left by
some of the
Victoria
Scouts the
day before. From this we
made out that the Victoria Force
was twenty to twenty-five miles
away and could not be there for
two days. There was a very extensive view in
the direction of Victoria, and after breakfast I
took a heliograph to the top of the kopje to try and
call up the Victoria Column, but without success. I also
took up the guides and examined them about the country.
To the south-east, the direction in which the Victoria
Column would come, the country was fairly level for some
distance, and the hills about Chilimanzi's, and behind them
those about Victoria, stood up in the far distance; To
the south, about ten miles away and extending for a long distance to
the south-west were the Matoppo hills, in which the guide informed me
Indaima, a Mashona Chief, had his kraals. The hills here ended to the
east, in a high "spitzkop" which they called Indaima's mountain.
They also informed me that Indaima's people had charge of a large
number of Matabeli cattle which they had to herd, and pointed out
a long bushy ridge, about six miles to the west, behind which they said
were the Insukameni cattle posts, at which were some of the cattle
taken from Victoria in July, and as I should have to wait at least a day
for the Victoria Column, I thought that I could not do better than try
to recover some of them.
Shortly after we had arrived in the morning some Mashonas had
come into camp to " konza" (pay their respects). They expressed them-
selves delighted to see us, and hoped that we should be successful in
Indaima's Kraal.
Leaving Mashonaland for the Fj'ont. 89
exterminating their ruthless enemies. I sent some of them back to the
kraals to tell the natives to bring in grain and food to trade, and I also told
them to make enquiries, and let me know that evening if the cattle were
still at their posts. During the morning the American Scouts attached
to the Victoria Column arrived ; they told us that the Column should
be there the following night. As the water was some distance from
the Iron Mine Hill, and the grass was poor, I decided to shift the laager to
a better site, I found one about two miles away, and we were spanning-
in to move when the picket sent down word that they had seen the
light of a heliograph. I went up at once and called up ; I got their
light, and found that it was an advance party of the Victoria Column
about ten miles away. I was just asking where Dr. Jameson was, when
I saw him and Sir John Willoughby ride up to our laager ; I went
down at once, and we then moved the laager to the new site. The
Doctor told me that the other Column was coming on all right, and had
had no opposition.
That evening some of the natives I had sent out in the morning
returned, and said that the cattle were still at their posts, but that
a small party of Matabeli had been at their kraal that day, that they
were going on to Indaima's to collect cattle there, and returning the
following day, picking up the cattle from the different kraals and
posts as they passed, and driving them into the country. As I did not
like to miss the opportunity of recovering the cattle, I started off at
3 a.m. with sixty men, twenty each from A, B, and C Troops.
Captain Heany accompanied me, and Captain Borrow was left in
command of the laager ; Dr. Jameson and Sir John Willoughby
accompanied the patrol, I had hoped to have got to the cattle posts
by daylight, or anyhow before the cattle were let out of the kraals
but the distance was greater than the natives had given me to under-
stand, and we had gone ten miles before we saw any cattle. A large
herd of what we thought to be cattle were seen as we were going
out, and Captain Heany took the A Troop men to try and cut them
off; they turned out, however, to be sable antelope. After going
about ten miles, and when I had nearly made up my mind to turn
back — as I did not wish to knock up the horses — we saw some cattle
coming out of the bush a few hundred yards in front of us. I sent
90
The Downfall of Lobcnoiila.
a small party round each side to surround them and drive them back,
and they drove out about 250. They were all fine cattle, but very wild;
only one native was seen with them, and he ran away. I told Captain
Heany to drive them back to the camp, and to take all the men except
ten of B Troop with him, as I wished the others to come with me to visit
a Mashona kraal on the way back. Directly after Captain Heany had
started, which he had to do at a good pace, as the cattle would not drive
slowly, Lieutenant Bodle appeared with the calves (about sixt}') belonging
to the troop of cattle we had taken ; he had found them still in the kraal,
close behind where the cattle had been found. He had several men with
him, and I told him to drive them out after the others, but in case of an
attack to leave them and ride for camp. Dr. Jameson and Sir J.
Willoughby rode straight back to camp.
I then went off with my Staff and the ten men to see the Mashona
Induna. I had a guide with me and he led us to a kraal on the side of
- . and deep down a very steep rocky valley.
He had told me that there were a
few of the cattle theie, and I
\ intended to take them. The
>palh ^\as \eiy rough and steep
Major V. W. 1*orbes
l^IFKME^\l^G xhe Mataeeli
I.NUUINA Ai IisDAi.>i.'\'s MOTjrsTAlN.
Leavmg Mashonaland for the Front. 91
and we were walking our horses down in single file, and had just
got in sight of the kraal, when Mr. Chappe, who was close behind
me, called out, " Look out, there are some men with guns," and we
suddenly saw about twelve or fifteen Matabeli, fully armed, moving
about in the rocks in front of us. I formed up the men and dis-
mounted half of them, keeping them at the " ready " to see what was
going to happen. As soon as we halted, six or seven of the Matabeli
came out from the rocks, and we saw that they all had rifles and
assegais. One of them, a very fine-looking boy, not more than eighteen,
was evidently chief of the party ; he stepped forward from the rest,
and stood about twenty yards from us without any sign of fear. I told
Mr. Acutt to call to them to put down their arms, to which he replied
that they would put down theirs when we did ours. He also said he
would come forward and talk if any one went forward without arms ; I
had a revolver on under my coat, but no weapon visible, and T rode
forward. He was coming forward when Acutt rode up to me with
his carbine, and the Matabeli would not come any closer. It was
impossible for us to do anything, shut in as we were and not know-
ing how many Matabeli there might be there ; so after a short parley
we retired out of the valley, leaving them in possession of the cattle.
We watched to see if they followed us out of the valley, but did
not see them do so, although from what happened afterwards it appears
that some of them must have. They did not know that we had taken
the Insukameni cattle that morning, or that the Victoria Scouts had
had a skirmish with some Matabeli that same morning, close to
Indaima's, and had killed twenty of them ; nor did I know this till
I returned to camp.
We rode on towards camp after leaving the valley, passing Lieu-
tenant Bodle and his party in the bush, and off-saddled for half-an-hour
at a small stream. We had just saddled up and moved on again when
a messenger galloped up from behind to say that Captain Campbell had
been shot, and was seriously wounded. I started back at once, but on
getting to Major Browne's party, the rear-guard of the party driving
the cattle, I heard that he was still four or five miles back, that he
was riding on, and that Dr. Edgelow and eight men had gone back
to bring him on. As I could have done nothing by going back I
92 The Downfall of Lobengiila.
pushed on into camp. On the way in Mr. Tanner, my galloper,
whom I had sent back with the cattle, caught me up, hurrying on to
get a cart sent back for Campbell ; he had been with Campbell
when he was wounded. It appears that after Captain Heany started
with the cattle, Captain Campbell and Messrs. Gourlay and Tanner
got leave to go out on the right flank to look for more cattle ;
they saw several and were trying to drive them towards the
rest, when they got in amongst some large granite boulders, and
suddenly Campbell saw a native covering him from behind a rock. He
drew his revolver — they had no rifles with them — but before he could
fire, the native shot him through the left hip. He fell from his horse,
and Gourlay then came up and fired several revolver shots at the
native, but without effect. They helped Campbell on to his horse,
and he managed to sit there with one of them supporting him on
each side.
When I got back to camp about 3 p.m., I found everything in a
great state of excitement. Some of the Victoria Scouts had come
in and reported that they had had a skirmish with some Matabeli
that morning, that they had killed twenty-two, and taken 150 head
of cattle, but had had no casualty, and that a large impi estimated
at 7,000 was then close to camp. The horses and oxen were got in,
and everything got in readiness for an attack, but it turned out to be
a false alarm.
I was much relieved to find Captain Williams' Scouting party in
camp when I returned. They had gone out six days before, and were
only to have been out three days, but the distance was much greater
than I had estimated, and they were unable to get back sooner. They
had been some distance along the main road, but had seen no signs of
any Matabeli.
Poor Campbell was brought in about 4 o'clock, and an examination
was made of his wound. It was found that the bullet had gone through
the hip joint, completely shattering it, and the doctors decided at once
that his only chance was in immediate amputation. Doctors Jameson,
Edgelow, and Stewart performed the operation, which they accomplished
successfully, and there were hopes that he might pull through. He
was extraordinarily plucky over it, but had had no hope from the
Leaving Mashonalafid for the Front, 93
first. He sank gradually, and died about one p.m. the next day.
The cattle had arrived safely in charge of Captain Heany, although
he had had hard work to keep them together. During the day Bishop
Knight- Bruce had arrived with his waggon, and with him Honourable
M. Gifford, E. Burnett, and Biscoe, who had not been able to come
with us at first, but had been subsequently supplied with horses by Mr.
Rhodes, who was then in Salisbury. The cattle were put in a strong
kraal near the laager, and we passed a quiet night, which was more than
I had expected, as I was sure that if there was an impi in the neigh-
bourhood they would try to recover the cattle.
The following morning, i6th, was dull and wet, and about 8 a.m.
the Victoria Column arrived under Major Wilson ; their strength on
joining us was 414 white men, 172 horses, about forty native drivers and
leaders, and about 400 Mashonas, who had been raised near Victoria by
Mr. Brabant. They were a very fine body of men, and were all keen
for work. They had three galloping Maxims — two with horses, one
with oxen, one seven-pounder screw gun on a low carriage, which was
carried on a waggon, and one one-pounder Hotchkiss with oxen. The
men were all armed with M,H. rifles, and all the dismounted men, of
which there were about 250, with bayonets. They had 180,000 rounds
M.H. ammunition, 1,000 one-pound shells for Hotchkiss, and 300 rounds
for seven-pounder gun. They had eighteen waggons carrying ammuni-
tion and supplies, and had about two months' full rations with them.
The officers were : —
Staff. — Major Wilson ; Adjutant Kennelly ; A.D.C.'s, Lieutenants Bowen
and Chalk ; Pioneers, Lieutenants Browne and Ware ; and Quartermaster,
Captain Greenfield.
No. I Troop. -Captain Fitzgerald, Lieutenants W. B. Harris and Hughes.
No. 2 Troop. — Captain Bastard, Lieutenant Sampson.
No. 3 Troop. — Captain Napier, Lieutenants Williams and Stoddart.
No. 4 Troop. — Captain Judd, Lieutenants Beal and Hofmeyr.
Infantry. — Captain Delamere, Lieutenants Steer and Robinson.
Artillery. — Captain Lendy, Captain Reid, and Lieutenant Rixon.
Scouts. — Captain the Hon. C J. White, Lieutenant Dollar, Messrs.
Burnham, Ingram, Vavasour, Mayne, and Possett.
Native Contingent. — Lieutenant Brabant.
Volunteer Unattached. — Captain Donovan.
94
The Downfall of Lobeftgjila.
~ KOTCHKJSS
Captain Argent Kirton was in charge
of their transport, and had adopted a dia-
mond shaped laager, which they kept all
through. The Victoria Column had two
mounted Troops each about thirty
strong. Captain the Hon. C. J. White
had accompanied the Victoria
Column, in charge of their
Scouts, numbering about forty,
and I placed him in charge of
all the scouts of the combined columns.
Captain Lendy, as senior artillery
)fificer of the Expedition, had the general
iperintendence of all the guns, and had to
that they were kept in proper order,
dthough the working of each was left to
own detachment. As the Victoria
Column was worse off for horses than
even we were, and theirs were not in as
good condition as ours, I decided to keep
the two columns as close together as possible when on the march,
letting one advance and one rear-guard serve for the combined
columns. I did not wish to mix up the duties of the two columns at
all, as it would have led to questions of seniority udiich are awkward
to deal with in two volunteer forces, and therefore each column found
its own daily duties, guards, pickets, etc., and had its own officers
of the day.
There was some slight trouble at first over the artillery of the
Victoria Column, as they claimed to have been raised as one Troop under
Captain Lendy, and to be independent of Major Wilson. As this was
of course impossible, I saw them all and talked to them, giving them
ten minutes to decide whether they would come on with the Column
under Major Wilson, doing whatever he ordered, or return at once to
Victoria; they decided for the former, and I heard no more of the
matter.
As the Salisbury Column was always on the right on the march, it
Diagram showing formation
OK Victoria Laager.
Leaving Mashonaland for the Front, 95
always found the right flanking party, and the Victoria Column the left.
They consisted of one Troop each, of about forty men, of which half
were extended in single file, covering the whole flank of the Column,
the other half with a galloping Maxim acted as support. The two
Columns furnished the front and rear guards on alternate days ; there
was also a Troop each divided in the same way as the flanking
parties.
On the day on which the Victoria Column arrived, Captain
Campbell was buried with full military honours at dusk that evening.
As he was an ex-Artillery Oflicer, the Artillery volunteered to furnish
the carrying party, and A Troop furnished the firing party. All the
Salisbury and a great many of the Victoria Column attended the
funeral, and the service was conducted by the Bishop. I think there
were a good many standing round the grave that evening who realized
for the first time that what we had undertaken was no child's play, but
stern reality, and that poor Campbell's fate might at any time be the
fate of one or all of us ; but there could be no turning back ; we had
undertaken the work, and had to go through with it.
The Victoria Column had brought with them about 150 head of
captured cattle, and these with what we had brought up our number to
about 450. As it would have been inconvenient to drive such a large
herd with us, I arranged with Mr. Brabant that he should send back 100
of his natives, under an Induna that he could trust, to Victoria with all
that we did not require for slaughter purposes ; and accordingly the
following morning we selected sixty for meat, and sent 362 back to
Victoria, where they eventually arrived in safety. Captain White had
about sixty Scouts all fairly well mounted at his disposal, and I arranged
with him that some of these should always be sopie distance from the
Column, forming a cordon something like ten miles away. I did not
wish to have any very distant work done, as it would knock up the
horses, and I was satisfied that an hour's notice was enough to enable
us to meet any attack.
Captain Napier had brought two natives with him that Dr. Jameson
had found some time before at Matipis, and as they were Matabeli who
knew the country well, but had to fly from the king on a charge of
"umtagati" (witchcraft), and had no sympathy with him, they were
96
The Downfall of Lobengula.
installed as guides in charge of Mr. B. Wilson. The elder one, Mayesi,
had a very good idea of the sort of country we wished to keep in, and
guided us very successfully all the way. He always accompanied the
centre of the advance party of the advance guard ; the support followed
him, and their Maxim opened a spoor, which one of the columns of
waggons, of whichever Column formed the advance guard for the day,
followed, the other columns of waggons and the other Column keeping
their distance from it. During the night one of the Victoria Column,
Percy Wood, died of fever, and was buried by the Bishop at day-
break.
A HALT. — Major Forbes and staff at mess.
CHAPTER VIII.
FROM SIGALA MOUNTAIN TO THE SHANGANI.
Bv Major P. W. Forbes.
Advance of the Combined Columns — A false alarm — Finding gold — Insukameni kraal deserted
— Somabula Forest — Matabeli scouts — E. Burnett shot — Crossing the Shangani River —
Capturing cattle — Arranging pickets — The eve of the battle — The first attack —
Quested 's natives driven in — Plucky advance of the Insukameni regiment — Driven
back by the Maxims — Captain Heany's skirmishers nearly cut off — The enemy routed —
Strength of the Matabeli — Inferior to fhe Zulu — Effect of fire upon the oxen —
The Columns advance — Captain Williams cut off and lost — A threatened attack —
Sighting the Matoppo Hill:> — Captain Heany burns Enxna kraal.
As I had decided to move forward with the two Cokimns on the day
following the arrival of the Victoria Column, Captain White took his
Scouts out that evening, and the next morning the two Columns marched
at 5.30 a.m. We followed the same path along which we had gone
when we captured the cattle, and for the first three miles kept on a large
open plain ; we then had to go through a broad strip of bush, in which
the Victoria Column had to do some heavy cutting, and laagered after
four and a-half miles on a small stream. The Columns marched where
the ground would permit about 300 yards apart, each in a double
column of waggons, the dismounted men of the Victoria Column
marching on the left of their waggons, and the spare mounted troop and
the few dismounted men of the Salisbury Column on the right of theirs.
The Victoria Column had a large number of natives under Mr. Harry
Ware, who went in advance of the waggons and cut roads, made drifts,
etc., and the Native Contingent of the Salisbury Column did the same
for them as before.
While we were outspanned some natives from a neighbouring
Maholi kraal came in to "konza" (pay their respects), bringing
presents. They stated that a few Matabeli had passed their kraal the
H
98 TJie Doivnfall of Lobeugiila.
previous day driving cattle, but tliey did not know of any impi in the
neighbourhood. The stream we were on was one of the sources of the
Rhwe-rhwe river, and in the afternoon we followed it down for some
distance, going through rather broken country, and over old mealie
gardens, and laagered after doing six miles, close to the post from
which we had taken the cattle ; the country in front all appeared
to be thick bush but level, and on our left there was a high range of
bare granite hills, the Umgogoghla, in which there were several Maholi
kraals.
The following morning (i8th) just as the Columns were marching,
two waggons which had followed the Victoria Column with further
supplies arrived. They were private waggons, but the owners did not
wish to take them back, and Dr. Jameson bought them complete and
handed them to me, thus giving each Column an equal number of
waggons— eighteen. These two waggons I placed on the rear face of the
laager, thus closing it up, and the Bishop's light travelling waggon,
which had now joined us, stood in front of the artillery waggon opposite
the Scotch cart. The Columns marched at 5.30 a.m., crossed the
Rhwe-rhwe, and after going about three miles came to a deep stream,
Umtangu. It ran through high steep banks, and some time was taken
up in finding suitable drifts ; at last two single ones were found about
half a mile apart, and the Columns commenced to cross. As there was
no suitable place for both laagers close together, the only open space
being close down to the river, the two Columns began to laager each
just across its own drift.
While we were busy getting the waggons into laager, some of the
Scouts galloped in, followed by a messenger from the Victoria Column
advance guard, to say that there were some hills in front of them
covered with Matabeli, the number being estimated at 4,000. Pre-
viously all due precautions for covering our crossing had been taken,
and it only remained to get the laagers in readiness as soon as
possible. This was done, and by putting several of the machine guns in
position on ant-heaps covering the open valleys running down to the
river, the positions were made fairly good ; the alarm however turned
out to be a false one. The natives that had been seen were only
Mashonas, and did not probably exceed 100 in number, although this
Fi'oin Sigala Mountain to the S/iangani.
99
had magnified into the other large number. It appeared afterwards that
some of the Mashonas, whose kraals were on these kopjes, had just left
their kraals and were bringing grain to us as presents, when they met a
party of thirteen Matabeli who were going to collect some of their cattle
from another kraal. The Matabeli at once set on them, and killed ten,
while the remainder, and all those from the kraals, ran up on the
rocks and so caused our alarm. Captain White and some of his
scouts were off-saddled close to where the natives were killed, but
knew nothing of it at the time.
We moved on that afternoon about five miles and got into fine
open country. Just before laagering we crossed a good stream of
water, and as the grazing was good I decided on giving the horses
a day's rest there. Before marching that afternoon I had arranged
with Major Wilson that to save cutting, each column should follow
one of the open " laagtes " (glades) running up from the river,
and that we should meet about two miles away. There was an
old waggon spoor along the one which we were to follow, and
I told my advance guard (we both found one advance and one
rear guard that day) to follow it. They did for a time, and then
lost it, and instead of sending back to me went straight on, with
the result that they led us into a large patch of mealie gardens
in a clearing in thick bush, where the going was very heavy, and
the oxen could scarcely move the waggons. It would have
taken longer to go back than to go through them, and so we
went on and got out all right, but after the events of the morning
it was rather an anxious time. During the previous day I had at
last come to the conclusion that I must replace Major Browne as
Staff Officer. I therefore asked him to resign, and Captain Finch
to act in his place as Acting Brigade Major of the combined
columns, and Adjutant of the Salisbury Column ; this he did right
through the campaign. There were some kraals close to where we
laagered, under a Mashona headman, Umchena, and we got two
waggon loads of grain from them that evening; and as the Scouts reported
that there was a large amount at some more kraals about seven miles
away, I sent Captain Heany Avith twenty of A Troop and two waggons to
them at daylight. Owing to then- being unable to get the waggons near to
H 2
lOO The Dowufall of Lobengiila.
the kraals, which were on high rocks, and so being obh'ged to have all
the grain carried about a mile in baskets, they did not get back till dark,
but brought two loads with them. My brother, who was a trooper in A
Troop, was one of the party that went out, and just before they returned
I saw his horse coming in with a saddle on but no rider. I was anxious
lest something had happened, but it turned out to be all right, and that
he had only let him go where they were watering the horses at a stream
below the laager.
Captain Heany had not seen or heard of any Matabeli, although he
had passed the dead body of one of the Mashona that had been killed
the previous day. During the day Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby
with a few men had ridden on some distance in the direction in which
we were going, but saw nothing. They found that it was a long march
to the next water, but that it was all through open country.
We marched at five the next morning, and previous to marching
I sent three horses that had knocked up to the Mashona Induna
to be taken care of. We crossed fine high open ridges, and after
going down a long grass slope about four miles long, came to the
Gwailo River, Avhich we found dry except for a few pools. \\'hile
on the high ground we came across a line of large old gold
workings, in one of which my brother picked up a piece of quartz,
about three pounds weight, covered with visible gold. From the
ridge before going down to the river we got a fine view of the
country in front, and it looked as if we should be able to keep in open
country for some considerable distance. There was a line of high bushy
kopjes just across the river, terminating to the south in a hill, Ugogo,
under which we laagered ; and to the west and about twelve miles from
the laager, is another high hill, Khoboli, just to the west of which our
guide told me the Insukameni kraal lay. We crossed the Gwailo and
laagered, and as we had done a long march, eleven miles, decided to
remain there till next day. As soon as we had laagered I sent out
Captain Williams in charge of a party of five Scouts, to try and find out
if the Insukameni kraal was occupied.
Until two years before this there were no Matabeli stationed as far
from Buluwayo b)- fifty miles, except the Max'eni, who had been sent by
Lobengula on to the borders of the country in disgrace some years
From Sigala Mountain to Ike Shangani. loi
previously ; but two years before, since the occupation of Mashonaland,
Lobengula had sent the Insukameni and Ihlati regiments to live near the
border. Captain Williams and his party returned shortly after dark and
reported that they had been as close as it was safe to get to the kraal ;
that they had seen cattle and a few men about, and had heard voices in
the kraal, but were unable to say if there was any large force there. They
also said that they did not think that they had been seen by the natives.
As I wished to have as few Matabeli as possible in our rear, I deter-
mined to send a force to the kraal, and therefore sent Major Wilson
off at midnight with lOO men, fifty from each column, and two Maxim
guns, to attack the kraal if occupied and burn it. I had intended to
have gone myself, but Dr. Jameson thought that I should remain with
the main body. Owing to the darkness they could only travel very
slowly, and had some difficulty in getting tlie Maxims through the bush,
and on the way they heard natives in the bush, but saw no one. At day-
light they had surrounded the kraal and advanced on it, only to find it
deserted. There was fresh spoor both of natives and cattle about, and it
was evident that it had only been vacated very recently. They burnt
it all down, and after resting the horses and giving them a good feed of
grain, returned to rejoin the column. We heard afterwards that the
kraal had been occupied when the Scouts were there the previous even-
ing, and that the natives had seen them, and fearing a night attack had
left it and gone into the bush. The kraal was quite new and very large,
and was probably capable of holding about 3,000 inhabitants. The same
morning I advanced with the two columns, Captain Bastard being in tem-
porary command of the Victoria Column. After going through the line of
kopjes we crossed the watershed and got on to wide open flats again, in-
tersected by small streams, which formed the head waters of the Lundi-
We did six miles and laagered on the Uguamo River, the largest of these
streams. It is in this neighbourhood that there has always been alluvial
gold reported, but I do not think that any indications of it were seen on
the march.
About three miles to the west of the laager we saw the Somabula
forest, a thick black line extending from a point rather to the south of
us, as far as we could see to the north. This forest is very dense, and
is supposed to go right up to the Zambesi, and it was principally to
I02 The Downfall of Lobengula.
avoid it that we had kept so far to the south. It was from three to four
miles wide where the Hartley Hill road went through it, and it was
always looked upon as the most likely place for the Matabeli to wait for
us. I did not wish to pass it before Major Wilson rejoined me, and so
remained on the Uguamo that afternoon ; Major Wilson and his party
returned about four p.m. Dr. Jameson had insisted upon accompanying
them, although I had tried to prevent him ; he would not realise how
important it was that he should keep as much as possible out of danger,
but whenever there was any outside work to be done he insisted upon
going.
The following day, 22nd October, we marched at 5.30, and got to
the Somabula Forest, where we found that we had to go through a
narrow strip of thick bush with a good deal of cutting to be done. To
make things worse a fog came on, and it was a very anxious time.
We got through the bush safely however, and after crossing a nasty
little stream, got up into the high open ground again, and then went
down a gradual slope to the Vungu River, on the east bank of which
we laagered. From there we sent back two runners, coloured " boys,"
to Salisbury, who got through in safety. The only previous com-
munication we had had was from the Iron Mine Hill, and Dr.
Jameson had sent back from there to let Mr. Rhodes know of the
taking of the cattle and Captain Campbell's death. The Vungu was a
wide watercourse, but nearly dry, and we had no trouble in crossing it,
which we did that afternoon, and did four miles on to the high ground
on the other side. While on the march that afternoon. Captain White
sent back to report that he and his Scouts had come across seven armed
Matabeli warriors ; that they had tried to stop them, but could not ;
and on their firing at the Scouts, the latter had returned the fire.
The following morning, 23rd, just as we were starting, a dense fog
came on. The fogs drift over very quickly, and I hoped that it would
clear away again ; but it did not, and after going two miles our
guide confessed that he could not find his way, and we laagered on
the east bank of the Vunguane River. The fog was so thick that
it was impossible to see any distance, and when I suddenly gave the
order to laager I think that everyone believed we were going to be
attacked, and wasted very little time ; both the laagers were complete
From Sigala JMouiitain to the Shangani. 103
under six minutes. We heid breakfast, and by nine o'clock the fog had
cleared and we spanned-in again.
Before marching in the morning I had sent Captain Williams with
his brother, Messrs. Burnett, Swinburne, Gourlay, and Hon. M. Gifford,
on to see if they could find some kraals — the Amatoilene, inhabited by
Maholi — who were reported to be friendly to us, and which should be
about ten miles ahead. They started off but lost themselves in the
fog, and when we started for the second time, they signalled to me from
about two miles away, they then went on again. We trekked six
miles and crossed the Tyabenzi River, on the west bank of which we
laagered. The Victoria Column oxen were very weak that day, and they
got some distance behind, and eventually crossed the river and laagered
about half-a-mile above us. We remained there that afternoon, and
about three p.m. the Hon. Maurice Gifford rode in to say that E.
Burnett had been shot through the stomach at a kraal, and was
dangerously wounded. I at once ordered out Captain Spreckley and
twenty men, but before they were ready Drs. Jameson and Edgelow
and Sir J. Willoughby rode off, with Hon. Maurice Gifford as
guide, to the place. Gifford took them seven or eight miles at
full gallop, and then had to admit that he had lost his way, and
they turned back to camp, where they arrived about dark. Captain
Spreckley started as soon as he could and tried to follow Dr. Jameson,
but in turn lost his way and found himself at some kraals about ten
miles away just at dark. They were fired on from the kraals and
returned the fire and burnt the kraals, taking some cattle, which the
natives who had accompanied them under Mr. Quested brought back to
camp ; they did not return till midnight, meanwhile Captain Williams
had returned bringing Burnett's body, he had died about half-an-hour
after he was hit.
I gathered generally that the incident happened as follows : Our
Scouts had gone to a small kraal, where they found an old man and a
woman who were very friendly, and who told them that there were
no Matabeli about, and only Maholis (slaves), who were in favour of
the whites. They had off-saddled, and Burnett walked off to another
small kraal close by to see if he could get some grain ; as he went up
to one of the huts a shot was fired from inside and he fell. It occurred
I04 The Downfall of Lobengida.
so suddenly that the others thought that he had shot himself, but
other shots were fired, one of which went through Swinburne's coat.
Our men fired several shots, but could not see if they had killed any
one ; and a woman behind the kraal called out that the man who had
shot Burnett had run away. They did not believe this and set fire to
the hut, and as the man appeared he was shot. They got Burnett on
his horse and Gifford started for a doctor, but Burnett died soon afcer
they started ; we buried him quietly that night, the Bishop officiating,
and only a few of the officers being present. He was a very popular
man, well known in Cape Colony as well as in Mashonaland, and had
come up to the latter with the Pioneer Column as one of the transport
officers ; we had now lost two really good men and had nothing at
all to show for it.
The following day, 24th, we marched as usual at 5.30, and did
seven miles over open country, and laagered on a small stream with
high banks about a mile short of the Shangani River, The kraal at
which Burnett had been shot was across the river. There was a line
of high bushy kopjes on the west side of the Shangani and a pass
through, opposite to where we were, and it was for this pass that we
were making. As soon as the laagers were formed Major Wilson
and I rode down to the Shangani, and after some difficulty found a
place where with a good deal of cutting we could make two drifts.
We started men at work at once and then rode up the other side
to see if we could find an open place to laager. The bush close to
the river and extending for about half a mile was very thick mimosa,
with deep dongas running through it, but about 1,000 yards from the
river there was an open ridge large enough to take in both laagers,
and after a little bush was cleared round it, forming a fairly good
position. We could see that we should have to go at least three
miles to get out of the hills and to get a better position, and as
we expected some trouble in getting the waggons across the river,
decided on going no further ; by three p.m. the drifts were made
and we inspanned. Before moving I sent two mounted Troops
with two Maxims and a seven-pounder to take up positions on two
kopjes on the west bank and so cover our crossing, and also sent
a mounted Troop under Captain Borrow across the river to work
From Sigala Mountain to the Shangani. 105
down amongst the hills to the north, and one under Captain
Fitzgerald to the south, to destroy kraals and seize cattle, and to
prevent any chance of our being attacked while crossing. The
drifts were not good, but everyone realised that it was a dangerous
place and worked hard, with the result that the Salisbury Column
took sixteen and the Victoria Column nineteen minutes to get all
the waggons across, and in an hour and a-half from the time of
starting we were laagered on the west bank. That night for the
first time the two laagers were joined ; they were about 150 yards
apart and a thick fence of thorn connected them on each side.
On his way from Victoria and previous to joining us, Major Wilson
had detached Messrs. Arnold and Quested, both of whom were well
known amongst the natives, to raise what Mashonas they could and
follow on. They joined us soon after leaving Iron Mine Hill with about
300 Mashonas each, so that we now had about 900, and found them
most useful in bushing the laagers, making kraals for the cattle, and
driving captured cattle.
Shortly after we had laagered, cattle and goats began to come in from
Captains Borrow and Fitzgerald, and by dark we had about a thousand
head of cattle and 900 sheep and goats ; we also saw kraals burning
all round. Both Captains Borrow and Fitzgerald returned about dark
and reported that they had seen no Matabeli, only a few Maholi
who had run away ; that they had burnt some kraals and taken the
cattle, they said there was very little grain (of which we were
again badly in need) in any of the kraals. Mr. Brabant had accom-
panied Captain Fitzgerald with Mr. Arnold and some of their
natives ; and at one kraal, Mgandane's, they had found about thirty
women and children, who had been captured the year before from
their kraals, Gutu's and Bira's, close to Victoria, to which some of
Mr. Arnold's natives belonged. The women were delighted to see
their own people, and insisted upon accompanying us ; they were
rather a hindrance, but we could not leave them to the mercy of
the Matabeli. There was not time to make a very strong kraal for
all the cattle before dark, but as good a one as time would permit
was built about 200 yards from and to the east of the centre of
the combined laager. As Mr. Ouested's natives were not very friendly
io6
The Downfall of Lobcngula,
with some of the others, they preferred to camp by themselves, and so
made a small kraal about 600 yards from the north-east of the laagers
on the rise ; they had several women with them whom they had re-
captured that day. Some of the other natives slept beside the cattle
kraal, and the remainder between the two laagers.
While the laagers had been separate each one was surrounded
by its own pickets at night, but now that they had formed one joint
laager I rearranged the picket. Each laager now found five pickets,
Victoria Column all double (i.e., six men each) of white men, and
Salisbury Column three double of white men and two single (three
While Picket
I
KatM Picket
Diagram showing formatio.\ of combined laagers and position of pickets at
Shangani.
men each) of natives. These were posted each evening before dark
by the respective captains of the day, who consulted together so as
to get a complete circle round the laager. The combined laagers were
made very strong that night, and I went round the last thing to see
that everything was all right. Shortly after dark I sent up a socket
signal, as I did most nights, followed by two rockets, on the chance of
some scouts from the South Column being in the neighbourhood. Ever
since starting I had had both laagers manned at 4 a.m. — an hour before
daylight — which is the natives' favourite time for attack, and every man
always slept fully dressed, and in his boots, with his rifle beside him.
From Sigala Mountain to the Shangani. 107
At five minutes to four the following morning we were suddenly
awakened by quick firing, and realised that the enemy were on us. The
waggons were manned immediately, and fire opened all round the
laager. It was too dark to see the natives at first, but their position
was shown by the flashes that came from the grass all round the laager.
I jumped up on the nearest waggon and tried to see into the darkness,
but could distinguish nothing but the flashes, which were very close and
frequent. The enemy were so close to us that I did not think it safe to
stop firing, even had I been able to do so in the noise that was going on,
and I was very much afraid that some of the men on picket would be
killed either by friends or by enemies, and I was greatly relieved to
hear shortly afterwards that they had all got safely in. During the
first attack Mr. Quested came into the laager ; he had been sleeping
with his natives, and they had received the brunt of the attack, waking
up to find the Matabeli right upon them and stabbing them. Quested
managed to make a stand for a short time, and then retired on the
laager with the people ; he was wounded in the arm and side, and had
his thumb shot off. Most of his people managed to get into the laager,
although several were wounded. C Troop was inlying picket, and had
saddled up their horses at the first alarm ; A Troop was on the right
and B on the left face of the laager. The first attack lasted about half-
an-hour, and then the enemy's fire ceased ; it was still too dark to see
any distance, but objects in the immediate vicinity were visible.
As I was afraid that some of our friendly natives might have failed
to get into the laager, I sent out Captain Spreckley with twenty mounted
men to go round the open ground close to the laager, and see if he
could find anyone ; he brought in several of our natives, and a few
shots were fired at his party from the bush, but no harm was done.
Shortly after they returned, and when it was getting light enough
to see some distance, a large number of natives were seen collecting
on the top of a small rise about 350 yards to the south-east of the
laager. I was standing with Mr. Chappe at the Maxim at the left rear
of our laager watching them through glasses, and from the quiet way
they were moving about, took them to be some of our natives who had
escaped into the bush at the first alarm, and now gone there for
safety. There must have been 200 to 300 of them, and I could see
io8
The Dow7ifall of Lobengula,
no shields among them. After they had collected on the top of the
rise, they opened out and began to walk quietly down towards the
laager; I, and I think everyone who was watching them except Mr.
Chappe, who insisted that they were Matabeli, thought that they were
friendlies. They advanced down the slope in a most casual way,
without hurrying or attempting to take cover, and I allowed no firing
at them. When they got to the bottom of the slope they suddenly
sat down and commenced to fire at us. A very heavy fire was at once
poured on them
from two or
three Max-
d
oo
and
were
rifles,
_ : ; ^ they
"'' , , forced to
.^ ^* " retire over
the hill
much faster
than they had
come down. The
w ay they advanced
ab most plucky, and we
found out aftei wards that they
were the Insukameni, the best regiment
there. Had the whole of the attacking force
come on in the same way, we should have had more
trouble than we had. As soon as they advanced,
firing recommenced from the bush all round ; but very few natives
appeared in the open, and after they retired the firing ceased again.
After waiting for some time, during which only a few shots were
fired at us at long distances, and it was now broad daylight, I sent out
Captains Heany and Spreckley with twenty mounted men each, and
told Major Wilson to send a party of the same strength to sec if the
enemy had retired. He sent out Captain Bastard, who extended his
men in the bush to the south of the laagers, Captain Spreckley doing
The Insukameni Regimeni
advancing upon
the Salisbury laager.
EYE
Battle
OCTOBk
Major SIR JOH
Afosi of the
A. PLAN III.
»
F ^ Scherm of
•wJio ivkef^
belt off.
G = Captain h
large bo
viously e
H & I = Captain /f^
Troops,
(left baci,
flank am »
K & N = Captains Sj
driven in
at S a.m
L ^ Hill over i '"_,
large nu
on either
Hotchkis
M
— Lovj ntoun L_
portion oj
for the 1^
against t,
shelled.
= Enemy
^ = Enemy
* — Mount
Water
y>^ = Enemy
" " — "" = Route
CglCg3 -Points
Open
Z^A6>
^iS2_>
€>S
^_'
-ia_ . - • • •
=: = IVuifr 0
900 Yards to tkeAck
The Downfall of Lobengula. plan m.
EYE SKETCH
OF THE
Battle of Shangani,
OCTOBER 25th, 1893.
Prepared by
Major SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY, Bart.,
Most of the distances ascertained.
Key to Plan
A ^^ Salisbury Laager,
B = Victoria Laager,
C = Trek oxen in thorn bush Kraal.
D = Kraal /or captured cattle,
E = S7nall Kopjie surrounded by thick lush ;
from here the enemy made his most
vigorous attack,
F ^= Scherm of Quested^ s Native Contingents
•who ivhen attacked drozie the Mata-
beli off,
G = Captain Heany's Troop driven in by
large bodies oj the enemy not pre-
viously engaged (8,io. a-jn.)
H & I = Captain Fitzgerald' s and Bastard's
Troops, showing change of position
(left back) to meet counter attack in
flank and rear {S.lO.a.tn.)
K & N = Captains Spreckley and Heany's Troops
driven in by large bodies of the enemy
at s a.m., it being still too dark to see.
L ^ Hill oz'er the lo%uer slopes of which a
large number of the enemy retreated
on either side, being shelled by the
Hotchkiss gun,
M = Low mound shaped Kopjie where the
portion of the enemy that was too late
for the 1st and 2rd attack showed
against the mounted troops and were
shelled.
= Enemy's first attack,
= Enemy's second attack.
I = Enemy's third attack.
* — Mounted Troops.
„ = Bush and Thorn Trees ; where not
indicated the groutul is open.
= Water,
Enemy's lines of retreat.
Route of the Columns.
Points shelled.
->» =
^^
^^■^ ^: '^1^^^
^1^
i(? Z^ 'k?0 ,S(?t?
I I I — 1 —
Sx:ale/ ^ <\laA<k).
I I
^^^
800 Yards to theJhck
lOLLINGRlD&E, LITHO-. LONDON
From Sigala Mountain to the Shangani. 109
the same to the east, and Captain Heany to the north-east. Each of
these parties found the enemy in the bush within half-a-mile of the
laager, and after a sharp skirmish, in which we lost four horses, had to
fall back on the laager, towards which the enemy followed them, but
were again driven back by the Maxims.
A large number of Matabeli now appeared on a small kopje, 2,000
yards to the west of the laager, and they appeared to be re-forming
there, but three very well-directed shells from the Salisbury seven-
pounder dispersed them. Meanwhile Captain Lendy was doing great
execution with the Ilotchkiss gun, firing at small parties crossing the
open 1,500 to 2,000 yards to the south and south-west of the laager.
It was afterwards found that one of the one-pounder shells had killed
twelve men. j
When the Matabeli were driven back for the third time, it was
thought that they had retired altogether, and the mounted parties were
again sent out. The one from the V'ictoria laager found a i^w natives
in the bush, and succeeded in dislodging them, pursuing them for some
distance and killing a considerable number. Captain Spreckley found
that they had all retired from the side on which he went out, and
Captain tieany found none within about 1,000 yards on his side; the
latter had just got on to an open ridge visible from the laager, and
had dismounted his men to engage a body of the enemy in his
immediate front, when he was attacked from both sides by a large
force ;y they were close to him in the bush when they commenced
firing, and tried to cut him off, but he managed by retiring at
a gallop to get into an open laagte (glade), and halted his troop
in the bush on the side nearest to the laager. The enemy at the
time were emerging in numbers from the bush about eighty yards
in his rear ; the troop at once dismounted and engaged them, driving
them back into the bush and then, re-forming, returned into laager.
He had tv.'o horses wounded, but no other casualties, although
several men had narrow escapes, one having the sole of his boot and
another his belt cut by bullets. The natives fell back behind a bushy
kopje, from behind which they attacked, and as they appeared to be in
force there, I had the seven-pounder brought to the north face of the
laager, and shelled their position. At the same time I sent Captains
no The Downfall of Lobengtila.
Heany and Borrow back again, the latter going to the east of the kopje.
When they got there they found the position vacated, and after going a
considerable distance round and finding out that the enemy had all
retired, returned to the laager ; this was the end of our first battle.
A few Matabeli were still to be seen on the hills, and 1 sent out
our Colonial " bo}'s " under Captain Nesbitt to drive them off, the
ground being too rough for horses ; they advanced in very good
order, but the enemy did not wait for them. We ascertained from a
wounded native who was brought in that the force which attacked us
consisted of the Insukameni, Ihlati, Amaveni, and Siseba Regiments,
and Jingen, Enxna, Zinyangene, and Induba kraals, in all not less
than 5,000 ; that they had been waiting for us in the Somabula forest,
but that we had passed it before they knew where we were, and that
they had then followed us up, expecting to catch us before we got to
the Shangani ; that they had arrived shortly after dark on the previous
evening, and had been in position ready to attack about ten o'clock,
but the socket signal and rockets sent up had frightened them, and
the attack had been postponed till daybreak ; they were all to
advance as close to the laagers as possible under the cover of the
darkness, and then rush in with assegais. It was finding Ouested's
natives so far away that caused the first firing, and so gave us the
alarm. The wounded native was one of the Insukameni, and had been
present when they walked down the slope towards the laager, but had
been shot through the back when they were retiring; he said that
their orders were to attack us on the march and not in laager, and not
to use their rifles; he could give no idea of the number killed and
wounded but said that there was a very large number. From what we
ascertained later, there cannot have been less than 500. A considerable
number of dead were left upon the field, but most of them and the
wounded were carried away ; several of the wounded hanged them-
selves or threw themselves into the river to avoid being taken. He
said that he thought they would probably attack us again as soon
as we marched. Our casualties had been very few, owing to their bad
shooting; they believing that the higher they put up the sights of their
rifles the harder they would shoot, and consequently nearly all their
shots were too high.
From Si gal a Mottntain to the Shangani. 1 1 1
We only lost one white man — Trooper Walters, of the Victoria
Column — who was shot through the groin, and died the same night.
The other casualties were, Trooper Forbes (my brother), shot through
the left elbow ; Trooper Conrath (Victoria Column), shot in the back ;
and Trooper Nutt, shot in leg; Trooper Behrmann (Salisbury Column),
through right side ; Conductor Dunman (Salisbury Column), through
the left arm ; and Levy Leader Quested, through left side and arm. We
also had ten horses killed, and one driver (Colonial "boy") of Victoria
Column shot through the head. The loss amongst our natives was
heavier, Mr. Ouested's especially having suffered, and there must have
been forty to fifty killed, as well as several women and children. As
soon as things were quiet^ I rode round the field with Dr. Jameson.
By Ouested's laager we found a large number of dead and wounded,
some Matabeli and some friendlies. When the Matabeli rushed them
they had stabbed indiscriminately, and there was one child about two
years old stabbed in three places ; we found three women badly
wounded and five dead. The wounded were taken to the laager and
attended to, and two of the three recovered. One native had to
have his arm amputated, and another his leg, and the latter died
from it.
It was the first time that I and the majority of those there had
been under fire, and I was pleased to find how steady everyone was ;
there was little or no excitement, and very little wild shooting.
Everyone took it as a matter of course, and set to work as if he had
never done anything else. Quite late in the engagement I was standing
behind one of the A Troop waggons, on which my brother was
stationed, talking to Captain Heany, when a bullet from behind came
between our heads ; he just said that it was too close to be pleasant,
when I saw that it had hit my brother, who had fallen forward. I ran
up and saw that it had passed through his arm, but that although it
had cut his coat, it had not entered his body.
The expenditure of ammunition was as follows : — ALH., including
Maxim and Nordenfeldt gun, 3,645 ; seven-pounder case 2, shrapnel i,
common 4, Hotchkiss 28, Gardner 400. All the machine guns worked
very well indeed, and without a single jam of any importance. The result
of the engagement was very satisfactory, as it not only gave all the men
1 1 2 The Downfall of Lohengnla.
confidence, but showed them that the much-talked-of MatabeH are very
inferior to the Zulu, the latter having been the standard by which they
had hitherto been looked upon. The Bishop went round and had all
the wounded natives carried up to the laager and attended to, and they
were afterwards taken on in a waggon. The oxen had been tied up as
usual to the trek-tows outside the waggon, and I had been curious to see
what effect the firing had on them. I was astonished to see that it had
practically none ; they all stood up when it began, and after that did
not move, standing perfectly quiet although there was a heavy firing
going on close over their heads, and several of them were killed by the
enemy's fire.
As soon as it was evident that the enemy had finally retired, the
pickets were posted and oxen and horses turned out to graze. As I
wished the Matabeli to see that their attack had not interfered with
our advance, 1 decided to move on that afternoon. There was a
large open plain about three miles from us and just beyond the hills,
and if we could get there in safety we need not fear another attack.
The open space between the hills along which we had to go was very
narrow, and that afternoon's march was the most anxious time I had
all through the campaign ; if we had then been attacked and had had
to laager, the natives could have fired right down into the laagers
from the hills, and we should have had great trouble in dislodging
them. The two columns moved close together, each in four parallel
columns, and as many men as could be spared were kept on the
flanks ; we got out all right, but I felt inexpressibly relieved when
we got round the ends of the hills into a large open valley. We
headed for the widest part of it and laagered there, having done
about three miles.
We had noticed a curious thing that morning, that whenever a
shell exploded all the Matabeli near fired their rifles at it ; on inquiry
from a prisoner we found that they thought that the shell was full
of little white men, who ran out as soon as it bunst and killed every-
body near ; we saw this done almost every time that a shell was
fired during the campaign. We had one prisoner, a very good-looking
boy of about eighteen, being a pure Matabeli ; he was shot through
the lower part of the spine, which was all shattered, and was partiall)'
From Sigala Mountain to the Shangani. 113
paralysed ; he was very quiet and gentle, and very grateful for all that
was done for him ; he sent me messages on several occasions, warning
me of certain localities where we were likely to be attacked, and
always gave me all the information he could ; we took him to Bulu-
wayo and he was doing well, although he would always have been
crippled ; but after the country was settled his people came for him, and
I heard that he afterwards died at his kraal.
We made the laagers very strong with bush that night, and I think
that everyone would have been pleased if the Matabeli had come again,
as we had level open country all round, and we could have given a very
good account of them ; but they did not come. A shot was fired by
one of the Victoria column vedettes in the early morning, and the alarm
was at once sounded ; the laagers were manned immediately, and
patrols were sent round to find out what it was ; it appeared that
the man had let off his rifle accidentally, and we turned in again ; not
a shot was fired from the laagers, so steady were the men, although one
of my men wanted to fire at one of the pickets, thinking that they were
Matabeli.
That morning we marched at 6 a.m. and did five miles to the Man-
zimnyama River, and laagered about one mile to the west of it, on the
site of an old kraal. We found a number of large kraals close by, all
of which had been vacated and were full of grain ; we loaded up three
or four waggons while we were outspanned ; our guide told us that two
of the large military kraals — the Jingen and the Zinyangene — were not
far to the north of us, the latter being the closer ; and when we marched
in the afternoon, I sent Captain Heany, with twenty-one men of
A Troop, to destroy it. Captain Finch also accompanied them ; they
found the kraal — a large one— about six miles away and burnt it ; but
before doing so, they saw a very large body of natives coming down on
them, and immediately afterwards had to retire towards the laager.
They had travelled fast, and two of their horses knocked up and had to
be left on the veldt, the riders walking ; Captain Heany then sent a
messenger on to me. Captain White had also joined Captain Heany,
but at the latter's request had come on to let me know that the natives
were following him in force.
The columns marched four-and-a-half miles and laagered on a high
I
114 ^^^ Downfall of Lobengiila.
open ridge, a long way from water ; there had been a few natives seen
along the march that afternoon and many shots were fired, but nothing
to stop us, as we were in fairly open country all the way. Just as
we were laagering, the messenger from Captain Heany galloped in
excitedly, telling me that the enemy were out in force. I at once sent out
twenty mounted men with a Maxim from each laager to help to cover
Captain Heany's retreat, and shortly afterwards they all returned to the
laager, their only casualty being, as I have said, two horses left on the
veldt, although they had narrowly escaped being cut off at one point.
Captain Williams' Scouting party, consisting of his brother, Messrs.
Carden, Gourlay, and Swinburne, and Hon. M. Gifford, had joined
Captain Heany as he was coming in, They had been cut off by a
considerable force, but managed to gallop through, running the gauntlet,
though, of a heavy fire at about a hundred yards ; after getting through
the natives they had galloped in, and Captain Williams' horse had run
away with him ; Gifford was next to him, but could not get up to him,
and Williams disappeared in the hills. W^e were not very anxious about
him at first, as he had a good horse and was very good at finding his
way about, and Gifford did not think that either he or the horse were
wounded. He had gone back to the kopjes near the Shangani, and we
expected him to get on our spoor and come in during the night ; I sent
up rockets several times that night for him, but he did not come, and
was never seen again alive.
We had to march the next morning, 27th, as we had to get to
water, and so moved off at 6 a.m. ; Captain Spreckley with C Troop
was on the right flank, and after we had gone about three miles we
suddenly heard them open a rapid fire ; we were crossing some old
mealie gardens at the time, and it was fairly open, and as the fire was
very fast and seemed to be approaching, I gave the word to laager, at
the same time sending B Troop (Captain Borrow) to support Captain
Spreckley, and also sending Captain Finch to find out what was going
on. The laagers were on this occasion both formed in less than six
minutes, and the Salisbury one would have been done in much quicker
time, only for the Bishop placing his waggon in the wrong place.
While we were laagering up, the officer in charge of one of the
Victoria Column scouting parties on the left galloped in to say that he
From Sigala Moimtain to the Shangaiii. 115
had seen a very large force of Matabeli on that flank ; as he did not
appear to know much about it, I sent him back again for further infor-
mation, and heard no more of them. We remained laagered up for
about ten minutes, and then, word being brought to me that the enemy
had been driven back, we broke laager and resumed our march ; the
right flanking party had been attacked all along the line, and had at
first been forced to retire, but on being reinforced by the Support and
B Troop, drove the enemy back, killing a large number of them. Our
only casualties were Trooper Lucas, who was shot through the right arm
and leg, and was also cut in several places by an assegai ; a Matabeli
had jumped on him from the bush, and had pulled him off his horse ;
they closed, and the Matabeli tried to stab him. Trooper Halforty
came to rescue Lucas, and in shooting the Matabeli with his revolver,
shot Lucas as well ; we also lost one horse.
We laagered about two miles further on, on some old lands, and a
large body of the enemy were hanging about on our flank all day.
Shortly afterwards a large number were reported to be sitting on a
kopje about 3,000 yards away, and visible from where one of the pickets
was posted ; I started to go up to Dr. Jameson, and took the seven-
pounder, but on arriving there saw that there were several large bodies
round us, and they looked as if they intended attacking. As our
position was a fairly good one, I took the seven-pounder back to the
laager, and sent out Captain Borrow with his troop, and Captain Bastard
with his, to try if they could draw the enemy on ; they were unable to
however, although they had some slight skirmishing about the edge of
the bush, out of which the enemy would not come ; they did some
slight execution, and had no casualties.
I wished to remain near here for a day to send back and look for
Captain Williams, and as the ground on which we were laagered was
very dirty and far from water, I moved the laager that afternoon about
one mile to the south, and got on to an open space running down from
the high ground along which we had been travelling for some time. To
the south of this was open flat country for five or six miles, and it then
rose gradually up to the Matoppo Hills, which ran right through the
country east and west. About six miles away across the flat we could
see a very large kraal, consisting of three large enclosures ; this we
I 2
ii6 The Doivnfall of Lobcngitla.
found to be the Enxna, the Induna of which, Umgandane, had been
killed at Victoria. That afternoon Captain Hurrell and a young
Dutchman arrived from Victoria, having ridden through in five days with
despatches from Mr. Rhodes for Dr. Jameson, and during the night
Messrs. Dunne and Harrison also arrived from Charter with duplicates
of the same ; they both reported that the country seemed quite quiet
behind us, and that they had seen no Matabeli along the road.
The following day, 28th, we halted, and the first thing in the
morning sent back two Colonial " boys," " John Selous " (who knew
Matabeliland well, and who was an old servant of Mr. F. C. Selous) and
Ghert, to try and take up Captain Williams' spoor and follow him ;
they took a spare horse and some food and m.edicine. There were a
number of large kraals around us, and I sent some waggons in charge
of Captain Spreckley to get grain. They found all the kraals deserted
with the exception of one, in which they found a small Matabeli boy
about two years old, whom Captain Spreckley brought back, and he
was afterwards adopted by Farrier-Sergeant Wallace ; he was an
enormously fat child, with a wonderful amount of self-composure, and
took to his new life without any trouble. They also got about sixty
bags of grain and a few head of cattle.
I did not wish to leave the Enxna kraals so near to our road
undisturbed behind us, but at the same time did not want to give the
horses more work than I could help, and Captain Heany volunteered to
ride over with anyone who would go, and burn the kraal if it was
deserted. About six who had good horses volunteered, and Captain
Lendy took the Victoria Column seven-pounder about one-and-a-half
miles from the laager, and tried to reach the kraal with shells ; it was
however too far ; Captain Heany and his party found the kraal
empty, burnt it, and brought back fifty head of cattle.
About ten o'clock "John Selous" and Ghert returned and said that
they had followed the spoor of Captain Williams' horse for some time ;
that it took them into a narrow place between the hills, and that the
natives commenced firing at them ; they were afraid of being cut off, and
so returned. As soon as the horses could be got up, I sent Captain
Borrow and twenty men with "John Selous" to try and follow the spoor
again, and they did not return till late at night; they followed it for
From Sigala Moiintain to the Shangani. 117
some miles, and got back to within four or five miles of the Shangani,
where they lost it. Where they saw it last the horse seemed to be
going strong, and they did not think it was wounded.
When we marched the following morning, Captain Hurrell and
" John Selous " went back to try and get information about Captain
Williams, and to go on to Victoria ; they were unable to get any
definite news, but got through safely to Victoria. It was only after
we got to Buluwayo that we heard full particulars about him ; his
horse had run away with him, and had been hit in the flank either
before it started or while running away, and the natives had followed
him ; he got into broken country, and the natives, by calling from hill
to hill, always kept near him ; at last, his horse failing, he dismounted.
The natives were afraid to come to close quarters as he was armed,
having a magazine rifle and a revolver, and remained at about 200 yards
firing at him. He sat down on a rock and returned their fire, killing
several, but at last was shot dead by a bullet in the left temple ;
they stripped him, taking away everything that he had, but did not
mutilate him in any way. Captain Gwynyth Williams was a very
great loss ; he was the eldest son of General Owen Williams, and
until recently a Captain in the Royal Horse Guards ; he had come
to Mashonaland two years before with Lord Randolph Churchill,
was most popular wherever he was known, and he had been most
useful with the Expedition by reason of his military training and
natural grasp of locality.
CHAPTER IX,
THE OCCUPATION OF BULUIVAYO.
By Major P. \\. Forbes.
Scouts sent to reconnoitre Buluwayo — News of Lobengula — Umsingvveni kraal burnt by the
natives — An anxious march — The battle of Imbembesi — The, horses stampeded — The
picket surprised — The Matabeli within 300 yards — -Attempt to surround the laager —
Plucky advance of Captain Delamore's dismounted men — The enemy retire — The Imbezu
beaten by a lot of boys — The Matabeli power broken — Heading straight for Buluwayo —
Kraals deserted — Buluwayo blown up — Letter from Burnham and Fairbairn — -Buluwayo
occupied — Short of supplies — News of the Southern Column — A messenger sent to
Lobengula — Capturing the king's peacocks — Lobengula's reply: ''Where am I to live?"
— -The first church parade at Buluwayo — Despatches for England.^
We marched at 6 a.m. the next day (29th), and after going about two
miles through rather broken country and bush, got out into the high
open veldt again. We were on the southern slope of the watershed,
and about a mile from it. and to the south of us the country gradually
fell away to the Matoppo Hills ; we laagered between two good streams
of water, having seen no natives that day, although the bush was full
of recentl3'-made scherms where they had stopped, and we found a few
head of cattle. We did four miles that afternoon, still on the flats, and
laagered close to a newly-deserted kraal which we burnt that night, and
from which we had taken some grain. The next day we did four miles
in the morning and four in the afternoon, passing a good many kraals,
but seeing no one except one very old woman, who had been left to
starve on the veldt, and whom we brought on in a waggon.
In some kraals close to where we laagered v.^e found a considerable
amount, of powder, caps, and bullets which had been left behind, and
which showed that the kraals had been deserted very hurriedly. As
the grass was good here we halted the following morning, and I sent
three men — Burnham, Ingram, and Vavasour — the first two being
>
<
3
O
z
Ld
CQ
O
-J
Ll_
O
_J
<
LL
Z
$
o
Q
UJ
I
r I
The Occupation of Btdiiivayo. 1^9
American Scouts, and the third one of the Victoria Column, who knew
the country about 'Bukiwayo, to try to get on to Buluwayo or to open
communication with the Tuli Column, which we reckoned should not
be far from Buluwayo by now.
We were to march at 3 p.m., and just before then one of
the Scouts who had gone on ahead with Captain White, galloped
in to report that they had ridden into a very large force of Matabeli
about three miles ahead, but had been able to ride out without any loss ;
they estimated the number at 4,000, and Captain White was remaining
to watch their movements. There was a narrow strip of bush to go
through in a hollow about a mile in front of us, and then it was open
country for about two miles, ending in a row of low bushy kopjes
running from south to north and terminating in a high detached hill,
and immediately behind the kopjes and in our direct route was the
military kraal of Umsingweni. I at once sent out Captain Spreckley's
Troop and one from the Victoria Column to try and draw the natives
on, but they could not get them to leave the bush, and as it was
necessary to push on as fast as possible, I determined to move as
arranged, and to laager again before we reached the kopjes ; we
accordingly moved about two miles and laagered on a very good
position. We had seen nothing of the enemy, but there was thick bush
extending almost from the foot of the kopjes to within 800 yards of us,
a small strip just along the bottom of the kopjes being clear. Just as we
had finished laagering, we saw a very large force of natives come through
a neck between the end of the kopjes and the hill and form up below
the hill ; at the same time we saw a lot of them along the kopjes. I
told Captain Lendy to have the Victoria Column seven-pounder, which
was sighted up to 4,000 yards, brought out and to try a shot at them.
The first shot fell a little short, and we saw them all fire their rifles at
it ; the next two went right into the middle of them, and must have
done great execution ; this scattered them, and they retired over the
neck. Two more shells very accurately placed accelerated their
movements ; but for this, I think that they would have attacked
us that night.
There was a thick fog the next morning, the ist November, and we
could not move until 8 a.m. ; by this time the Scouts had reported that
120 The Downfall of Lobcngiila.
the country was clear of natives in front of us. We passed the kopjes,
finding that the Umsingweni kraal had been burnt by the natives, and
then came to a large bushy basin in which the Imbembesi River rises.
Our guide wished to take us across this, but I could see that by keeping
to the left we could go through a narrow strip of bush and get into open
country again, and so turned the Column that way. During the march,
Burnham, Ingram, and Vavasour returned and reported that they had
been unable to get close to Buluwayo, as there were too many natives
about who had chased them several times ; they had caught two women
near a kraal, and learnt from them that the King had left Buluwayo,
but that some of the people were still there, and that nothing had been
heard of the Southern Column. The Scouts, advance guards, and
flanking parties saw several groups of natives in the bush, but we were
not interfered Av^ith, and after rather an anxious march through open
bush, came out on a high ridge and laagered. The country was quite
open to the west, south, and east, and about ten miles away we saw
Intabas Induna, which we knew to be eight miles east of Buluwayo.
The high ridge ran east and west, and to the north of it was level
for about i,ooo yards, after which it gradually fell away to the
Imbembesi ; to the south it sloped away very quickly, but there were
several spurs running out, and on one of these, at about 400 yards from
the bush, we laagered on the side of an old kraal. The water was some
distance away at the foot of the slope, and the horses and oxen were
sent down to it, with orders that as soon as they had been watered they
were to be driven back towards the laager, and were to feed on the
slopes under cover of the guns. It had been very cold when we
marched in the morning, and eighteen trek oxen had had to be left on
the ground, in addition to which B Troop had lost three horses the
previous day, and I was going to send back some of the Colonial
" boys " to try and find the horses, and bring them and the cattle on.
I was giving orders about it when I saw a large number of natives,
several of whom were mounted, driving a few head of cattle, come out
of the west end of the bush ; I knew that there was a main path to
Buluwayo, and I thought that they were going along it ; they were
about 1,800 yards away, and I had the seven-pounder brought out and
commenced to shell them. There was a mounted picket between us,
The Downfall of Lobengula. plan iv.
compass sketch
Battlk of IMHI{MHKS1,
NOVEMBER l^t, 1893.
Prrparfd by
Major SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY. Bart.,
Key to Plan
A - SalUhury Laagtf with wide ga(>i and
unbuthtd.
B = Victoria Laa£<r Partially hutlitd.
ISO yards dttttmt from Salis:
p.p. ^ Dgad groHHtl, i/iwied, -uihrrt the tntnty
eould obtain cover over an area o/
20" to $00 yartlt ufi to within 150 ana
80 yards e/ Laagtr.
G.G. = Entmy's first lintt of tktrmishtfs
i2,sSp.m.
H,H.
to cut off C. ,
covtrtd by Shell .
Maxim firt at i.Soo yards.
-Captain Bastard's 'I roofi in finrsui
L.L. =
N. == Troop in support of diitnounttd 1
O. = Vedettes.
^ Norden/eUl gun.
- Maxim gvn.
tlightly adiaticed /'O
<cn mo-.-ed fonvard fro
Key to Plan
- Saliil'wy Laager milk wUie j:af.i t
-= yutoria Laager partially lu
D.D. = Un/iHUhtd tmloiun (thorn) /or
80 yardi f/ Laagff,
Q.G. ^ Rntm^t ftrit lintk a/ ikifmlihtu
li.S^p.fM.
H.H. Rntmy charging /rem bnth at J.rs >■»«.
lo cut a/f Captain Haitard'i Treap.
liii rttrtat covtrtd by Shill and
Maxim /Irt at i/ionyavdi.
I -Captain Hattard't 'I roop in purtuit oj
routid Jniu/ritfnini, j.is p.m.
vrpriud fn the
L.L. '
M.M.'
' PotiHoH e/ alt the oxtn duting tlie
latttrha{/ of the fight.
" Troop fn support of diimounttd men
ikiruiUhlnji, hut loo /ar dttlant t»
afford tuchi/ rtquirtd.
- Vidtttii.
-■' laiuhamlni tklntiithtrt t\fltr the tlam-
Ptdtd horitt, hut too latt—l,4<J /•»•
- Nordit^eldt gun.
•" Maxim gun,
- Cardntrgnn.
- Maxim guH.
■ J-poJndtrgun.
MnMm guH ttightly mh-amtd /foiii
llotxhicitt j-ttn mevtd /.^tfatd /'vm
- Tpoundtr gun
HOVid /or
d /,vm
uk OM the
■^ MfH adfanc/d hy Major H'ttnu lo
assist in •^fetttng the ir"- ' — "-
Saiisbury Laager,
^ Notes.
J ^= Appmtimate jo/i, It
=-. .UotiHtfd ifoofs.
= i tdtltes.
= Thorm Husk.
^ I'.imountfd Troops.
xss. Lints ^enemy's rttrtat,
-.iss Route HP the tnv Columns.
s Enemy's skirmishers.
The Occupation of Btihiwayo. 1 2 1
over which we had to fire, and the first shell, owing to a bad fuse,
exploded nearly over the picket, but without hurting them. The picket
had seen the natives, and one of them came in to report them ; just as
he arrived we saw the whole edge of the bush, about 500 yards away,
alive with natives coming towards us ; the alarm sounded at once, the
laagers were manned, and the fight began. The attack was entirely on
the right face of our laager, and owing to the position of the laagers
the Victoria Column saw little of the main attack. The natives had
intended to surround us, and those we had seen on the left front were
to have come round on that side, but were stopped by the shells, and
some others tried in the same way to get round the right, but were
driven back by one of the Victoria Column Maxims. The horses and
oxen had been sent for immediately the alarm sounded, and the horses
were driven up when the fight was at its hottest; just as they reached
the laagers some " boys "' ran out to turn the horses in and stampeded
them, they went off at a gallop up the hollow towards the enemy, and
it looked as if we were going to lose them all, but Sir J. Willoughby,
Captain Borrow, and Trooper Neale, the latter of whom was on horse-
guard and endeavouring to intercept them, dashed forward on horse-
back ; these were followed by Captain Donovan, Mr, Bowen, Corporal
Fife-Scott, Lieut. P. H. Browne, and several others, who jumped on
some horses that were in the laager ; the stampeding horses were turned
when within a hundred yards of the enemy, but not before both they
and the relief party were exposed to a very heavy fire which, however,
only killed one horse.
There was a mounted picket of three m.en just at the edge of the
bush, and one of them had come in to get his dinner. The other two.
White and Thompson, were sitting under a bush not looking out at all,
with their horses grazing a short distance from them, when the Matabeli
came on and were on them before they saw them. Thompson failed to
catch his horse, and then tried to climb a tree, but was pulled down and
stabbed ; White caught his and mounted, but fell off on his way into
camp and then ran on beside his horse, he luckily kept away to his left,
and so cleared our front and enabled the fire from the laager to cover
him. Corporal Whittaker, who had charge of the Gardner at the right
rear, worked it with great accuracy and coolness, and managed to stop
122 The Doivnfall of Loben^iila,
the natives immediately in rear of White, and so let him get to the
laager, which he did, falling down from exhaustion when he arrived.
It was entirely owing to their own carelessness that they had been
surprised, as although there were small patches of bush that were very
thick, they could get a good view for 500 or 600 yards, and would have
been quite safe if they had been keeping a proper look out. Meanwhile
the enemy had been coming on in great numbers ; their fire was very
hot, luckily for us it was high, and for ten minutes or so I thought
it quite as hot as ours ; we had a Maxim, a Gardner, and the
Nordenfelt gun firing all the time, besides about 150 rifles. The main
attack was on our right, and although the natives came on very v/ell
to within about 300 yards and held their own there, they could not
get closer and were at last forced to retire.
There were three half- built huts about 100 yards to the left front of
the face, and a slight depression in the ground enabled five of the enemy
to crawl up to them under cover ; they began to shoot rather straight,
and were not dislodged for some time, but at last three of them retired,
one badly wounded, leaving two dead there. While the main attack was
being conducted on our right face, several attempts were made to get
round us, but in each case were stopped by the Maxims, and none ot
the enemy except those in the main attack appeared to care about
leaving the bush. The fight lasted about forty minutes and then the
enemy retired, but did so in a sulky sort of way, not hurrying or taking
cover, but walking quietly back until they were out of sight.
As they still kept up a desultory fire at a long range, I sent out 100
of the Victoria dismounted men, under Captain Delamore and Lieu-
tenant Stier, to clear them out of the bush, and sent Captain Borrow
with B Troop to support them and to prevent any attempt that might
be made to cut them off from the laager ; I also sent Captain Bastard
with his Troop to try and cut off some of the enemy that had been seen
going down the valley behind the next ridge to the one on which we
were. Captain Bastard got too near the bush, and a large force ran out
from the left to try and intercept him ; but several shells from the
seven-pounder, and a very well-aimed discharge from Lieutenant
Biscoe's Maxim at 1,800 yards, turned the enemy back into the bush.
Meanwhile the dismounted men advanced very steadily in skirmishing
The Occupation of Biduwayo.
12
order into the bush ; they were opposed to a hot
fire at first, but luckily no one was hit, and they
gradually drove the enemy back in front of
them, and after advancing about 500 yards
into the bush found that they had all re-
tired and returned to their laager, being
greeted with a cheer by the Salisbury
Column as they passed. This was the
end of the Tmbembesi fight.
As soon as the dismounted
men had gone forward, I sent
out some of the Native Con-
tingent to bring in some
wounded, from whom we could find out
what the force had consisted of The
first one brought in was a pure Mata-
beli — one of the Imbezu regi-
ment ; although he must have
been in great agony — his left
leg being shattered by a shell-
he burst out laugh- J
was brought into
"Fancy the Imbezu
lot of boys!" He was
to say much, and
but from other
that the force was
attacked us at the
addition of the Im-
The Pickf 1
SURPRISf D
I>Y THF
Matabeli.
ing when he
the laager, and said,
being beaten by a
too badly wounded
died shortly after;
wounded we found
the same that had
Shangani, with the
bezu, Ingubu, and the
N'Gobo regiments; and several kraals, including Godhlwayo,Umsingweni,
and Umswanansi. The Imbezu and Ingubu were the two best regiments
in the country, and had only joined the others on the previous evening ;
they had been waiting for us in the bush on the Imbembesi, and had we
gone that way the result might have been very different. They said that
when the Insukameni had told the King that they had been beaten at
the Shangani, the Imbezu and Ingubu had laughed at them, saying that
124
The Downfall of Lobcngula.
The Induna
OF
THE ImBEZU
Regiment]
advancing.
it was ridiculous that they, the crack regiments, should have to be sent
to beat us, and told the King that they would not have to fight, but
would walk into the laagers, leading us out on the other side, killing the
elder men and keeping the rest for slaves. The King had given the
Imbezu regiment lOO M.H. rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition, and
another 10,000 rounds had been distributed among the rest of the force
on the previous evening. They had had orders to attack us on the
march, but said that they could never find an opportunity when we
were not ready ; they all admitted that they were
thoroughly beaten, although they could not under-
stand how it should be so, and we found out
afterwards that the Imbezu who led the attack
must have lost in dead and wounded nearly 500
out of a total of 700 men. Our casualties, con-
sidering the very heavy fire of which
we had the brunt, were very slight.
Trooper Thompson, as already stated,
was killed on picket, and Troopers
Cary and Siebert were shot through
the head, and never regained conscious-
ness, although they lived to the fol-
lowing night ; Trooper Barnard was
shot through the knee, and Trooper
Crewe through the right leg; Trooper
Calcraft through the back, and Captain
Moberley and Trooper Mack were each
grazed the former on the side and the latter on
the head ; Driver William Brown was also shot in the
hand and a Coolie through the arm ; we also lost three horses.
The Victoria Column was protected from the fire, and had no casualty
but one horse killed.
There were a large number of the enemy's dead lying on the field,
but they had carried away most of them, and during the fight we had
seen a number being taken away. The behaviour of all the men was
excellent, and although I was continually round the laager I only saw
two men who had lost their heads. The machine g-uns worked
The Occupation of Btthiwayo. 1 25
splendidly, and to them our success was mainly due ; both Lieutenant
Biscoe's Maxim and the Gardner in charge of Corporal Whittaker were
outside the laager and under no cover, but were continually in action
and were worked with the greatest coolness. At the corner where the
Gardner was the enemy's fire was hottest ; Trooper Calcraft was shot
while at the gun, but his place was taken at once by Captain Moberley,
himself hit by the same bullet, and the gun did not cease firing ; while
two men were shot in the waggons immediately behind, and I counted
fifteen bullet marks on one of them afterwards.
It was a source of great satisfaction to us to find out what the
force had been composed of, and to realise that we had met, and
handsomely beaten, practically all that Lobengula could send against
us. I wished to send forward lOO men at once to follow up our
advantage and seize Buluwayo before the news could reach there,
but on consulting Major Wilson, we came to the conclusion that the
horses were not in sufficiently good condition to risk it ; for the same
reason we could not follow up the natives to any distance. We
obtained a considerable number of rifles, some being M.H., and a
large amount of ammunition from the enemy ; we found that they
had been armed with all sorts of rifles, including four-bore elephant
guns, and expresses firing explosive bullets. Our expenditure of
ammunition was 8,600 M.H., 25 seven-pounder shells, 30 Hotchkiss,
and 570 Gardner.
The following morning I sent out two mounted parties to patrol for
a considerable distance through the bush, and on their return, as
they stated that the country was clear of natives, although they had
found a large number of dead, the two Columns marched. As the
country appeared quite open to the Intabas Induna, we struck straight
across for it ; each Column was in four columns of waggons, and all
the natives marched in between the Salisbury and Victoria Columns.
As the country was bare of trees, I made each of the natives carry
a thorn bush from the laager, and the sight of the whole Column
marching like this was very imposing. We marched at 12 o'clock,
but had to make a slight detour to avoid some rocky ground, and
it was late in the afternoon when we came to a thick strip of bush,
through which we had to go, as the water was on the other side. The
126
The Downfall of Lobcngula,
flanking parties were strengthened, and extended through the bush on
both sides, the Columns got through safely and laagered in the open
on the other side, on the west bank of one of the tributaries of the Koce
stream. There were a large number of kraals about, all deserted, and
close to us was the Umswanansi kraal, the Induna of which — Malevo —
had been at Victoria ; we burnt this and all others within reach, and a
large quantity of grain. Both Gary and Siebert died at this laager,
and were buried the next morning.
We were now about three miles from the Intabas Induna, and saw
a large herd of cattle in the bush under the hill in the evening ; I tried
a few shells from the Victoria Column seven-pounder, but the distance
was too great to reach them. The next day, the 3rd, we started at
6 a.m., and crossed the main Koce stream, and shortly after crossing a
large force was reported in the bush, about Intabas Induna ; I therefore
laagered up and sent Captain Spreckley with his Troop to try and draw
them on ; this they were unable to do, although there was a heavy fire
from the bush, and they heard the Indunas trying to get the men to
advance ; they had no casualties and returned to the laager. As soon
as they returned I took out Mr. Biscoe's Maxim to a rise, about 1,000
yards from the bush, and fired a few rounds into the edge of it, and
at the same time Captain Lendy put one seven-pounder and several
one-pounder shells into it, which effectually dispersed the enemy.
Before starting that morning I had sent Burnham, Ingram, and
Posselt on again to see if they could reach Buluwayo;
and just as we were crossing the Koce, we saw and
heard a large explosion in the direction of
Buluwayo, and shortly afterwards we saw a
large column of smoke rising, and soon after
we laagered I got a note from Burnham,
brought by a native, in which he said he was
within sight of and about seven miles from
Buluwayo, which had been fired in four places,
and that he was going on there.
We marched again at 3 p.m., keeping to
, the left of the Intabas Induna, to avoid the
Messrs. Burnham and Ingram, '
THE American Scouts. bush between there and Buluwayo; and close
The Occupation of Buhiwayo. 127
to the hill got on to the road from Umhlangeni (Inyati) to Hope Fountain,
and followed it for about three miles through open bush, where we got
into open country again and laagered on a small stream, a tributary of
the Umguzu. Just as the leading waggons were coming in Ingram and
Posselt returned, bringing letters from Burnham and Fairbairn ; the
latter, with Usher, had remained in Buluwayo after the other whites left,
and had had a very anxious time since the King had left. They were
delighted to see our Scouts, and asked for a few men to be sent on that
night to protect them against any stray Matabeli that might still be
hanging about. As Captain Borrow was advance guard with his Troop,
I sent him off at once with twenty men, and Ingram as a guide, to
occupy Buluwayo ; and thus, exactly a month after leaving Charter, the
main town of Matabeliland was occupied by the British South Africa
Company, and the nation was scattered ov^er the country.
There were several small kraals round the laager, from which we
got some grain, and in the distance to the south we could see the
Inyatini and Umziniyantini military kraals. I gave orders that no
kraals were to be burnt now, as we should require all the grain we could
get. It was about an hour before sunset when Captain Borrow left, and
about half-an-hour afterwards I sent my galloper, Mr. Tanner, after him
to tell him. not to allow his men to do any looting, and to put sentries
over any stores, etc., there might be, until the Columns arrived. Mr.
Tanner rode as fast as possible, but failed to catch him, and rode rio-ht
up and into the burning kraal ; Captain Borrow had turned off to Mr.
Dawson's store, where Fairbairn and Usher were, and spent the nio-ht
there. The kraal was lighted up by the fires burning all round, and
Tanner rode into the centre of it but could see nothing but hundreds
of Kaffir dogs running about. It must have been a very eerie sensation,
and he escaped from it as quickly as possible, and luckily found his
way back to the laagers, being helped by the rockets that I sent up
as usual.
The following morning we marched at 6 a.m., and after going three
miles through old lands came to the Umguzu River, which we had some
trouble in crossing ; there was not much water in it, but the banks were
steep and had to be cut away ; it is said to be full of crocodiles, which
Lobengula always preserved. I had hoped to have made Buluwayo in
128
The Downfall of Lobcngula,
one trek, but it was too far, and we had to laager soon after crossing the
river ; the country all about was covered with low thorn bush, with no
grass except close to the river. Dr. Jameson and Sir J. Willoughby
rode on to Buluwayo when we halted. We marched again at 12 o'clock,
and after crossing two small streams, over the first of which we had to
make drifts, arrived at Mr. Colenbrander's house at 2 p.m. The kraal
of Buluwayo (which was still burning) was on the rising ground across
the stream about 1,000 yards away, and the bush had all been cleared for
some distance round. There were several houses and huts in Mr,
Colenbrander's compound which would be very useful for hospital and
store purposes, and so we laagered up there, the Salisbury laager taking
the north-west corner of the compound and forming up so as to
flank the north and west sides of it, and the Victoria laager taking the
opposite corner. We found that the Matabeli had not interfered in any
way with the houses belonging to white men, although by the King's
orders they had burnt down Buluwayo and all the other royal kraals.
Buluwayo
itself con-
sisted of a
large ring
about 100
yards wide
of kraals,
enclosing
an open
space of
about 700 yards
m diameter, and m the centre of this were
the King's own buildings ; they consisted of
two large brick houses, one being the King's
living house and the other the waggon house;
a large group of huts belonging to the queens,
and a cattle and goat kraal. All these were
entirely destroyed, partly by fire and partly by
the explosion. The explosion had consisted
The kraal and the surro,ntdingstcKkadeu.erehcrnt f 3^ qqq rounds M. H. ammunition and about
down, and a large store 0/ ivory, etc., destroyed. ^'- uv^,w-/v-/ iv^miv^^
Rui.NS OF Lobengula's Storehouses
AT Buluwayo.
The Occupation of Buhiwayo. 129
2,000 pounds powder, which had been left by Lobengula in charge
of Fairbairn when he left Buluwayo ; and he had given orders to
the men remaining there, that if the nation was beaten at Imbembesi
they were to set fire to the kraal and follow him, carrying the
ammunition and powder, but so great was the panic that they would
not wait to pick it up, but set fire to the kraal and left. All this
time we had heard nothing definite of the Southern Column beyond
the fact that Gambo, the Chief of the Ikapa people, had been sent
by the King to stop their advance. Gambo, although a son-in-law
of Lobengula's, had always been antagonistic to and was not trusted
by him, and although the former had 3,000 to 4,000 men, the King
had only given him ten M.H. rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition,
and Dr. Jameson thought it quite possible that, instead of attacking
Colonel Goold - Adams' Column, he would join them. We had
heard a report that they had attacked the Column, had killed a number
of white men and had burnt some waggons, but this had not been
confirmed.
As Dr. Jameson wished the news of the occupation of Buluwayo
to get to Mr. Rhodes as quickly as possible, Burnham, Ingram, and a
Zulu boy who knew the road, started off that evening for Tati —
distance 120 miles — where they expected to find a telegraph station.
It was a risky ride, as we knew that Gambo's impi was probably on the
road somewhere, but Burnham had done a great deal of scouting among
the Indians, and could be depended upon to get through if it were
possible for anyone to do so ; they got through safely, although they
only just missed Gambo's impi, and rode for about a mile through the
fires, which were still burning. On arrival at Tati they found the
telegraph had not reached there, and that the heliograph communication
which had been established with Palapye could not be depended upon
owing to cloudy weather, Burnham consequently went on to Palapye,
he did the whole distance, 210 miles, in four days, and the news of the
breaking of the Matabeli power and the occupation of Buluwayo was
published in the English papers of November loth.
I had issued orders that no one was to go into Buluwayo until I had
been there myself to see if it was safe (as the fire was still burning and
there had been several small explosions where powder had been left in
K
1 30 The Downfall of Lobengula.
the huts), and on the following morning I rode up with Dr. Jameson ;
we found everything in the King's block of buildings entirely destroyed,
a large number of cartridges of all sorts lying about, mixed up with bits
of old rifles, loading machines, and beads fused by the heat. Lobengula
had had presents of rifles made him by different hunters, and amongst
others there were the remains of one double-barrelled rifle with one
barrel above the other instead of side by side as is usual. There
was nothing of value visible, although several curiosities, including
the silver elephant given to Lobengula by the Tati Company, were
picked up afterwards among the ruins ; but there was a considerable
amount of grain, of which we got about 600 bags, and this we
wanted badly.
This being Sunday, the Bishop held a voluntary service v^hich was
largely attended, in the afternoon, in Mr. Dawson's compound. On
Dr. Jameson's arrival in Buluwayo the previous day, he had sent out to
Usher's farm — about fourteen miles away — to try and find a Matabeli
boy who was working for Usher, and who he thought would be willing
to take a message to the King. As the boy did not come in. Usher
went out himself to look for him ; he did not find him but returned
about dark and reported that he had seen an impi 500 or 600 strong
about six miles out, that several of the large chiefs from round Buluwayo
were with it, and that it had been part of Gambo's force. As it was
important these men should be prevented if possible from getting
to the King, Major Wilson went out before daylight the following
morning, with sixty men and one Maxim, to try and find them ; but
although they went a large round could not do so, and returned in
the afternoon. On the same morning Calcraft, who had been
wounded at Imbembesi, died, and was buried that evening ; Rixon,
of the Victoria Column, had died the previous day of fever. I had
sent a message by Burnham to any transport riders who might be
on the Tati road to push on as fast as possible, as we were getting
short of supplies.
Dr. Jameson had arranged for 80,000 pounds of meal to be waiting
at Tati, and to be ready to come in as soon as he sent for it ; he sent
for it by Burnham but it had not arrived at Tati, and did not till some
time later. As the Victoria Column was better off for supplies than we
The Occupation of Bitluwayo. 131
were, all that both Columns had were put into one of Mr. Colenbrander's
houses, and Captain Greenfield took charge of them, issuing them as
required. The following day (Tuesday, 7th) two Makalakas arrived
bringing a letter from Colonel Goold- Adams, who was then at Mangwe
— sixty miles away — and the same afternoon Johan Colenbrander,
Armstrong, and Mullins also came in, having ridden through from
Palapye with despatches for Dr. Jameson. They stated that Colonel
Goold-Adams' Column had kept too far to the west in trying to avoid
the range of hills through which the main road ran, had run short of
water and grass, and had had to come back to the main road, that they
had been attacked by Gambo and had lost two white men killed,
besides some natives, and Mr. Selous had been slightly wounded,
that they were coming on, but very slowly, as their oxen were done up ;
they also said that Khama had turned back with all his men. Colonel
Goold-Adams said he had sent Captain Raaf and 100 men forward,
and we heard from Colenbrander that they ought to be on the Kami
River, twelve miles out, that night. As our oxen had had a little
rest, we sent ten span off to them at once in charge of Captain Judd,
who was to hand them over to Captain Raaf at the Kami, or wherever
he met him, and Dr. Jameson sent orders to Captain Raaf to return
with them to Colonel Goold-Adams. The reason for sending Captain
Raaf back was that we could spare no food for his men, and did not
want them before their waggons could get in. I had been trying since
our arrival to get some natives to take a letter to the King, who was
said to be about thirty miles to the north of Buluwayo, in the bush
near Shiloh, and that morning three Colonial " boys,'' John Grootboom,
a very plucky boy, Samuel, and Wilhelm volunteered to go. Dr.
Jameson gave them a letter written in English, Dutch, and Zulu, to
Lobengula, telling him we had occupied Buluwayo, that the nation
was beaten, and that he wished to avoid further bloodshed, asking
him to come in and see him, guaranteeing his safety. It was a
dangerous mission, as although they would be safe if they got to the
King, there was a great chance of their being killed before arriving
there. Dr. Jameson also said he would give the King two days
(I think) after the return of the messengers to enable him to come in, or
if he did not by then he would send after him.
K 2
132 The Downfall of Lobengitla.
The following day (8th) he sent two Zambesi boys as spies
to see what they couid find out ; and during the day Captain
Heyman, who had been Acting S.O. to Colonel Goold- Adams, came in
from the other Column.
Nothing of interest occurred on the next day except that I
sent out Mr. Brabant with some natives to catch the King's
peacocks, which were at the Ingugeni kraal about three miles off,
and which we did not want to have destroyed ; they brought in I
think eight. The following day the two Zambesi boys returned, and
reported that they had been right amongst the Matabeli, who according
to their account were extended across the country about thirty to forty
miles north of Buluwayo, protecting the King, who was said to be at
the Intaba-gi-konga, a small hill in thick bush at the junction of the
Imbembesi and Inquequesi, about fifty miles from Buluwayo. They
said there were a very large number of natives there, in three large
camps at Shiloh, on the Imbembesi, and at Umhlangeni, but they were
all much cowed. As an instance they said they had walked about
amongst the Imbezu and talked to them, they themselves pretending to
be looking for some of their people who had left their kraals, and the
Imbezu had been quite civil, whereas previously no Zambesi natives
had dared to go near or speak to an Imbezu.
The mounted messengers should, we calculated, have been back
before this, and we were afraid they had been killed, and Dr. Jameson
arranged that I should start off the following day with 200 of the
Salisbury and Victoria Columns to try and get the King ; but after
arrangements were made he found there was such a strong feeling
against it on account of the danger that he countermanded it. The
following day (9th) the three messengers returned, bringing a letter
written by John Jacobs, a Colonial "boy" who had accompanied the
King ; the letter was written in English, and said that the King had
received the Doctor's letter and read it, and " so I will come." He
asked where he was to live, as all his houses had been burnt, and ended
by asking for writing paper, pens, and ink. The messengers said
they had gone to Shiloh, where they were taken prisoners and handed
over to the Imbezu to be looked after, that the letter had been taken
from them and sent to the King, that there was a very large impi there.
The Occupation of Biiluwayo. 133
but they were kept close prisoners and did not see much that was going
on ; Grootboom had had some conversation with Umjan, the chief of
the Imbezu, whom he had known when he was in MatabeHland before
as driver to Mr. Helm, and who had rebuked him for joining us. They
understood that the nation as a rule did not wish to fight any more,
the Imbezu and Ingubu being especially averse to it, but that some of
the young men of the Insukameni, Ihlati, and Sesiba were still anxious
to fight, but wished us to come into the bush, leaving the waggons,
Maxims, and seven-pounders behind. They appeared to have a great
horror of the Maxims and shell guns and also of the rockets, which
they looked upon as white man's medicine. They confirmed the death
of Captain V/illiams, and saw a compass and a chain which he used
to wear, there was no question of his identification, as they
described the paintings (tattooing) on his arms and legs ; they
also said that the Matabeli had lost very heavily at both the fights,
and that Gambo and his impi had not rejoined the King, and it
was not known where they were.
The following day, Sunday, 12th November, we had a church
parade for the whole Force at which the Bishop officiated, and in the
evening Colonel Goold-Adams rode in from the Kami River, where he
had left his Column. On Monday we sent back despatches to
Salisbury ; Trooper Savile of A Troop wished to go back and Dr.
Jameson sent Major Browne, who had nothing to do, with him ;
Lieutenant Snodgrass also asked, and was allowed to go. Some
supply Vv^aggons had been sent by Mr. Duncan to Charter, and were to
start from there a fortnight after we had left, and we had expected to
hear of them before this. As it was important that we should know
where they were, I sent Troopers Taylor and Ribstock back with
Major Browne, giving the latter distinct orders that they were to
return whenever they met the waggons ; Major Browne however, for
some reason of his own ignored these orders and took them on to
Salisbury. Colonel Goold-Adams was sending despatch riders back to
Tati that afternoon, and Mr. G. Paget, who wished to return to England,
asked permission to accompany them ; the Bishop also had pressing
business somewhere else, and I gave him a horse to go with them.
The road was absolutely open, as the Bechuanaland Border Police had
134
The Doivnfall of Lobcngu/a.
marched up to it, seeing no one after their fight, and waggons were
already beginning to come in. On arriving at Buluwayo I found
that Mr. Dawson had a few tinned things in his store, which I took
over on the Company's account for the Hospital, and as the Victoria
Column had brought a fair supply, the patients did pretty well. All
the wounded were doing very well except my brother, whose arm
had become troublesome ; the doctors had thought at first the
bone was not damaged, but it appeared afterwards that the joint
was broken, and he had to undergo two operations to take out loose
pieces of bone.
A GROUP OF CAMP " BO VS."
CHAPTER X.
THE PURSUIT OF THE KING.
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Preparations for attacking Unihlangeni — The royal kraals deserted — News of the king on
the Bubye river — Messengers sent to Lobengula and the Imbezu— Captain Raaf
objects to advance — A consultation— The patrol to retire to Unihlangeni — Imbezu cattle
captured by our Mashonas, driven oft" by the Matabeli, and again recaptured —
Further messages sent to the king — Heavy rain storms — Retire to Shiloh — Arrival
of reinforcements — The second advance — Lobengula's message to Dr. Jameson — Dividing
the force— Following the king's spoor — The Matabeli tired of fighting — Finding the
king's bath chair and two waggons.
As the King's two days' grace had now elapsed, and there were no
signs of his coming in, Dr. Jameson decided that we should follow him,
and arranged with Colonel Goold-Adams — who was returning to his
camp on the Kami that day — that he should send on 150 men under
Captain Raaf with two Maxims and a seven-pounder gun, drawn by
ten mules. These arrived the next morning, and consisted of ninety
Bechuanaland Border Police, with two Maxims and the seven-pounder
under Captain Coventry, and sixty of the Tuli Column, the whole under
Captain Raaf Although Captain Coventry, as Captain in an Imperial
force, was senior to Captain Raaf, he had had but little experience in
native fighting, and so Captain Raaf was placed by Colonel Goold-
Adams in command. It had been decided that it would be better to
attack the impi which we heard was at Umhlangeni, as it was the
largest and the country was said to be fairly open, whereas about
Shiloh and the Imbembesi the bush was very thick, and it was
hoped that if we could disperse this impi it might induce the King to
come in, which was most necessary. Although the nation had been
beaten and a large number of natives wished to submit, they would do
nothing so long as the King remained at large and in the country, and
he had therefore either to be captured or driven out of it.
136
The Downfall of Lobengiila.
Umhlangeni was about forty miles from Buluwayo, and it was
decided to start after dark that night and go as far as possible, remain
in the bush the following day, and go on at night so as to reach
Umhlangeni and attack at daylight ; and accordingly I started at 7.30
with the following : — Salisbury Column, ninety, with Captains Heany
and Spreckley, and one mule Maxim under Lieutenant
Biscoe ; Victoria Column, sixty, under Major Wilson,
with a horse Maxim under
Captain Lendy; Tuli
Column, sixty, under Captain
Hon. C. J. Coventry; and
Bechuanaland Border Police,
ninety, the two latter under
Captain Raaf, with two horse
Maxims and one mule seven-pounder
in charge of Captain Tancred.
We took three days' food
^... carried by natives, and each man
carried lOO rounds of ammunition.
Lieutenant Brabant brought about 200
of his natives as carriers, and to drive
cattle if we captured any. We marched till
one o'clock and then halted on the Koce
River, about two miles beyond the Intabas
Induna, having done fourteen miles all
the way through fairly thick bush ; we
foimed up in a square, the Salisbury
and Victoria Columns taking the front
and right faces, and the Tuli
and Bechuanaland Border
Police the left and rear, a
Maxim being at each corner
and the seven pounder on one
face. Our horses were not very
first class, and I thought it
HoisiiiN^, The Bkitish 1-lag at Buluwayo. better to go on earlier than I
The Pursuit of the King. 137
had intended in order to save them, we therefore moved on at one o'clock ;
just before we marched Sir J. Willoughby and Mr, Murray Gourlay came
up. We went on about eight miles, about three of which were through
very dense bush, and came to the Elebeni kopjes, and in them, just beside
the road, the kraal of that name. This was a royal kraal, but a small
one, it was quite deserted, and the queens' huts — there were three
queens living there — were the best I saw in the country ; the kraal was
full of grain, mostly mabele (Kaffir corn), but there was also a large
amount of mealies here. We dismounted for half an hour and gave the
horses a good feed ; I climbed on to the top of one of the huts with
Mr. Colenbrander, and got a very good view of the country round,
he showed me the Umhlangeni Hill and where Shiloh lay. After
feeding the horses we went on and halted just at dark about two miles
short of the Imbembesi ; we passed the site of the old Induba kraal,
and saw the new one about 1,000 yards to our left, but no natives.
We had a heavy shower during the afternoon, and it was a very nasty
squally night and very dark till the moon rose about ten o'clock ; we
had formed up as on the previous night, except that we had a double
line of men on each face, and so reducing the size of the laager. At
1 1 p.m. we moved on again, crossing the Imbembesi at a wide sandy
drift, then quite dry, and getting to the Inkwekwesi River about 3.30.
We made a slight detour just before getting there to avoid a kraal of
Malabama's that is on the road, and where we heard dogs barking and
smelt fires ; crossing that river we formed up on the north side to wait
till it was light enough to attack.
I arranged that Major Wilson with 145 men and two Maxims
should advance to the right of the position where the natives were said
to be, and Captain Raaf with his force to the left, Captain Heany with
forty-five men and the seven-pounder advancing along the road where
it was open, Messrs. Acutt and Colenbrander guiding the two columns.
It was a very convenient position to attack, and the dispositions were
very well carried out, but no impi was there, nor had there been
one ; there were a few natives living with their wives and cattle along
the edge of the bush, and they after firing a few shots ran away. We
killed ten or eleven men, took some women and children prisoners, and
about 1,000 head of cattle. From the women we heard that the King
138 The Downfall of Lobengtila.
had left Intaba-gi-konga and was on the Bubye river, the sources of
which were about ten miles to the north of Umhlangeni, that he had
four waggons with him, but the oxen were knocked up and they were
being pulled by natives, and that he had very few people with him,
as they were all sick of fighting; they also said they had no idea
that we were coming until they actually saw us there. On hearing that
the King was quite close, and as far as I could learn in fairly open
country, I determined to wait till dark and then push on after him.
We took possession of one of the two Mission Stations belonging to
Messrs. Reiss and Eliot at Umhlangeni, both comfortably built, brick
houses, thatched, standing in compounds, they had been comipletely
gutted by the natives, everything breakable having been broken to
pieces ; there was also a large dam built by Mr. Reiss, and round this
there was excellent grass.
I had intended to go on that night, but in the evening Captain
Raaf persuaded me that it would be better to send scouts out
first, to find out whether the King had really left Intaba-gi-konga or
not, and although I did not wish to waste any time, as the King might
be travelling on all the time, I gave in to him. I sent Burnham and
Ingram to Intaba-gi-konga after dark with a native guide, and two of
Captain Raaf's men to the Bubye, and we remained at Umhlangeni ;
each of these parties returned soon after daylight. Burnham reported
that there were people living about the hill, but he had gone care-
fully round it, and there were no signs of the King's waggon spoor ; he
had seen a few natives, but they had all run away, and a great lot of
cattle. The other party reported that they had gone about eleven miles
to the Bubye, and had seen a few natives, but no sign of the King's
spoor, and had brought back as a prisoner a native that they had
caught in a kraal on the Bubye. On their way back they had seen
some natives and called to them to stand, but on their running away
they had fired on them and killed one.
During the night a native had come in with a flag of truce, extem-
porised by himself, consisting of a bit of calico tied on a stick, and
explained that he had been left by Mr. Eliot in charge of his station,
but he had been powerless to prevent the natives looting it. which
they did on their return from the Imbembesi fight ; he, Makasa, had
The Pursuit of the King. 139
been with the impi there, and gave a graphic account of what had
happened. He corroborated what the women had said about the King,
and this was further corroborated by a prisoner who was brought in
the next morning. As all the information went to show that the King
was on the Bubye, I sent runners to Buluwayo to tell Dr. Jameson what
I was going to do, and moved off that night at dark with 200 men,
leaving Captain Fitzgerald in charge at Umhlangeni with eighty men,
the seven-pounder, and one Maxim (that of the Salisbury Column), with
mules. The bush was very thick for the first three miles, and it was
too dark to have flankers out, but we marched in two columns, keeping
as close together as possible, and having two Maxims in front and one
at the rear of the Column. I had sent a patrol out shortly before dark
to see that the country through the bush was clear. We followed the
main Mashonaland road for about three miles, and then turned off to
the left, getting into open country and going due north ; we went on
till II o'clock, and then, having done about ten miles, took possession
of an empty kraal and remained till daylight.
We had by now finished all the food that we had brought from
Buluwayo, but had plenty of slaughter oxen, and there was a small
amount of Kaffir corn in the kraals ; we moved on at daylight, and
after going about four miles came to the Bubye, a series of large pools
of water. Just as we got there we saw a large troop of cattle being
driven into the bush, about 1,000 yards away, and I told Captain Raaf
to send after them ; he sent Captain Francis and about twelve men.
This was one of the senior officers that Captain Raaf had with him,
and he had been specially pointed out to me in Buluwayo as a good
fighting man ; knowing, however, a good deal about his previous
military experiences in Natal, I thought that probably he was not as
much to be relied on as was said, and I afterwards proved quite right.
Just after Francis had started off I saw Raaf, who was riding about
fifty yards to my left, start off full gallop, followed by his "staff," which
always accom.panied him. Captain Raaf had a wonderful pony that he
rode right through this patrol, and although small it was very strongly
built and always kept its condition. We saw them all start off, and
then saw that their object was a native who had been crossing the
open but had suddenly seen us and commenced to run. It was an
140
The Doivnfall of Lobcngula.
exciting hunt, and he had nearly reached the bush when he was caught
and brought back in triumph by Captain Raaf.
As soon as we reached the Bubye we formed up and let the horses
go for a short time ; Captain Francis brought back a large number of
cattle and some prisoners, and some more prisoners were brought in by
the flanking parties. All the men brought in were interrogated separately
^ , and their information was all practically the same ; that the
King had struck the Bubye River about twenty miles lower
down, and was going down it intending to cross when
# __ he had got far enough to be within a day's
"#^^^ journey of the Shangani ; that he had not a
large force actually with him, but a very large
number of men, women, and
children were following him
with their cattle. One of them
said he had left the Imbezu
Regiment that morning, and
they and the Ingubu were
following the King and would
arrive at the Bubye that night ;
he said they did not wish
to fight, but would not
give themselves up without
orders from the King.
There were several kraals
close by, and we moved up to
one of them, where we found a quan-
tity of grain, and remained there until the
evening ; we heard from the prisoners that
five of Lobengula's queens had slept at the kraal the night before, and
had only left as we came up. From this kraal I sent off some of the
prisoners as messengers ; three to Lobengula and two to the Imbezu,
telling the King I was going to follow him wherever he went if he
did not come in, but that I wished to avoid killing any more of his
people, and would not fire on any of them until I got his answer ; I also
guaranteed his safety. To the Imbezu I sent to say that I had heard
Mr. Harry Ware
command of the pion
and road party
The Pursuit of the King, 141
they did not wish to fight, and we did not wish to either, but intended
to catch the King if we had to follow him across the Zambesi ;
I told them my reason for following him was that he had broken
his word to us, having sent to say he was coming and then having
run away ; I also told them that if they came in and gave themselves up
they would be allowed to return quietly to their kraals.
I had intended to have gone on down the river that afternoon,
but Captain Raaf again persuaded me to wait until we could send
out scouts to report what was in front of us. I was very much
against waiting, but had to give in to him, as I feared that if I
moved after what he had said he would unsettle all his men to such
an extent, by talking about the difficulties of the matter, that their
morale might suffer ; I was therefore compelled to remain there for
the night, moving out into the open to laager just before dark. The
following mornmg (19th) I sent Burnham and Armstrong down
the river at daylight, and soon after they had gone I heard that
there was great dissatisfaction in the force about going any
further. We had now reached the last kraals to the north, and
beyond this there was no certainty of our getting food ; I was not
told until some time afterwards this agitation had been started
among Raaf's men, and that he had actually told them they
should go back that day. As I knew if the men were taken
on against their wish they would not be much good, I called Major
Wilson and Captain Raaf, and we discussed the whole question.
Captain Raaf pointed out that it was a very dangerous mission
we were on with what he called a handful of men, no reserve ammu-
nition and no means of carrying the wounded. As he had originally
proposed to come in and take the whole country on precisely these
lines, I was rather surprised at his saying this ; he did not tell me
his men had raised any objection to going on, nor that he had told them
they should not. We then decided we should have a parade
of each corps at a certain time, and without letting anyone know
beforehand what it was for to ask them if they were willing to go or not.
As the Company was unable to fulfil their side of the contract with the
men, namely, give them rations, I thought it only fair to give them a
choice. I impressed upon both Major Wilson and Captain Raaf that
142 The Downfall of Lobeugula,
nothing was to be said to anyone until they were on parade, and
then they were only to be asked whether they would go on or not, and
no pressure of any sort was to be brought to bear either way. While
we were talking Burnham and Armstrong returned, and reported that
they had been about six miles down the river, and had seen a large
number of natives and cattle, all travelling east, that they had crossed
a spoor nearly a mile wide of a very large lot of cattle, which Burnham
estimated at not less than 7,000 : this spoor crossed the river, which was
full of dead cattle that had been crushed to death, and the pools
through which they had been driven were covered with fish trampled to
death, that although they had been close to some of the natives they
had not been molested in any way, they also said the country was open
along the river for five or six miles.
The parade was ordered for eleven o'clock, at which time each
corps fell in by itself, I spoke to the Salisbury Column, telling them
I could not guarantee food any further, and asked those who wished to
return to Buluwayo to step forward. To my astonishment all but
seventeen did so, these seventeen included the B Troop men who had
come as escort to the A Troop Maxim, and nine from A and C Troops ;
I asked these seventeen if they were ready to come with me wherever
we might have to go to catch the King, and they said they were.>)(
I then went to Captain Raaf and asked him about his men, and he said
that only four would go on ; Major Wilson told me all his men
wished to go on, but as I knew some of them had been the first to talk
about the danger, and feared that owing to some misapprehension
pressure must have been brought to bear upon them, I said to Captain
Raaf, " As your men want to go back, you will have to go with them,"
to which he replied, " But I can't go back, I am a soldier, and besides,
I have the Bechuanaland Border Police." They being Imperial Troops
had of course not been consulted. Directly afterwards some officers of the
Salisbury Column came to me and protested very much against the way
in which, as they said, their men had been humbugged into refusing to go
on, they said they had been told nothing about it, whereas Major Wilson
they believed had. I repeated to them what the arrangement had been,
and that I had purposely not told them as I did not wish them to
influence their men ; they understood me to mean influence them to go
The Pursuit of the King. 143
back, whereas I intended exactly the opposite, knowing^as I did that they
would not have allowed a single man to decline to go on. I did not know
until long afterwards that they had misunderstood me in this way,
but the result of it was to make them and all their men very bitter
against me; I told them I should take the force back, and wrote to
Dr. Jameson telling him what had happened, stating that I should
be at Umhlangeni the following night, and asked him to send
instructions and some food there. I decided to wait there that night
and return the next day. That afternoon two natives gave themselves
up to one of the pickets and were brought to the laager — they proved
to be an Imbezu and his slave, the Imbezu told me that the messengers
I had sent out the previous day had come to the impi and delivered
my message, that they, the impi, were not satisfied of the genuineness
of it, and had sent him to see if it was all right, and that a number of
them were awaiting his return in the bush. Previous to this some of
our natives had gone out on a raiding expedition by themselves, and
had found a large troop of cattle belonging to the Imbezu ; these
had been brought in, and were then grazing about 1,000 yards
from the laager in the open, but close to the edge of the bush.
While I was talking to him we were sitting on an ant-heap about 100
yards from the laager, the " alarm " sounded and we all started up, we
saw our native cattle guards running to the laager and all the cattle
being driven into the bush by Matabeli, although all the Matabeli had
rifles they did not fire at the cattle guards. The horses were all got
in at once and the laager manned, and I told Captain Raaf to send some
men out to bring back the cattle, I also told Major Wilson to send a party
out. Captain Raaf sent out Captains Francis and Phipps,[and Major
Wilson sent Captain Judd, and they returned shortly afterwards with
the cattle, having killed eleven or twelve men who were driving them.
Several of the officers were for having the Imbezu that had come in
shot as well, saying he was a spy, etc., and his statements were all
untrue, I would not allow him to be molested in any way, as I believed
then and do still, that his statement was quite correct, and that the
Imbezu had been waiting for his report, but the sight of their cattle
close to them, only guarded by a few Mashonas, was too much for
them, anyhow I kept him a close prisoner in the laager. After this
144 ^'^^ Dozvufall of Lobengula.
attempt I thought it would look as if we were afraid if we went back
at once, and so decided to go a few miles further down the river the
next day, returning the same afternoon. I knew that the socket signals
had frightened the natives a great deal when I had sent any up, and as it
seemed we were not going to succeed by direct means in catching
the King, I thought it worth while trying indirect, and by frightening
them and working on their superstitious fears, do what we could not
by force. I therefore got Burnham and another to ride down the river
again in the dark to where he had seen the natives in the morning, and
there let off two socket signals right among them ; they cause a very
loud report when exploding and leaving the socket, and another when
the bursting charge goes off at a great height in the air, dropping a
shower of stars. Burnham did this most successfully, getting close to
where a large number of natives were encamped, and as he said
frightened them for '' quite a bit " ; he and his companion then set
fire to two kraals from which they were hurrying in their fright, and
altogether caused a considerable panic. ~
The following morning I sent back eight men who were sick,
and all the cattle we had captured — amounting to 400 or 500 — to
Umhlangeni, and Mr. Tanner, who had fever, went with them ; we then
went about six miles down the river, seeing no natives, but abundant
traces of a large number having been there lately, and came to the end
of the open country and laagered near the river, with bush close to us
all round. Just after we laagered the " alarm " sounded, everything
was got ready at once, and I went to Captain Raaf, who had had it
sounded, to find out what had happened, he told me the alarm
was a false one, but as he had seen a man galloping towards the
laager, he thought we were going to be attacked, this was one of
his flankers who was rejoining the force unnecessarily fast. I told
him I would not have the alarm sounded by anyone but myself if
I was present, as it only helped to upset the men's nerves. While we
were laagered here four natives were seen stalking one of the pickets,
and one of them fired at the picket, they were in turn fired on and
three of them killed. We saw a few natives moving about in the
distance, and I think there were probably many more in the bush
round us. Before leaving there I sent away all the prisoners (about ten)
The Pursuit of the King. T45
that we had, telling them that although we were turning back we were
not going to give up the chase of the King, but were only going back
for more men and food, and then going to resume it. I also told them
that columns would be sent down the Gwailo to the east and Guay to
the west to cut him off, and that he must be taken somewhere ; I told
off two of them to take this message to the King.
We started back at two o'clock, and at starting I sent Captain
Francis out to the right to some kraals belonging to a son of Kisi, a
big Induna, which were said to be about four miles off our road, to
destroy them, Major Wilson going out on the left to destroy any kraals
he could find ; Captain Francis did not get to these kraals, but burnt
some others, and Major Wilson burnt a large number on his side. We
moved back to our laager of the previous day, seeing no natives on the
way, but capturing a small lot of cattle. The next morning I sent
Captain Francis out again to Kisi, Captain Coventry and twenty-five
Bechuanaland Border Police going with him ; after burning these
kraals they were to get across to the Inkwekwesi valley and destroy
kraals up it, rejoining me at Umhlangeni ; Captain Heany went out
with twenty men to the east to do the same thing. Captain Coventry
burnt a large number of kraals and took some cattle, but lost them
again in the bush. Captain Heany got very bad with fever soon after
going out and had to take his party into Umhlangeni, but previous to
this burnt eight kraals. We moved to the first water above, five miles,
off-saddled for a few hours and then went into Umhlangeni.
While off-saddled I got a letter from Dr. Jameson in reply to mine,
saying that he had consulted with Colonel Goold-Adams, and was sending
Captain Napier with a large reinforcement of dismounted men with
waggons, more ammunition, and what food he could spare, to Shiloh, and
that he wished me to go on there direct from Umhlangeni, get on to the
King's spoor there, and follow it right up. He also said that Captain
Borrow had left for Shiloh with sixteen mounted men and some carriers
with two days' food to last until the waggons' arrival ; he was sending
John Jacobs, the King's clerk, to show us the way — John Jacobs had
left Buluwayo with the King, but had escaped from him near the Im-
bembesi. The following morning Captain Borrow and his men arrived,
having been to Shiloh and then come on ; he reported the country
L
146
The Downfall of Lobengitla.
quite deserted about Shiloh and along the road. We remained there that
day to rest the horses, and had some heavy rain, the first of the season,
although we had had slight showers before ; in the evening Sir J.
Willoughby rode into Buluwayo. Captain Borrow told me that every-
thing was quiet round Buluwayo, and that a great number of the chiefs
were giving themselves up, but that many were still waiting to see what
the King was going to do. The next
I sent all the captured cattle, about
Mr. Brabant's natives to Buluwayo
light for Shiloh. We off-saddled
the Imbembesi for four hours, and
Mr. Biscoe's Maxim broke its
one had to be put in. We went 4!
and had two of the
that I have ever
one was short,
until we got
shortly before
the Column,
Reli
EF WAGGONS ON THE
WAY TO Shiloh.
day, 23rd November,
1,600, in charge of
and started at day-
on the west bank of
in crossing the river
disselboom, and a new
on in the afternoon
heaviest rain storms
experienced ; the first
but the second lasted
into Shiloh, which was
dark. I was at the head of
and when the rain was at its
worst Captain Raaf halted his
^i men, who were in rear, without
'^' my knowing it, and the Column
got separated. Shiloh is a deserted
"' mission station situated in a hollow with
high ground all round it, and the rain was so
heavy that it covered all the ground some
inches deep, and caused us to lose the road,
and we had some trouble in getting down to
the station ; we got down at last however,
thoroughly wet through and miserable, and
found that Captain Napier had just arrived
E^ - with the waggons and food, a few mounted,
and 200 dismounted men. He had brought a small
quantity of brandy, there was just enough to give
everyone a small tot and small as it was it cheered
us all up.
The Pursuit of the King, 147
Captain Napier had laagered his party, and so I formed a separate
laager close by, he had brought out ten waggons and spans, but of
these only five were fit to go on. It rained heavily during the night,
and it was impossible to go on, the next day I went through the
supplies Captain Napier had brought out, and found there were
three-quarter rations for 300 men for twelve days, and enough to
take the other 280 men back to Buluwayo. I did not wish to take any
waggons with me, but I knew that as they were there I should have to,
if it was only for a few days, and I decided on taking some dismounted
men to send back with them when it had been proved to everyone's satis-
faction that it was impossible to take them on. As I have said, I had
only rations for 300 men for twelve days, and I therefore made up the
300 as follows : Salisbury Column, Captain Borrow and twenty-two
men mounted ; Victoria Column, Major Wilson and seventy mounted
and one hundred dismounted ; Tuli, Captain Raaf and twenty mounted,
and Bechuanaland Border Police, Captain Coventry and seventy-eight
mounted, I took four waggons, four Maxims — two galloping and two
on waggons — and the Hotchkiss which had come out with Captain
Napier. As Mr. Tanner was still suffering from fever I sent him into
Buluwayo, and Mr. Murray Gourlay went in with him.
The following morning I started with the force as above, sending
all the other men back to Buluwayo, Captain Heany being in charge of
the mounted, who were to go straight in, and Captain Bastard of the
dismounted, who were to remain with the waggons. I wrote to Dr.
Jameson telling him what I was doing, and also that as I only had
twelve days' rations, I should go as far as I could, but should be back
on the main Mashonaland road at the Shangani by the twelfth day,
and asked him to have food there to meet me. I also asked him to send
Captains Heany and Spreckley along the main road to the Shangani
and down it, to create a diversion in that direction ; this he could not
do, but sent Captain Spreckley to the Gwai River. Captain Finch had
been suffering from toothache, so I persuaded him to go into Buluwayo
to have it seen to, and as he Vv^as in a very poor state of health I did not
think he would come out again, but he did. We got on to the King's
waggon spoor at his camp, about one mile from Shiloh, and followed it
through thick bush for eight miles, and then laagered on a small stream ;
L 2
148 7 he Dozvnfall of Lobcngiila.
we passed a great number of large scherms where the King and his
people had stopped, and found some grain in some of them ; we also
passed a few kraals, which we burned, but saw no natives. We laagered
up as before, but had a waggon at each corner, and the oxen fastened to
their trek-tows in a square inside, and inside them again the slaughter
cattle. The following morning, just as we were starting, Mr. B. Wilson
came out with some brandy for which I had sent for the sick, and a
letter from Dr. Jameson still emphasizing the necessity of getting the
King, and saying that messengers had been in from him bringing an
answer to the m.essage sent by me from down the Bubye, also saying
that he would send food to the Shangani. These messengers said that
the King had only been three miles away when we turned back, that he
was very sick and almost deserted ; the King asked Dr. Jameson to stop
the troops going after him, saying again that he would come in. Mr. B.
Wilson did not wish to come on, and as Acutt was sick I allov/ed him to
go back with him. Two of my horses had strayed away from the others
in the bush and could not be found when we marched ; we went on four
miles through very heavy ground, and laagered in a small open valley .,vr
Colenbrander had been on the right flank during the march, and had
come on a lot of cattle, which he drove in, bringing with them two little
boys who had been herding them.
While out-spanned one of the pickets sent in to say that about
twenty armed Matabeli had come up to them, and said that they
wanted to speak to me, that they were quite civil, but refused to put
Uieir arms down. I had the horses brought in at once and the laager
manned, and went out with two small parties of mounted men to see
them, but by the time I got there they had all run away, nor could
any of them be found, although I sent Captain Raaf with some men
a long way round to look for them, he did not return till so late that
we could not march that night. We had been having heavy storms
every day, and there was a very heavy one that night. At daylight
Captain Finch returned, bringing Trooper Farquhar of the Victoria
Column with him, and my two horses, which I was very glad to see, he
had found them at Shiloh ; he brought a letter from Dr. Jameson, saying
that the King had sent in again asking for Usher and Fairbairn to be
despatched to talk to him, and that from all accounts he was in a bad
The Pursuit of the King. 149
way. We moved on at 6.30, but the country was so wet and heavy
that we only managed to do eight miles all day, and had to halt
in the middle of the day without water. When we started in the
morning, Captain Raaf asked me to allow him to ride on two or three
miles to look for water ; he went on eight miles to water, and spent the
day with his staff there. Luckily there were few natives about or he
would very likely have been cut off from us ; although there were
twenty-five of his party altogether, there were only twelve duty men, the
remainder being his staff. During the march that day some natives had
been seen and followed, and one of them who had climbed a tree was
caught ; Burnham, who had gone off with Captain Raaf, also caught
two. These told us the same story about the King that we had heard
before, and also said that the people were leaving him fast and coming
back to their kraals ; they thought he was on the Shangani, and
intended to remain there for a time. That night and the next day were
very wet and we halted for the day; the oxen were all knocked up, and
it was quite evident that if we were to catch the King we must leave the
waggons behind, I therefore had all the best horses picked out, and
found that I could take on 160 mounted men. As we were not more
than eighteen or twenty miles from Umhlangeni, I decided on sending
the waggons across there instead of back to Buluwayo. The force to go
on consisted of Salisbury Column 28, Victoria Column 46, Tuli Column
24, and Bechuanaland Border Police 60, with two Maxims — one horse
and one mule — and one pack-horse carrying ten days' food for every ten
men ; and the remainder under Captain Delamore were to go to
Umhlangeni and wait there for orders from me. We marched the
following morning, and after going eight miles crossed the Imbembesi,
the river was about three feet deep where we crossed it, we laagered
on the east bank, and Burnham who had been scouting brought in two
prisoners he had caught ; we went on nine miles in the afternoon, and
laagered for the night in heavy rain at a recently burnt kraal.
The next day, 30th, we did eight miles in the morning to some
water holes, and eight miles more in the afternoon ; we could see the
Bubye Valley in front of us, but could not reach it that night and had
to laager about two miles short of it. We had been passing scherms all
along the road (we were following the King's spoor all the way), and
I50
The Downfall of Lobengula.
some of them had only been very recently vacated, and we did not
know where we might catch up some of the people. Shortly before we
came to the place where we laagered that evening, we had to go down
a long deep donga with high banks and thick bush on each side of us,
it was a place where the Maxims could have been of little use, and I
was very anxious until we got out of it. It opened into a wide valley,
and just as we got out some of the flankers brought in about twenty
women and children with a few men that they had found in the scherm,
they had not shown fight, and appeared to be thoroughly frightened.
Previous to this Colenbrander, who had been in front, had captured a
native whom he knew as one of the Indunas ot
Buluwayo, and these were all brought to the laager.
Just as we were laagering, one of the flankers came
in to say that there was a large scherm in the bush
about half a mile away full of people, and I sent
Captain Borrow with his men and Colenbrander to
interpret, to see them ; it was nearly dark when
they got there. They found about 200 people, but
the men all hid among the women, and Colenbrander
could not tell who they were, they seemed to
---- be very submissive, and Colenbrander told
them to bring wood and water down to the
laager, which they agreed to do but did
not ; he brought down two " boys " that
had worked for him before.
After dark I talked to the Induna
and heard from him pretty much what
before, that the King was at the Shangani
and had a very small number of men actually with him, but that bits of
all the regiments were in the neighbourhood guarding him ; that it was
only a few of the young men of the Insukameni, Ihlati, and Siseba
Regiments who wanted to fight, and that all the rest of the nation were
getting tired of trekking, and were breaking away in small parties and
going back to look for their wives and children. He also stated that
they were suffering very much from hunger and small-pox ; the
people with him came from the kraals round Buluwayo and expressed
\\\y%---
A CAPTURED M.'iTABELI InDUNA.
we had been told
The Pursuit of the King, 151
themselves as only too glad to be allowed to go quietly home. /J
told him that they were at liberty to do so, and that on arriving at
Buluwayo he must report himself to Dr. Jameson ; I also warned him
that he must not send on to let the King know that we were coming,
threatening to destroy all his people if he did, he promised not to do so,
but I afterwards found out that he had. Previous to meeting any of
these parties of natives, I had consulted with Major Wilson and Captain
Raaf as to what was best to be done about them, and we came to the
conclusion that by treating them kindly and not molesting them we
should have the best chance of getting to the King. If we attacked
them we should probably get some men wounded, which would hamper
us, and the news of our fighting would only induce the King to push on
faster, and as our horses were in a poor state and our food supply very
limited, it was very important that we should catch up with him as
quickly as possible. I had not hesitated about leaving these people
unmolested behind us, as I always intended to go back up the
Shangani River.
The following morning we moved on two miles to the Bubye and
laagered there, and when we marched I sent Captain Fitzgerald to the
party that had been seen the evening before to take whatever cattle they
might have, as a punishment for not coming in, he saw none of the
natives, but took about twenty-five very thin sheep and goats. The place
where we halted was very pretty with very large thorn trees and good grass,
and the horses got a good feed. We moved on at two p.m., and before
starting I sent Burnham and Ingram forward to look for the next water ;
at starting we had to cross the Bubye, which was dry, and a very narrow
channel with steep banks. By bad driving 'the leading Maxim was
upset, the gun turning completely over and throwing the near wheeler
right over the top of the off one, luckily no one was hurt and no harm
done, and it did not take long to get it right again. We did eight miles
that afternoon all through bush and camped in an open valley at the
head waters of the Gwambo stream, on the way we passed a number of
natives living in scherms, they were in a miserable state and their cattle
all half starved, they were delighted at being told that they could go
quietly home. Burnham had found some natives on the Gwambo, and
had the Induna with him when we arrived, he told the same story as
15^
The Downfall of Lobengula.
the others, and said that all his people were in a deplorable state from
starvation, fever, and small-pox ; I repeated to him what I had just
said to the others.
We had been following the spoor of the King's waggons all the way,
and it kept a very straight course through the bush, he had done very
little cutting, having driven straight over everything but the largest
trees. We had passed two of his waggons which he had burnt when he
left them, and close to this laager we found the remains of his bath-chair,
the latter had been pulled by sixteen men, and hence I think arose the
report we had heard on the Bubye that his waggons were being pulled by
natives. We could not see sufficient of the country when at the Bubye
to say how far we were below the point at which we had turned back
before, but we thought it to be about fifteen miles. We had been having
a great number of heavy storms, and this evening the worst storm that I
ever saw threatened passed over us ; the clouds came up very fast,
inky black and full of lightning, and all thought we were in for a
regular downpour. The King's waggons — now reduced to three — had
separated here, and we had some trouble in getting on the right spoor
again, but we found that they had only separated to avoid a nasty bog,
into which some of our horses got. The spoor from here ran down the
east bank of the Gwambo, running then almost due north, through an
open valley 600 to 1,000 yards wide, and along the edge of the bush
on both sides were deserted scherms.
Fording a River.
CH MAP.
lisbupy and Victoria to Buluwayo,
Shangani Patrol,
ior Wilson's Party when killed.
Major P. W. FORBES,
% Company's Combined Forces in Mataheliland.
VICTORIA
^coile t incli=-i()\ miles
COLLINORIOOC
i^^^^^/ryTc^d^ y^-^v-.
The downfall of lobengula. plan ii.
y,
5'
^VICTORIA
ilumns from Salisbury and Victoria
And of the Shangani Patrol,
showing position of Major XVihon^s Party when killed.
Prepared by Major P. W. FORBES,
Comvtanding ilu Briiiik South A/ricct Company s Combined Forces in Matabetiland.
Approximate Scale I 7«c//— i6i viites
^/^^^~^^7c^^^^_A-^.
CHAPTER XI.
THE LOSS OF THE WILSON PATROL.
By Major P. W. P"orbes.
Close upon the king — An anxious time for the scouts — Preparations for an attack — The
king's camp deserted — Major Wilson sent to reconnoitre — Preparations for a dash for the
king— Messengers sent back to Major Forbes — Captain Borrow sent with reinforcements
— Heavy firing across the river — The column attacked — The sole survivors of Major
Wilson's party — Burnham's account of the disaster — To retire up the river — Short oi
ammunition —News sent to Dr. Jameson — A deluge of rain — Mr. Howard's plucky swim
across the river.
We did six miles in the morning, and as we went along a native called
out to Colenbrander from the bush and came out to us, he was from a
kraal near Umhlangeni, and had been a pupil of the Missionary, he told
us that the King was on the west bank of the Shangani, about fifteen
miles away, on the previous day, and that the force actually with him
was very small, although there were a large number of people scattered
about near him looking after cattle, etc. He also told us that the spoor
turned into the bush again about three miles below, and that we should
find no water between the Gwambo and the Shangani, and said that
Magwegwe the Induna of the Buluwayo kraal, and Manyou, and several
other Indunas were with the King, and that Ingubugubu, the King's
brother, who had just returned from Cape Town, had passed there on the
previous day on his way to the King, he said he knew nothing definite
about Gambo's movements, but believed, and we afterwards found it to
be true, that he had ridden across with two other men and had joined
the King, but had none of his people with him.
We moved on in the afternoon, intending to go as far as to where
the spoor turned into the bush and then to laager, pushing right on to
the Shangani in one march the next morning. I had sent Burnham,
Ingram and Mayne, the three American Scouts, on in the morning with
154 T^<^ Downfall of Lobengztla.
a Zulu boy to interpret for them, as we were getting close to the King and
were continually coming on small parties, I wished Burnham if possible
to find out the lay of the country for some distance in front, in order to
be able to take us across to where the King was, and so save us following
the spoor and running into an ambush, in case they laid one for us. Just
after we moved in the afternoon they returned, and Burnham reported
that they had followed the spoor, which as we had heard turned up into
the bush about four miles ahead, they had then followed it about
two miles towards a bushy ridge, and just before reaching the ridge
they had off-saddled in some rather broken country. Ingram's horse had
knocked up, and he started to lead him back ; soon after he had left them
they were suddenly surrounded by about twenty armed Matabeli, who
told them that they belonged to Gambo and that they wanted them to come
and see Gambo. Burnham in turn suggested that they should come and
see me, and they talked for some time ; one of the Matabeli who was, so
Burnham said, the most ferocious-looking brute he had ever seen, being
for taking them into the bush and killing them. The Scouts had their
horses with them, and while they were talking had quietly saddled them
up and mounted, and then started slowly back along the spoor, the
natives following them. It was an anxious time for them, for had one
shot been fired they would have been killed at once, and they were very
anxious about Ingram, who had gone on in front by himself, the natives
followed them to the edge of the bush, but did not come out of it and the
Scouts rode back to us, catching up Ingram on the way. Burnham had
always appeared before to be absolutely fearless and ready to go any-
where, but this upset his nerves very much and showed him, what he
would not admit before, that the Matabeli were really an enemy to be
careful of I told Major Wilson of this, but no one else except Captain
Finch ; I had found that Captain Raaf could not keep anything to him.-
self, and did a great deal of harm by talking to the young officers
he had with him about the dangers of the march, etc. Major Wilson
and I knew what was in front of us, and that we were liable to be
attacked by, as far as we could ascertain, 2,000 to 3,000 men,
and were quite prepared for it ; we had seen in our two fights
when going into the country that the natives could not stand against
the Maxims, and determined to push on all we could, only taking
TJic Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 155
care that the Column was always ready to form up and fight at a
moment's notice.
We laagered this night in the open and put a strong bush scherm
round us, and after daylight started again ; we went over the high open
ridge where Burnham had been surrounded the day before, and on it
found a large series of deserted scherms ; Burnham went round these
counting the blocks of wood used by the natives for pillows, and
estimated that 1,500 men, women, and children must have used
them. After crossing this ridge we came down again into the
open valley of the Lupani, and although we had been told that we
should find no water there, found a large pool full ; as we came down to
the valley we saw a herd of wild pigs feeding in it, and as they are very
timid and easily scared it did not look as if there were any natives
about. We went on in the afternoon, entering the bush again and going
up a rise similar to the one we had crossed in the morning. I had no
scouts on in front of us, as I did not wish to risk losing them, but had a
small advance guard of four men about 300 yards in advance of the
column, a rear guard of the same strength, and two half sections
on each flank, with connecting files between them and the column. One
of the Maxims was at the head of the column and the other at the rear,"
and the men marched in sections between them, the Salisbury Column
being first, then the Victoria, the Tuli Column, and Bechuanaland
Border Police, and on an alarm the Column was to form laager at once,
Salisbury and Victoria Columns taking front and right faces, Tuli
Column and Bechuanaland Border Police left and rear, with the Maxim
in the left front and right rear. The bush was thick in places, but as a
rule was thin enough for a good view 300 or 400 yards on each side, and
the column could always have been in fighting formation in two minutes.
I thought it more than likely that we should be attacked that afternoon,
as I knew that this was the last bush that we had to go through
before reaching the Shangani, consequently I was very careful to keep
the Column closed up. The ridge near the top was rather broken, and
just as we were getting on to it the advance guard sent back to report
that five or six natives had crossed the road in front of them, but had
disappeared in the bush. I did not send after them, as I did not wish to
detach any men ; almost immediately afterwards a shot was fired on our
156
The Downfall of LobengiUa.
Major Wilson and hjs
tarty leaving the camp
11 left rear.
J. 25" Captain
Raaf who
was rid-
ing oft
the road
on the left
at once went
to find out if the
flankers had fired it, and sent to
report to me that they had not
and had seen no one; I had little doubt
that this shot was a signal either to attack or
leticat, but nothing happened. Shortly afterwards
the light flanking party sent to report that they had
come on fresh spoor of natives and a mounted man
going the opposite way to us ; I sent Colenbrander
to see it, and he said that it was that of two horses
and forty to fifty natives. The ridge was four or five miles wide,
and after crossing it we went down again and came into the head of
a narrow valley, which the prisoners with us said led right to the
Shangani, we followed it for three or four miles, and then came to a
roughly built kraal which had only been very recently vacated, and at
which we saw by the spoor that the horsemen who had gone back had
halted, we were expecting every minute to find someone, and were
ready for an attack at any moment.
Burnham and Colenbrander were now with the advance guard, and
on going through a narrow strip of bush, several of which ran across,
connecting the two sides of the valley, saw a large herd of cattle with
two boys guarding them and a mounted man riding about them, they
galloped in and caught one of the boys and brought the cattle back, but
could not catch the other boy or the mounted man. The boy told me
at once that the King's camp was just in front, and that the King had
been there that afternoon, that he had left with his waggons on
the previous day, but they had stuck in the mud and he had
returned on horseback that afternoon for men to pull them out, and that
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 157
he did not wish to fight, but he sent back his eldest son, Mnyamandi,
that afternoon with a letter to Dr. Jameson, telling him that he was
coming in to Buluwayo. As there was no time to waste, I formed the
Column into square at once and advanced, we had to go through a
narrow strip of bush and then came out in a wide open flat, and found
the King's camp just on our right on the edge of the bush, as we came
out of the bush a lot of natives ran away across the open, but I would
not allow them to be fired at. I rode up to the King's camp and found
it deserted, it consisted of a number of roughly built huts and shelters
and they had evidently only just been vacated, as fires were still alight
and a number of cooking pots were lying about. In one of the huts we
found a small slave boy asleep, he was pulled out and suddenly con-
fronted by a lot of us, and I asked him at once where the King was, he
said he had left the previous day with the waggons and had not been
back since. The Column was marching slowly on and I rode back to it.
I called Major Wilson out at once and told him that I wanted him to
take his twelve best horses and push on along the spoor as fast as he
could to see which way it went, returning by dark, this was about five
o'clock, and there was about one-and-a-half hour's more daylight, I said
to him that if he went fast he would be able to do five or six miles out
and back. At this time we were entirely ignorant as to where the King
had gone, and did not know that he had crossed the river which was
close in front of us and the spoor was going down the west side. One
report that we had heard from the natives along the road was that he
was making for the junction of the Gwai and Shangani Rivers, and to
get there he might keep on the west side of the Shangani all the way.
Major Wilson at once called out his twelve best mounted men, and
several other officers, including Captains Kirton and Greenfield, asked if
they might go, and were allowed ; they all understood that they were to
be back that night, and Kirton asked Dr. Hogg, with whom he was
messing, to keep some dinner hot for him as they would not be in till
dark. Mr. Bowen, Major Wilson's galloper, who had accompanied him
everywhere previous to this, asked if he should go, but Major Wilson
told him to remain with the Column. Mr. Bowen's explanation of this
is, that Major Wilson had promised him some time before that if we
caught the King, he would ask me to let him, Bowen, take the news
158 The Downfall of Lobengula,
back to Buluwayo (Bowen had about the best horse amongst us), and
that it was to keep his horse fresh that Major Wilson would not let him
accompany him. Major Wilson then started off with his party ; Burnham
and Ingram were not with him, but were still at the King's camp
lighting the huts, I sent for them, and as Burnham's horse was not very
fit, gave him my own and sent them on after Major Wilson ; Burnham
I thought might be useful, and was very quick at following a spoor. I
then took the Column and laagered about 200 yards from the river, in
the open. During the evening we heard the natives, who had run away
from the King's camp, building scherms across the river.
The day before we got here Major Wilson and I had discussed the
question and agreed that it was not advisable to take the Column any
further than the Shangani. We had now been nine days out from
Shiloh, and I knew that it could not be less than sixty miles to the
main drift on the Shangani, and even if we went up as quickly as
possible, we could scarcely get through before we had run out of food,
and I wished to avoid this if possible. When the laager was formed
up I had another talk to the boy we had caught ; he said he was
the son of Magwekvve, the chief of Buluwayo, and if this was true,
we knew he was of some importance. He told us there were about
3,000 men with the King, belonging principally to the Insukameni,
Ihlati, and Siseba Regiments, with a few from each of the other regi-
ments, he said that his father, Manyou, and Gambo were also there,
the King he said had a swollen leg and could only travel very slowly,
he repeated what he had told me before about Mnyamandi having
been sent back with a letter.
As all the accounts made out the number of men with the King to
be about the same, 3,000, the majority of whom I knew to be of very
little use from a fighting point of view, I made up my mind to take fifty
men and a galloping Maxim on the next morning and make one rush
for the King. I told Mr. Chappe what I intended doing, and he
expressed himself quite willing to go with me, I told him that I
should leave the laager where it was in charge of Major Wilson. I
sent for Captain Coventry and got him to bring up the driver of the
mule Maxim, a Cape " boy," and I asked him about the mules, he told
me they were still quite fit, and that if necessary they would do
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 159
twenty-five miles out and back again the following day. I intended
taking Captain Borrow and his twenty men, who were all good men
and well mounted, and thirty of the Victoria Column, with the best
horses I could get, and to start about 3 a.m. ; I did not give any
orders about it as I had to wait until Major Wilson returned to know
what he had found out, I told Captain Borrow what I proposed, and
he agreed with me that it was the only thing to do as the Column could
not go further. Just at dark Mr. Chappe called me on one side and
told me that he had been talking to the slave boy, and he told him
all that the other boy had told me was untrue, that an impi had
gone back at day-break to attack us in the bush, and that only about
100 men were with the King. I sent for the other boy at once and
taxed him with telling lies, and he admitted it ; he then told me that
an impi made up of divisions from different regiments and kraals, of
which he gave me the names, had started back at daylight that morning
under command of Umjan, the Chief of the Imbezu, with orders from
the King to attack us in the bush, and having stopped us there to
follow on after the King, he said there were only twenty of the
Imbezu with the impi, all the rest having been killed or died from
wounds, from the numbers he gave, we made out that the impi was
about 2,800 strong and they were to have been doctored that day
and leave the next, but on hearing we were on the Gwambo, the
King hurried them off to attack us ; he also said that the men actually
with the King now were only a few Indunas, and some of the Bovani
(Maholi slaves). He said they had heard that we had no Maxims
with us, and he attributed the fact of our not being attacked in the bush
to their having found out their mistake at the last minute, I went round
to the other side of the laager and told Captain Raaf what I had heard,
and also that I wanted extra precautions taken and the night pickets
doubled. It was dark by now, and Wilson had not returned. The
prisoners were in the centre of the laager among the slaughter cattle,
guarded by some of our " boys," and soon after dark one of our " boys "
came to say that the Matabeli boy now said that the King's orders to
the impi had been to attack us in the bush, and if they missed us there
to foUov/ us up and stop us where they could, and that they were
certain to attack us that night. It was very dark, and there were some
i6o The Downfall oj Lobeiigtila.
slight showers during the night, I sent round again to warn the pickets
to be on the alert, and also warned them not to allow any herds of
cattle several of which were grazing about us to come near them, as I
thought it possible that if the natives attacked they might drive the
cattle up to hide their advance.
About nine o'clock two men, Sergeant-Major Judge and Corporal
Ebbage, came back from Major Wilson and reported that he had crossed
the river and followed the spoor for about five miles, they had
been sent back because their horses were knocked up, but Major
Wilson was going on and was going to sleep out, and that if I thought
it necessary I could send on some men in the morning, and that the
Maxims could get along the spoor, but he did not think they would
be required ; he also said that he had heard that the impi was all
behind us, and that the King had very few men with him. Few
of us went to sleep that night, as I was expecting an attack every
moment, the natives had proved that they could not do us much harm
by day,^and I thought it more than likely that they would try a nighc
attack, using assegais only ; I had the magnesian lights and rockets
ready every night in case they might be required.
At about eleven o'clock Captain Napier and Troopers Robertson
and Mayne rode in from Major Wilson, and Captain Napier reported
that they had followed the spoor, crossing the river about two miles
down, and had ridden up to a scherm on the other side. From a native
there they learned that the King was only a short distance on, and had
very few'men with him, but that the impi had gone back that morning
to stop us and was now behind us, he volunteered to guide them to the
King, and they pushed on as fast as they could. They passed a number
of scherms filled with women and children and cattle, and about three
miles from_.the river came to a series of large scherms into which they
rode, they passed in succession through five of these looking for the
King, Captain Napier who was interpreting calling out in each that they
did not want to hurt anyone, but had come to speak to the King, the
natives were too astonished to take any action, and thought that the
whole Column was on them. By the time they had got to the fifth
scherm it was nearly dark, and the natives from the scherms through
which they had passed began to run up from behind with their rifles,
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. i6i
and Major Wilson ordered a retreat ; they withdrew without a shot
being fired, and went into the bush about half a mile away. The
guide had shown them a scherm with a high fence round it, not
far from the last one into which they had gone, and told them that
it was the King's, and that his waggons were there ; there was a very
heavy storm just after they retired, and it became very dark. While
riding through the scherms Lieutenant Hofmeyr and two of the men got
detached, and in the darkness could not rejoin Major Wilson. As soon
as they had formed up in the bush Major Wilson asked Captain Napier
if he would ride back and let me know where he was and what he had
done, to this Captain Napier agreed, and brought with him Trooper
Robertson, one of his employes, and Mayne, one of the Victoria Scouts ;
they neither saw nor heard anyone by the way, and arrived as I have
said about eleven, ^Major Wilson sent no written message, and no direct
verbal one, beyond telling Captain Napier to let me know what had
happened, but on my asking Captain Napier what Major Wilson
expected me to do, he said he thought he expected me to go on
at once with the whole force, but that to attack the King at daylight
it would be necessary to be there by 4 a.m. I told him at once that it
was impossible for me to move that night, but that I intended to push
on at daylight as we were surrounded and expected to be attacked
at any moment, and that in my opinion if we attempted to move before
it was light we should bring the impi on us at once. The Column,
owing to the Maxims, could not travel without making a considerable
amount of noise, and it would be very dangerous to attempt to cross
the river through deep sand and in the dark, when it was impossible to
say what force might be v/aiting for us on the other bank, where the
bush was very thick.
The river was very low and there had been no local rain to cause
it to rise ; we found afterwards that it rose the following morning from
heavy rains on the Gwailo, seventy or eighty miles away, I was then
confronted with the alternatives, either to recall Major Wilson at once,
or to support him with as many men as I could without materially
weakening the Column ; I did not wish to recall him, as I had absolute
confidence in his judgment and he had decided to wait there, he knew
as well as I did how important it was that the King should be caught
M
1 62 The Downfall of Lobengztla.
and he knew, which I did not, the exact state of affairs about the King.
If I recalled him I undid all that we had been striving for so long,
namely, to get in touch with the King, and we should have to start all
over again or else give up the pursuit and go back to Buluwayo unsuc-
cessful. Besides this I was quite sure that after Major Wilson had
shown himself at the scherms, Lobengula would ride away as quickly as
possible, leaving his people to follow, and I thought it quite probable
that they might be able to intercept him at daylight (as I did not expect
him to leave in the dark), and catch him almost alone. Major Wilson
did not consider that his party were in any danger when Captain Napier
left, or he would have brought them back to camp.
Having decided not to recall him, the next thing was to decide
how many men I could spare without weakening myself too much.
Captain Borrow had twenty men all well mounted, and their horses had
done less work than the others, so I decided on sending them ; before
giving him any orders I went over to Captain Raaf, told him all that
had happened and what I proposed to do, and he concurred. He was
averse to weakening the Column by splitting it up, but I showed him
that I was not doing so to any serious extent, as we still had the two
Maxims ; he raised no difficulty at all to me, but went back to his own
officers, told them what I was going to do and also, as he said
afterwards, that "this was the beginning of the end." I then gave
Captain Borrow his orders, and told Captain Napier what I was doing,
and he quite agreed with it, and I asked if he wished to go back with
them ; he said that as only a small number were going Major Wilson
would only be able to act on the defensive, and that he did not care to
go back, as he was very wet, but that Robertson would go as guide.
Mayne had a touch of fever and did not go back. Just before Captain
Borrow started, he asked me if it was necessary for his men to take their
full lOO rounds of ammunition, as it was heavy for the horses, and I told
him to ; each man also had a revolver and twenty rounds ; they took
out some food in their wallets for Major Wilson's men, who had had
none that evening. They started off at about 12.30, and I gave Captain
Borrow a note for Major Wilson, in which I told him that I could not
move before daylight, as I was surrounded and expected to be attacked
at any moment, but that I would move as soon as it was light, and that
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 163
meanwhile I was sending Captain Borrow and twenty men, which as I
said would make him "safe." I told him to use his own discretion
absolutely, as he knew the state of affairs and I did not, but to be
careful.
Captain Borrow's men had formed the front face of the square or
laager, and as soon as they left I had to close the laager up, to do this
it was necessary to drive out the slaughter oxen which were in the
centre, and Captain Raaf and I with several of the men did this, we
then closed the horses and men in, making the laager into a triangle,
with the Maxims at two of the corners. Nothing further happened
during the night, and immediately it was light preparations were made
for a move ; the slaughter oxen had grazed away and were not visible,
and I told the " boy," John Grootboom, who herded them to go and
look for them. Just as we were ready to move we heard heavy firing
across the river where the King was, it lasted several minutes, and then
ceased. Just then Grootboom returned with the cattle, which he told
me had been put by the natives into the cattle kraals at the King's old
camp, together with the cattle which we had taken the previous after-
noon, but let go again (although this camp was only about 800 yards
away it had been too dark to see it), that he had found some natives
there and told them that they had got our cattle, to which they replied
that they would drive ours out if he would point them out, this he did
and they turned them out of the kraal. While they were doing it they
heard the firing at the King's camp and expressed astonishment at it,
saying that the men with the King had said that they should not fight
again, and that they themselves had no wish to.
As soon as we were ready I advanced the Column along the spoor ;
we were in as close a formation as we could, with our right towards
the river and the two Maxims on our left. Shortly after starting we
saw three women, carrying water, come from the river and go across the
opening in front of us into the bush, and directly afterwards a man on a
white horse came out of the bush followed by about twelve men, and
went down towards the drift, they were about 800 or 900 yards in front
of us. We kept on along the spoor, which followed the open part of
the valley about 1,000 yards, and then turned towards the river, going
through some low scrub where the bush had been cut away at some
M 2
164
The Downfall of Lobcngula.
previous time, and then keeping down close
to the river bank, which
was here about ten feet
high and overhanging. We
had scarcely got into this
low scrub when we were
fired on from the bush
about 300 yards away
on our left ; we formed
up at once, all the
horses being crowded
as much together
'** as possible, some
' ■ of the men taking
cover behind a few
mopani bushes that
were still standing,
and the remainder
lying down round the horses, the two
Maxims being on the right and left of our positions as we faced the
enemy.
The bush in front of us where the enemy was being very thick
mimosa, extending to the right and left in front of our position, and
back to a ridge about 1,000 yards away. The enemy's fire was very
heavy for some time and very general from all over the bush, but it was
impossible to estimate it accurately, as very few natives were seen, only
those who, bolder than the rest, advanced to the edge of the bush and
took cover behind some large stumps there, appearing at all ; but we
reckoned that about 300 were firing at us. Their shooting was as
usual very erratic, and ours very steady, although there were only the
puffs of smoke to fire at, and for some time they did not do us much
harm ; after a time, however, they began to fire at the Maxims, and
then we began to lose some horses. It was evident from the beginning
that we must get into a better position as soon as possible, but for a
long time it was impossible to move. The river bank was too high for
us to get under it, and to move either backwards or forwards necessitated
A HOT CORNER AT THE
SHANGANI RIVER FIGHT.
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol.
165
■^ - ■»- .a. '27^'^ 'a.""
inspanning the Maxims, and taking them, if only for a few minutes, out
of action ; and with an indefinite number of natives in the bush within
250 yards, I could not run the risk of their attempting a rush when the
Maxims — which were our chief reliance to stop a sudden rush— were
out of action. During the fight two of Captain Sorrow's men, Landsberg
and Nesbitt, crossed the river behind us ; they had become separated
from Captain Borrow, and had made their way back to us as being the
safest thing to do. After about an hour of it the enemy's fire slackened
and we saw several natives crossing the opening a long way to our right
and going down the river. I thought that we could attempt to m.ove
now, and had the horse Maxim ^ ^ ^ - ... ^
in spanned ; the firing was O^'f^-'^'i^'^i^^^-^'^sL^^*^^.^
still going on on both
sides, but I was going
to retire one Maxim
at a time, keeping
the other in action
meanwhile.
Directly the
horses were put into
the gun a heavy and
fairly well directed,
though rather high
fire broke out from
the bush to our right
front, and it looked
as if the enemy were
trying to get round us on that flank. I had the Maxim outspanned
at once, and a very well directed fire from it into the bush stopped
the enemy's fire from there altogether ; I then had both the Maxims
inspanned and we retired slowly along the open, the Maxims and
all the available men (dismounted) on the right flank. The enemy
kept up a slight fire at us as we retired, and we returned it ; we
had one man badly wounded and one mule killed while retiring.
After going about 600 yards we turned into the end of a strip of
mopani bush on the river bank where there was fairly good cover and
Kings w-j . .^
^■^r />
i-c''k "■ ^/^"^"U s A ^"^^
I *Bush «
«-"--*,.
— • . «t.
SKETCH PLAN SHOWING POSITION OK THE KING'S CAMP AND
FIGHT ON 3RD DECEMBER.
1 66 The Downfall of Lobengiila.
formed up again, and shortly afterwards the enemy's fire ceased and
they all retired. While we were retiring, Burnham, Ingram, and
Gooding, one of Captain Borrow's men, rode up from Major Wilson ; as
they came up Burnham jumped off his horse, came to me and said,
" I think I may say we are the sole survivors of that party ; " I told
him to say nothing about it till we were out of our own fight. We had
lost sixteen horses killed and two mules in the fight, and had five men
wounded, all of whom belonged to the Bechuanaland Border Police ;
they were Corporal Williams, shot through the body ; Trooper Middle-
ton, through calf of left leg ; Trooper Shanaghan, through left arm ;
Captain Napier and Trooper Newton were struck by spent bullets, and
Le Fleur (coloured mule driver), shot through right leg.
As soon as we halted the wounded were attended to by Dr. Hogg,
who was in medical charge of the Column, and we proceeded to make
ourselves as strong as possible, by cutting down some trees and making
a scherm, and by digging rifle pits along the river bank, we made our-
selves fairly safe. There was also a narrow strip of bush running along
the river from the laager to the north, and this was held all day by
reliefs of men stationed about 200 yards from the laager ; the river had
been rising all the morning, and by now was much too high to cross.
About half-an-hour after the firing ceased I sent a patrol of the
Bechuanaland Border Police along the open valley to our right to see if
all the enemy had retired, giving them orders to return at once if fired
at ; they saw no one, and on their return we turned the horses out to
graze. During our fight we had heard a considerable amount of firing
where Major Wilson was, and those who could hear it plainly were of
opinion that it was getting gradually further away ; about two hours
after we laagered there were a few shots fired farther away and more to
the right.
Immediately the laager was made safe I had a consultation with
Captains Raaf and Napier ; it was quite impossible for us to advance, as
we could not cross the river, and we could only hope that some, if not
all, of Major Wilson's party had escaped. There was no object in
stopping there, as the river might not fall for some days, and if Major
Wilson's party did not get back to us that day, we should know that
they had either been cut up or had escaped up the river. Major Wilson
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 167
knew that it was my intention to return that way, the only thing then
was to return to Buluwayo. I had always intended to return up the
Shangani, as our supplies should be waiting for us there, and as far as
we could ascertain the country was fairly open up the river ; I did not
know the exact distance, but did not think it could be more than sixty
miles to the drift. Captain Raaf wished to start after dark that night,
but I would not allow it, as I did not wish the natives to think that they
had beaten us, and I wished to give Major Wilson a chance to get
back; I therefore decided to remain where we were until the following
morning and then to commence our retreat up the Shangani. As
soon as I had arranged this, I asked Burnham about Major Wilson's
party. He told me that as soon as Captain Napier had left on the
previous evening. Major Wilson had asked him to go with him and try
to find the three men who were missing, and after some time they had
managed to do so, but it was so dark that Burnham had to follow the
spoor by feeling for it with his fingers, and had at last found them by
calling to them ; that Captain Borrow had arrived safely before
daybreak, having neither seen nor heard any natives on his way out, but
that IMajor Wilson's party had several times heard natives talking and
moving about during the night. He said that after Captain Borrow
came, Major Wilson discussed the question with all the officers, and they
decided on making a rush for the King's scherm and trying to secure
him. At daylight they rode straight up to it, it was at the head of a
valley with bush on each side, and got within a few feet of it ; Burnham
said that he saw two waggons, one of which he could see right through,
and it was empty, they halted at the scherm and called to the King
and were at once answered by a heavy fire from in front and both sides.
Burnham reckoned that there were about 100 men firing at them ; they
dismounted and returned the fire, but had to fall back, and as Major
Wilson saw that the natives were endeavouring to get round them, he
mounted the men and they retired at a gallop to a large ant-heap 600 or
700 yards back down the valley, behind which they dismounted again.
The natives had followed them down the open, but on the white men
commencing to fire from behind the ant-heap, they got into the bush
again on each side. Firing was kept up by each side for some time,
and two of Major Wilson's horses were killed but no one hit, and Major
1 68 The Downfall of Lobcngula.
Wilson saw that the natives were surrounding him again ; he ordered
them to mount and they galloped away, two horses this time carrying
double. They went some distance and got into the waggon spoor again,
and away from the natives, they were retiring quietly along the spoor
— what Gooding called " shogging along," not trotting — and Major
Wilson and Captain Borrow were riding behind talking. After a bit
Major Wilson asked Burnham if he thought that he could get through
to me, and he expressed himself ready to try if Major Wilson gave him
a man to accompany him. Captain Borrow told Gooding, who was
about the best mounted of his party, to go with him, and Ingram,
Burnham's mate, also asked to go and the three started off, they had
scarcely gone lOO yards when a large number of Matabeli rushed towards
them out of the bush, shouting and waving their assegais ; they galloped
away to the left and by hard riding managed to get away, although
they had a shower of bullets at them and got down to the river.
Finding it in flood they had to go some distance up to cross, and
eventually swam over, about one-and-a-half miles up ; immediately after
they had escaped from the last lot of natives they heard Major Wilson's
party come to them, and heavy firing began, and Burnham was sure
that none of them could have got away alive, although Gooding was
much more hopeful. I checked the firing which we heard with
Burnham's account of what had taken place, and made out that it was
only the last burst of fire we had heard that Burnham did not know
the result of, and as it was no heavier than the previous ones, from
which little harm had resulted, we could hope that some had escaped ;
we have now learned that none did, but that they all stood and fell
together on the one spot.
Burnham was tired out when he returned and naturally his nerves
were much shaken, he was sure the natives would come on again and
follow us until they had killed us all, as he said, "If I got as ferocious
with anyone as those men did with me, I would follow him twenty years
until I killed him." He told me that it would be absolutely suicidal for
anyone to try and get through to Buluwa\'o, and I was not ver}- anxious
to send ; I knew that we could hold our own marching up the river, as
at present we had plent}- of ammunition, and I expected to find food
and reinforcements at the drift up the river. Soon after this however,
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 169
Ingram came and offered to ride into Buluwayo, and I agreed to let him
if he could find anyone to go with him ; I told him that they could start
soon after dark that evening. Soon after our fight was over I had sent
up a socket signal to show any of Major Wilson's party who might have
escaped where we were. We kept a good look-out during the day, but
nothing happened, and no natives were seen on our side of the river,
although a large number were seen to come down on the other side
some distance below us and then separate, some going up the river and
some down ; I think that this was done with the intention of stopping
us should we try to cross. One of the men on picket reported that he
had seen four white men brought down by a number of natives to the
river, and that the natives were dancing round them, but no one else
saw them; we saw four try to cross the river about 1,000 yards down,
but a shot or two turned them back. Towards the evening a number
of natives were heard singing and talking in the bush on the other side,
but we were not molested in any way.
I wrote a letter to Dr. Jameson telling him what had happened
and that we were going to retire up the river, that we were all right
for ammunition to stand another big fight, but that if we had this fight, I
should have to laager and wait for more ammunition, as our supply
would not warrant me in risking a third in the open, I asked him to
send off reinforcements at once with food and ammunition, and also
wrote to Captain Delamore at Umhlangerii, telling him to push on with
his men to the Shangani by the main road and then follow the west
bank down till we met. I had just got these ready for Ingram when
Captains Raaf and Francis came over and asked if I was sending any-
thing in writing ; I replied that I was, and that it was quite safe to do
so as there was no native in the country except those in our camps
who could read ; they implored me not to and as Ingram was
perfectly cool and composed and knew everything that had happened
both with me and Major Wilson, I gave in to them and did not send the
letter to Dr. Jameson, only that to Captain Delamore, which did not
refer to our position at all. I did not know until after I returned to
Buluwayo that some of Captain Raaf's officers had given Ingram letters
to people in Buluwayo, couched in a melancholy strain, saying good-bye
to everyone, etc. ; it did not occur to me that anyone would write, as I
I70
The Downfall of Lobengtila,
Mk Howakd swims thf 1.-
shangam ki\ er
10 capture bome cattle.
\y should
passed
e that
talked of our
position as des-
perate, as I did not consider it so in any way. We had met almost
the whole force that Lobengula had that morning, and had beaten them
with scarcely any loss, and if they followed us we could do it again ; it
they did not, we were very unlikely to meet anything like so many any-
where else. We did not know that all Major Wilson's party had been
destroyed, and it was the general belief that some had escaped, the
only two I think who always gave them up being Captain Raaf and
Burnham, the former always said that he had listened attentively to
the firing and that it was all in one place, this differed from the general
opinion, but now seems to have been right ; Burnham had no hopes
from the first of any of them having escaped. I never thought for a
moment that we should be followed, as my opinion was always that
they had fought in desperation as we had got so close to the King, but
that they would only be too glad to see us turn back, and would
then follow the King.
Ingram was ready to start at dark, and had selected one oi the
Victoria Column, Lynch, to accompany him, Mayne the other American
Scout also volunteered to go, but I thought two quite enough and could
not spare more horses. I told Ingram my reasons for not sending a
letter, and told him to tell Dr. Jameson all that had happened, and also
The Loss of the Wilson Patrol. 171
f i) That I was going up the Shangani, and should keep to the river up to
the drift, and (2) That I wanted him to send me more ammunition at
once, as in the event of another big fight I should have to laager and
wait for it. I gave Ingram and Ljmch the three best horses we had,
one of them being Bowen's, which was to have taken back the news of
Lobengula's capture, and they started at dark ; their instructions were to
keep up the river for a time, and then cut across to the Bubye and follow
it up to Umhlangeni. They got through all right without being inter-
fered with, but the strain on his nerves had so affected Ingram by the
time he got to Buluwayo that he could not remember what I had told
him to repeat to Dr. Jameson, and he could not even tell him which way
I intended to retire. Immediately after they started I sent up a rocket,
and it had scarcely burst when a storm that had been gathering for some
time broke, and we had a deluge of rain ; our laager was small and the
ground uneven, and in a few minutes everyone was drenched through
and most of the horses standing up to their knees in water, altogether
we passed an unpleasant night. As the men were all tired Captain
Finch asked some of the officers if they would volunteer to do horse
guard during the night, and this they did for some nights. We were not
disturbed during the night, but everything was so wet in the morning
that we had to wait for a time to get our blankets, etc. dry. The
wounded had passed a miserable night as the rough shelter which we
had put up did not keep the rain out, and the horses moving about had
disturbed them, but they were not much the worse for their wetting,
and both then and right through were marvellously plucky. I had
stretchers made for the worst two, Williams and La Fleur, and they were
afterwards carried some distance in them, but it was very hard work on
the men carrying, and we found that they could ride all right on the
gun carriages, the others rode right through.
Shortly after daybreak I rode with two or three men over the
scene of the fight of the day before, thinking that I might find some
ammunition left by the enemy, but everything had been taken away
and although we saw blood in several places, saw no dead bodies
near the edge of the bush, and the ground was too soft after the rain
and the bush too thick to go far into it. During the night the slaughter
oxen had broken out of the kraal, frightened by the storm and could
172
The Dozunfall of Lobengula.
not be found the next morning. Soon after daylight three head of cattle
came out of the bush on the other side of the river just opposite our
laager, and Mr. Howard, a volunteer who had originally served in the
Bechuanaland Border Police and had brought despatches up to
Buluwayo, swam across the river with his revolver in his mouth to try
and drive them across. It was a very plucky thing to do as the bush
was thick, and we could not see that it was not full of natives ; he was
carried about 150 yards down and his attempt failed. The cattle were
frightened at his white skin and ran away ; he went a short distance
after them and saw a number of natives and scherms in the distance and
then returned across the river.
CHAPTER XII.
RETREAT FROM THE SHANGANI RIVER.
By Major P. W. Forbes.
Down the river's bank — Horses falling off fast — Short of food — Capturing the royal cattle —
A skirmish in the bush — A heavy rain storm — The men depressed — The last of the
horses done up — A sudden attack — The gun carriages left behind — Captain Raaf
addresses the force — ^The first night march — Tired out — Horse flesh flavoured with
garlic — A fight while on the march — The Matabeli now behind us — Mr. Selcus brings
tidings of food — Back to Umhlangeni and Buluwayo — Disbanding the force — Pegging
out farms — Death of Captain Raaf — A parade of all forces before Mr. Rhodes — Rumours
of Major Wilson's party — How Englishmen can die.
"At nine o'clock we commenced our retreat, moving in solid forma-
tion in three sides of a square, left on the river, the Maxims being on
one spoor on the right face, the river formed our left face all the way
up, and always gave us a clear field of fire for several hundred yards
after the river fell, as it did after three days, and at first when the river
was full it was a great protection to us. Our horses were by now in a
bad state and several had to be left every day, they had hitherto had
nothing but young green grass to eat ; this did not strengthen them
at all, and for the few days previous they had had little time for grazing.
Colenbrander and two men who were well mounted were about 300 yards
in front to act as advanced guard, and give us notice of any bad ground
that might be in front of us, one section was on the right flank and one
in rear.
Shortly after starting the strip of bush in which the King's camp
had been came down to within 100 yards of the river, and there were some
scherms in it. Colenbrander was riding up to one of these when he saw
two natives with rifles, one of whom was aiming at him, he just had time
to jump off his horse when the native fired, hitting the horse and killing
it at once, they fired at the natives and killed one of them — the other
174 '^^^ Duzviifaii of Lcbengtila.
got away. We did ten miles up the river without seeing any other
native, halted for three hours and then went on for four miles more and
laagered at a bend of the river, where we were able to make a very
strong scherm by cutting down several large thorn trees. The river
bank formed one-half of our circular scherm, and was here about twenty
feet deep ; there was a long valley stretching down to the river on the
other side, and I thought that if two men could swim their horses
across the river under cover of the bush they could get into this valley
and ride up for four or five miles, and so probably cut the spoor of any
of Major Wilson's party who I thought were retiring up the other
bank. I spoke to Burnham but he said it would be too dangerous,
and that although he would go if ordered, he should consider it the
most risky thing he had ever ; tried after this I did not press it.
I spoke to Hovvard afterwards and he was quite ready to go, and
volunteered to do so by himself, I would not allow this, and could find
no one who would accompany him.
The following day (6th) we did fourteen miles more up the river
without incident, four natives were seen on the other bank and four or
five on our side, but they ran away when fired at. Our horses were
falling off fast and we were now getting short of any that were fit for
much, one of mine had been knocked up by Burnham when he
returned from Major Wilson, and the other I had given to one of the
wounded men, who rode it right through. Captain Raaf's pony was
still very fit and as he had still several good horses among his men I
asked him to take charge of the advance, rear and flanking parties,
getting what men were required from the different corps, and I being on
foot remained with the Column and kept it in shape ; we laagered this
night again in a bend of the river and had a quiet night. We had seen
some cattle on the previous day and Captain Raaf had sent after them,
but they had been driven away and we did not get any, we had to kill
one of our two pack-oxen for meat, and had now nothing left but one
pack-ox.
The next day (7th) we started at 7.30, and on a bushy ridge to our
right we saw the smoke of some fires and heard cattle, I told Captain
Raaf to try and get some and he went off, but came back to say that
the country was too broken to attempt it. Shortly afterwards we saw
Retreat from the Shangani River.
175
a troop of half-grown calves and Captain Raaf sent Francis to drive
them in, which he did successfully ; before marching in the morning one
of the men had shot a water-buck cow, which we cut up and took with
us. We had to keep away from the river a good deal this day as there
was thick bush close to it, and halted in the middle of the day close
to a large mud-hole full of " barber, " we sent some of our natives in
with assegais and they killed a large number. We got back to the
river in the evening and laagered, having only done eight
miles that day owing to very heavy rain.
The next day (8th) we had done about three
miles up the river when Colenbrander shot a roan
antelope, I halted the Column while it was being
cut up, and while halted we saw a number of
cattle 500 or 600 yards away, which I pointed
out to Captain Raaf and suggested to
him that full-grown beef was better than
veal, he rode off at once with several of
his men and brought back about 100 head,
he also brought the boy who was herding
them. When they were driven up I saw at
once that they were regimental slaughter
cattle, being all well-grown oxen, and thought
there might be some trouble about them, the
boy told me they were royal cattle and were
going down after the King, that there were a very
large number of cattle all along the river following the
King, and that there were a few men with each lot but
no impi anywhere near. The cattle were very wild
and we did not want so many, so I had twenty picked
out and left the rest and also the remainder of the calves taken the
previous day. We went on about a mile and then off-saddled on the river
in as clear a place as we could find, but where there was a thick patch of
mopani bush on our right, I distributed the meal left by Major Wilson
and Captain Borrow's parties here. It was nearly time to get the horses
in again when suddenly a hot fire opened on us from the bush in front,
the pickets had not been looking out, and the natives had got right up to
A QUIET SHOT AT
OUR PICKETS.
176 The Downfall of Lobengtila.
one of them before they were seen, they managed however to get in all
right. Our horses were grazing to the left of the laager, and immediately
the firing began Captain Finch and some men ran out and turned them
towards the river behind the laager, the bank sloped gradually down
here, and there was good cover behind it. Raaf's and the Bechuanaland
Border Police horses were grazing on the right, and were frightened
and stampeded across our front and then stood between us and the
enemy ; for some unexplained reason the enemy at once ceased firing
until some of the men had run round the horses and turned them before
the bank.
As soon as they were all in I told Captain Raaf to take out twelve
men and turn the natives out of the bush, it was only a narrow strip
and by going to one end of it he could open fire on them and drive
them out, meanwhile I had all the horses saddled up two at a time,
and linked behind the laager. Directly Captain Raaf went out the
natives all ran from the bush, and he advanced through it, and on
coming out at the other end saw some of them running away in the
distance and followed them for a short way, but as he did not v/ant to
hurt the horses did not go far. On his way back he saw thirty to forty
natives some distance av/ay coming up in our direction, this report
spread and it was very soon believed that there was a large impi
following us up. Our only casualty was one horse slightly hit, but
during the firing the natives had driven away the cattle we had
taken that morning as well as the sole remaining pack-ox, and we were
left again without meat, with the additional satisfaction of knowing that
if we took any, they would probably come and worry us and take it
back again. / As soon as Captain Raaf returned we got ready to start,
but a tremendous storm came on and delayed us for a time, after
waiting until the worst of it seemed to be over we started, but it came
on very heavy again, and we had only done two miles when we had to
laager. The previous day we had crossed the footpath leading from the
Inyoka country, one of the Zambesi tribes tributary to Lobengula, to
Buluwayo, and near it Captain Finch picked up a large cake of tobacco,
which was most acceptable as everyone was getting very short. We
saw a large river running in from the other side during the morning
march, and took it to be the Gwailo. Some of the men's spirits were
Retreat from the Shangani River.
177
rather cast dowa that night by the sight of an old map (Bailies', made
thirty years ago) which was produced by someone, and which showed
that the Gvvailo joined the Shangani over 100 miles below the waggon
drift ; as no white man had so far as is known ever been up the
Shangani before, the map could not be in any way relied on, but after
the hardships our men had gone through very little served to depress
some of them.
The next day (9th) we moved at 5.30, and after going about five
miles came to a high ridge running right down to the river bank, it
would have taken us a long detour to get round it, and there was a
narrow footpath at the river end. A few natives had been seen on the
ridge but .had run away, I sent some men on to the ridge and others
to the other end of the path, and then took the Maxims round by hand,
running them on one wheel and holding them up with drag ropes. We
got round safely and went on, and in the bush about 200 yards further on
came to a scherm full of women and children with a few men, they had
some sheep and goats and I took them all on to an open space where we
halted. They turned out to be people belonging to 'Mhlangabesa, a
brother of Lobengula whom the King had had killed some
years ago because he was very like the King, and was often
^ taken for him, for this reason they were not at all
friendly to Lobengula, their kraals were on the
Imwekwesi near its junction with the Imbembesi,
and they had run away some time before.
They had heard that the people on the
Bubye had been allowed to go back to
their kraals, and most of their people had
already started home, and they were only
waiting until some cattle which they had
lost could be found, they knew nothing
about the country round there,
and could give us no idea how
far it was to the drift, they said
that a messenger had come by
there the previous day from the
FRIENDLY NATIVES BRINGING IN FOOD. King, and hc had been sent to tell
N
178
The Downfall of Lobeiigula.
a.^BBP under
Cap^ Coventry.
b.^aaFs Rangers
under Cap* Raaf
C. ^Victoria Hangena
uniJcr Capf Hapier.
/*_ First position of
rear Maxim.
i°^ Second position oF
raar Mamm
Z « Position of teadi
Max
where tfie
horses were shot
and asse^i/cif.
OO. Morses undercover
all the men in charge of royal cattle to take them on after the King at
once. We took some of the sheep to kill at the time, and I told the
Induna I wanted five head of cattle to take on, he sent out and
brought in ten head, of which I took the best four.
We marched again at 2 p.m., and soon after we had started it
began to rain very heavily. The river here came through very broken
country, and for some miles we were unable to keep near it — there
must be a fall of 600 or 700 feet in the river in about ten miles
here. We only did three miles that afternoon, through thick bush
and over broken country, causing great trouble in getting the Maxims
^ : •" «> ,. along. The gun
horses were now
tired out and it was
doubtful whether
they would be able
to pull for many
more days; the oxen
got away in the
bush, we had a
quiet night in the
bush and waited
until eight o'clock
the following morn-
ing to get our things
dry. Marching at
eight we went for
three miles through
very bad country,
thick bush, long grass and broken granite kopjes, and came to a deep
dry gully which had to be crossed. The gun horses were done up and
we should soon have to halt, I asked Captain Raaf to ride on a little
and see if the country got any better, he did so but returned to say it
was all the same and that where we were was as good a place to halt as
any. I sent Captain Napier and his men across the gully to cover the
passage of the Maxim, which had to be taken over by hand, and we got
it across all right ; there was a good cover in the gully for the horses in
'"y
Sketch plan showing position when surprised on
lOTH December.
Retreat from the Shangani River. 179
case of an attack, but it was necessary for some of the force to be on
each side of it as there were kopjes there which had to be held, I there-
fore kept one Maxim on our side and we off-saddled ; I only intended to
give the horses about an hour, and then to push on again and try to get
out of the bush.
The horses were grazing close to us, and just behind one of the
kopjes on which there was a picket, when we were suddenly startled by
shots all round us, we started up and I shouted to the men to get into
the kopjes, running myself with Captain Finch to turn the horses into
the gully, we managed to get them down all right, although several
were killed while we were doing it. The natives had crawled up in the
long grass behind the large boulders that were lying about, and had got
close to the horses before being seen ; several of them got among the
horses and stabbed two of them, and a few of them tried to get into the
kopjes before we could occupy them, but were too late. As soon as the
horses were safe I went to the kopjes and saw that the men were all
under cover, and warned them to be careful of their ammunition ; there
were very few natives to be seen, but they kept up their fire for some
time, and if any one of us showed himself he was fired at. We were
quite safe in our kopjes, but there was the fear that the natives might
get among the horses by a sudden rush and kill them all, but they did
not attempt this. Several of the men felt very anxious, and their
anxiety was increased by two who could understand what the natives
were saying (for although we could not see them we could hear them
talking), and who kept on warning them with, " Look out now, they are
going to surround us," and "They are going to keep us here till dark
and then come on with assegais." They did not make either of these
attempts, and after about an hour's desultory firing went away, or rather
ceased firing ; owing to the thickness of the bush we could not tell if
they had really retired or not.
I had had all the horses saddled up directly the firing had
slackened sufficiently to allow two men at a time to leave each kopje,
so that we could move on as soon as possible and try to get into the
open again, and as soon as the firing ceased I took the other Maxim
across the gully and had all the horses brought up. Sergeant Gibson,
Bechuanaland Border Police, who was in charge of one of the Maxims,
N 2
1 80 The Doivnfall of Lobcugula.
had been shot dead when sitting near his gun, but that was our only
casualty in men, although we left eight horses dead there. In forming
up to advance I had all the horses led by natives and as few men as
possible, crowded up, and moving on close together with one Maxim in
front and one in rear. Captain Raaf took charge of the advanced guard
and right flank with about thirty men, and about thirty more remained
in the kopjes to cover our advance until we had gone 400 or 500 yards,
and then retired protecting our rear. We moved on like this for about
two miles, getting down to the river but having to leave it again, as it was
too broken to travel along, and came to a small valley the near side of
which was very steep and covered with large loose stones ; we had
seen no natives since leaving the kopjes, and it looked as if we were not
going to be molested again. The horses could not take the Maxim
over the stones, and had to be taken out, and the gun was half-way
down being pulled by men, the other Maxim being in position at the
top when firing began again ; Captain Raaf was on the right flank and
saw some natives amongst the rocks near him, and opened fire on them,
which they returned. The gun was pulled up again at once and the
horses hurriedly put into a little hollow among the rocks, where they
were under cover, the two Maxims got into position and all the men
disposed in the best positions round ; there was a good deal of firing
for some time but no casualty.
While it was going on a heavy storm came on, and as it was getting
late I decided to laager there for the night, I told Captain Raaf so, and
he and I looked for a suitable place. We found a fairly good one in
the rocks close to where the horses were, and made a strong fence
round it, moving the guns and horses in as soon as it was ready. While
we were doing this Captain Napier came to me and suggested that we
should leave the gun carriages behind when we went on, as the horses
could scarcely get them along, and they were only a hindrance to us ; I
told him I would think about it and that I was going to have a talk
with Captain Raaf as soon as the laager was finished and settle what we
should do. I was very adverse to leaving the carriages, as I did not wish
to do anything which would make the natives think they had got the
better of us or inconvenienced us in any way, but owing to the weakness
of the horses I did not see how it could be avoided ; the wounded were
Retreat from the Shangaiii River. i8i
all doing very well and could all ride, and we could carry the Maxim
ammunition on horses.
When everything was made ready for the night I went over to
Captain Raaf and he at once suggested leaving the carriages ; I told
Captain Tancred to see if we could carry the gun in any way, and if so
we would leave the carriages, we found that six men could carry each
gun fairly easily in blankets and so this was decided on. I then dis-
cussed the whole situation with Captain Raaf, and we decided as we were
leaving the carriages and so could move more quietly, we should start
that night at ten o'clock and try to get to the river again by daylight ;
that the march must be done in perfect silence, no smoking allowed, all
horses that were knocked up left in the laager as well as all spare kit»
each man taking only a blanket or cloak, and all dogs should be
killed before starting. I asked Captain Raaf to let his men know as
soon as possible what wc were going to do, and said I would tell
Captain Napier and went away to do so ; just as I got back to the
other side of the laager I heard Captain Francis and Mr. Farley shout-
ing " Order ! " and I then saw Captain Raaf standing on a rock and he
began to address everybody ; he began by saying we were in a tight
fix and had to get out of it as best we could, and then went on to
say what had been arranged. I said in a chaffing way to Captain
Napier that the little man looked as if he'd taken charge, but did not
stop him, as although he was wrong in doing it I thought it was only
done in ignorance of etiquette, and that he meant it for the best. We
did not know whether the natives were all round us or not, but hoped
to be able to get through them in the dark, they bad been heard talking
and chopping trees for scherms just before dark, and we knew they
were somewhere close.
At ten o'clock we moved as arranged, it was very dark and difficult
to find a way over the stones by which we could get the horses into
the valley. I went down first with Burnham and formed up the Column as
they got into the valley, Captain Raaf stopping at the laager and seeing
everyone out of it ; we left about twenty horses in the laager with their
saddlery, and a number of cloaks, blankets, etc. It seemed a long time
waiting in the dark for all the Column to come down, but at last Captain
Raaf reported everyone was down, and we started for our first night
1 82 The Dounfa/l of Lobe ng it /a.
march ; the order of march was as follows : — Burnham and I in front
selecting the best road, then a Maxim carried by reliefs of six men and
followed by prisoners and horses carrying its ammunition, then the
wounded riding, and all the surviving horses — about sixty — led four
together by one man, and lastly the other Maxim, also carried by six
men. Our progress was very slow as the bush was thick and the
Maxims heavy, and the carriers had to be frequently relieved. Captain
Raaf was the only one except the wounded who rode, and he had bad
feet and could not walk ; he kept backwards and forwards along the
Column, seeing that it kept closed up, reporting to me if there was any
delay in rear, when I halted. At first it was anxious work, and for the
only time in the campaign I unloosened my revolver, but we neither saw
nor heard anyone, and after going a mile or so I knew v.^e must
have got through the line of natives if there was one around us, and
were safe for the present. We marched till five o'clock with frequent
halts, sometimes to change reliefs of the guns and sometimes when
Burnham either heard or smelt cattle in front of us ; on these occasions
the Column halted while we went forward to find out what it was and
the best way to avoid it. The worst of the halts was that the men w^ent
to sleep immediately they laid down, and there was always a chance of
one being left behind when we moved on ; the previous day had been
a hard one and we were all tired out, it was hard work to keep awake
even when standing up. The men carried the gun for some distance,
and then as they were getting done up, we tried carrying it, tripod and
all, on a horse across the saddle, a man leading the horse and one
supporting the gun on each side, this answered very well, and we got
on much faster.
By daylight we had got out of the bush and kopjes and on to a
large open plain with the river in the distance, we hurried across this
and laagered on the bank of the river, having done twelve miles ; we put
a strong fence round us, those who had food ate it, and then feeling
quite safe, at any rate for a time, as the pickets could see a long distance,
all who were not on duty had a good sleep. It was found out at day-
light that one of the Victoria Column men, Shelldrake, was missing, and
no one knew where he had been lost, it was impossible to send back to
look for him, and we could only hope he would turn up all right, as he
Retreat from the Skafio^ani River. 183
did the following day. We moved on again at 1.30 and did six miles
through good country by four o'clock, and then rested till midnight when
we again started, but as the country was rough and it was very dark we
had to stop till morning, got off again at 5.30, and did five miles and
then halted./ That morning we saw the Vungu join the Shangani, and
knew we could not now be very far away from the waggon drift, I knew
the Longwe joined the Shangani on our side about ten miles below the
drift, and that the main road crossed it near the Intaba-gi-Momba about
half-way between Umhlangeni and the drift, and by keeping up it we
could save a good deal of distance. I therefore sent four " boys " on,
Grootboom being one of them, to go up to the drift and see if the
waggons were there ; if not, two were to come back to report, the other
two going to Umhlangeni with a note to Captain Delamore asking him
to come to meet us down the Longwe. One of the " boys " came back
soon afterwards saying that he had a bad foot ; his feet were all right
but he was afraid to go on, he shortly afterwards did have a very bad
foot, as he was bitten by a snake.
Food had been very short for some time, and only those who had
been very careful at first had had any bread or coffee for some days, and
now we had been entirely out of meat for two days, and had to kill
a horse. Some of the men did not like the idea of eating it, and it was
not good, but I think everyone had to sooner or later ; there was
a sort of wild garlic growing all along the river and this flavoured the
horse meat. Boots were rather a difficulty as the rough walking had
ruined most of them, and all sorts of substitutes had to be made, several
of the men walking in wallets. I had intended to halt there for the day,
but the grass was so bad we had to move, which we did at 1.30.
Just as we were starting Shelldrake, the missing man arrived ; he had
gone back to the laager for something after we left that night, and in
following us had lost the spoor, he had seen a few natives but they
had not molested him, he was very tired and hungry but glad to get
back safe. We saw a number of cattle about 1,000 yards away soon after
we started, but did not try to get them ; we could only just manage to
carry our wounded and ammunition, and our spare horses for flanking,
etc., had now been reduced to six, and capturing cattle might have
brought the natives on to us and given us more wounded to take along.
1S4 The Downfall of Lobengula^.
We had gone about a mile and were close to the river when fire was
again opened on us from the bush about 200 yards away, the Maxims
were got into action at once, all the spare men taking cover as far as
they could near them, and the horses and wounded hurried under the
river bank. The fire was hot for a few minutes and they were evidently
firing at the Maxims, as Trooper Nesbitt, Salisbury Column, who was
lying beside one of them, was shot through the arm, and directly after-
wards Sergeant Pyke, Bechuanaland Border Police, who was working it,
was also shot through the right arm. I was close by him at the time
and picked him up and saw at once that the arm was broken and sent
him to the doctor. The Maxims kept up a steady fire whenever we saw
where the shots were fired from, and as soon as all the horses were
under cover I withdrew the men to the river bank, carrying the Maxims
back one at a time. There was a wide strip of grass half-way down the
bank and the horses could move along this quite protected, and as there
were evidently not a great many natives there, we moved on, all spare
men not required to lead horses keeping along the top of the bank,
the Maxims being carried on mules but ready to be brought into
action at a moment's notice. We moved along like this for about two
miles and then came to a decent position where we could halt under
cover; the enemy had kept up a slight fire all the time but had done us
no further damage. There was a small rocky ridge close by running
parallel with the river and about 150 yards from it, and this Captain
Raaf managed to occupy with the flanking party before the enemy got
there, and so effectually covered us. We formed up here and firing was
kept up on both sides for some time, the natives making an attempt at
getting into some trees under the river bank but being stopped by the
Maxim ; a heavy thunderstorm broke as usual just before dark.
At 1 1 p.m. we started again and by daylight had done ten miles,
going through some very nasty kopjes and thick bush, but seeing no
one rested till nine and then on again until twelve, halting between some
high kopjes and the river. At 2 p.m. we were off again, and saw a
high range of hills running down to the river at right angles in front
of us. Captain Raaf rode on to see if we could get round them, but
he found we could not and returned. Just then we came on three
parallel paths through the grass, along which a considerable number of
Retreat fi'oin the Shangani River. 185
natives had gone very recently, as it looked as if they were going to
wait for us in the kopjes I crossed the river there (it was quite shallow),
went about two miles on the other side and then re-crossed, laagering in
an open space. Just after crossing to the other side natives were heard
shouting out in the bush on our left, and there was some little excite-
ment for a minute but nothing happened. We moved again at 7.30,
and shortly afterwards it began to rain very heavily ; I knew we
must be close to the Longwe and that it was the only river of any size
that ran in from our side, but nobody knew it by sight. After going
about a mile we saw what looked like the junction of two rivers, and a
little further on Burnham, Chappe, and I went to find out if it was still
the Shangani or another river. There was a sandy bed about 300 yards
wide and we could see the bush on the other side, we crossed to this
and then found we were on an island, the river dividing higher up ;
we went back to the Column which was halted and moved on. In
about another mile we crossed a dry sandy river, and as some of our
•' boys " said this was the Longwe, we got on to an open place
near and lay down till daylight, it was very cold and rained all night.
As soon as it was light enough to see where we were going we got
down to the Shangani, we had halted about half a mile from it and
followed it again looking for a good place to laager ; I had told the
"boys" I had sent on that I should wait for them there, and they
ought to be back at any time. We had to go about two miles before
we got to anything like a decent place, and then on coming out of the
bush saw what was unmistakably the Longwe in front of us ; as the
ground on the other side of the Shangani was better for laagering, we
crossed and formed up in a patch of bush in a large open.
While coming along that morning and when it was barely light, we
pas.sed a small kraal of five huts and heard cattle lowing, I knew
that there were nothing but Maholi kraals about and they would
probably be friendly, and if they were not, with over lOO men I could
surround the kraal and take them all without firing a shot, and I
intended to do so, but Captain Raaf protested so strongly against it that
I had to give it up, and we left the beef behind and killed a horse when
we laagered. We had finished our breakfast, in most cases horse-meat
and garlic only, though I was astonished on going to see Raaf afterwards
1 86 The Doioufall of LobengiUa.
to find that he still had cookies and cofifee, when a native appeared ; he
turned out to be a Mahoh', and the head of the small kraal that we had
passed, had heard us pass while he was in bed but thought it was
thunder, and in the morning saw our spoor and came to see us. He told
us we had left all the Matabeli behind us now, and that that part of
the country was quite quiet, he also said a number of Matabeli
were returning up the Shangani with their cattle and going back to their
kraals ; he told us he could take us straight across to Umhlangeni,
and if we started at once we could be there by the same time next
day. T told him we wanted meat, and that I would give him four
cows on arrival at Umhlangeni for two now, and he went to fetch them.
While he was away the two " boys " returned to say there were no
waggons at the drift, and they had gone back some distance along
the Umhlangeni road but had seen none, and had then come back down
the Longwe, Grootboom going on by himself to Umhlangeni. The
native returned with the two cows, which were very wild, and as we
were afraid of losing them if we tried to drive them I had them both
killed at once, one we ate straight off, and the other we cut up and
carried with us.
As soon as we had had our meal we started again, guided by
our friendly native, and did about five miles and then halted for the
night in an open valley. We had scarcely done so when two men
appeared riding towards us, they were greeted with cheers, and turned
out to be Messrs. Selous and Acutt ; they told us that a relief column,
with Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson, was only one-and-a-half miles away
with food, etc. I told Captain Raaf to bring the Column on as soon as
the men had had some food, and rode back myself with Mr. Selous to
see the Doctor ; the Column arrived just after dark and were received
with open arms and lots of cookies and coffee. The relief Column
consisted of about 150 men under Captain Heany, and with it were
Mr. Rhodes, Dr. Jameson, Major Sawyer and Sir J. Willoughby.
Major Sawyer had been sent up by Sir H. Loch to report on what
was being done. All the men had a good meal followed by a good
night's rest, and the following morning we started for Umhlangeni ;
Captain Heany gave horses for all my men to ride, his own men
walking, the wounded were carried in carts and we did the twenty-
Retreat from the Shangaui River
187
two miles to Umhlangeni by dark. When we started in the morning
Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson rode straight in and at once sent off
to announce our safety ; Captain Heyman was in command at
Umhlangeni with a mixed force, and the day after our return we
went on to Buluwayo, Captain Heyman following the next day
with all British South Africa Company's Troops, leaving some of the
Bechuanaland Border Police and Cape IMounted Rifles with all the guns
to garrison Umhlangeni, under command of Captain Coventry. The
morning after our arrival at Umhlangeni Pyke's arm was successfully
amputated at the
shoulder, and he and
all the other wounded
were doing very well.
We had a very —
wet journey to Bulu-
wayo but got in on
the third day, and as
all the Company's troops were
now there Dr. Jameson began
to make arrangements for
disbanding them ; there were
plenty of stores in Buluwayo
now, and by the 20th arrange-
The nathe zn foreground is weantig the distinguishing
mentS had been made, and mark—yeUoiu "Umbo" round Ms head, as worn by our
"' /riendlies."
on the 2 1st December all
the men who wished to return to Salisbury or Victoria started off
in waggons, having received a month's rations for the road, and
on the following day all those who were returning to Johannes-
burg left via Tati. The latter did a very good journey, getting
through to Johannesburg in five weeks, but the Salisbury and Victoria
parties found the country very boggy and were consequently very
much delayed, but got through safely ; the Salisbury party under
command of Captain Spreckley arriving on the 2cth January, and
the Victoria party under Lieutenant Beale about the i8th; Captain
Carr, of Raaf's Column, was in charge of the Johannesburg party.
A large number of men decided on stopping in Matabeliland, and
Maholi marching i.\ to Buluwayo to
surrender thf.ir arms.
1 88 The Downfall of Lobeugula.
the Company at once raised a Police force 150 strong under Lieutenant
Bodle, and on the 25th December the country was thrown open for
prospecting and pegging off farms.
Nearly all the chiefs had now surrendered and there was no fear of
further trouble. Captain Raaf was not very well when we returned
and was not sufficiently careful, consequently he became worse
and died shortly afterwards. My brother was still in bed when I
returned to Buluwayo, his arm being still troublesome, and Dr.
Jameson did not consider him fit to risk the post-cart journey to
Vryburg ; he therefore gave us the Bishop's travelling waggon,
which had been taken over by the Company, and on the 31st
December we started for Salisbury accompanied by Captain Finch,
and arrived on the 20th January. Before the men were disbanded Mr.
Rhodes had a parade of all the forces and addressed them ; all the
arms, ammunition, equipments, etc., were taken into store at Buluwayo,
and just enough issued to each party going away to take them through ;
the Company had about 350 horses left after the men were disbanded,
and the majority of them were handed over to the Police, every man
remaining in the country had a rifle and ammunition issued to him and
a month's free rations. We heard many different accounts from natives
about Major Wilson's party after we returned to Buluwayo, some of
them stating that men had escaped, but most of them that they had all
been killed ; it was not however until Mr. Dawson found their bones
that I gave up all hopes of some having got away.
In conclusion I would wish to express my appreciation of the
behaviour of all the Company's Troops during the campaign, and above
all, my sincere sorrow at the loss of gallant Major Wilson and his brave
band, and my heart-felt sympathy with their relations and friends. The
story of how these thirty-four (nearly all of whom were great friends
of my own) stood and fell, shoulder to shoulder, rather than desert two
of their number who could not escape with them, will not only remain
for ever in our history, but will be handed down through generations ot
the native tribes of Africa as an instance of how Englishmen can and
will die, and the effect of their heroism on the natives, who above all
else honour personal bravery, cannot be over-estimated.
MAJOR SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, Bart.
(Chief Staff Officer to His Honour the Administrator.)
CHAPTER XIII.
CROSSIiYG THE BORDER.
By Major Sir John C. Willoughby, Bart.
The Victoria incident — The state of public feeling— The organisation cf the Volunteets—
Correspondence with the High Commissioner — The Southern Column — The start of
the Columns— Our rival allies— Crossing the Border— Junction of the Salisbury and
Victoria Columns.
For some time prior to July 14th, 1893, in the Victoria district, the
Matabeli had been raiding in great force — their numbers being estimated
at 5,000 to 6,000 men — killing the Mashonas right and left, including
those in the employ of Europeans, under the very eyes of the latter,
and even in the township of Victoria itself They had also burnt the
huts and stores on farms occupied by Europeans, and had stolen their
cattle. On hearing of these events His Honour the Administrator,
Dr. L. S. Jameson, hastened to Victoria from Salisbury, arriving there
on the above-named date, and at once sent for the head indunas of
the Matabeli impi : Manyou, Mjan, and Mangandan. These, on being
interviewed, were very insolent. Dr. Jameson therefore gave them an
ultimatum, ordering them to retire across the border forthwith, and
inform.ing them that he should drive them out if they had not com-
menced to do so within one hour.
One hour and forty minutes' law was actually given, and then
Captain Lendy, R.A., at that time Magistrate of the Victoria district,
received instructions to go out with thirty-eight mounted men, and, if the
impi had not by then commenced to retire, to open fire on them.
Captain Lendy and his small party encountered 300 Matabeli,
forming the advance party of the impi that were laying siege to
Magomela's Kraal, four miles north-west of Victoria. Immediately the
Matabeli saw the advanced guard of the mounted troop they opened
fire. This was returned, whereupon the Matabeli fled, and were pursued
IQO The Downfall of Lobengula.
for three miles. The mounted men had no casualties, but forty Matabeli
were killed, and several wounded ; Mangandan, the most impertinent of
the indunas, being among;st the first to be shot. Had Captain Lendy
continued the pursuit two miles further he would have encountered the
main body of the Matabeli, which, as soon as it heard the firing, fled for
a considerable distance, a part of it however returning during the night
to recover its dead and the cattle it had raided.
At daylight next morning Dr. Jameson again sent out a party to
ascertain whether the Matabeli had re-crossed the border, and on finding
that such was the case, telegraphed via Palapye to Lobengula, informing
him of what had occurred, and asking him to punish the indunas
responsible, finally demanding compensation for the damage done by
his impi to the property of Europeans, and the restitution of the cattle
stolen from them ; he also informed Lobengula that the white people
could not give up Mashona women and children to be slaughtered, as
they had claimed their protection ; but that if any of the people had
done wrong they would be tried in the usual manner before the
magistrate of the district, and if convicted, punished accordingly.
A complete narrative of the above events was then telegraphed to
His Excellency the High Comm.issioner at Cape Town, who at once
sent a strong remonstrance to Lobengula, telling him to comply with
Dr. Jameson's demands, at the same time expressing a wish to remain
on friendly terms with him and his people.
The question of compensation was afterwards dropped by order of
the Colonial Office, and was never again referred to.
Lobengula, before receiving his own people's account of the engage-
ment, replied in a most friendly manner, informing Dr. Jameson that he
would be quite right to drive his impis away if troublesome, because they
had distinct orders not to interfere with the white people and acknow-
ledged he was wrong in having allowed them to go so near the white
settlement.
When, however, his own people reported the skirmish, he sent a
second message, more threatening in tone, and demanding the uncondi-
tional surrender of Mashona men, women, and children, before he would
even enter into the question of compensation for damage experienced by
the white men.
Crossing the Border. 191
At this point all communication between Dr. Jameson and Loben-
gula ceased ; but His Excellency the High Commissioner continued still
to send friendly messages.
The European population in the Victoria district had been much
scared by the occurrences during the Matabeli raid, and even subsequently
to the skirmish which ensued they continued in a great state of alarm.
Almost all development work, both mining and agricultural, remained
practically at a standstill ; native labour and waggon transport were
absolutely unattainable ; and all waggons on the road at the time turned
back, many of the transport riders off-loading and leaving their goods in
the veld, to accelerate their escape out of the country.
Meetings were held, and the people were openly clamouring for the
Matabeli question to be settled once for all by vigorous and instantaneous
action ; and declaring that, if the British South Africa Company did not
undertake this at once, they would leave the country en masse, consider-
ing both their lives and their property in danger.
Dr. Jameson, having himself from the first taken the same view of
the situation, thereupon, to satisfy their demands, commenced the organi-
sation of defence columns, which at the same time would be suffi-
ciently strong for offence, should such subsequently be required. The
necessity of offensive action being taken was fully realised by everyone
in Mashonaland, and by those outside who knew anything of the
Matabeli, as the only solution possible ; though of course no active
measures of offence could be undertaken without the sanction of the
Imperial Government.
Acting on this determination, Captain Raaf, C.M.G., Magistrate of
Tuli, was authorised to purchase 750 horses as speedily as possible, and
to organise a Volunteer Force of 250 mounted men, with fifty additional
pack horses : the force to be recruited from Tuli and the surrounding
districts.
The original idea was that this force should consist entirely of
Dutchmen, who it was erroneously supposed (as subsequently proved
to be the case) would be willing to campaign with merely ammunition
and biltong, and in the event of a forward movement would live on the
native produce of the country, thus obviating the necessity of a train of
waggons. Captain Raaf, however, found that, with few exceptions, the
192
The Downfall of Lobengula.
Dutchmen were unwilling to come forward, and therefore had to look
elsewhere.
At the same time a Volunteer Force was started at Salisbury by
Major Forbes, the Magistrate of that district, and also at Victoria by
Captain Allan Wilson, of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company,
who had had considerable experience in all the later Kaffir wars,
and who was personally known to most of the prospectors in the district,
possessing their full confidence. Each of these corps were to consist of
250 mounted men, with the object of defending the border, but, if
necessary, of invading Matabeliland, unencumbered by waggons, but with
pack and spare horses. (The latter idea was afterwards abandoned as
impracticable, owing to the
poor condition of the horses.
The numbers of both corps
were afterwards considerably
augmented and a sufficient
train of waggons engaged to
accompany each.)
In the meantime the best
routes into Matabeliland from
the East side, along which the
natural features of the country
offered fewest obstacles, such as
thick bush or broken country,
to an advance, were sur-
veyed as far as possible, and the services engaged of such guides as
were forthcoming, both European and Native, who to some extent
were acquainted with the intervening country between Mashonaland and
Buluwayo.
Finding that Captain Raaf was not collecting so many horses as he
had been instructed to do, 300 more horses, mostly salted (i.e., proof
against horse-sickness), were also purchased, and the reserves of
ammunition, machine guns, and all kinds of equipments, of which the
Company had a large stock at Tuli, were pushed up to Victoria and
Salisbury, while contracts were made with Mr. Napier and Mr. Bezeiden-
hout to supply the necessary waggon transport and oxen for the Victoria
A CORNER OF THE HORSE LINES IN LAAGER.
Crossing the Border. 193
and Salisbury Columns respectively, in the event of an advance becoming
necessary.
On my arrival at Victoria, September 7th, the work of organisation
had made great progress. I found the Salisbury Column was already
equipped, organised, and on the march to Charter, which place was con-
sidered, from its central position, as m.ost suitable for occupation, being
central for the defence of the North Eastern border, as also the nearest
point to the most Northern and most favourable route by which this
Column could enter Matabeliland if offensive action became unavoid-
able. The Victoria Column wasTiot so forward in its organisation, owing
to its reinforcements from below not having yet arrived. With the excep-
tion of the Artillery Troop, under Captain Lendy, fifty strong, garrison-
ing the Fort, the remainder were encamped five miles North of Victoria.
Both columns were still awaiting the full complement of the horses,
there being only 100 at the time belonging to the Company, though an
additional 100 were subsequently purchased from private individuals
when it was found that Captain Raaf had failed to get his full authorised
number.
The next fortnight was spent by Dr. Jameson and myself in
visiting the forces at Tuli and Charter. In the meantime frequent scares
occurred, one of which seemed especially well founded, as all the Mashonas
in the neighbourhood of Victoria were busily fortifying themselves,
laying up stores of food and water in their caves of refuge, and sending
in to inform us that the Matabeli were coming back in a short time.
On September 30th, two men of Captain White's patrol were fired
on near the border, within thirty miles of Victoria, and fresh spoor of
impis and raided cattle crossing the border were observed by the same
patrol.
From native information received locally at Victoria and Charter
we were led to believe that the Matabeli were advancing in great force
and in two divisions — one on Victoria and the other in the direction of
Tati. This was also corroborated by Mr. Colenbrander's report to His
Excellency the High Commissioner after a trip taken by him to beyond
Tati ; and the fact that the Matabeli should have ventured to fire on
Captain White's patrol near a kraal that a short time previously had been
visited by white men without any molestation, was naturally considered
o
'194 ^^ he Downfall of Lobengula.
a "proof that those Matabeli were but the outposts of a large impi, as it
was unlikely that they would have ventured to fire unless emboldened
by the support of large reinforcements in their rear.
About the same time a report came in that the Matabeli were
raiding some little distance west of Sinoia ; Matabeli had also been
seen on the road between Tuli and Victoria.
On October 5th a patrol of the Bechuanaland Border Police was
fired on in the Protectorate and South of the Shashi River, and shortly
•afterwards His Excellency the High Commissioner telegraphed his
sanction to a general forward movement into Matabeliland.
I.
[Copy of Telegram.]
From To
Dr. Jameson, His Excellency the High Commissioner,
Victoria, Cape Town.
. ' . (Dated 2nd October, 1893.)
" Have just arrived from Charter and found Captain White awaiting me with
the following report : —
" About twenty-five miles from Victoria a Mashona kraal reported that an
impi of Matabeli crossed Shashi to this side, captured cattle and returned beyond
border.
" Captain White's patrol took up spoor of natives and cattle which led up to
a kraal eight miles beyond Shashi. Police demanded to see Induna, whereupon
a large number of Matabeli appeared upon the rocks and fired on them. Police
returned fire, and retired beyond Shashi to main body of patrol. Captain White
then at once came into camp to report the occurrence. Captain White also
reports, twenty-five miles north-west of Victoria, spoor made by Matabeli
regiments, consisting of sixteen pathways ; calculated by native experts that
from 6,000 to 7,000 men have been there.
"Now I feel sure Your Excellency will agree with me that the natives
would not have fired even upon two policemen unless large bodies of Matabeli
were in the neighbourhood. Captain White further reports that natives all along
the border report the existence of large bodies of Matabeli all along the Shashi,
and I have little doubt that this kraal which fired on the police is one of the
advance posts of the Matabeli regiments.
" Captain White also states that the kraals along the Shashi refused to give
Crossing the Boi'de7\ 195
or sell food, but told him he might take anything, because they were afraid of
Matabeli in the immediate neighbourhood.
"I will now keep Captain White and his party here until I hear from Your
Excellency, in case you should allow me to move further forward with both the
Salisbury and Victoria parties, and a few days later the Tuli Company, who have
a shorter distance to go, should it be necessary to go right into the country.
Should you still desire me to send out the large patrol I mentioned from
Charter, I will keep Captain White's party in readiness to go on receipt of
your wire."
Note. — There are two Shasha or Shashi Rivers, the northern being a small tributary of the
Tokwe River, and the southern river demarcating the Shashi-Macloutsie territory.
II.
[Copy of Telegram.]
From To
High Commissioner, His Honour Dr. Jameson,
Cape Town, Victoria,
(Dated October 5th, 1893.)
October 5th. — Following telegram dated to-day received from officer
commanding Macloutsie (Colonel Goold-Adams) begins — " A patrol of mine,
consisting of a non-commissioned officer and two men, reports by heliograph
from my post between here and the Shashi, that whilst patrolling this morning
on the bank of the Shashi River, they were fired upon by, as far as they could
gather, about thirty Matabeli ; our men returned the fire ; on some more of our
men coming up the Matabeli retired. I cannot hear of any large body of
Matabeli, and suppose this was only a party pushing forward to see what we
are doing. There were no casualties on our side. I have a patrol of one non-
commissioned officer and ten men out at that spot on the Shashi, and am in
constant communication by the heliograph. What are Your Excellency's
instructions ? " Ends — " Will you please make arrangements at once for placing
the Tuli mounted force under Colonel Goold-Adams ? "
III.
[Copy of Telegram.]
From To
High Commissioner, His Honour Dr. Jameson,
Cape Town, Victoria.
(Dated 5th October, 1893.)
October 5th. — " Received last evening Sir J. Willoughby's and your Jong
O 2
196 The Doivjifa// of Lobcn^ula.
telegrams reporting the result of Captain White's and Mr. Brabant's scouting. I
quite agree, as I pointed out in my telegram of the 2nd inst., that it would be
very imprudent to attempt to push back the Impis by attacking them in the
rough ground which they apparently occupy; whatever your plans are with
regard to the advance of the columns from Fort Charter and Fort Victoria they
had better now be carried out, and an endeavour made to induce the Matabeli
to abandon the position from which you would have great difficulty to dislodge
them by force. Have you any concerted plan by which this can be done ? The
Impis now, whether large or small, must be withdrawn to greater distance than
they are apparently at present, and it must be left for you to decide what course
should be adopted for this purpose. Should the Impis withdraw peaceably and
of their own accord to a safe distance, they must be allowed to do so without
interruption ; but if they should resist, then I have informed you you may take
such measures as may be necessary under the circumstances for the protection
of life and property. Should hostilities occur, Colonel Goold-Adams has orders
to advance at once on Tati and Monarch Mine, and I have requested Khama
that 1,000 of his men may be immediately placed under Colonel Goold-Adams'
command. It would doubtless greatly strengthen his column if the mounted
men belonging to the British South Africa Company at Tuli were placed under
his directions ; and it would be for you, in consultation with Colonel Goold-
Adams, to decide whether this force should move forward by itself by the
Mangwe River towards Mangwe, or accompany Colonel Goold-Adams to Tati,
etc., etc. In either case, as the British South Africa Company's men would be
working within the Bechuanaland Protectorate Territory, I shall require them to
come under the Company's Discipline Act of 1891 for a period say of three or four
months on such terms as may have been already arranged between them and
the Company, and that they should be under any circumstances under Colonel
Goold-Adams' authority while within or passing through the Protectorate. I
have given strict orders that no pillaging or cruelty to the natives will be per-
mitted, and that anyone acting in contravention of these orders will be very severely
punished. I have also desired Colonel Goold-Adams to pay for any supplies
required. I trust you will enjoin on the Officers and men of the Company's
forces acting in Mashonaland, the necessity for strict attention being paid during
military operations to the requirements of humanity. The men are not under
any rniUtary law, but I have every confidence in the restraining influence of the
Officers and the good feeling of the men to act as if they were under strict
military regulation ; and that there will be no necessity for me in the exercise of
the authority I possess to enact any special laws by proclamation to provide for
Crossing the Border. 197
the punishment of offences against the peopile or breach of good disciphne. I
trust that disciphne and obedience to orders will ensure to the British South
Africa Company's troops the success which their undoubted bravery and
devotion to duty in coming forward in defence of the country deserve."
IV.
[Copy of Telegram.]
From To
Jameson, His Excellency the High Commissioner,
Cape Town.
(Dated October 6th, 1893.)
October 6th. — " Have received your three wires of yesterday, and am now
acting upon Your Excellency's instructions to carry out my plans, the outline of
which I wired to you on October 4th. Both the Charter and Victoria Columns
are now moving forward, and with Sir John Willoughby I shall follow and join
the Victoria Column, proceeding with it until its junction with the Charter force,
when further movement if necessary will be decided upon.
" I have telegraphed Captain Raaf this morning to place himself under the
orders of Colonel Goold-Adams, and have asked the latter to telegraph his
instructions to Captain Raaf. As in the attestation paper of the Tuli Force
Ordinance No. i of 1891 is not mentioned, I have telegraphed Captain Raaf to
get the signatures of all his men to an attestation paper with the following
heading: 'We, the undersigned, do promise and swear that we will be faithful
and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and to her heirs and
successors according to law, and that we will faithfully serve in the British South
Africa Company's Police, and that we will perform the duties assigned to us to
the best of our ability under the provisions of the British South Africa Com-
pany's Ordinance No. i of 1891.' " Ends — " As I shall still be here two days
I have asked Colonel (ioold-Adams to keep me informed of his movements and
intentions during that time, and after leaving I shall as far as possible by native
runners keep Your Excellency and Colonel Goold Adams informed of our
progress and of the movements of the Matabeli. I note Your Excellency's
confidence that no pillaging or cruelty to the natives will be permitted by the
otificers of the expedition, and I am sure this confidence will not be abused. To
further ensure good discipline, and no unnecessary cruelty to the natives en
route, any native allies which accompany us have been placed under reliable .
white men. I can further assure Your Excellency that the whole expedition is
198 l^hc Downfall of Lobcngula,
under strict military discipline. I thank Your Excellency on behalf of the
officers and men for the good wishes expressed at the end of your telegram,
which will be communicated to them.
" The Patrol which I expected last night has not yet returned, but as it is
under Mr. Brabant and accompanied by reliable native scouts I have no anxiety
about its return. Should it meet the column en route, or should it arrive here, I
will at once telegraph to Your Excellency Mr. Brabant's report.
"The Salisbury and Victoria Forces are attested under the provisions of
Ordinance No. i of 1891."
V.
[Copy of Telegram.]
From To
Jameson, Goold-Adams,
Macloutsie.
(Dated October 6th, 1893.)
" His Excellency wired me last night to make arrangements for placing Tuli
mounted force under you ; I have wired Raaf accordingly this morning, and he
is now entirely under your orders.
" Victoria and Salisbury Columns start this morning. I shall be here with
AVilloughby till Sunday in case you wish to communicate ; we will then join
Victoria Column en route. Will send back as far as possible native runners
from time to time with any information particularly as to our progress and
movements of Matabeli which may be wired to Macloutsie, and from there you
mischt make similar arrangements."
As already stated, it had been intended previously that the Tuli,
Victoria, and Salisbury . Columns, in the event of an invasion of
Matabeliland becoming necessary, should each march from different
points unencumbered by waggons. It had also been intended that
each column should act independently and march by its own separate
route to Buluwayo. This plan of campaign was afterwards modified ;
the Victoria and Salisbury Columns to take with them each twelve
waggons carrying food supplies and reserve of ammunition ; and
subsequently, when the Bechuanaland Border Police were ordered to
take part in the Campaign, the Tuli Force reinforced them, having its
Ci'ossinor the Border. i99
own waggon transport, and henceforth became a portion of the Southern
Column under the command of Lieut-Colonel Goold-Adams.
The number of waggons of the Victoria and Salisbury Columns
was also subsequently increased to eighteen in each column. The idea
of these two columns marching independently of one another was also
abandoned, and it was arranged that they should meet at Iron Mine
Hill, at the head waters of the Tokwe, a spot situated equi-distant from
Victoria and Charter, and at a sufficiently safe distance from where
it was likely that any very serious opposition from the Matabeli could
be met with.
The Salisbury Column finally received its orders to march on
Iron Mine Hill October 7th, and taking a road of its own across the
veld reached that place October 14th, having traversed a distance of
eighty-six miles through a bushy country without incident.
The Victoria Column started October 6th, via Makouris (old post
station), near which it turned off the main road and struck out in the
direction of Iron Mine Hill, this detour being necessary to avoid the
very broken country of Chilimanzi's ; it then halted for three days eight
miles beyond, where it turned off the main road and thirty-eight miles
from Victoria, to await the Artillery Troop and the arrival of its
dismounted men enlisted at Tuli. This halt was invaluable to the
horses after their long journey up country, as they still much needed
further rest and there was good grazing in the vicinity. A good
position was taken up at the foot of an almost impregnable granite
kopje, which it was intended to hold in preference to the laager in case
of attack. Though it was improbable that any such attack would take
place, it was just possible, as it was rumoured that a Matabeli impi was
stationed in the broken country of Chilimanzi's ; this rumour it was
impossible to verify as the broken nature of the country in that
direction to the south rendered efficient scouting quite impossible.
On October 8th, Dr. Jameson and myself, having settled all the
final details, and having seen off the last drafts of dismounted men for
the Victoria Column, lefc Victoria, rejoining that force at its temporary
halting-place the following day.
The only information hitherto received from the scouts was to the
effect that a few Matabeli had been seen on our side of the border.
200
The Downfall of Lobengtila.
The following day the Artillery troop under Captain Lendy and
the last detachment of dismounted men arrived. The latter, fifty-six in
number, had done exceedingly well, having marched from Tuli, a
distance of 240 miles, in twelve days. During the previous night a slight
alarm was occasioned by a native report sent in by our advanced scouts
under Captain the Hon. C. J. White, that two impis of Matabeli were
within five miles of the camp in broken
country and threatening our left flank.
As the country was too broken for
the mounted scouts to reconnoitre
in that direction, native scouts were
sent out, and reported that this
information was incorrect ; it was
afterwards ascertained that a force of
Matabeli had been stationed in the hills
behind Chilimanzi's principal kraal, some
fifteen miles south-west of the camp, but
that it retired on gaining notice of our
advance. Native information through
Mr. Brabant led us to believe that the
Umbezu, Hlahlangela, Inyamind-
Crossing the Shashi River.
Ihovo, Amaveni, Imzinzati,
Inyati, and Enxna regi-
ments were all retreating
on the Shangani River. Major
Wilson rode on from camp to
Chaka's kraal, eight
miles ahead, and while
interviewing with Mr. Quested's
Mashona contingent, recruited in
the district, the kraal was raided
by Mr. Brabant's Mashona con-
tingent— a slight misunderstand-
ing amongst our rival allies
which was soon explained and
put right.
Crossing the Border. 201
It had originally been intended to attack Chilimanzi and Ndema,
both powerful Makalaka chiefs, who were reported to have been hostile
to whites and in league with the Matabeli ; but as both these chiefs on
our approach sent friendly messages and presents of oxen, with offers of
help in the way of a contingent from each, it was decided to push on direct
to Iron Mine Hill and combine forces with the Salisbury Column. The
column accordingly started at 6 a.m. on the 12th, and trekked seven
miles to within two miles of the Shashi River, making poor progress
through rather heavy sand, and being delayed somewhat in crossing the
Umshagashi River. The small kraals of Chitakabi and Masendeka on
granite kopjes were passed, and the columns halted near Chaka's kraal,
Chaka being chief of the three above-mentioned kraals; these were
apparently friendly to us, as were also the few kraals along the, line of
march still further ahead. From here onwards Mr. Brabant's natives
commenced their scouting duties at least one trek ahead of the columns,
being subdivided into smaller parties under the men forming Mr. Dollar's
European party of scouts (twelve in number), while Mr. Quested's natives
commenced scouting some miles to the south-east on our left and most
threatened flank. As we advanced further and across the border, the
whole of the native contingents were distributed in front and rear and
both flanks to a radius of five or six miles, until we got in touch with
the Matabeli impis, when they showed such a strong disinclination to
keep any distance in advance, that it was considered advisable to depend
merely on our European scouts for information of the country in advance;
however, the native contingents were excessively useful in saving our
horses much hard work during the earlier stages of the advance.
On October the 13th the Column did two treks of seven miles and
five miles respectively ; during the first the Shashi River v/as crossed
without difficulty (this river was the nominal border between Mashona-
land and Matabeliland), also theTetekwe River, where the Column made
its midday halt. The Salisbury Column was here reported by natives to
be at Iron Mine Hill, and two Matabeli impis were also reported to be
between it and us ; later information of the natives during the day sent
in by our scouts was that there were four impis lying between us and
the Salisbury Column. During the day's march the kraals of Chaka
and Masibadonda were passed. On the first information being received
202 The Downfall of Lobcngnla.
concerning the arrival of the Salisbury Column at Iron Mine Hill, four
scouts were sent on at once to verify it, but returned, having found
the hill but no one there. The Column halted for the night about one-
and-a-half miles south-west of the Matonga River. Dr. Jameson and
myself here left the Column to push on to Iron Mine Hill, sleeping that
night with Captain White's inner circle of scouts near Makamia's kraal,
four miles ahead of the Column.
Next morning we reached the Umgezi River, eight miles distant,
and two miles further on gained a high plateau and open country, the
line of march up to this point since leaving the Salisbury main road
having led us through more or less bush country (chiefly Magondi forest),
skirting, as before stated, the very broken granite country of Chilimanzi's.
Iron Mine Hill, a distance of twenty-nine miles from where we left the
Column, wa3 reached without incident at 5 p.m., not a single native
having been encountered, the country, till close to Iron Mine Hill, being
very open and waterless. Here we found the Salisbury Column, which
had arrived that morning, just starting to form laager at the head of the
Tokwe, one-and-a-half miles beyond, for the position at Iron Mine Hill
was a very bad one, far from water, and the laager being formed at the
foot of the hill immediately commanded by it, The Salisbury scouts
reported no Matabeli impis in the vicinity, but a few men of the
Insukameni Regiment, in charge of cattle that had been recently raided
from Victoria in the Mgagoshla Hills, some seven miles north-west.
Indaima, whose principal kraal lies fifteen miles south-west of Iron Mine
Hill, was also reported anxious to be friendly. As the Salisbury
Column had to halt here pending the arrival of the Victoria Column, it
was decided to employ the time in recapturing the above-mentioned
cattle and reconnoitring ahead.
{^From this point, for the details of the daily marches, of the zvork
accomplished, and of the etigagenients fought, the reader is referred to
Major Forbes accoiuit of the operations. Major Willoughbys account
is 1-esumed at a later point, dealing zvith the conchision of the campaign.']
CHAPTER XIV.
THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.
By Major Sir John C. Willoughbv, Bart.
The surrender of Indunas— Major Forbes instructed to pursue Lobengula — The Shangani
reached — Major Wilson sent on ahead — The party surrounded and cut off — The last
stand — A relief party organized— The retreat of Major Forbes' patrol— Hardships
on the way— Submission of the Matabeli— The duties of the British South Africa
Company's Police and the Bechuanaland Border Police— Messrs. Dawson and Riley's
mission — The death of Lobengula — The final settlement of the country.
Without recapitulating the facts embracing the return of Major
Forbes to Inyati, it may be mentioned that some of the head indunas
of the country, including Babyan, Glishu, Maarswee, and Sikombo, had
come in to surrender ; and that from information obtained from John
Jacobs, one of the colonial natives with the King, who had also come
in to give himself up, it was supposed that the patrol after the King
was on the wrong tack, and that the King was not on the Bubye at all,
but in the direction of the Gwai River to the North-West of Shiloh.
Instructions were therefore sent to Major Forbes to proceed at once
with his whole force to Shiloh, where reinforcements and food supplies
would be awaiting him, and from there to follow the King's waggon
spoor, which would be pointed out to him by John Jacobs. He was
then to make every endeavour to overtake and capture the King ; the
original instructions to disarm all armed natives, or to shoot them if
they refused compliance, were still to be adhered to. Ten waggons,
with 220 men, twelve days' rations for the whole force, and reserves of
ammunition, were sent to Shiloh; and on the 25th of November the
patrol, reconstituted and re-equipped, made a second advance from that
place. The force, as rearranged, consisted of about 165 mounted and
105 dismounted men, four Maxims, and the Hotchkiss, and five
waggons carrying reserves of ammunition, and sixteen days' short
rations (i.e., half ration of meal) ; the balance of the force, 280 men,
204 The Dozvufall of Lobcngula,
partly mounted, five waggons, and the seven -pounder, returned to
Buluwayo. By this time heavy rains had set in, making the veld very
bad travelling for both waggons and horses ; and during the next few
days the Patrol made such poor progress that on the 29th Major Forbes
decided to push on without waggons. He accordingly again subdivided
his force, taking on with him only 165 mounted men, spare and pack
horses, two Maxims, ten days' rations, and 20,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion, leaving Captain Delamere with instructions to proceed with
the remainder of the men and the waggons to Umhlangeni,
Up to the 3rd of December the progress of the patrol was without
incident. All natives met appeared to be friendly, with the exception
that two scouts, on the 2nd of December, were surrounded by some
twenty Matabeli, who told them they intended to take them to Gambo,
their induna ; the scouts, however, escaped from them. All native
reports induced Major Forbes to consider that there were only a few
men actually with the King, and that he would meet with little, if any,
opposition. On the 3rd a point on the Shangani was reached, a distance
of eighty-four miles N.N.W. of Shiloh ; here the King's latest scherm
was found, and in it a Matabeli boy and a young Maholi were captured,
from whom it was ascertained that the King had only left that morning
on the news of the near approach of the white men, that his waggons
had experienced much difficulty in crossing the river, and that an impi
had been sent back to attack the patrol in the thick bush, through
which it had just passed ; if it failed to do this, that the impi was to
follow it up and attack it wherever it was. Major Wilson and eighteen
men were sent forward in the afternoon to reconnoitre along the King's
spoor, with instructions to be back by sun- down. He however did not
return.
Captain Napier and two others returned about midnight to inform
Major Forbes that the King was some five or six miles ahead, and that
Major Wilson was close to him ; that there were more natives with
him than was expected (Captain Napier described their passing in the
dark through a number of scherms, some of them of great size), and
that it would be advisable for the whole force and Maxims (on packs)
to come on at once. As it was a dark night and the horses were knocked
up, and as he thought he was at the time surrounded by an impi and that
The Close of the Campaign.
he might be attacked at any moment, Major
Forbes thought it unsafe to take on the whole
force (150 men), but he sent on Captain Borrow
and twenty men without any Maxims, and
decided to move on himself at daylight. The
main body, it would appear, however, did not
make a move till nearly one hour after daylight,
and some time before it started heavy firing was
heard in the direction of Major Wilson's party.
Soon after making a move the main body was
attacked on its way along the river down to-
wards the drift where the King had crossed. The enemy
opened fire from the bush about 250 to 300 yards away to
the left of the force, which thereupon formed up in the open,
where it remained for one hour until the enemy's fire was
silenced. During the whole of the engagement the natives
kept well under cover in the bush, a very few showing
themselves, and it was impossible to ascertain their numbers.
It was not till the enemy's fire was silenced that the force
at length retreated to a better position. The casualties of
the patrol were, five men wounded, sixteen horses and two mules killed.
About 8 a.m. Messrs. Burnham, Ingram, and Gooding came back from
Major Wilson's party. They reported that they had all ridden up at
daylight to the King's scherms and called to him to come out, upon which
about 100 natives ran out and opened fire, killing or wounding two horses.
The fire was returned, and the party then retreated 600 yards, where it was
again attacked. The three above-mentioned were then ordered to return
to hurry on the main body, and on the way were met by a large body of
Matabeli, who pursued them and drove them off to the left and up the
river. They succeeded in effecting their escape, but on reaching the
river, found it had come down, and had to swim across it. The main
body, still thinking it was surrounded, formed a strong scherm, and it
was decided to await the return of Major Wilson till the next morning,
it being considered impossible to go to his assistance on account of the
river having risen. Natives were seen and heard on the opposite side of
the river during the day. From subsequent information obtained from
Matabeli Scouts
ON THE Banks of
THE Shangani.
2o6 The Doivnfall of Lobcngula,
natives who were on the spot, /and whom I have personally cross-
examined, it seems that Major Wilson momentarily repulsed the men
actually round the waggons ; but the King had fled on horseback with
the indunas Bosumwan, Magwegwe, and one other, the previous
afternoon. On Major Wilson retreating while pursued by the enemy,
he encountered and was surrounded by the larger portion of the impi
that had been sent on December 2nd under Mjan (commander-in-chief),
Manondwan, and Manyou, to waylay the patrol in the thick bush. This
impi consisted of a mixed lot from the Insuka, Umbezu, Ingubu, Inhlati,
Mclecho and Umhlahlangela regiments, and people from the towns of
Induba and others, the King being left with the Buluwayo people,
Mabambani and part of the Icapa (Gambo's division). When this impi
failed to catch the patrol and found it encamped in the open on the
river, Mjan decided to take back the Umbezu and Ingubu across the
river to guard the King, leaving orders for part of the Insuka, Isezeba,
Mclecho, Inhlati and Umhlahlangela to cross the river at once, and lie
in ambush near the drift, and the remainder to stay on the left bank.
These orders were disobeyed on account of the night being very wet and
dark ; and the force that was to have crossed the river did not do so till
next morning after daylight, and then, hearing the firing at the King's
waggons, it rushed on and intercepted Major Wilson's party while
retreating.
On the night of the 3rd, Mjan, with the Umbezu and Ingubu,
reached the King's waggons after Major Wilson had ridden up to them,
and had then retreated into the bush. The people at the waggons, in the
absence of any induna, had not known quite what to do, and had been
at first inclined to open fire on the party, but were stopped by Major
Wilson telling them not to do so, as he had not come to fight, but only
to talk to the King, and asking where he was, they replied " that he had
gone." On Mjan's arrival, finding the King had disappeared, and that
no one knew where he or Major Wilson's party were, Mjan said, " We
can do nothing in the dark, so we will sleep round the waggons, and see
what happens in the morning." When Major Wilson and his party
again rode up in the morning he was at once attacked by this force, and
Mjan's son was one of the first killed, two of the horses of the party
being also shot. While retreating, Major Wilson sent off Messrs.
The Close of the Campaign. 207
Burnham, Ingram, and Gooding. These, as before narrated, effected
their escape, soon after which Major Wilson's party encountered all those
portions of the regiments which Mjan had detailed to cross the river the
previous night, and who were hurrying up to reinforce the party round
the King's waggons. He was then completely surrounded by these,
though he tried on every side at first to get out, and finding this impos-
sible, he formed a ring of his horses and made his last stand on the
King's waggon spoor. Here he and his party fought for several hours.
As the horses dropped shot they formed a barricade of their dead
bodies. They twice drove the enemy off, and but for their ammunition
running short would probably have beaten him off altogether,
as, after their experience of Shangani and Imbembesi, the Matabeli
were disinclined to expose themselves in a rush. As it was, how-
ever, it was the continuous stream of reinforcements coming in on
all sides that overwhelmed them. All died game to the last. One
man was especially mentioned, for when all the others were shot down
and more or less wounded, and though himself wounded in several
places, he collected some rifles and revolvers and made a stand on a
neighbouring ant-heap, keeping the enemy at bay. For a long time the
enemy could not kill him, and he shot down at least eight or ten before
he was eventually shot dead himself, and on running in at last they
found him with six or eight wounds on his body. Nearly every man of
the party received four or five wounds ; the party killed at least ten men
for every one of its own, and there was literally a fence of dead bodies
piled one upon the other around it. The bodies were all stripped, but
not mutilated ; and at first Major Wilson's was left untouched out of
respect, though it was afterwards stripped like the rest. The natives
were especially struck with admiration at the way in which all died,
when they could fight no longer, without a struggle or a murmur, and
secondly, for the way in which they fought on when wounded, and the
coolness with which one would take off his shirt while under fire, tear it
into strips and bind up the wounds of a comrade, who would then
resume the fight. Though all Englishmen cannot but deplore the
circumstances that led to the heroic death of this gallant band, they
must all feel proud of these their countrymen, who have achieved a
record of heroism worthy to be placed amongst the highest in the
2o8 The Downfall of Lobengula.
annals of the race. It is men such as these who have made our country
great.
The Matabeli, after burying a portion of their dead, retired in the
afternoon with the idea of attacking the main body of the Patrol, but the
river had risen too high to permit of crossing, and no doubt, after their
experience of the morning, they were probably not too keen to do so if
they had been able. When the Patrol retreated up the river the follow-
ing morning, the enemy followed all day on the opposite side ; but then,
being still unable to cross, returned to the drift, and there crossed and
followed in rear for a few days. The enemy then returned to the drift and
encamped there, and a week later, received orders from the King to dis-
perse and collect women and cattle and return to him. This was done
in some cases, but the majority gave up all idea of returning, and have
since submitted.
Major Forbes on the night of the 4th sent two mounted
messengers back to Buluwayo to inform Dr. Jameson of what had
happened, and asking for reinforcements and supplies, especially ammu-
nition, to be sent him ; " that he intended, if possible, to effect his retreat
up the Shangani River ; as he thought it very possible that these mes-
sengers would not get through he would not put any details in writing."
The messengers reached Buluwayo on the seventh, having met with no
hostile natives. Dr. Jameson and myself started next day with a party,
under Captain Heany, of 119 men, partly mounted and partly dis-
mounted, 250 Mashona Contingent, and waggons carrying food supplies
and ammunition, for Umhlangeni (Inyati), which place we reached on the
loth. Here we fully expected to find further news as to Major Forbes'
movements awaiting us, and failing such, we were for the moment at a
loss what to do, as the Patrol might take any one of four routes, viz.,
the long roundabout one along the Shangani to the Hartley Hill Road,
and by that road to Umhlangeni ; up the Shangani to the junction
with it of the Longwe, and then up that river to the Hartley Hill
Road and thence to Umhlangeni ; along the Inyoka road across
the veld, the most direct route of all ; or back along the King's
waggon spoor to Shiloh. In the state the veld was in, after
the continuous heavy rains, it appeared unwise to start a force to
the Shangani, with the prospect of intervening rivers rising, and so
The Close of the Campaign. 209
preventing its return in case the Patrol had gone some other way. It was
therefore decided to await more definite news, and in the meantime
strong patrols were sent out in all directions to try and obtain information
from the natives, while Messrs. Graham and Schulz, who volunteered
for the purpose, rode down some thirty miles below the junction of the
Longwe and Shangani, a distance of over fifty miles from Umhlangeni.
These latter returned in four days' time, havmg actually passed the Patrol
without knowing it. They met 'vith no resistance and disarmed several
natives, but in the meantime, and before they returned, a colonial native
came through to Umhlangeni on the night of the 13th with messages
from the Patrol to say that it was fifteen miles below the junction of the
Longwe on the 12th, which place it would reach on the 14th. On
receipt of this news two Scotch carts and one light ambulance waggon
were loaded up at once during the night with supplies and ammunition,
and at daylight next morning we started, with 100 mounted and fifty
dismounted men, to the relief of the Patrol, reaching to within three miles
of the junction — a distance of twenty-four miles — before dark the same
day. The march was without incident, the few armed natives being
encountered being promptly disarmed without any show of resistance.
Messrs. Selous and Acutt then rode on to the junction and met the
Patrol, which then came on and joined the relief column. The whole
party, including the few wounded, five in number, had had a very severe
time of it ; the men had undergone considerable hardships from their
clothes and boots being worn out with the rough wear, and from want
of food, the last few days, having had to eat some of their horses. One
more slight attack from natives of a cattle post was experienced on the
morning of the 12th. The total casualties of the Patrol throughout,
exclusive of Major Wilson's party, were one man killed and seven
wounded, including Serjeant Pike and one native driver. Twenty-eight
horses and two mules were shot, but the Patrol had left behind (aban-
doned) nearly 100 horses (some of these have since been recovered from
the natives). I have been unable to ascertain the actual amount of
ammunition expended by the Patrol, as no record was kept, but the
expenditure must have been about 8,000 rounds, and the Patrol returned
with considerably more than half the ammunition it started with. I
should mention that Mr. Rhodes and Major Sawyer, Military Secretary
P
2IO The Downfall of Lohengula.
to His Excellency the High Commissioner, who had followed us to
Umhlangeni, accompanied the relief force that went to meet the Patrol
on the Longwe River.
On the 15th December, the Patrol returned to Umhlangeni, and the
whole force left for Buluwayo the following day, with the exception of
118 men left to garrison Umhlangeni, where it had been decided to keep
a strong post during the remainder of the rainy season.
On our first arrival at Umhlangeni it was found that a large number
of natives in the neighbourhood had already tendered their submission,
but they were still in possession of their arms. Dr. Jameson immediately
ordered all arms to be brought in, and during the five days we were there
over 1,000 assegais and 100 guns, including some Martini, had been given
up. The numerous herds of the king's cattle found in possession of the
natives were left with them to be taken care of, and also the cattle actually
brought in by natives to be given up were returned to them to be taken
care of pending the settlement of the country. The same proceedings
had already been instituted at Buluwayo, Umpandine (a post temporarily
occupied by the Bechuanaland Border Police, on the edge of the Matopo
hills), Mangwe, and the Nek ; and subsequently at Shiloh, where another
post of British South Africa Company Police was afterwards established,
and also at Umhlangeni. The satisfactory result was that by the end of
December large numbers of natives, including many of the principal
indunas, had already submitted, were settling down at their kraals, and
had commenced ploughing their lands; and about 10,000 assegais and
over 1,000 guns and rifles had been given up.
On his return to Buluwayo, Dr. Jameson at once commenced
preparations for the disbandment of the Volunteer Forces and the
organisation of a civil Police Force, and on December 23rd the whole
of the Volunteer Force was disbanded. Those volunteers wishing to
leave the country were started off with necessary food and waggons (at
the expense of the British South Africa Company) to take them to
their various destinations — Salisbury, Victoria, Tuli, and Johannesburg.
From the 450 who elected to remain in the country, a civil Police
Force of 150 men, under Inspector Bodle, was formed, the remainder
being enrolled as Burghers ready to be called up in case of necessity.
Lieut. -Colonel Goold-Adams at the same time decided to keep 420
The Close of the Campaign. 211
men of the Bechuatialand Border Police in the country during the rainy
season, merely for the purpose of doing garrison work, and sixty men
distributed along the southern line of communication at Mangvve, the
Nek, and Tati ; the remainder of the Bechuanaland Border Police,
including the reinforcements under Major Grey that had been sent up
to be ready in case of our expedition meeting with any serious reverse,
being stationed at Macloutsie. It was first intended for the British
South Africa Company to take over thirty-five of the Cape Mounted
Rifles, who had formed Mr. Rhodes' escort on his journey to Buluwayo ;
but these were subsequently sent back to the Colony at their own
request, as they were anxious to be back to take part in any operations
in Pondoland, rumours of the possibility of such being undertaken
having reached them. The arrangement with Colonel Goold-Adams
was that, acting on the High Commissioner's instruction, his force of
240 men in the country were to garrison Buluwayo only, and that the
British South Africa Company Police were to do all patrols ; but as he
wished himself to undertake the Patrol in force down the Shangani
River, which Dr. Jameson was anxious to send immediately in search of
Major Wilson's party, in order that he might himself recover his Maxim
gun carriages abandoned by the Patrol during its retreat up that river,
it was arranged that he should take his whole force to Umhlangeni and
garrison that place until this patrol should be accomplished. The
British South Africa Company Police therefore garrisoned Buluwayo
and the stations at Mapondein and Shiloh.
The rains prevalent in November and December ceased towards
the end of the latter month, and an uninterrupted spell of fine weather
ensued throughout the greater portion of January. Unfortunately
Colonel Goold-Adams was delayed, partly by the time the making of
the above arrangements took, and also because of the communications
necessary between the Bechuanaland Border Police and the authorities.
Another factor in this delay was the difficulty of getting reliable
information of the movements of the King or his exact whereabouts.
When at last all arrangements were complete and Colonel Goold-Adams
was able to make a start, wet weather again set in, rendering the pro
gress of a large patrol difficult.
Dr. Jameson, in the meantime, had been making every endeavour
P 2
212
The Doivnfall of Lobcngula.
to open up communication with the King and to send him the High
Commissioner's message, with a view to getting him to submit and so
avoid the necessity of any further hostilities. For a long time none of
the old white residents at Buluwayo would hear of going on this
mission, and of the natives asked to go most refused, the few who
assented invariably returning after they had gone a short distance.
At length Messrs. Tainton, Riley, and Dawson, volunteered to go,
provided that indunas could be found willing to accompany them.
This latter condition was a serious difficulty, as all the indunas who had
submitted, having once left the King, were afraid to go back to him.
At last, however, after much negotiation, one named Malibamba
undertook to accompany Messrs. James Dawson and Patrick Riley,
and this mission started from Buluwayo for Umhlangeni on
February the 2nd. The above mission was all the more
expedient, because, from the most reliable information
hitherto obtained, the King and his following of young-
men were by now in the neighbourhood of the Zambesi,
and therefore too far off to be reached by any
military operations until the rains were over.
Dr. Jameson and myself awaited the
return of this mission at Umhlangeni. The
mission was much delayed by the heavy rains, and
did not return to Umhlangeni till the first week in
March. Messrs. Dawson and Riley brought back
with them authentic news of Lobengula's death,
concerning which we had already heard many
rumours. They had found a large number of
natives still encamped on the Shangani
River, near the furthest point reached by
the patrol under Major Forbes ; these at
first appeared distrustful, and inclined to be
hostile, assuming that they were but the
advance party of a second attacking force. However, on hearing
the object of the party, the natives all gladly promised submission,
and many forthwith started for their homes. They were found
to be in a very wretched plight ; what with fever and small-pox
MjAN THE MaTABELI GENERAL.
The Close of the Campaign. 213
and the result of a long course of meat diet, numbers had already-
died.
Messrs. Dawson and Riley, with the assistance of the natives, had
found the remainder of Major Wilson's party, and had temporarily
buried them on the spot. On their return they volunteered to go back
a second time to bring the remains into Buluwayo, and also to take
waggons with food and medicines to help bring in the principal
indunas and Lobengula's queens and children.
While this was being done, Gambo, the head Induna of the Tcapa
Division (comprising the Southern portion of the Matabeli nation),
who, next to Mjan, was the most powerful chief in the country, came
in with all his indunas to tender his submission, and at length, in the
beginning of April, all those chiefs who had hitherto been holding cut
faithful to Lobengula, including Mjan (the commander-in-chief of the
Matabeli armies), Manondwan, the commander of the Insukameni, and
many others, arrived with Messrs. Dawson and Riley at Buluwayo.
From Mjan we received confirmation of Lobengula's death, which
occurred within forty miles of the Zambesi. The Induna Bosamwan was
the only one present with him at the time, and had at once sent for
Mjan, who thereupon had hastened to the spot and had himself interred
the body.
To sum up : at the time of the disbandment of the volunteer forces,
Matabeliland was already practically pacified, with the exception of that
portion of the nation then following the King in his flight. This portion
consisted of a few of the older men who still remained faithful to him,
and a large sprinkling of the younger and more enterprising men of the
nation who still clung to him in the hopes that he would lead them
across the Zambesi, when circumstances should permit, to start a new
dominion on the other side.
The death of Lobengula may be looked upon as the closing event of
the campaign ; although the possibility that any further opposition
would have occurred on his part, had he lived, is clearly disproved by
the fact recently brought to light, and since investigated, viz., that when
Lobengula became convinced that Major Forbes' Patrol was following
him up in earnest, he at once sent messengers to negotiate terms of
peace, with a large sum of money : the surest test that a Kaffir can give
2 1 4 The Downfall of Lobengula.
of his desire to submit. This, as stated by Mjan, was accompanied by
a message, that he was prepared to come in and talk matters over with
Dr. Jameson at Buluwayo, merely asking to be assured of his own
personal safety.
It may appear to many rather an anomaly that it should have
been considered safe to disband the volunteer force immediately on
the return of Major Forbes' Patrol ; but the gallant and heroic conduct
of Major Wilson and his small party, and the fact that a handful of whites
should have fought to the last under adverse circumstances, surrounded
in thick bush, and without any machine guns to support it, should have
killed at least ten times its own number before being finally over-
whelmed— these, I contend, had as much to do with showing the Matabeli
the hopelessness of any further resistance, as had any of our previous
successes.
Dr. Jameson was correct in his estimate of the final situation, and
as a result, at a final interview with him on April the nth, Mjan and
all the head indunas were definitely informed of the conditions of their
submission, and the settlement of the Native and land questions was
determined.
All commissariat arrangements for large food supplies to follow in
rear of both the Mashonaland and Southern columns turned out most
satisfactorily. Waggons from the south came in within a fortnight of our
arrival at Buluwayo, and the first convoy from Mashonaland arrived at
the end of November. But for the heavy rains the latter would have
arrived much sooner. It is a curious fact that, once the expedition had
made the road, it was perfectly safe for small parties ; for, as the expedi-
tion advanced, the fighting portion of the Matabeli nation receded in
front of it ; and none ever seem to have thought of harassing us by
molesting those who soon followed in on our tracks in small parties.
There was some little difficulty, at first, in persuading transport riders
that the Tati road was perfectly safe, and it was not till this had been
proved by Dr. Jameson sending our own oxen and drivers down to Tati
that independent transport riders would bring their waggons on to
Buluwayo. During the month of December waggons kept on arriving
almost daily, and by January, 1894, there was eight months' reserve of
rations at Buluwayo for all those who were remaining in the country.
Photo by IV. &r D. Do'Mtuy, Ebiiry Street, S.W.\
LIEUT.-COLONEL H. GOOLD-ADAMS, C.M.G.
{Commanding the Beckuanaland Border Police and the Southern Column into Mataheliland.
CHAPTER XV.
WITH THE SOUTHERN COLUMN.
The diversion of a part of Lobengula's army — 8,000 men under Gambo sent to intercept
Colonel Goold-Adams — Mr. Dawson's mission — The indunas arrested — Mantuse and.
Inqubo, in attempting to escape, are killed- Major Sawyer's enquiry — Commandant Raaf
joins the Column— Meet Chief Khama at Shasbi River — The plans of the march —
Scarcity of water — The Matabeli in force in front — The waggons attacked — The
Matabeli rush the rearmost waggons — Mr. Selous wounded — Driven off by the Maxims
— Small-pox breaks out amongst Khama's men — He decides to return home — Sub-
mission of Makalaka chiefs — News of victories of Major Forbes' Column — At
Buluwayo.
As soon as permission had been granted to the Chartered Company to
take the field against the Matabeli, Sir Henry Loch decided to move up
to the front a support consisting of Bechuanaland Border Police, with
some volunteers from the regular troops stationed in the Cape Colony.
The advance was made on the nth October, when a junction was
effected with Commandant Raaf, commanding the Tuli Column. The
brunt of the fighting fell, of course, upon the columns commanded by
Major P. W. Forbes, but it should not be forgotten that a very important
diversion was effected by the simultaneous entry into Matabeliland of a
body of troops from the south. Of this the net result was the division
of Lobengula's force into two bodies, as it was afterwards found that no
less than 8,000 men (from twenty-three towns), under Gambo, the king's
brother-in-law, had been sent to intercept the forces under Colonel
Goold-Adams. It is true that the fighting done by the Southern
Column was not of a very serious character, consisting as it did in
repelling a half-hearted attack made by a force of six or seven hundred
Matabeli ; but that it did not subsequently meet with more determined
opposition was due to the fact that Gambo and his men had been dis-
heartened by intelligence of the reverses incurred by the other half of
Lobengula's army on the Shangani and Imbembesi Rivers, and decided
2i6 The Downfall of Lohengiila.
i-o retreat, as Colonel Goold-Adams explains in his report. The successful
action fought with Gambo enabled Colonel Goold-Adams to supply
food to the Company's forces, which, on their arrival at Buluwayo,
were reduced to three or four days' rations. Subsequently the
Bechuanaland Border Police took a prominent part in the pursuit of
Lobengula, and generally did their utmost to assist the Chartered
Company in the conduct of the campaign.
Upon reaching Tati the Southern Column was met by a mission
consisting of Mr. Dawson (a white trader at Buluwayo) and three
indunas : Ingubogubo (a half-brother of Lobengula), Mantuse and
Inqubo. Unfortunately the indunas were killed in ignorance of their
character. Nobody seems to have been to blame in particular, and in fact
the whole unfortunate affair consisted of a series of misconceptions on the
])art of the indunas and the whites concerned. On arriving at the camp
Mr. Dawson, who did not expect to find white troops there, went off with
Mr, Selous to get some refreshment, being considerably exhausted with
his long ride under the hot sun, while an employe of the Tati Company
went off with the envoys to find accommodation for them and their horses.
Just then the interpreter of the forces came to Colonel Goold-Adams
with the news that the indunas were meditating an escape. At this
Colonel Goold-Adams, who was entirely ignorant of the fact that they
were envoys from Lobengula, and merely supposed them to be natives
who had escaped with Dawson out of Buluwayo, instantly ordered their
arrest, but at the same time assured them that they had nothing to
fear. They became however thoroughly alarmed, and Mantuse, snatching
a bayonet from one of the troopers, stabbed two of his guards and was
shot while endeavouring to escape. The second induna, Inqubo, making
a like attempt, was also killed. The third, Ingubogubo, offering no
resistance, was simply secured and placed under arrest. Meantime Mr.
Dawson, after having had a meal, was making his way to the Colonel's
tent in order to report the object of his mission when he received the
first intimation of the incident.
The matter was promptly seized upon by a few newspapers hostile
to the Chartered Company, and was made the subject of a good deal of
gross misrepresentation. As a consequence Major W. H. Sawyer, the
High Commissioner's Military Secretary, was despatched to institute a
Wiik the Southern Column. 217
complete inquiry into the circumstances on the spot. Major Sawyer
completely exonerated the officers and men of the Bechuanaland Border
Police, and delivered it as his opinion that the death of the indunas
might clearly be traced to a series of extraordinary mischances, and to
the fact that the indunas themselves also refrained from giving any
intelligible indication of their character as envoys. Mr. Dawson's
omission was due to the fact that the camp was situated some distance
away from the Tati Company's settlement, and on the other side of the
river, and to the fact that being considerably fatigued with his journey, he
thought that the business might stand over until he had had some
refreshment. On the other hand, Major Sawyer's report stated that the
evidence he had collected showed that the indunas had made a violent
and determined effort to escape. The success of the expedition
depended in great measure upon the maintenance of secrecy as to its
existence and movements, and it was the obvious duty of the guards to
prevent the evasion of any natives likely to carry news to the enemy.
The following is Lieut.-Col. Goold-Adams' report, dated November
2 1st, 1893 : —
'• Under instructions from his Excellency, after leaving sufficent men
to garrison Macloutsie, I started from that place with 225 officers and
men, 210 horses, four Maxim guns, two seven-pounder guns, fourteen
waggons, and fifty native drivers. I was joined on the morning of
nth October by Commandant Raaf, of the British South Africa
Company, with 225 officers and men, 191 horses, one Maxim gun, and
eleven waggons, with their complement of drivers. Since I considered
it expedient to occupy Tati Settlement as soon as possible, I pushed
forward with 145 mounted men of the Bechuanaland Border Police, and
seventy mounted men of the British South Africa Company, the
waggons being pushed on as rapidly as possible after us. I reached the
Shashi River [3th October, and here I met the Chief Khama with 130
mounted men, and between 1,700 and 1,800 dismounted men, about
half of whom were armed with Martini-Henri rifles. He also had with
him about thirty waggons and a number of pack horses. Having
ascertained that water was very scarce at Tati, I pushed on with my
mounted men only, and left Khama and his people on the Shashi
River. Our waggon train arrived at Shashi River i8th October, and
2i8 The Downfall of Lobengula.
on the 19th I made a move from Tati, being joined by the waggons
that evening.
" The force leaving Tati numbered about 440 Europeans and about
2,000 natives, 520 horses, and about 2,000 head of oxen. The proposed
route was to the Monarch Mine, thence to the Ramokabane River, up
that river to its source, across to the upper waters of the Mitangwe River,
and along the high veld to the eastward, striking the main road about
the Fig Tree. The first move was made by sending Commandant Raaf
with 100 of his mounted men and 100 of Khama's mounted men up the
main road towards Makkobis, intended as a feint to cover the flank
movement to the Monarch Mine with the waggon train. So far no
Matabeli had actually been seen, but the spoor of their scouting parties
had often been cut by ours. A party of scouts under Mr. Selous
proceeded up the Ramokabane River to ascertain whether it was
practicable to take the column that way. He returned with the
information that it was absolutely impossible, there being great scarcity
of water, not nearly enough for our great numbers of men and animals.
I then decided to push forward on to the Mpakwe River, to try to get
round the point of the hills by moving to the head waters of the
Mpakwe or Nguisi Rivers.
" Considering it impracticable to take the whole of my waggon train,
I pushed on with only 190 mounted men of the Bechuanaland Border
Police, 200 mounted men of the British South Africa Company, twelve
waggons, three Maxim guns, and two seven-pounder guns, leaving
Khama and his men and the remainder of my force in laager at the
Ramokabane. I arrived at the Singuesi River, a tributary of the Mpakwe,
29th October, without meeting with any resistance. From Makalaka
we captured we learnt that the Matabeli had been down and gathered
in the whole of their cattle, and had taken them up to the hills ; that the
Matabeli were in force in our immediate front, divided into two large
impis, one at or near the Semokwe Poort, and the other at a town called
Khosingnana, at the north-eastern extremity of the hills. Further, we
learnt that there was no water to be depended upon even for our force,
should we succeed in getting round the hills to the northward. My only
alternative then was to send back for Khama and the men left behind
at Ramokabane to join me without delay, and to push on to the foot of
With the S 021 them Column. 219
the hills with the whole force and try to get the Matabeli to attack us,
and if not, to actually storm their position and drive them before us.
Orders were sent to this effect on 30th October. Meanwhile I laagered as
strong as possible close to water. The position was not a good one, but
was the best that could be found within reach of the water. There were
high kopjes of from 150 to 300 feet about 1,000 yards to the south and
south-east of the laager, and rising ground to the north from the bank
of the river.
"On the afternoon of ist November, the Chief Khama with his
people and waggons arrived, and drew up about 200 yards to the east
of my laager. At about 7 p.m. I received a message from Captain
Tancred, who was in command of the party I had left at the Ramoka-
bane, to the effect that his oxen were knocked up for want of water ;
that he had outspanned them about three miles from my laager,
and had sent them on to the water. It being dark, it was im-
possible to send the cattle back that evening, and orders were given
that they should start at sunrise next morning, and bring the waggons
on without delay. In accordance with this order, the oxen started
shortly after daylight, and from the report furnished by Captain
Tancred, it appeared that some of the spans arrived some time before
others, and that these were inspanned and started immediately. When
these waggons were within about a mile and a-half of the laager, they
were attacked from the rear by a force of about 600 or 700 Matabeli.
Immediately the sound of firing was heard from the laager, mounted
men were sent out to assist in getting in the waggons. Mr. Selous,
who had his horse close to him when the firing commenced, arrived
first at the waggons, and in trying to stop the rush of the Matabeli had
already been wounded when the mounted men arrived. But by this
time the rearmost of the waggons had been rushed. Corporal Mundy
and a native driver who were with it being both assegaied, the waggon
fired, its contents, principally quartermaster's stores, destroyed, and the
oxen taken away. Our mounted men covered the- movement of the
waggons to the laager, and fell back with them, the Matabeli following
them up through the bush, eventually getting to within 150 yards of the
laager, when the Maxim guns opened fire, and they at once turned.
The Matabeli then retired into the hills to the southward. I then
2 20 The Downfall of Lobengula.
ordered our mounted men out after them, and Khama's men to storm
the hills, our men going round the base of the hills to prevent the
Matabeli, as much as possible, from getting out. Firing was kept up
on the hills for about an hour, when nothing more could be seen
of the Matabeli, We afterwards ascertained that they must have
remained in hiding in the caves and rocks until nightfall, when they
made their way back to the Motopo Mountains. Over sixty dead
bodies were counted, and a great number must have gone away
wounded. Sergeant Dahm (British South Africa Company) was shot
through the head during the attack on the hills, three of Khama's men
were killed, and six or seven wounded. Mr. Selous, Sergeant-Major
Codrington, and Corporal Ransome (Bechuanaland Border Police) were
slightly wounded, and Sergeant-Major Robertson and Sergeant Dempsey
(British South Africa Company) were also wounded, but not seriously.
Two Bechuanaland Border Police horses and two British South Africa
Company horses were shot.
" On 3rd November I moved on to a good site, close to Umpandine
Kraal. On 5th November, just as I was inspanning preparatory to
moving on towards Mangwe, the Chief Khama informed me that
neither he nor his people could go on any farther, that small-pox had
broken out among his people, and that unlesr he could get back to
his own country his people would be dying in the veld. I asked him if
he did not understand that he had already agreed with his Excellency to
place 1 ,000 of his men under my immediate orders, which men were to
receive is. a day, and had been rationed by me since the date of
their leaving Palapye. He replied that he quite understood that, but
now that small-pox had broken out he must take them all back, and
that, of course, he forfeited all claim to money. I did my utmost to
persuade him to lend me a few waggons and oxen to assist me in
getting forward to a position nearer the hills, from whence I should be
within striking distance of the Matabeli. This he refused to do. I
then asked him to remain in laager where he was, until I could get
forward to a new position, for I did not want the Matabeli to see that
he was leaving me and going home. This he at first said he would do.
Within half an hour, however, he sent me a message to say that he
must go at once. I again saw him and asked him whether he was
With the Southern Column. 221
going home in consequence of any action of mine. He assured me
positively that it was only on account of the small-pox having broken
out among his people. My oxen being in very poor condition, I had
lightened my waggons by putting some of the loads on Khama's
waggons. This stuff he off-loaded and trekked away. I was thus left
with a very large quantity of stuff, with which, with the waggons and
oxen at my disposal, I could scarcely get forward.
" Within a few hours of Khama's leaving, I received a deputation
from the Makalaka Chiefs Malaba and Manyami, stating that they
Avanted protection for their people. They also informed me that the
Column from Mashonaland had had a battle near Buluwayo, that the
Matabeli had been beaten, and that King Lobengula had fled. They
also stated that the impis that had been in our immediate front, on
hearing the news from Buluwayo, had fled in the direction of the Gwai
River. On 6th November I received a message from Dr. Jameson con-
firming these reports. I immediately despatched 100 mounted men up
the main road to Buluwayo to see if the road was clear, and leaving a
party of fifty men with two Maxim guns at Umpadine, under Lieutenant
Munro, I started with the remainder of my force to Mangwe, and thence
by the main road to Buluwayo, which I reached 15th November travel-
ling by easy stages.*.'/
As the representative of Her Majesty's Government, Sir
Henry Brougham Loch, to whom reference is frequently made in
the preceding and following pages, exercised an important influence
over the campaign. His action has been sufficiently recorded in the
Blue Books, and in Sir John Willoughby's chapter bearing upon the
causes of the war. Suffice it to say, therefore, that when Sir Henry had
satisfied himself that war was unavoidable, he gave the fullest possible
discretion to the Administrator, and heartily supported the advance by
ordering up Lieut. -Colonel Goold-Adams with the Bechuanaland
Border Police and a contingent of Khama's levies. Sir H. B, Loch,
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Cape
Colony, and Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa,
commenced his varied and distinguished public career in the Royal
Navy, but relinquished that service for the Bengal Light Cavalry,
acting as A.D.C. to Lord Gough during the Sutlej Campaign. He was
222
The Doivnfall of Lobengiila.
sent by the War Office in 1854 to assist in organising the Turkish
troops, and crossed from Varna to the Crimea. In 1857 he accom-
panied Lord Elgin's special mission to China. In 1858 he accompanied
Lord Elgin's second embassy, and in the subsequent war was captured
by the Chinese and subjected to indignity and torture. He was
Sir Henry Brougham Loch, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.
Gai'ernor of the Cape Colony, and Her Afajesty's High Commissioner /o>- South Africa.
afterwards private secretary to Sir George Grey, then Home Secretary,
and in 1863 became Governor of the Isle of Man, for which he secured
a new constitution. In 1882 he was appointed Commissioner of Woods
and Forests, and in 1884 Governor of Victoria, Australia. Five years
later he succeeded Sir Hercules Robinson as Governor off the Cape,
With the Southern Cohiuni.
22
where he rendered a great pubHc service by his firmness and promptitude
on the occasion of the great Boer Trek, which was turned back by
Dr. Jameson and the British South Africa Company's Troopers at the
Limpopo. Sir Henry has recently returned from the Transvaal, where he
has successfully arranged what promised to be a very serious difficulty
between the Boers and " uitlanders " in respect to the " commandeering "
question. In a country proverbially the grave of reputations, Sir Henry
Loch has made no very material mistakes, is generally respected and
admired, and is personally very much liked.
The Bechuanaland Border Police formed a considerable portion ot
the flying patrol sent after Lobengula, and though in point of fact their
assistance was never needed, it was at all times available ; and, had the
campaign been less ably conducted, there is no doubt but that their
support would have been absolutely necessary to the Rhodesian
forces. Their commander. Lieutenant - Colonel Goold - Adams, is
a son of the late Mr. Richard Wallis Goold-Adams, of Jamesbrook,
Cloyne, Co. Cork, Ireland, and a cousin of the first Earl of Bantry.
His mother was a daughter of Sir William Wrixon Becher, of
Ballygiblin, Mallow, who married Miss O'Neil, the famous actress. He
was originally intended for the navy, and after failing for the entrance to
the "Britannia," went to the "Conway" training ship in the Mersey.
After completing his training there, he was apprenticed to a
sailing ship, and started on a voyage to Australia, but the vessel was
nearly lost in the Bay of Biscay. The crew only just managed to get
back to Falmouth, where most of them, including Mr. Goold-Adams,
concluded that the charms of a sea-going life were somewhat over-
rated. He returned home in such a miserable plight that his parents
decided to buy him out, and to let him enter the army, which his other
brothers intended making their profession. He therefore went to
Eastman's Royal Naval Academy at Southsea, and thence to Mr.
Wolfram's at Blackheath. In 1878 he passed into the Royal Military
College; ultimately joining the "Royal Scots ^' in Malta, and proceeding
to India on promotion to the other battalion, with which he returned to
this country in 1881. After remaining in Ireland for a year or two with
his regiment, he exchanged to the battalion stationed in Malta,
subsequently proceeding with it to the West Indies, and thence on to
224 ^-^^ Dow7ifall of Lobengula.
the Cape. There he joined Sir Charles Warren's Expedition into
Bechuanaland, serving with the mounted infantry troop of his regiment.
Subsequently he exchanged into the Bechuanaland Border Police, and
on the retirement of Sir Frederick Carrington succeeded to the supreme
command. Colonel Goold-Adams' services were recognised by his being
appointed C.M.G. on Her Majesty's last birthday.
Among his earlier work with the Bechuanaland Border Police
Colonel Goold-Adams personally commanded a punitive expedition
against Lehutetu, a Bushman village in the Kalahari Desert, and was in
command of the escort which accompanied Sir Sidney Shippard to the
frontier on the occasion of the " Grobelaar incident," and thence to Bulu-
wayo. Here the whole party was in very serious danger, as the Matabeli
nation was in a very excited state at the time, "dancing " before Loben-
gula for several days, and demanding permission to attack the white
strangers. It was only owing to the King's firmness that the party got
away safely, Lobengula very chivalrously ordering his people, if they really
wanted to fight, to go down to Kimberley and attack the whites there ;
not to attempt to harm a small party who were his guests. Colonel
Goold-Adams is spoken of by those who know him as a sound, well-
grounded, and accomplished officer, with plenty of tact, and he is very
popular.
Raaf's Rangers, which formed part of the Southern Column, were
placed under the command of Commandant Raaf, whose senior officer
was Captain Hermann Melville Heyman. He is son of an
artillery officer holding a command at Woolwich, and has also a brother
in the Royal Artillery. He came out to South Africa to join the Cape
Mounted Rifles, in which he became captain, resigning in order to go
up to the Johannesburg Goldfields, He has taken part in all the recent
down-country wars since and including the Basuto Campaign, and
bears the reputation of being cool in action and an energetic and
useful officer. Captain Heyman is especially good as an artillerist, and
has gone through a special course of gunnery. He also at one time held a
commission in the Cape Field Artillery. He entered Mashonaland as a
captain in the British South Africa Police, on whose disbandment he
received a magistracy in the Company's service. Subsequently he
was the hero of the Massi Kessi incident, when, with thirty troopers, he
With the Southern Cohinin. 225
utterly routed and drove away 500 Portuguese soldiers. After this he
was appointed resident magistrate at Umtali. At the beginning of the
war he was requested by Dr. Jameson to join Commandant Raaf as
senior officer under him. He was the first of the Southern Column to
reach Buluwayo, where he remained as commandant while Major
Forbes went forward with the flying Patrol, and now occupies the
important position of chief magistrate there. He is, according to his
brother officers, courageous to a fault, tactful, and reliable, and one of
the Company's best officers.
It would not be fair to record the events of the brief campaign in
Matabeliland without reference to the share — small though it was —
taken therein by Khama, paramount chief of the Bamangwatos. Khama
stands easily in front of all other South African chiefs, either as a loyal
subject of the Queen, or as an enlightened and able ruler of his numerous
people. From the time when he first voluntarily placed himself under
British protection he has been a potent influence for good in the north-
western regions of our South African empire. It was his action, by
inviting Sir Charles Warren's mission and by loyally supporting him
in everyway, which led to the establishment of our protectorate over those
vast territories, and which was an important step towards the subsequent
acquisition of Mashonaland, Matabeliland, Barotsiland, and the adjacent
countries. He is a straightforward Kaffir chieftain, and was highly
spoken of by Livingstone; is uniformly courteous and generously
hospitable to white traders or travellers, and under his wise rule the
Bamangwato nation is flourishing like the green bay tree.
He discourages polygamy, and is a rigid teetotaler, the sale of
alcoholic liquor being absolutely forbidden, either by whites or blacks,
throughout his dominions. As to the wisdom of this course — among
natives — there is no question ; it is the only thing which can save the
South African races from degradation. He even discourages the use of
Kaffir beer and tobacco, but at the same time is by no means puritanical.
Since Khama became paramount chief there has been only one or two
executions in his dominions ; he is beloved by all his subjects, and is in
every way a striking contrast to his hereditary foe, the late King
Lobengula. He has been educated — reading and writing Sechuana —
by the missionaries, who, however, neglected to teach him English. He
Q
226
The Dozunfall of Lobengula.
is an excellent shot and a keen sportsman ; and though sixty years of age
is active and for all purposes a vigorous young man still. He is an
extraordinary character — exceedingly able and conscientious. When
the Bechuanaland Border Police were ordered to the front, Sir Henry
Loch requested that Khama should march against Lobengula
with 1,000 men. The old king promptly took the field, but the
Bamangwatos are not of good fighting stuff, besides which the crops
wanted reaping, and small-pox broke out among his men. Khama's force
soon turned back — a proceeding which naturally gave a great deal of
annoyance, but which was readily understood and condoned by those
who knew the Bamangwatos.
The Waggons arriving at Buluwayo.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE PATTERSON EMBASSY TO 'lOBENGULA.
By H. Rider Haggard.
{Being a Note on the circumstances attending the Deaths of Captain R. Robert
Patterson, Mr. J. Sargeaunt, and Mr. Thomas in Matabelilaud in
September, 1878.)
I HAVE been asked by the Editors of this book to place on record briefly
such facts as are within my knowledge concerning the unhappy deaths
of my late friends, Captain Robert Patterson and Mr. John Sargeaunt,
who together with a certain Mr. Thomas, the young son of a missionary
in the Amandabeli country, came to their ends while on a journey from
the kraal of Lobengula, then King of the Matabeli, to the Falls of the
Zambesi. The task is not altogether an easy one, seeing that the
evidence obtainable is necessarily of a hearsay character ; that many
years have gone by since the tragedy occurred, and that it was imprac-
ticable to investigate its circumstances upon the spot. Still, a residuum
remains which may fairly be accepted as fact, and that is perhaps worthy
of preservation.
Captain Patterson, when I became acquainted with him, was a man in
early middle life, florid in appearance, and rather stout in person, of an
open manner and a genial disposition. Being, I believe, the possessor of
considerable means, in an ill-omened moment a desire entered into him to
visit what were then the less explored districts of South Africa. The evi!
opportunity was not lacking. At that time, namely in 1878, the late Sir
William, then Mr. Sargeaunt, was commissioned by the Colonial Office to
proceed to Africa and report upon the financial condition of the Transvaal,
which had recently been annexed to the British Empire. Being on terms
of intimacy with Sir William, Captain Patterson arranged to join his expe-
dition in an unofficial capacity. With them went also Sir William's
Q 2
2 28 The Downfall of Lobengula.
young son, Mr. John Sargeaunt, a gentleman of about twenty years of
age, and my friend, Mr. Arthur Henry Douglas Cochrane, who is to-day
the sole survivor of that party.
On arriving in the Transvaal, Captain Patterson and Mr. John
Sargeaunt took journeys to the neighbourhood of Secoeconi's country
and elsewhere for the purpose of shooting game. Captain Patterson's
appetite for travel in the veldt being whetted by these pleasant and
successful excursions, he determined, before returning to England, to
journey further afield and to visit the famous Falls of the Zambesi.
About this time Sir William Sargeaunt went home, the object of his
mission being accomplished; but unfortunately enough he assented to
the wish of his son, Mr. John Sargeaunt, and allowed him to become a
member of Captain Patterson's expedition northwards. As it chanced
at this juncture, Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner for the Cape,
was anxious to send a friendly mission to Lobengula, the King of the
Matabeli. This chief had been making himself obnoxious by allowing
white traders in his country to be molested, and as Captain Patterson
proposed to visit the district, it occurred to the authorities that here
was a cheap and favourable opportunity of opening negotiations with
him. Accordingly Captain Patterson was asked to combine business
with pleasure and undertake the affair, which he readily agreed to do.
Sir Bartle Frere's choice was in one way ill-considered, as its terrible
issue proved, seeing that his envoy had little experience of natives of
Zulu blood and none of dealing with them diplomatically.
The party at its start consisted of Captain Patterson, Mr. J. Sar-
geaunt, Mr. Gray Palmer, the interpreter, a hunter and guide of experi-
ence, two of my own and Mr. Cochrane's servants, named Khiva, a Zulu
boy who spoke English perfectly, and Vent-vogel or Wind Bird, a clever
Hottentot driver, together with a it\y! other natives. That Mr.
Cochrane and I did not accompany it was owing only to our being unable
to obtain leave from the Government of the Transvaal, which we both of
us served in different capacities.
I remember well that after the waggon had started, together with
Mr. Cochrane I rode out from Pretoria to the place of the first outspan,
where we bade our friends good-bye — for ever.
The mission reached Lobengula's kraal in safety. At first — so we
The Patterson Embassy to Lobengula. 229
gathered from information and letters received — the King did not greet
them well, for when Mr. Sargeaunt went forward to see him, he asked
rudely how it came about that the Government at the Cape sent a
beardless boy to talk to him ? Captain Patterson, however, opened his
business, and finding that Lobengula's attitude remained unfriendly, it
would seem that at a certain point in the negotiations he made a great
mistake which was to cost him and his companions their lives, though
whether he did this by accident, or by design in his ignorance of the
character and habits of native tyrants, will never now be known.
In those days a pretender to the throne of Matabeliland named
Kruman, or Korooman, by many believed to be its rightful heir, was
living in Natal, whither he had fled to escape the assegai. I have a
recollection of hearing the late Sir Theophilus Shepstone tell Captain
Patterson the story of this Kruman, who I think was at one time in his
employ as a gardener, but of whose rights to the chieftainship of the
nation a section of the Matabeli people were advocates. Of the existence
of this rival Captain Patterson is believed to have been so unfortunate
as to remind the King, either by way of a hint which that potentate was
not slov/ to take, or perhaps incidentally in the course of general
conversation. At any rate the effect seems to have been startling, for
from that moment Lobengula, to whom the name of Kruman was as a
writing on the wall, became profusely civil to the envoys, and from that
moment, as I believe, he doomed them to a sudden and cruel death.
The political object of their journey being to all appearance
accomplished satisfactorily. Captain Patterson told the King that before
returning to the Transvaal he was anxious to visit the Zambesi Falls.
Lobengula readily gave the required permission ; but when he was asked
to allow young Mr. Thomas, the son of a missionary of that name, to
accompany him, he at first refused, nor would he alter his decision
until considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon him. The
reason of this attitude was doubtless that he entertained kindly feelings
towards the lad, and did not wish to include him in a slaughter which
was already planned.
At length, all having been arranged. Captain Patterson, Messrs.
Sargeaunt and Thomas, Khiva, Vent-vogel, and twenty bearers
furnished by Lobengula, started on foot to make the twelve days'
230 The Doivnfall of Lobengitla.
journe}' to the Falls. The waggon, with the interpreter, Mr. Gray
Palmer, and the other native servants, remained at the King's kraal to
await their return. The next thing we at Pretoria heard of the progress
of the party was from the lips of messengers sent by Lobengula, who
announced that the bearers had returned to the King's kraal, but that
the three white men and their two servants had died of drinking
poisoned water. The manner of their deaths was given in great detail,
Mr. Sargeaunt, I remember, being represented as having lived the
longest because he was '• very strong."
In the first shock and confusion of such news it was not very
closely scrutinised — at any rate, by the friends of the dead men ; but
on reflection there were several things about it that struck us as strange.
For instance, we knew well that however thirsty he might be, Captain
Patterson was in the habit when travelling of never drinking water
until it had been boiled to destroy impurities. It seemed odd that on
this one occasion he should have neglected an invariable precaution.
Also it was curious that while Lobengula's bearers appeared to have
escaped, the white men and their two servants had perished without
exception. Lastly, even in that district it is not usual to find water so
virulent that it will kill as rapidly as it was reported to have done in this
instance, unless indeed it had been poisoned designedly. Such were the
doubts which assailed us — doubts that on the return of the waggon in
the charge of the interpreter, who brought with him most of the effects
of the deceased men, resolved themselves into something like certainty.
Then, by putting two and two together, we were able to piece out the
real history of the diabolical plot whereof I believe that our poor
friends were the victims. It was a terrible story, and one which shows
to what depths of wickedness and treachery the savage will sink who
thinks that his place and interests are threatened.
Among the articles taken from the bodies and brought to Pretoria
by Mr. Gray Palmer, was a rough diary consisting of some sheets of
paper fastened together with string. This diary belonged to Captain
Patterson, who was an extremely methodical man and had the habit of
making notes of all that he did. In it we found entries of his prepara-
tions for a trip to the Falls, and among them the number and names of
the bearers provided by Lobengula, with, if my memory serves me, a
The Patterson Embassy to Lobengula. 231
list of the goods entrusted to each man. There also we found a brief
chronicle of the first three days' journey and that of the morning of the
fourth day. Then the record stopped abruptly. It seems probable that
the last entry was made a few minutes before Captain Patterson was
killed. One striking omission is to be noted in this diary. It makes
no mention of the fact of the party having passed several days without
water, as was stated by the messengers to be the case, and of the ultimate
discovery of the poisoned spring. Also, although the story of the
messengers was to the effect that some of the party lingered a long
while, no single line appeared to indicate that this was so. Had their
tale been true, would not Captain Patterson or one of his companions
have made shift to scrawl some few words of explanation and farewell ?
These coincidences and omissions taken by themselves, however,
would not have amounted to anything worthy of the name of evidence.
But now comes the curious part of the story, which exemplifies in a
striking manner the truth of the old saw — " Murder will out." On the
arrival of the waggon at Pretoria we learned from the interpreter, Mr
Gray Palmer, and the native servants that on their return journey, while
they were outspanned one day beyond the borders of Lobengula's country,
some Kafiirs — Bechuanas I think — arrived and fell into conversation with
the driver, remarking that he had come up country with a full waggon
and that now he went down with an empty one. The driver replied
with lamentations over the death of his masters from drinking poisoned
water, whereupon the head man of the Bechuanas, who was wearing
a shooting coat made of a yellowish cloth of the nature of " kharkee,"
which was recognised as having belonged to Captain Patterson, told
him the following story : He said that a while back a brother of
his was out hunting in the desert for ostriches in the company of
other natives, when hearing shots fired some way off they followed
the sound, thinking that white men were shooting game and that
they would be able to beg meat. On reaching a spot by a pool of
water they were horrified to see the bodies of three white men lying
on the ground, and with them those of a Hottentot and a Kaffir,
surrounded by a number of armed Matabeli. They asked the Matabeli
what they had been doing — killing the white men ? and were told to
" be still," for the deed was done by " order of the King," who killed
232 The Downfall of Lobengula.
whom he chose. Then they learned the story of this treacherous
massacre.
It appeared that the white men had made a midday halt by the
pool, where Captain Patterson sat down under a tree, at a little distance,
and entered in his diary the last words that he was destined to write on
earth. Presently one of the bearers, following a pre-arranged plan, went
to the edge of the pool and called suddenly to the white men to come
and see, for there was " a great snake in the water " Captain Patterson,
who was devoted to natural history, at once ran up, and as he leaned
over the edge of the pool, his neck was broken by a blow from his own
axe. The others were then shot and assegaied, Mr. Sargeaunt making
a desperate resistance and being the last to fall Vent-vogel, the
Hottentot, almost effected his escape, for with the cunning of his race
he sprang from side to side as he ran, disconcerting the aim of the
murderers. At last, however, when he had covered about a hundred
and fifty yards of ground, a bullet " winged with fate " broke his back
and he died. The Bechuana further described the clothes that his
brother had seen upon the bodies, and also some articles belonging to
the white men that had been given to members of his party by the
Matabeli soldiers. His description was so accurate that, when considered
in conjunction with the fact that he was wearing Captain Patterson's coat,
which he had obtained from his brother, it left little doubt as to the
truth of his story.
In confirmation of this version of the facts, I may mention
two things : first that Mr. F. C. Selous, who has travelled a great deal
in Matabeliland, informed me recently, that as a result of inquiries
carried out on the spot he had no doubt but that Patterson and his party
were murdered. Secondly, when the articles belonging to the ill-fated
expedition were sold by public auction at Pretoria, I purchased Mr.
Sargeaunt's double-barrelled breach-loading gun. On examination it
was found to show traces of violence and struggle, the breach being
choked with mud and the locks strained. Moreover, Sir Theophilus
Shepstone, who knew natives and their temper better perhaps than any
white man who has ever lived, told me that he was convinced that the
party came to their end by foul means. In this connection also it may
be well to quote a foot-note to a paper by the late Captain Patterson,
The Patterson Embassy to Lobengida. 233
which was communicated by the Colonial Office and read before the
Royal Geographical Society, on Feb. lOth, 1879. It runs thus : —
According to a letter since received from Sir Bartle Frere, statements have
been subsequently made to Sir Theophilus Shepstone which throw doubt upon
Lobengula's story, and afford but too much reason for suspecting that the
unfortunate explorers were the victims of a foul conspiracy.
No public notice was taken of the matter, for the obvious reason
that without enormous expense and the undertaking of war upon a large
scale, it was impossible to get at Lobengula to punish him. Nor indeed
would it have been easy to come by legal evidence to disprove that
chief's ingenious story of the death of the party through the accidental
drinking of poisoned water, since anybody trying to reach the spot of
the massacre, and there to investigate the facts, would very probably have
fallen a victim to some similar unlucky chance before he returned with
his proofs.
Such is the brief account of the fate of Sir Bartle Frere's ill-starred
embassy to Lobengula in the year 1878. If, as I believe to be the case,
it is indeed true that the King did plan and execute this most wicked
murder, his subsequent history and end may give food for reflection to
those who hold that such crimes meet with a just reward at the hand of
Providence. Perhaps as he lay dying, a hunted fugitive in the
neighbourhood of the Shangani River, Lobengula may have remembered
the innocent white men whom he butchered nearly twenty years before.
Perhaps, on the other hand, in the river of blood which he had shed, to
his hardened sense theirs would have seemed of small account. However
these things may be, it has seemed to the writer of this note that the story
of the tragic and mysterious end of his friends, as far as it can be pieced
together after the lapse of so long a time, may prove an incident of
interest, worthy of record in the annals of the early history of Mata-
beliland ; one, moreover, which will be remembered in after genera-
tions, when that country is the prosperous home of tens of thousands of
white men.
CHAPTER XVII.
IN MEMORIAM.
The effect of the war— Its causes— The vassals of the Matabeli— The cost of the campaign—
A story of heroes — The last stand— A hallowed circle— The national regret— The
memorials at Buluwayo and Zimbabye — The conduct of the expedition — Major Allan
Wilson— Commandant P. J. Raaf, C.M.G.— Captain H. J. Borrow— Captain A. L.
Campbell— Captain F. Fitzgerald— Captain Greenfield— Captain Judd— Captain A. B.
Kirton— Captain C. F. Lendy, R. A.— Captain O. G. Williams, and the others.
Almost every page of South African history is stained with the
blood shed in a long series of wars undertaken to establish the supremacy
of the white races, and — it sounds paradoxical, but is none the less
true — to secure that " pax Britannica " which is our proud tradition-
It is therefore no small thing to say that it seems quite possible that
the war lately concluded has finally removed the need for another.
The Matabeli nation constituted the last unbroken military power which
menaced the general peace of South Africa ; and, as we had already
found before in that country, so it proved to be now : a trial of strength
was inevitable. Apart altogether from Matabeliland, the moral effect of
the object lesson among the other native races has been striking :
witness the case of Pondoland — till lately the scene of the most horrible
forms of savage cruelty — which has been reclaimed to civilisation without
firing a single shot.
The whole story of the country, which, as " Rhodesia," is named after
the man who brilliantly conceived and ably carried out the scheme of
its acquisition in British interests, savours strongly of old-time romance.
It carries us back to the far-off days when Elizabethan adventurers
roamed the globe in search of new worlds ; a race of merchant-soldiers
of whom Mr. Rhodes seems to be a latter-day survival. So in this last
of our " little wars." Even the most cynical cannot honestly deny that
it has achieved much in the general interests of mankind, and that it
Photo hy Harry Walter, Strand.'\
MAJOR ALLAN WILSOxM.
{Coiiimaiiding the Victoria Coin inn.)
lioRN 1S5S. Killed at Shangani, Decemijer 4111, 1893.
In Mevioriam. 235
has brought in another fair inheritance which South Africa will
bequeath to her children ; another area of expansion for those over-
crowded populations which struggle for survival in these our islands.
From every point of view the war was inevitable, necessary, and
advisable, and its causes and conduct were alike creditable to the
colonists upon whom it was forced. It originated in the manful
determination to deliver at all costs the Mashonas, over whom the
white man's protecting arm had been extended, from the assegai of the
Matabeli majagha ; and it was absolutely necessary for the well-being
of the settlers, for the protection of their hard-won interests, for their
very safety.
If the campaign recently closed illustrates one thing more than
another, it is the self-reliant spirit of the Englishmen dwelling on the
fringe of barbarism in South Central Africa. With plans hastily, though
well-matured — the .season of the summer rains was drawing dangerously
near — with all arrangements for commissariat and equipment made in a
few anxious weeks, they fearlessly ignored the prophets of disaster,
marched out to grapple with a foe whose strength they knew not, in a
comparatively unknown land, and succeeded in dispelling the thunder-
cloud which had long darkened the South African sky. It is not necessary
to attempt to forecast here the ultimate and important results of the final
settlement of the Zambesi regions. Suffice it to say that the chief and
most immediate effect has been the liberation of the subject races of
Mashonaland and Matabeliland from the terrible thrall under which they
had groaned in helpless and hopeless misery for the last half-century.
Every hunter, trader, or traveller who had visited those countries agreed
that the cruelty and ferocity of the Matabeli towards their vassal tribes
knew no limits. Old men and boys, mothers and the babes at their
breasts, were alike sacrificed to crimson the virgin assegai, or driven off
into a slavery more ruthless than death itself; and the most competent
authorities have estimated the Matabeli " butcher's bill " at some two
thousand men, women, and children slaughtered yearly. The "raids"
were no mere looting forays ; they were organised plans of wholesale and
periodical carnage, which, however, were looked upon by the Matabeli
very much as an Englishman might view the annual training of a
militia battalion, or his yearly " shoot " on the moors. No ; whether
■3
6 T/ie Downfall of Lobengitla.
we consider the causes of the war, its conduct, or its most probable
effects, the South African people have every claim to be congratulated ;
and it is difficult to understand how any right-minded man can deny
that it is one of the most creditable enterprise's to which they have
set their hands ; or can fail to feel proud of the way in which the
frontier forces, from the commanding officer to the last trooper, have
carried out this bold and honourable enterprise.
But, the cost. We shrink from considering the price at which
peace and security have been purchased, when lives of gallant men form
the currency. Nevertheless, the bond had to be redeemed. Let it be
some assuagement of the grief of the friends and countrymen of those
who fell in Matabeliland, in the cause of humanity and for their country's
credit, to know that the sacrifice was not in vain. The story of the last
heroic episode of the war is one which has reached us in fragments,
and we have chiefly to thank Mr. Selous and a few others for scanty
records — sifted from Matabeli sources — of that last desperate struggle
on the Shangani River. Those records, however, very materially supple-
ment the plain and accurate statements set forth by Majors Forbes and
Sir John Willoughby. They enable us to say with confidence that few
of the splendid military legends which have ennobled the pages of British
history since the days of Boadicea are more creditable to the nation,
more worthy of its high traditions, than that which tells how a handful
of civilians met a soldier's death on our African frontier. And of those
immortal tales, few perhaps prove more completely that the devotion to
duty and a cause, displayed when the Saxons died round Harold at
Hastings, or when the Scots fell round James on Flodden Field, is still,
in times of difficulty and danger, conspicuous in their descendants*
We learn once more that the latter-day civilisation has not fined down
all the noblest instincts of the race to the vanishing point, and that
courage and fidelity may still be counted among its surviving virtues.
Picking up the threads of the grim story, we are told by Majors
Forbes and Sir John Willoughby that, after crossing the river and
following the king's spoor, Major Wilson and his men reached a
series of scherms, or temporary encampments protected by felled bush
or trees. These scherms were filled with Matabeli, who, however,
offered no resistance, probably because they did not know the strength
In Memoriam. 237
of the whites, or believed them to be but the advance guard of a
larger body. So the Patrol rode on till they reached the royal scherm,
within which the king's waggons were dimly visible in the gathering
gloom. Here a halt was called, and Lobengula summoned to
surrender. The reply was an ominous rattle of arms within the
reed fence, while parties of Matabeli, rifle in hand, came hurrying up
from the rear. With so small a force nothing could be done, and
the Patrol withdrew into the bush, Captain Napier and Troopers
Robertson and Mayne being sent for reinforcements. These in due
time appeared in the form of Captain Borrow with eighteen mounted
men. A miserable night was passed under arms in the drenching rain,
and when day at length dawned. Major Wilson decided to make one
more dash for the king, with the tragic result which will not soon be
forgotten in South Africa. From the start the Patrol was outnumbered,
and almost as soon as the attack began, Ingram, Burnham, and
Gooding had to be sent to cross the river, if that were possible,
to ask for further support. That support, however, never arrived,
and Burnham's first breathless remark to Major Forbes, after reaching
the main body, was, " I think I may say we are the sole survivors
of that party." The Shangani had risen in flood, added to which
Major Forbes was himself attacked in force on the way down to
the river. Either of these circumstances was enough to prevent the
arrival of succour in time to save the doomed men, to whom the
last chance of escape was lost. To the end, however, there was no
thought of surrender, no request for quarter. They resolved to show
the Matabeli that the white man could play a losing as well as a winning
•game. Taking cover behind the dead bodies of their horses, with
an iron calmness they fought on for two long hours, pouring a
destructive fire into their encircling foes, and coolly singling out the
Indunas for their aim. One by one, however, they sank under the
heavy fire from the bush, but many of the wounded continued, so the
natives say, to re-load and pass their rifles to their uninjured
comrades. Again and again the Matabeli would issue from their cover
to attempt a conclusive charge, but again and again were repulsed
with a well-directed fire ; upon which Wilson and his men would wake
the echoes with an undismayed, defiant cheer. But at last the end came.
2 7,S The Downfall of Lobengula.
Of the thirty-four vaUant men whose hearts beat high with hope and
courage as they rode behind their leader in the early dawn that morning,
only one remained erect ; the rest lay prone, dead or dying, upon that
" field of honour." The name of the one man who stood at bay against
an army of Matabeli will never be known ; his remains could not be
identified. But the natives tell that, picking up several rifles and
bandoliers, this hero amongst heroes made his way to an ant-heap some
twenty yards from where the rest lay stretched upon the earth. From
that point of vantage he checked, single-handed, several rushes of the
Matabeli with a cool and deadly fire. At length, shot through the hips,
he sank on his knees, but continued to load and fire until he succumbed
to his wounds. Then, and not till then, the Matabeli came out
from the bush, but on reaching the hallowed circle where the Patrol
lay side by side, were fired upon by several of the unconquerable
wounded who were still alive. So great had been the terror and
demoralisation inspired by the desperate bravery of the Patrol, that
when the revolvers rang out the natives turned and fled precipitately
into the bush; and it was not till several hours later — "when the
sun was right overhead," as the Matabeli tell the tale — that they again
ventured to leave their cover. But by this time death had mercifully
come to the wounded, and as the native warriors gazed upon the forms
of their fallen foes there was silence.
For some weeks afterwards the comrades of these brave men had
hoped against hope that even one of the Patrol might have escaped down
the Shangani River, although, as Ingram, the American scout, had
explained, "Two of the men were dismounted, and many of the
horses were completely done up. Some of those with the best
mounts might have got away, but, well, they were not the sort
of men to leave their chums." He added, " No ; I guess they
fought it out right there — where they stood." Thus it was ; for when
Dawson crossed the river some weeks afterwards, the bones of thirty-
three of Wilson's heroic band were found laying close together, even
as they had stood at the last supreme moment. Those of the dauntless
man who had faced the Matabeli alone lay apart.
Thus they died. Youths fresh from our schools and universities,
older men who looked back upon a useful span of life spent upon the
In Meuioriani. 239
frontiers of our great African empire, they were alike stout-hearted
and loyal Britons, who had deliberately chosen death rather than desert
their comrades in that last dark hour. We live in an age when sentiment
is out of fashion and cynicism the vogue. The Little-Englanders may
say that the men who fell on the Shangani were adventurers who
entered Matabeliland to kill or be killed. But let us hope that
even the thin stream which flows through the veins of such may
course a little faster when they remember that " some of them might
have got away, but they weren't the sort of men to leave their
chums." Those who knew Wilson and Borrow and their comrades
knew them to be courageous and high-minded men who would have
reflected credit upon any community; who were representative of the
best types of Englishmen. Their glorious end forms the most stirring
incident in the history of South Africa, where their m.emory will always
be cherished in proud regret. No fitter memorial could have been
suggested than the hospital which is to be reared at Buluwayo by their
friends and countrymen ; no fitter place of sepulture than Zimbabye,
where the monuments of a pre-historic cultivation look down upon a land
consecrated by the blood of the advance guard of modern civilisation ;
where a simple obelisk of granite, the tribute of another Englishman,
will rise to mark the resting-place of the lion-hearted dead.
Major Allan Wilson is one of the heroic figures of the
campaign ; a type of the hardy race of British colonists whom no
dangers can daunt, whose bold spirit no hardships can tame.
His repeated attack on Lobengula's encampment, held by such a
large force of Matabeli, has occasionally been adversely criticised ;
but it must always be borne in mind that if the brave men who
fought and conquered Lobengula had stayed to weigh risks too
minutely they would never have entered xMatabeliland at all, and that
chief would still be cutting throats throughout Mashonaland to-day.
And even granting that the deed was daring for a commercial age, the
nation which remembers the exploits of its Elizabethan forefathers, of
Robert Clive and Warren Hastings, and the Charge at Balaclava, will
not think coldly of Allan Wilson and the gallant men who fell with
him on the Shangani River. Major Wilson was a Scotchman, the son
of Mr. Robert Wilson, a railway and road contractor, and was born
240 The Downfall of Lobengula.
in Ross-shire in the year 1856. He was educated at the Grammar
School at Kirkwall, Orkney, and Milne's Institution, Fochabers,
Morayshire. An old school-fellow of Major Wilson's, writing to
the " Westminster Budget," gives us an interesting glimpse of his
earlier life.
" Poor Allan Wilson ! " will be the audible or inaudible exclamation of
everyone who, having known him, now knows that he can see him no more.
The world can ill want such a type, for a type he was. I can speak of him from
the days of his rough boyhood. And yet he was not rough, for he was, with all
his superior strength of frame, gentle and kindly. Wilson was a good-hearted
fellow, no more clever at books than Clive, equally larksome, popular with every-
one, and ready to lead anyone to do or to dare. A poor cricketer himself, he
was captain of the school eleven, and a nod or a gesture from Wilson behind the
wicket arranged the manoeuvres of every over. No one would have dreamed of
doubting his judgment or decision in any situation. There was the spirit of
decision and dictation behind that physical prowess which we all used so much
to admire. He had an unconscious pride in his herculean build, and in all feats
of manly strength and vigour he not only excelled, but inspired others to take part
in. He came of a "large" family (his father being a contractor for the building of
railways, bridges, and roads), and the whole family seem to have inherited a spirit
of enterprise and adventure. It was not unnatural that three years' experience
of life as a bank clerk turned all the tastes of Allan Wilson away from sedentary
life. All the while in his northern home at Fochabers, under the shadow of
Gordon Castle, he was organising " Highland Gatherings," so called, to which the
tossing of the caber, the putting of the stone, the tug of war, the playing of the
bagpipes, and the dancing of the sword-dance, attracted hundreds. These Spey
side gatherings were a great impetus to local athletics.
But the fire of venture was in his veins; he could be no home-keeping youth.
He joined the ranks of the Cape Mounted Police, and it did not take his
superiors long to find out that Trooper Wilson was a man to lead and command,
and not always to follow and obey. The events of the last few months have done
no more than to show forth more widely his superior qualities as a man and a
soldier. The word " fear " was not in his vocabulary. He was intrepid, cool,
resolute, decisive, and determined; honest as truth itself, and freely frank as the
pure light of the sun. The opportunities for martial heroism now are infrequent,
but we may yet expect to hear some true tribute to Major Wilson as one of the
staunchest guiding spirits of the recent campaign.
After leaving the Cape Mounted Rifles, Allan Wilson received a
Ill Moiioriani.
241
lieutenant's commission in the Basuto Police. This he afterwards
relinquished for the service of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company.
Before the war he was senior officer in the Victoria Volunteer Force
(Mounted Infantry). When the war broke out he at once volunteered,
and was appointed Major in command of the Victoria Column, ren-
dering signal service until killed at the Shangani. He was wonderfully
popular among all classes, and it is said of him that he had not
an enemy or an ill-wisher in the world. Speaking of him as the
commanding officer of the Victoria Rangers, Major Forbes says, "No
better man could possibly have been found." He was famous for the
power that he possessed over his officers and men. Nine of the former
fell during the campaign— six by his side on the Shangani.
The late Commandant Pieter
Johannes Raaf, C.M.G., was a well-
known figure throughout South Africa*
in \\hose wars he had served with bravery
and distinction — notably in the Zulu War
in 1879, in which he organised and com-
manded Raaf's Rangers, being created
C.M.G. for his services. He was also
offered, in recognition of his work, a
junior commission in one of the Native
East Indian Regiments. This, however
he declined. At the close of the Zulu war
Commandant Raaf returned to Pretoria,
where he was in the British service.
Sir Owen Lanyon being Administrator.
When the war with the Boers began,
Raaf went down to Potchefstroom, where
he organised a second "Raaf's Rangers" among the loyal residents
of the place, and ably assisted Sir Marshall Clarke in the work of
defence. He was for some time subsequently engaged in pro.specting
for gold in the Transvaal, but ultimately went up to Mashonaland,
and was appointed Resident Magistrate at Fort Tuli. On the
outbreak of the Matabeli war he was commissioned to raise a corps
of 250 mounted men in the Transvaal. Thus for the third time
COMMAN'DA.NT P. J- RaAK, C.M.G.
242 The Do'W7iJall of Lobengula.
Raaf's Rangers came into existence, recruited mostly from the mining
population of Johannesburg. During the war Raaf's Rangers were
placed under the supreme command of Lieutenant- Colonel Goold-
Adams, and formed part of the Southern Column. After the occupation
of Buluwayo Commandant Raaf went forward with ninety men of the
Bechuanaland Border Police in the patrol sent to attempt the capture
of Lobengula, and survived all the perils and hardships of the campaign,
including the retreat from the Shangani, only to fall a victim to inflam-
mation of the bowels at Buluwa}'o after its close, on January 26th,
1894. H^s ^^'^s o^s of the best known among the frontier soldiers so
numerous throughout South /\frica, and his death was greatly deplored
by a large number of old comrades and friends, and especially by the
burgher population, among whom Commandant Raaf had great
influence. There are innumerable stories told of Commandant Raaf
which are " ben trovato," even if not true. The Boers themselves
recount that before Majuba, Raaf used to say, " Never mind the Boers ;
if you drum upon an old kettle they will run." He was wrong, however.
One of the most prominent men in Mashonaland, and one of the most
popular in that new community, was Captain Henry John Borrow,
the second in rank of the ill-fated Wilson Patrol. One of the very
earliest pioneers in British Zambesia, he had taken a leading share in
the arduous work of developing the mineral resources of the country,
where his loss has been severely felt.
Captain Borrow was the eldest son of the Rev. H. J. Borrow, for-
merly rector of Lanivet, Cornwall, and now residing at the Old Palace,
Bekesbourne, Canterbury, and was the grand-nephew of George Borrow,
the author. He was born on March 17th, 1865, and educated (with
Captain Greenfield, of the Victoria Rangers, who met his death at the
same time) at Tavistock Grammar School, and at Sherborne.
Accompanied by his father, he went out to the Cape Colony in
1882, and passed three years in ostrich farming with Mr. Hilton Barber
near Cradock. The life was not much to his liking, and about Christ-
mas, 1884, he joined the Second Mounted Rifles (Carrington's Horse),
under command of Colonel Sir Frederick Carrington, and with his
■corps accompanied the Warren rLxpeditiori. After the disbandment of
the expedition he joined the Bechuanaland Border Police, also under Sir
Photo by Lo>:rfoH Stereosco/'ic Company, Kegnit Street.]
CAPTAIN HENRY JOHN BORROW.
(Coiiiinandiiii^ B Troop, Salisbury Horse.)
UoRN 17111 March, 1S65. Killed at Shangani, Decemuer 4rH, 1S93.
In Memoriani. 243
Frederick Carrington, and received promotion while serving with that
force. In March, 1887, he left the Bechuanaland Border Police, and
joined his friends, Frank Johnson and Maurice Heany, in an expedition
to Matabeliland ; this expedition ultimately resulted in the forma-
tion of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, Limited, of which
Captain Borrow became Assistant- Superintendent. It was in this
capacity he first became acquainted with the late Major Allan Wilson,
who had been sent up country as an employe of his Company. Also
while with the Bechuanaland Company, Captain Borrow escorted to
Buluwayo the Queen's messengers. Captain Fergusson, Surgeon-Major
Melladew, and Major Gascoigne, who were the bearers of Her Majesty's
first letter to Lobengula.
When Mr. Rhodes decided upon the effective occupation of
Mashonaland, Captain Borrow was a party to the contract, together
with his old Bechuanaland companions, Major Johnson and Captain
Heany. They at once proceeded to raise and equip the now famous
Mashonaland Pioneers, in which corps d'elite Captain Borrow held the
rank of lieutenant and adjutant. When the Pioneers were disbanded,
the three friends formed themselves into the firm of Johnson, Heany, and
Borrow. They did wonders in the way of opening up the gold districts
and the country generally, and in arranging communication with the
East Coast, and ultimately became merged into Frank Johnson and Co.
Limited, of which company Captain Borrow became one of the
Local Managing Directors at Salisbury. After several years of the
severest labour and almost uninterrupted hardships, during which, by
his kindness and generosity, he endeared himself to the whole
community, he returned to England in February, 1893, and floated an
offshoot of his company, viz., the Mashonaland Central Gold Mining
Company, of which also he became a Director.
At length the war broke out, and Captain Borrow threw
himself heart and soul into the task of organising the forces, in which
work the influence of his firm as large employers of labour was very
strong. He had commanded a troop of the Local Volunteer Force fthe
Mashonaland Horse), and when the Salisbury Horse was enrolled he
was appointed Captain in command of " B " Troop. Throughout the
campaign he took prominent part in all the engagements and was
R 2
2^4 T^^^ Dozvnfa/i of Lobcugula.
always to the fore in times of danger and emergency. At the battle of
the Imbembesi, his troop being on the inner face of the laager and not
very actively engaged, Captain Borrow was among the first to observe
the threatened loss of all the horses of the command, and with Sir John
Willoughby took the initiative in preventing their capture by the enemy.
Rushing to the centre of the laager he sprang upon one of the few
horses which happened to be within the lines, and galloped off to the
rescue of the others, thus exposing himself to a heavy fire from the
enemy at close quarters, and only accomplished his object at very
imminent risk.
The day preceding the fight at Shangani, he was out with his
Troop collecting cattle and burning kraals, and only returned to the
laager, with many hundreds of head of cattle, long after dark. The day
after the loss of Captain Gwynyth Williams, no information relative to
him having been received, Captain Borrow with fifteen men scouted the
country for many miles in rear of the Column searching for the spoor of
the missing officer's horse, and only returned to the laager late at night.
This was a service of great risk, and was very ably performed. He was,
moreover, the first man of the united Columns to enter Buluwayo,
having been sent forward with twenty men to take possession the day
before the main body arrived.
During the campaign he acted as special correspondent of the
Times, and sent home several interesting accounts, notably Mr. James
Fairbairn's diary of events in Buluwayo prior to its occupation. He was
a splendid horseman and a keen sportsman, being passionately fond of
shooting, hunting, and racing. He was a good all-round athlete, and
one of the very best shots in a country where good shots abound, big
game of all sorts having fallen to his rifle. He stood over six feet, and
was finely built and very handsome, modest, unconscious of his gifts,
and thoroughly kind-hearted. Despite his numerous occupations he
was a great reader and a deep student of mining and all that went with
it, and there was probably no better or more practical judge of a gold
reef in Mashonaland. Captain Borrow had very many warm friends in
South Africa, where his straightforward, manly, and energetic character
made him universally respected and admired. Fairly launched as he
was in his career, no man in the country had brighter prospects than he
lu Menioriani,
245
when he went cheerfully to meet his death by the Shangani River on
that morning of the 5th of December, 1893.
The late Captain John Alex-
_^-^ ANDER Livingstone Campbell.
C^^^^I(K R.A., who was the first to fall in
^'^^ the campaign, was born on the 6th
^E of January, 1856. He entered the
f|g^ ^r Royal Artillery on the 2nd of Feb-
ruary, i^jG, after passing through
Woolwich, and received his captaincy
on January loth, 1885. In 1888
he left the service, and four years
afterwards went out to South Africa,
entering a year later the service of
the British South Africa Company.
He became a magistrate in Mashona-
land, and at the outbreak of the
war volunteered for active service
with the Salisbury Horse, being
attached to the staff of Major Forbes.
He was shot in the hip-joint by
a native from behind a rock, while driving in some captured cattle on 15th
October, 1893, and died the following day at Iron Mine Hill. Captain
Campbell was exceedingly popular among the members of the Char-
tered Company's forces, and his loss was deeply regretted. On the day
on which the Victoria Column arrived, Captain Campbell was buried
with full military honours at dusk in the evening. As he was an ex-
Artillery officer, the Artillery volunteered to furnish the carrying party,
and "A" Troop furnished the firing party. All the Salisbury and a great
many of the Victoria Column attended the funeral, and the service was
conducted by the Bishop. " I think there were a good many standing
round the grave that evening," says Major Forbes, " who realised for
the first time that what we had undertaken was no child's play, but
stern reality, and that poor Campbell's fate might at any time be the
fate of one or all of us ; but there could be no turning back. We had
undertaken the work, and had to go through with it."
Captain J. A. L. Campbell.
246 The Downfall of Lobengula.
Captain Frederick Fitzgerald, commanding No. i Troop of
the Victoria Rangers, and killed with Major Wilson, was an ex-
ceedingly popular officer, who had done excellent work throughout the
campaign, being several times mentioned by Major Forbes for special
services. Before the war broke out he was Sub-Inspector of the British
South Africa Company's Police at Victoria, and after the Victoria
incident took a prominent share in the organisation of the Victoria
Rangers, receiving the command of the senior Troop. He had a high
character and an amiable disposition, and had the power of keeping his
men well in hand.
Also among those who died with Wilson and Borrow on the
Shangani was CAPTAIN Harry GREENFIELD, son of Mr. T. W. Green-
field, of Tavistock, Devon, where he was born, being thirty-two years of
age at the time of his death He was educated at the Tavistock
Grammar School, and the Independent College, Taunton. Like
Major Wilson, he commenced life in the office of a bank, and
obtained, after several years spent in this kind of occupation, the
chance of going abroad as a member of the staff of the National
Bank of the Orange Free State. Subsequently he migrated to
Kimberley, where he became overseer at one of the mines. Captain
Greenfield appears to have had a full share of the roving and
adventurous disposition for which the men of Devon have always been
famous, and after the occupation of Mashonaland, made his way to
that country in charge of stores for one of the leading South African
merchant firms. On war being declared against the Matabeli, Captain
Greenfield, like all the pick of the white men in Mashonaland,
volunteered his services, and was appointed quartermaster and subse-
quently captain of the Victoria Rangers. He still is well remembered
in Tavistock as a genial and high-spirited boy, and leaves, it is sad to
say, a widow and two children, who are now at Salisbury, Mashonaland.
Captain Greenfield, who possessed considerable literary taste, occa-
sionally amused himself by v/riting descriptive accounts of his travels
for the newspapers. His last letter to his father, in which, amid much
lighter references, he hazards the suggestion that the lines may come to
be looked upon as '•' touches of a vanished hand," has been reproduced
in nearly every journal in the kingdom, and was made the subject of a
CAPTAIN HARRY GREENFIELD.
{QuarUrmasler 10 the Victoria Colu,nu.)
BOKX iS6i. K,:.u.:o at bHANCANr, Decembek ^n^, ,893.
In Mciuoi'iani, 247
stirring picture in the "Graphic" by Mr. John Charlton. It bears
important and independent witness to the causes of the war with
Lobengula. The following is the letter in question : —
Mv De.\rest Father,— By the time this reaches you I shall be— well, I
don't exactly know where, but not in Mashonaland, You have, of course,
heard in the English papers of the trouble we have had with our beloved next
door neighbour, Lobengula. Not content with the snug annuity the Chartered
Company has been paying him (^1,200) for some years past, he must needs
kick up his heels, and allow his warriors to approach our very towns in pursuit
of the helpless, and likewise worthless Mashonas. An Englishman can, and
does,' stand a lot of cheek from a nigger, but when it comes to killing our own
native servants in the precincts of the town — even we, who take our pleasures
sadly and our cheek soberly, had to rise in our wrath, and chastise our dusky
brethren. Of course, according to the gospels of " St. Labby " and Exeter Hall,
we should not have done this, but let them gang their ain gait until the wet
season had properly set in — those of us who had not the sense or means to go
down country, being all more or less down with fever, the full rivers forbidding
relief columns or more provisions ; and then they would have swooped down in
their tens of thousands, and butchered man, woman, and child. This is the
programme Exeter Hall would have liked us to follow, rather than injure a few
of their petted heathen, who, by-the-bye, would have as much pleasure in
slitting a few of the above-named trageophilists, as those of their Mashona
vassals. Being, however, men who live among the black devils, and know their
ways, we are taking the bull by the horns and are going to make a bold push for
Buluwayo, the head-quarters of this savage potentate. Remember, I am in no
way a servant of the British South Africa Company, and in many ways I have
despised their ways and their policy, so that you may regard me as a perfectly
unbiassed witness in the matter. That being so, I say, without the slightest fear
of contradiction, that the Company has been forced into any action they have
taken by Lobengula himself; for at the time the disturbance took place they
had neithei the means nor inclination to commence what may eventuate
into a big war. As to the inuendos in several of the English papers about
a hankering after Matabeliland by the Company, that's all bosh ; but what
would have happened had they not taken the stand they have done, would
have been a slaughter of almost every white person in Mashonaland, and
the Company would have lost what they have already got, and paid so
dear for — Mashonaland. Had the affairs been in less capable hands than
those of our Administrator, Dr. Jameson, I dread to think what would have
248 The Dowiifall of Lobengiila.
happened ; but on the occasion there arose a man to cope with it ; and if
the expedition is successful, as it must be, the Chartered Comitany ought
to recognise that in ])r. Jameson they have a man second in abihty only
to Cecil Rhodes himself
I have been wandering away from what I intended to say at the outset, that
one of the three columns about to invade Matabeliland is starting from this
place, and that I am going with it. You know of old my wandering and erratic
spirit, and will not, therefore, be astonished at my going. I have got a captaincy
in the Victoria column, and hope I shall do nothing that would in any way be a
discredit to yourself or the place I come from. Of course, the odds against us
will be very great. The Matabeli number about 25,000 ; we shall scarcely
muster 1,000 all told ; but then we are all accustomed to horse and rifle, both of
which the Matabeli know nothing or little of; and in addition to that we have
seven Maxim quick-firing guns, with deadly hail of about 500 bullets per minute.
This is the first time for the Maxim gun to be used in actual warfare, so that our
movements, for that reason alone, will be watched with great interest by the
outside world. It is a great piece of work — equipping, clothing, arming, and
rationing 300 men in an out-of-the-way place like this— and, being quartermaster,
a lot of work falls on me ; but we shall start in a few days, and then most of the
heavy work will be over ; after which plenty of fighting and hardships for the
next six months ; but, as I said before, better that than stay here to be killed
like rats in a hole.
Our column will consist of about 300, man and horse, 16 waggons (each
drawn by 16 oxen), containing rations and ammunition, three ^Maxim guns drawn
by horses, one Hotchkiss shell gun, and one 7-pounder, in addition to which we
shall secure about 60 niggers of all sorts, mostly colonial natives. The Salisbur)-
column will consist of about an equal number, and the Tuli column about 50
less. Of course, we gain greatly by having three distinct columns, small though
they may be, for each is, so to say, a separate army perfectly independent of
each other, and the three can combine or not just as may be found advisable.
The English Government has, so far, not recognised our claim as British subjects,
but from latest advices we hear that John Bull has at last aroused from his
lethargy, and is going to send the Bechuanaland Border Police— a fine regiment
about 600 strong — to assist us on the south, and has also removed his veto from
his vassal Khama, the chief of the Bamangwatos, who will put about 1,000
trained warriors into the field. If this is a fact, the power of Lobengula is
doomed, and the whole campaign will be at an end in a few months. Of course,
in the coming struggle a good many of our horses will lose their riders, and a
In Menioriani. 249
good many of us will be spoken of in the past tense as "Poor old So-and-so,"
but in this case, unquestionably, le jeu vaut la chandelle, and as nothing worth
having is acquired without danger, we must take things as they come, and if you
have afterwards to regard this letter as " touches of a vanished hand," you and
others— amongst whom I hope will not be any long-suffering creditors— will be
sorry for one that is gone. Anyhow, I know that from all my old friends in
Tavistock I shall receive a hearty God speed, and when I see you all, which I
hope to do within the next year or so, we will crack a bottle of the very best for
" Auld Lang Syne."
By Major Wilson's side also died Captain WiLLlAM JOSEPH
JUDD, commanding No. 4 Troop of the Victoria Rangers. He was
originally a farmer in the Cape Colony, but sold his farm for the
purpose of joining the Pioneer Force, in which he was a trooper. After
the Occupation of Mashonaland he became engaged in transport
riding, making his head-quarters at Victoria, where he was elected
Commandant of the local Burghers. When the war broke out he
volunteered, and received the command of a troop in the Victoria
Rangers, which many of the more prominent burghers joined. He
rendered excellent service througliout the war, being quick and ready
as an officer, and to be absolutely relied upon in any emergency.
Personally he was exceedingly popular with the forces, and was well
known as an expert shot with gun and rifle.
Yet another of the officers of the expedition killed on the Shangani
among the Wilson Patrol was Captain Argent Blundell Kirton,
who was born on February 6th, 1857. He was the son of Major Edward
B. Kirton, formerly attached to the Admiralty, but subsequently to the
Royal Engineering Department, War Office. Major Kirton served for
some years at the Cape, and was a great friend of Sir Harry Smith.
Argent Kirton was born at Portsmouth, and was educated at the St.
Paul's Grammar School, Cosham. He left for South Africa at the age of
sixteen to join his two brothers, who were already established there :
Joseph Kirton, C.E., who subsequently died of fever ; and George
Kirton, who was killed by a fall from his horse. Among Argent
Kirton's earlier exploits, it may be mentioned that, at imminent
risk, he carried despatches through the Boer lines during the war,
for which he was complimented by Lord Wolseley. He lived on
250
The Downfall of Lobengitla.
Captain A. B. Kirton.
his own farm in the bush-veld,
about thirty miles from Zeerust,
and was already familiar with
Mashonaland and Matabeliland
through successive trips to those
countries, prior to the advent of the
Chartered Company. For many
years he was on terms of intimacy
with Lobengula, At the time that
hostilities broke out, he was acting
for Sir John Willoughby, at Vic-
toria, on behalf of an English
syndicate which had acquired farms
in Mashonaland, and immediately
volunteered for service. He was
placed in charge of the Transport
Department, with the local rank of
captain of the Victoria Rangers,
and was present at every battle with the Matabeli. On the arrival
of the column at Buluwayo, he volunteered for service with Major
Forbes' Patrol, and was killed with Major Wilson. A pluckier man
never wore shoe leather, and he was popular throughout the country.
His motto. " Fortis voluntas vincit," was characteristic of the man.
He married, in 1S87, Katherine, daughter of the Rev. Mr. Thomas, a
missionary in Matabeliland, one of whose sons was murdered by
Lobengula at the time Captain Patterson was treacherously done to death
by the Matabeli. Captain Kirton leaves a widow and three children.
Another general favourite among the officers who died during the
campaign was the late Captain Charles Frederick Lendy, who was
born at Sunbury House, Sunbury-on-Thames, on the 7th of January,
1863. He was the eldest son of the late Major A. F. Lendy, F.L.S.,
F.G.S., etc., formerly Captain on the French Staff, who came to England
in 1850, and became, after eleven years, a naturalised English subject,
joining the 4th Middlesex Militia (7th Fusiliers), Pie was one of the
first to start a practical and military college, in 1855, at Sunbury-on-
Thames, where he lived for thirty-four years, and died October loth,
?*:.
Pkoto by litest d- Son. Go.port:,
CAPTAIN CHARLES FREDERICK LENDY, R.A.
[Commanding the Artillery of the Victoria Column.)
HoKN 7rH jA.UA.v, .863. Die.. BLauwAvo, isth Januarv, 1S94.
In Me7noriaiu. 251
1889. He was of French-Swiss extraction, his father, Colonel Lendy,
being aide-de-camp to the Due de Nemours, and Commandant of the
Military School at Metz.
Captain C. F. Lendy was educated in Paris (at the Lycee St.
Louis), Germany, and Harrow, and passed sixth into Woolwich in
February, i88r. On leaving he went through the Long Course at
Shoeburyness, and from thence to Gibraltar in 1883, and afterwards to
Bermuda, On his return to England in 1886, he went to the Isle of
Wight and Hurst Castle, during which time he passed as interpreter
both in French and German. He next went to Gosport and Wey-
mouth, where he was stationed when seconded from the Artillery to
take command of the Maxim guns for the British South Africa Com-
pany. He sailed from England May 17th, 1890, delighted with the
prospect of an adventurous life. From a very early age he evinced
great aptitude for science : chemistry, geolog)% and botany, and was
also a keen spoitsman, being particularly devoted to shooting and
fishing. He was a very powerful man, being able to lift very heavy
weights and perform many unusual feats of strength. He always
travelled about with very heavy dumb-bells (20 lbs. each), which he used
night and morning with unfailing regularity\ These he carried in a
small portmanteau, besides shots of 30 lbs. and 16 lbs. weight, for
"putting the weight," a branch of sport in which he excelled, and which
finally caused his sad end. Bad luck alone prevented him from being
amongst the list of amateur champions, as the only summer he was in
England of late years found him at Gosport, and on the morning of the
Championship Meeting at Stamford Bridge he, unfortunately (after a
long, tiring night spent in signalling), missed the only train which would
have got him to London in time to compete. The same afternoon,
before his brother officers, he covered just over forty feet with more
than one " put," whereas the winner of the Championship " put " only
over thirty-eight feet. Just before going to Africa, while stationed at
Weymouth, he went in zealously for sculling, and it was his intention
to have tried for the Diamond Sculls at Henley, for which many good
judges thought he held a very good chance, in spite of his having
taken to it so recently; he had also been very successful in various
punting competitions on the Thames.
252
The Doivnfall of Lobengnla.
Captain Lendy was at first stationed at Fort Charter, but subse-
quently at Fort Victoria, where he was appointed magistrate. On
one occasion, which Mr. Labouchere has made famous in this country.
Captain Lendy was sent to suppress a disturbance at the kraal of
'Ngomo, a Mashona chief who had defied the authorities. It was
found necessary to employ force, and, of course, several natives were
killed. Captain Lendy was thereupon held up to the execration of
mankind in Mr. Labouchere's highly-coloured but ineffective manner.
This, however, is what Mr. Selous has to say on the subject : —
There is not an Englishman in Mashonaland who does not deprecate the
cruel aspersions which have been cast upon the character of Captain Lendy —
aspersions which, in spite of all the testimony as to the honourable career of that
unfortunate young officer, his detractors have not sufficient generosity of
character to withdraw, but still allow to blacken his memory.
Captain Lendy died after the campaign was over
in consequence of a strain brought about while pur-
suing his hobby of "putting the shot,"
being, unknown to himself no doubt,
considerably weakened by the hard-
ships gone through. He was attended
to the last by Dr. Jameson and Dr.
Hogg, the date of his death being
the 13th of January. He was brother
to Captain E. A. \V. Lendy, D.S.O.,
the gallant and promising officer who
was killed in the Warina " blunder "
on the West Coast of Africa, Decem-
ber 23rd, 1893.
It is difficult to express the deep
regret with which the news that so pro-
mising a career had been cut short
was received both in South Africa
and England. The estimation
^, ^^ . ^_, - n in which his abilities were
"--^^^ "- -" I generally held is fully shown
The Lendy Memorial at Sunbury-on-Thames. by the fact that he received
Ill Mciuoriam.
253
the command of the artillery of the combined columns throughout the
campaign. It is understood too that it was owing to his advice that the
number of the Maxim guns taken with the British South Africa Com-
pany's forces were increased, and it is only necessary to read any account
of the campaign to see how important an influence this step had upon
the result of the war. All who knew Captain Lendy felt confident that
his would be a most successful future; among others, the Duke of
Abercorn, President of the Chartered Company, who, in a letter to the
deceased officer's relatives, spoke most highly of his services, and
alluded to the severe loss which the Company had sustained in his
untimely death. At Sunbury, where their boyhood was spent, a
fountain is being erected by the inhabitants as a memorial of the two
brothers, who both died in their country's service within the space of a
few weeks.
The third to fall in the cam-
paign was Captain Owen Gwynyth
St. George Williams, eldest son of
General Owen Williams. He was chief
of the Scouts of the Salisbury Column.
His close friend, the late Captain H. J.
Borrow, told the story of his death
as follows : " He had been out with
several others, and they had been sur-
rounded and very nearly entrapped by
a large body of armed natives. They
succeeded in getting through, however.
Captain Williams' horse was fresh, but
those of the others were comipletely
knocked up, so that when the party
came together later on he was missing.
It was, however, confidently believed that he was ahead, and would
turn up safely. As he did not return to laager that night, signal rockets
were discharged, and two of our best native hunters were sent out to take
up his spoor. This they did, but could only follow it a few miles, as the
natives pursued and fired on them continually. They reported that, as
far as they could judge, his horse, though wounded, was going well and
Captain O. G. W^illiams.
254 ^^^^ Dozunfall of Lobengitla.
strong, and the tracks of his pursuers were growing fainter. I was sent
out at once with a party and took up the track from where they had left
it, following it for nearly ten miles, and not returning till late at night.
My report corroborated that of the native scouts, and the general
conclusion arrived at was that he was heading for Hartley Hills or
Salisbury. He was known to be a good man on the veld, well able to
take care of himself, and the anxiety felt on his account was therefore
lessened. However, nothing more could be done, for the enemy were
about on all sides, and further delay was out of the question. We now
learn that he was eventually overtaken, and after shooting some of his
pursuers, sat down on a rock, revolver in hand, and faced the rest, who
then retired about 200 yards and fired upon him, and he fell, shot
through the temple. Thus amongst the officers of the expedition, has
another promising career been prematurely cut short." Captain Williams
formerly held a captain's commission in the Royal Horse Guards, and
had first come to Mashonaland as a member of Lord Randolph
Churchill's expedition. Referring to his untimely death, Major Forbes
says that he was a very great loss to the expedition. He was most
popular wherever he was known, and had been particularly useful both
on account of his professional military training, and by reason of his
remarkable natural grasp of locality, which stood him in excellent stead
as an officer of scouts.
This completes the list of those holding the military or local rank
of captain who were killed during the campaign. Among the junior
officers was LIEUTENANT Arend Hermanus Hofmeyr, of the Victoria
Rangers, killed with Major Wilson's party. Tiie only information to hand
concerning him is that he was the son of a clergyman of the Dutch
Reformed Church in the Cape Colony, and a connection of the Hon.
J. H Hofmeyr, the famous leader of the Afrikander party in the Cape
Parliament. He was second lieutenant in No. 4 Troop.
Lieutenant George Hughes, one of the Wilson Patrol, was the
son of an Irish Methodist Minister. He was educated at the Methodist
College, Belfast, from which he took a mathematical scholarship in
the Royal University, where he matriculated and passed his first two
examinations in Arts. Having a strong bent towards travel and
adventure, he quited college before taking his degree and emigrated
In Memoriani.
255
Lieutenant George Hughes.
to America. He remained there for
some months and then went to South
Africa to join an elder brother. He
joined the British South Africa Com-
pany's Pioneer Force ("D" Troop) in
1889, and when it was disbanded
entered the service of the Bechuana-
land Exploration Company as pros-
pector. When the Matabeli war broke
out he at once volunteered and was
appointed lieutenant in the Victoria
Rangers, No. i Troop.
Lieutenant Rixon, a popular
officer of the Victoria Rangers, died
at Buluwa}'o on November 5th from
fever. He was English born, and was
for some time resident in Johannes-
burg. About the time of the occupation he went up to Mashonaland,
where he was engaged in storekeeping.
Another of those killed with the
Wilson Patrol was SERGEANT WIL-
LIAM Henry Birkley, Salisbury
Horse, who was born in London and
educated at the Reading Grammar
School. He emigrated to South Africa
in the year 1884. Mr. Birkley, who
claimed descent from King Robert H.
of Scotland and his Queen Euphemia,
went to Africa when Sir Hercules
Robinson was Governor, and was for
some time in the Cape Mounted Rifles,
but afterwards enlisted into Colonel
Carrington's Horse. He volunteered at
the outbreak of the war, and joined
''B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse. Mr.
Lieutenant Rixon. Birkley from time to time wrote home
256
The Downfall of Lobengitla.
Sergeant W. H. Birklry.
a number of very interesting and amusing
letters, some of which now, however, read
rather pathetically. One of the last, dated
October the 19th, from Matabeliland, con-
cludes : "The natives round here yesterday
predicted that there wouldn't be a white
man left in the country by the time the
sun goes down to-night. The Matabeli will
have to look pretty sharp, as it only wants
about an hour to sundown." He held the
rank of sergeant during the campaign, and
was thirty-one years of age when killed. He
died a soldier's death, which has been the
fate won in many of his family, who have
many records of honour and glory of the
by-gone battles and campaigns. Before
going out to South Africa, Mr. Birkley was articled to a solicitor,
and was established in business in
Salisbury when hostilities commenced.
He was particularly well-connected,
as indeed were a very large proportion
of the rank and file, and possessed
many sterling qualities which won for
him the respect of his comrades and
fellow colonists. As a sergeant in the
Salisbury Horse he spared no effort
for the success of the undertaking.
Sergeant Clifford Bradburn,
killed with Major Wilson's Patrol, was
twenty-five years of age when he died.
He was formerly in the Birmingham
Bank, and after the formation of the
British South Africa Company was
one of the first to join the Pioneer
Force. About two years ago, hearing
that his mother was dangerously ill. Sergeant C. Bradburn.
In Memoriani.
257
he started for England, but unfortunately arrived too late. He returned
to South Africa, and when the war broke out volunteered, being
appointed sergeant in the Victoria Rangers. On New Year's Day a
very cheering letter was received by his friends, stating that he, as one
of a volunteer patrol, was about to attempt a dangerous and difficult
enterprise — the capture of Lobengula. He hoped, however, to be with
them at home in June next. Mr. Bradburn was the son of Mr
Alfred Bradburn, of Edgbaston, Birmingham. Before going to Mata-
beliland he was in Ihe Cape Mounted Rifles, from which he resigned in
order to come home on a visit. He was born on December 17th, 1868,
at Moseley, Birmingham, was educated at Queen's College in that
town, and went out to South Africa in 1890.
Sergt. Harold Alexander
Brown, killed with Major Wilson
on the Shangani, was sergeant of the
Victoria Rangers. He was educated at
Harrow and Exeter College, Oxford,
and was exceedingly fond of travel,
having, even before leaving Oxford,
explored many out-of-the-way corners
of Europe, Africa, and Asia. He pos-
sessed a large share of that daring
and adventurous spirit characteristic
of Englishmen in the frontier
colonies. Mr. R. Bosworth Smith, his
old form-master at Harrow, describes
him as quick-tempered, strong, and
active, and, when at school, " fond of
escapades, and quite ungovernable if
you got on his wrong side." He could
not put together two lines of Greek or Latin without alarming mis-
takes, but possessed, nevertheless, great ability, with almost a touch of
genius. He was exceedingly well read, and had gained, while in the
Fifth form at Harrow, the school prize for English verse — a feat not often
performed. His rough-hewn, determined, fearless character was instinct
with the spirit of daring and the love of travel and adventure. He had
S
Sergeant H. A. Brown.
253
The Downfall of Lobengula.
wandered, often alone, through Egypt, the interior of Asia Minor and
Morocco, Albania, Montenegro, the Balearic Islands, and left a full
account of one of his most dangerous journeys in the shape of a volume
(published by Griffith and Farran) entitled, "A Winter in Albania."
Mr. Brown accompanied the Pioneers to Salisbury, and one of his private
letters describing the events of the march, published anonymously in the
" Pall Mall Gazette," so much interested Mr. Cecil Rhodes, that it is said
he wrote to the editor asking him to divulge the name of the writer.
Sergeant Dahm, Raafs Rangers, was the only one of that force
killed during the advance of the Southern Column, being shot through
the head in attacking the Matabeli in the hills near the Singuesi River
on November 2nd. Unfortunately no biographical information has
been received.
Armour-Sergeant D. W. Gibson was one of the two white
men of Lieutenant-Colonel Goold-Adams' forces killed during the cam-
paign, meeting his death on December lOth during the march from the
Shangani to Umhlangeni. Of him, too, no biographical information
has been received in time for this edition.
Troop-Sergeant-Major Sidney
Charles Harding, Victoria Rangers,
killed wath Major Wilson, was educated
at Felstead School and at St. John's
College, Cambridge. Developing a dis-
position for out-door life in preference
to sedentary work, he looked to South
Africa as an area for the display of
an active spirit. He resigned the
lieutenancy he held in the 2nd Cam-
bridgeshire (University) Rifle Volun-
teers, and on his arrival at Capetown
he was offered, and accepted, a com-
mission as lieutenant in Dyme's
Mounted Rifles. Before the Basuto
question was at an end he had seen
something of South African warfare.
This over he went up to Natal, and served under Colonel Dartnell,C.M.G.,
Troop-Sergt.-Major S. C. Harding.
In Meinoriam.
259
in the Natal Mounted Police. In 1885 he returned to England, where
his father hoped he would remain to fill an appointment which he had
obtained for him, but the fascination of colonial freedom was too strong,
and after a few months' stay at home he was reluctantly parted
with, and returned to Natal, when he again entered the Mounted
Police service. Subsequently, in 1889, he joined the Bechuanaland Border
Police. From Fort Elebe, in that year, he wrote of Bechuanaland as
a " grand country when it is opened up." " Big game " hunting
while on periodical leave reconciled him to the monotony of life.
During the four years he served in Bechuanaland, at Macloutsie and
elsewhere, he seems to have made himself a general favourite, taking
a prominent part in the local recreative and social movements. He was
a fine young Englishman, with a reputation for determination, energy
and pluck. He was born in the old Court suburb of Kensington on
the loth December, 1861, and was the son of Colonel Charles Harding
Hon. Colonel of the 4th V.B. Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment.
Corporal Samuel Calcraft,
killed at the Imbembesi, was the eldest
son of Mr. Samuel Calcraft, of Camden
Town. He was born on December 22nd,
1858, in the Parish of St. Pancras,
London, and was educated at the
Camden High Schools. At the age of
nineteen he went out to South Africa,
where he was several years Chief Clerk
and Controller in the General Post
Office at Port Elizabeth, under Sir
Henry Wilmot. He afterwards left for
the gold fields and still later served in
the Bechuanaland Border Police, in
which he became Corporal. When
the Matabeli War broke out he volun-
teered for active service with the
Salisbury Horse and was wounded in
the Battle of Imbembesi. He died from his wound on November
6th, 1893.
S 2
Corporal Samuel Calcraft.
2 6o
The Downfall of Lobcngula.
CORPOKAL F. C. COLQUIIOUN.
CoRPL. Frederick Crossley
CoLQUHOUN, who was killed with the
Wilson Patrol, was the son of ]\lr.
Francis Crossley Colquhoun, Assist-
ant Commissary-General, who served
throughout the Crimean war. He
was born in Edinburgh in the \ear
1867, was educated at the Bedford
Modern School, and first went to the
Cape in 1889, but had previously
been for nearly two years learning
farming in Manitoba. When he first
went to South Africa he was at Mr.
Featherstone's farm near Somerset,
but joined the Pioneer Corps and
went with it into Mashonaland.
After this he went into the British
South Africa Company's service at
Victoria. On the outbreak of hostilities he at once volunteered for
service with the Victoria Rangers. He bore the character of being
eminently a young fellow who could be counted upon to always do his
duty, and was very popular.
Corporal Harry Graham Kinloch, who was one of Major
Wilson's party, was born at Norwood, Surrey, in 1863, and was educated
at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, He entered Mashonaland
about three years ago, and practised with considerable success as a
solicitor at Salisbury. He had also attained some reputation as an
athlete, was a good cricketer, and an ex-amateur champion light-weight
boxer. When war against Lobengula was declared he entered the
Salisbury Horse as a trooper, and went through the whole campaign
until killed on the Shangani River. No man was more thoroughly
popular in the whole country than Mr. Kinloch, who united quiet
unassuming manners to considerable abilities and sterling qualities.
Lance-Corporal R. ^Iundy, of the Bechuanaland Border Police,
was assegaied when the waggons were rushed by the Matabeli on the
Singuesi River on November 2nd, on the occasion on which Mr. F. C.
In Meuioriani. 261
Selous was wounded. Unfortunately no biographical information has
been received.
In Mr. Albert Edward Burnett, who was mortally wounded in
a skirmish at the commencement of the campaign, the expedition lost
one of its best known, most popular, and most trusted members He
had seen service before, having passed through the Warren Expedition
in Colonel Cough's Regiment (3rd Mounted Kifles). Afterwards he
joined the Bechuanaland Border Police under Colonel Sir F. Carrington,
leaving that force to go north with Messrs. Johnson, Heany, and
Borrow, with whom he was connected up to the time of the flotation
of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company. After that he was com-
missioned to proceed with Mr. Selous to Tette on the Zambesi, and
thence down-country to secure a concession of Mashonaland from
the Mashona chiefs, the attempt to obtain the concession of that
country from Lobengula having up to that time proved a failure. The
concessions so obtained were afterwards ceded to Mr. Rhodes. Subse-
quently he joined the Pioneers as Captain in charge of the Transport
Department, and rendered signally good service in road making and
in other ways. After the occupation he embarked in mining in
Mashonaland, and was so engaged until the war broke out, when he
volunteered. On the departure of the Salisbury Horse, he remained
behind for the purpose of bringing on despatches from Mr. Rhodes-
No man in the country had a better knowledge of the veld
than Mr. Burnett, who was a perfect scout. Mr. Burnett, who was
killed while out on scouting duty, was born in East London (Cape
Colony), and was at one time engaged in diamond mining at Kim-
berley. He was a keen sportsman and a wonderfully good shot, and
as already said, very well known and a general favourite in many parts
of South Africa.
Altogether twenty-eight troopers were killed or died of sickness
during the campaign, twenty of these (fifteen being Salisbury and five
Victoria men) being among those gallant fellows who died round Major
Wilson. Of these one was Trooper William Abbott, Salisbury
Horse, who was the son of Mr. Joseph Abbott, of High Hill, Keswick,
and was born at Thornthwaite, Cumberland. He sailed for South
Africa on the 21st May, 1889, and after staying for some time in
262
The Downfall of Lobengula.
Trooper William Abbott.
Capetown and Kimberley, went
into the employ of the Bechuana-
land Trading Association, in which
service he remained for three years.
He afterwards settled down to
mining work in the Mazoe fields,
Mashonaland, volunteering when
the Matabeli War broke out.
Among the twenty men taken
by Captain Borrow to relieve Major
Wilson was Trooper William
Bath, the eldest son of Mr. Job
Bath. He was born on November
nth, 1856, in the county of Mid-
dlesex, and was educated in the
Commercial Schools, Clapham.
He joined the Cape Mounted
Rifles in October, 1876, and went
through the Basuto Campaign in 1879, taking part with Major Wilson in
that famous incident in Kaffir warfare,
the storming of Morosi's Mountain.
He was promoted to Sergeant in
1 88 1, but subsequently left the Cape
Mounted Rifles and became overseer
of a diamond mine at Kimberley.
Later on again, he joined the British
Bechuanaland Border Police, which he
left to come home in 1889. After re-
maining in England for two years and
a-half, he left for Johannesburg on April
2nd, 1892, and there had charge of the ^
battery at the Langlaagte Estate and ,;„>]
Gold Mining Company. He went to
Mashonaland on June 24th, 1893, and
volunteered for service in the Salisbury
Horse when the Matabeli War broke out. Trooper William Bath.
In Meinoriaiu.
263
Trooper William Henry
Britton, Salisbury Horse, who was
killed with the Wilson Patrol, was born
in 1870, at Halstead, Essex, where he
was educated. He was always of an
adventurous disposition, and on the
death of his father decided to try his
fortune in South Africa. He therefore,
at the age of nineteen, left Halstead
for that country, and finally settled at
Fort Salisbury. After the Victoria
incident he volunteered for service in
Matabeliland, and went through the
whole campaign.
Trooper Edward Brock,
Salisbury Horse, formed one of Major
Wilson's party. No biographical in-
formation has yet been received.
Trooper W
Britton.
Trooper W. A, Gary.
Trooper William Arthur
Gary, killed at the battle of Imbem-
besi, was born in 1872, and is the
fourth son of Colonel Francis W.
Gary, commanding the 53rd Regt.
District. He accompanied his father
to South Africa when the latter com-
manded the 1st Battalion of the East
Yorkshire Regiment, in the autumn
of 1888, and continued his education
at the Diocesan Gollege, Rondebosch,
near Capetown. In May, 1891, when
only nineteen years old, he joined,
with his brother, Mr. Charles Gary,
the British South Africa Company's
Police. He was, therefore, only
twenty-one years of age when he died,
but was a fine manly young fellow.
264
The Downfall of Lobengula.
who is spoken of by his comrades as possessing all the characteristics
of an honourable and upright English gentleman. He was devoted
to athletic pursuits, and was notably a good cricketer. He was also
a first-rate shot, and in his college cadet corps (of which he was
sergeant-major) won the challenge cup for rifle shooting with the
highest score ever made in South Africa by a member of a cadet
corps. On the outbreak of the Matabeli war he volunteered for service,
and was attached to the Salisbury Horse, Captain Heany's Troop. That
officer says of him that " he was a general favourite, an adept at all
field sports, and a clever lad all round ; and sincerely regretted by his
comrades. He was especially anxious (being a wonderfully good shot)
to make good shooting at Imbembesi, and it was in eagerly exposing
himself with that object that he was hit in the head with a Martini bullet."
Troopers Philip Wouter De Vos and L. Dewis, Salisbury Horse,
were killed with Major Wilson. No other information has been received.
.^ Trooper Dennis Michael Cronly
Dillon, son of the late John Cronly
Dillon, Postmaster General of the Punjaub,
was born at Burdwan, India, on April
20th, 1868. He was sent to England at
the age of nine or ten, and was educated
at St. Edmund's College, Hertfordshire,
from where he took a first class in the
matriculation examination at the London
University, and also passed his inter-
mediate Arts at the same University,
finishing his education at Stonyhurst
College. Failing in the examination for
the Ceylon Civil Service, he went to
Africa in October, 1888, There he
joined the " Pioneer Force," and had his
share of the hard work of opening up Mashonaland, Oh the outbreak
of the war he joined the Victoria Rangers and acted as signaller
until killed with Major Wilson's party. A clever scholar and good
athlete, he was at college a general favourite both with his pro-
fessors and fellow students, as also among his comrades in Mashona-
Mr. D. M. C. Dillon.
In Memoriaiu.
26:
Trooper E. M. Forbes.
land. The portrait is from a
photograph taken at the age of
twenty.
Trooper Eustace Mac-
Leod Forbes, who was drowned
while endeavouring to cross the
Umsingwani River, was a brother
of Major P. W. Forbes, and the
fourth son of Mr. Alex. C. Forbes,
of Whitchurch, Oxon. He was
born on 21st November, 1862,
and was educated at Repton, and
Jesus College, Cambridge, at both
of which he took a leading part
in cricket and football, being in
the Repton cricket and football
elevens for some years, and Cap-
tain of the Jesus College cricket
eleven. After taking the degree of Bachelor of Arts at Cambridge,
he went through a course of electric engineering at Messrs. Crompton's
Works at Colchester, but finding no opening in this country, went out
to Mashonaland in October, 1891, to join his brother. He was a clerk
in the Public Prosecutor's Office of the British South Africa Company,
and afterwards in the Mines Office, and it was while in the latter that
he volunteered to join the force going into Matabeliland. He served
through the war as a Trooper in the Salisbury Horse, and was wounded
through the left elbow at the Shangani fight; and it was owing to
this wound that he was drowned on nth February, 1894, when trying
to cross the Umsingwani River on his way home. This sad event was
the result of Mr. Forbes' plucky endeavour to assist in finding a drift
across the river for the waggons to cross by. He had got out of his
depth, and having only the use of one arm, was swept away by the
current and drowned, despite the strenuous efforts made by several
friends who were present to save him.
Trooper Harold John Hellet, Victoria Rangers, was killed
with Major Wilson; and Trooper Abe Levy, Victoria Rangers, was
266
The Downfall of Lobengula.
wounded at the battle of Shangani, October 25th, and died the following
day. Further information as to these two last is still wanting.
Among those killed on the Shangani River was Trooper GeorgE
Sawers Mackenzie, who was born at Murree, Punjab, India, in i860.
He entered Mashonaland in 1889 with the Pioneer Force, and shortly
after it was disbanded went into the service of the Zambesia Exploration
Company as assayer. He held this position until the war broke out,
when he volunteered for service with the Salisbury Horse.
Trooper Matthew Meiklejohn (Salisbury Horse, killed with
Major Wilson), whose family reside in Cape Town, was prior to the war
in the employ of Messrs, Frank Johnson and Co., Limited, by whom he
is spoken of in high terms. He formerly resided in the Transvaal.
Trooper Harold Dalton Watson
Moore Money, who was killed with
Major Wilson, was a son of Major-General
R. C. Money. He went out to Salisbury
in company with Captain Borrow. On
the outbreak of hostilities he volunteered
to serve in Borrow's Troop — "B" Troop
of the Salisbury Horse — which he did
with much credit, and was one of the
twenty of his troop ordered out on the
pursuit of Lobengula. Young Money was
of a fearless and courageous character, of
high principles, and a great favourite. He
came from a family of soldiers, and his
natural desire had been to enter the army,
although he failed to pass the Sandhurst
examinations. He was only twenty-one
years of age, having been born on June 30th, 1872, at Tulpigori, Bengal.
He was educated at Wellington College, and went out to South Africa
in May, 1893. At the time of the outbreak of the war he had not been
many weeks in Mashonaland, and was a most enthusiastic volunteer. In
one letter to his relatives he said that though he " could not get into
Her Majesty's Service at home, he would win a V. C. out here." He
was one of the seven who made up a Public School Mess in Borrow's
Trooper II. D. W. M. Money.
In Memoriam.
267
troop, and all seven were killed except Batley, who was stopped in Shiloh
with rheumatism, and Gisborne, sent back with despatches. The five
killed were Watson and Money (Wellington), Brown and Kinloch (Harrow),
and Vogel (Charterhouse). As a boy he was noted for his good influence
over other boys. A Wellington master, writing of him, says : — " He was
as good a boy as ever lived. Most men would give worlds to have had
as innocent and happy a boyhood as his. He was as much liked by
the boys as he was by all the masters who had anything to do with
him, and I could always feel that there was an influence for good among
my boys when Harold was among them. We feel that we have lost a
Wellingtonian who would always have been an honour to the school."
He was very devoted to sport of every kind, especially riding and
shooting.
Trooper Edward Graddon Morrison, Salisbury Horse, died
while on service at Buluwayo, on January 15th, of sickness. He origin-
ally came to the country with young Mr. Swinburne, his close friend.
He was educated at an English public school, was a splendidly built man,
a good all-round athlete, and exceedingly plucky ; and he was much liked
and sincerely regretted by all his comrades.
Trooper Percy Crampton
NUNN was born at Bury St. Edmunds
in 1855, and was the son of Mr. Robert
Nunn, professor of music. In 1881 he
left England for the Cape, joined the
Cape Mounted Rifles, and afterwards
the Bechuanaland Border Police. He
was a trooper in the Salisbury Horse.
During the march on Buluwayo he
forwarded from time to time to the
" Daily Graphic " illustrated accounts
of the fighting. His last contribution
appeared on December 19th. He was
one of the ill-fated Wilson Patrol.
Troopers Robert Oliver and
Alexander Hay Robertson, Victoria
Rangers, were killed with Major Wilson. Other information is wanting.
Trooper P. C. Nunn.
268
The Downfall of Lobengula.
Trooper J. Robertson.
Trooper John Robertson,
another of the gallant band killed on
the Shangani River, was just twenty-six
years of age. He was the youngest son
of Mr. John Robertson, of Auchnahyle,
Pitlochry, upon whose death about six
years since he decided to seek his
fortune abroad. Young Robertson was
a fine, handsome man, standing about
six feet high, and was just the sort to
volunteer in any hazardous undertaking,
and, as his last few letters to his people
have been full of the atrocities of the
Matabeli to the Mashonas, his friends
were not surprised to find him in the
front in the Victoria Rangers.
Trooper Julius Siebert, Salisbury Horse, was dangerously
wounded on November 1st at Imbembesi, and died near Buluwayo on
November 3rd. Other information is wanting.
Trooper Frederick Thompson,
killed at the battle of Imbembesi, was
the son of the late Mr. Henry Thomp-
son, of Ballina House, Maryborough,
Queen's Co., Ireland, and was born in
1857 at Ballingarry Castle, Co. Tip-
perary. He was educated at Rockwell
College, Tipperary, and commenced life
in a bank, resigning after a few years
to join his brother in South Africa. He
first joined the Cape Mounted Rifles,
and after spending four years in that
service was induced by his brother to
leave and go to the gold fields, where
he remained until the latter's death. He
then joined the British South Africa
Company's Police, and at the expiration Trooper Frederick Thompson.
In Meiuoriaiu.
269
of his period of service went in for prospecting, in which he was
engaged when the Matabeli War broke out. He at once volunteered
his services to the British South Africa Company and joined " C "
(Captain Spreckley's) Troop of the Salisbury Horse. He was killed on
1st November, 1893, while on picket duty in the bush just before the
battle of that date commenced. His commanding officer, Captain
Spreckley, said in a letter that he would ask for no better soldier to
stand by him. In the end, when surprised on duty, he shot two Matabeli
and wounded two others, but the natives were too many for him, and
he was killed without a chance of getting away.
Trooper William Alex-
ander Thomson, killed with
Major Wilson, was born in Aber-
deen on the 8th of January, 1871,
but a few months afterwards his
parents removed to Elgin, Moray-
shire (only eight miles from the
home of Major Wilson), so that
he always looked on Elgin as his
native place. He was educated
at the Elgin Academy, but when
fifteen years old he went to Aber-
deen, where he lived for two and
a-half years. He had always a
desire to go abroad, and in May,
1889, he left for the Cape, where
he was for two years with Messrs.
J. Forrest and Co., of Rondebosch,
near Cape Town. When the Vander Byl settlement at Laurence-
dale, Mashonaland, was being organised, he applied for a place in
the Expedition and obtained one. Here a knowledge of drugs
stood him in good stead, and proved of value to the Expedition.
He had charge of the medicine chest, and was called " The Doctor "
b)- his comrades. Mr. Thomson saw a good deal of Mashona-
land, his knowledge of the country growing rapidly, and his
admiration for it growing with his knowledge. He always had
Trooper \V. A. Thomson.
270
The Downfall of Lobengula.
great faith in the future development of Mashonaland, and he expressed
his determination to stick to it " through thick and thin." When war
broke out with the Matabeh, he at once volunteered his services as
a trooper, and was placed in "B" Troop of the Salisbury Horse,
under the late Captain Borrow. He served with his troop through
the campaign until the end and bore the reputation of being energetic
and straightforward. He was also very popular, being genial and warm-
hearted, and having many friends. He was a good athlete and a keen
angler, and was also a volunteer in the Cape Highlanders during the
time he lived at the Cape. Like many others of those who fell in the
war, he was a mere boy — scarcely twenty-three — when he died.
Trooper Henry St. John Tuck,
one of Wilson's party killed on the
Shangani, was born in 1868, and was
the eldest son of William Henry Tuck,
M.A. He was educated at Lancing
College and in Germany, and in 1889
proceeded to South Africa, when he
enlisted in the Cape Mounted Rifles,
and subsequently joined the Pioneer
Force on the occupation of Mashona-
land. For this service he received, with
the others, a grant of land. When the
Matabeli war broke out, however, he
volunteered his services and joined the
Salisbury Horse, serving throughout
the campaign. Before going to South
Africa Mr. Tuck, like some of the other
members of the forces, learned his first
lesson in a volunteer corps in England, having been a member of the
late corps of Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers.
Trooper Frank Leon Vogel was one of the gallant men
forming Major Wilson's heroic party. He was the second son of the
Hon. Sir Julius Vogel, K.C.M.G., and was born on October 21st, 1870, at
Auckland, New Zealand. After being educated at Charterhouse he went,
in 1890, into the London OfTfice of the British South Africa Company.
Trooper Henry St. John Tuck.
In Memoriavi.
271
He left England for South Africa on April 4th, 1891, and became a
trooper in the Mashonaland Mounted Police at Tuli. When this force was
disbanded, in 1892, he went into the Survey Department at Salisbury,
and subsequently became Acting Assistant-
Secretary to Dr. L. S. Jameson. When
the war broke out he volunteered, was
enrolled in the "B" Troop of the Salis-
bury Horse under Captain Borrow, and
during the campaign served the Maxim
gun attached to his troop, under Lieut.
Llewellyn. He left Salisbury with the
column, but returned alone two or three
weeks afterwards on business. Rejoining
his troop two or three days after they left
Fort Charter, he marched with the column,
and was in all the engagements on the
way to Buluwayo, serving the Maxim gun,
besides volunteering for special scouting
expeditions. He was one of the small
party sent out in search of Captain G.
Williams, and also one of the expedition on which Captain Campbell
was killed. He served the Maxim at the engagement on the Shan-
gani River on the 25th of October, and also at Imbembesi on the
1st November, where he had a narrow escape, one bullet passing
through his hat. He reached Buluwayo safe and sound on November
4th, and on the loth wrote his last letter to his relatives, being
then evidently in high spirits, and regarding the campaign as over.
He left Buluwayo on the 14th, and remained with Major Forbes
throughout the patrol which ended at Shiloh ; thence again, as a
volunteer, he accompanied the force under Major Forbes to the
Shangani River, where, under Captain Borrow, he joined Major
Wilson, with whom he was killed.
Trooper Thomas Colclough Watson, another of the public
school men who fell with the Wilson Patrol, was a son of Colonel
Thomas James Watson, a grandson of Colonel Thomas Colclough
Watson, and a great-grandson of Colonel Jonas Watson, who was killed
Mr. F. L. Vogel.
272
The Downfall of Lobengula.
Trooper Thomas Colclough Watson.
in the Irish Rebellion. After being
educated at Wellington College he
joined his father in India. The family
afterwards went out to Tasmania, where
Mr. Watson resided for three or four
years ; subsequently he returned to
England, and finally went out in
ic^Qi to Mashonaland, volunteering for
service when the war broke out.
Trooper Henry George
Watson, Salisbury tlorse, was killed
with Wnison's party on the Shangani.
Trooper Edw^ard Earle Welby,
Victoria Rangers, was also killed
with Major Wilson. Trooper Percy
Wood, who died almost at the com-
mencement of the march upon Bulu-
wayo, of fever, was in the Victoria
Rangers. Further information is wanting as to the last named
three members of the expedition.
Of the several memorials of these valiant men, one will take the
very fitting and suitable form of a hospital at Buluwayo, — formerly
" The Place of Slaughter," now a place of healing ; and a bronze tablet,
whereon will be inscribed the names of the dead, will be placed in the
church at Salisbury. The bones of Wilson and the famed patrol are
now being removed from the distant part of the country where they met
their death, to consecrated ground near the ruins of Zimbabwe. Here
a granite monolith will be placed above their resting-place by
Mr. Cecil Rhodes — a last honour to those "pickets of civilisation,"
whose noble deaths marked the downfall of a fierce and blood-stained
barbarism — the rise of a civilised era. But the most eloquent tribute
of all has been the profound impression created, not only among their
friends, relatives, and countrymen, but among their savage foes, b)' the
splendid gallantry of the fallen. Some of the horses have lost their
riders ; too many of the men are spoken of, as Captain Greenfield
prophesied, as " poor old So-and-so." But splendid legacies remain:
In Memoriavt.
273
a fair country for the expansion of the race ; a high example of duty
and devotion. May the remembrance of their heroism be ever green
among the Englishmen who keep watch and ward on the frontiers
of our broad South African domains ; may it ever be present in their
minds, to nerve their arms and fire their courage should the time again
come to saddle-up and march.
iiiMiiiiiMmiiT[iinniniiimMlri«ffliiitiwiiiiiiiIfltii|Tniiiriimin[ti[iiiii[niii»[iiir^^ .^n^».:^...^.::..^„T«;^,^,.;,;,T^..'. ^ .N,
The Salisbury Memorial Tablet.
74
The Downfall of Lobengula.
THE FOLLOWING IS A COMPLETE LIST OF THOSE KILLED; THOSE WHO DIED OF
WOUNDS OR SICKNESS; AND THOSE WOUNDED; IN THE RECENT CAMPAIGN.
Revised ajid Corrected to August, 1894.
Mashonaland Force. Total Strength, about 672 Europeans, 155 Colonial Natives.
Name.
Corps.
Victoria Rangers
Salisbury Horse
Scout
Commanding Salisbury
Scouts
Victoria Rangers
Salisbury Horse
Victoria Rangers
Salisbury Horse
Officer Commanding
Victoria Rangers
Victoria Rangers
Trooper Percy Wood
Capt. John A. L. Campbell
Mr. Albert Edward Burnett
Capt. Owen Gwynydd St. George
Williams
Trooper Abe Levy
,, Frederick Thompson . .
,, William Arthur Cary . .
,, Julius Siebert ..
Lieut. Milner R. Theodore Rixon
Corpl. Samuel Calcraft . .
Major Allan Wilson
Capt. Frederick Fitzgerald
,, William Joseph Judd
,, Harry Moxon Greenfield
,, Argent Blundell Kirton ..
Lieut. George Hughes . .
„ Arend Hermanus Hofmeyr
Sgt.-Mjr. Sidney Chas. Harding
Sergt. Harold Alexander Brown
,, Clifford Bradburn . .
Corpl. Fredk.Crossley Colquhoun
Trooper Edward Earle Welby ..
,, John Robertson
Alex. Hay Robertson ..
Harold John Hellet . .
,, Denis Cronly Dillon . .
Capt. Henry John Borrow
Sergt. William Henry Birkley ..
Corpl. Harry Graham Kinloch. .
Trooper Harold Dalton Watson
Moore Money
,, Frank Leon Vogel
,, L. Dewis. . ..
,, William Henry Britton
,, Philip Wouter De Vos . .
,, Thos. Colclough Watson
,, Henry George Watson . .
,, Edward Brock ..
William Bath ..
Percy Crampton Nunn
,, Henry St. John Tuck ..
,, William Alex. Thomson
„ William Abbott . .
,, Geo. Sawers MacKenzie
,, Matthew Meiklejohn ..
Trooper Robert Oliver . . . . Victoria Rangers
The following died at the close of the Campaign :
Comdnt. Pieter Johannes Raaf . . O. C. Tuli Column
Salisbury Horse
Capt. Charles Frederick Lendy
Trooper Edwd . Graddon Morrison
„ Eustace Macleod Forbes
Colonial Native Contingent
Mashona ,,
Victoria Rangers
Salisbury Horse
Salisbury
Date of
Death.
1893.
Oct. i6th
Oct. 23rd
Oct. 26th
Oct. 26th
Nov. ist
Nov. 3rd
Nov. 5 th
Nov. 6th
Place.
Iron Mine HilL.
Nr. Shangani R.
Zinyangene
Shangani
Iinbembezi
Near Buluwayo
Buluwayo
Dec. 4th Shangani
Remarks.
Fever.
Wounded Oct. 15th.
Mortally wounded.
Horse shot. Cut off
when scouting.
Wounded Oct. 25th,
Battle Shangani.
Wounded Nov. ist.
Battle Imbembesi.
Fever.
Battle Imbembesi.
Party surrounded
and cut up.
Not known
Dec. 26th Buluwayo
1894. I
Jan. 15th „
Feb. nth ' Umzingwane
1893.
Oct. 25th j „
I On march
Died from illness.
Dysentery.
Drowned.
/// Alcnioriain.
275
Mashonaland Force. — List of Woijnded.
Name.
Corps.
Trooper Conrath ; Victoria Rangers
,, William Nutt .. .. ; ,, ,,
„ J. Behrmann .. .. Salisbury Horse
Asst. -Conductor J. Dunman .. ,, ,,
Mr. W. Quested : Mashonaland Cont.
Trooper J. H. Lucas
F. Mack..
,, F. H. Crewe
„ M. H. Barnard .
Capt. W. F. Moberley .
Trooper F. Nesbitt
Colonial Native Contingent
Mashona Contingent
Coolie
Salisbury Horse
Salisbury
Date of
Casualty.
Place.
Oct. 2Sth I Shangani
Oct. 27th Zinyangene
Nov. ist : Imbembesi
Dec. i2ih
Nov. 1st
Oct. 25th
Shangani
Imbembesi
Shangani
On march
Remarks.
Slightly.
Severely.
Seveiely in attack
on the march.
Slightly.
Severely.
Slightly.
Slightly .
Severely
List of Killed, or Died of Wounds, of the Southern Force, 445 Europeans, and
Khama's Force, 2,000; Latter Retired on November 6th.
Name.
Corps.
L.-Corpl. R. Mundy
Sergt. Dahm
Arm.-Sergt. D. W. Gibson
Coloured Driver W. Le Fleur
Khama's Force
B. B. P
Raaf s Rangers
B. B. P
Date of
Death.
Place.
Remarks.
1893.
Nov. 2nd
Dec. loth
1894.
Jan. 2nd
1893.
Nov. 2nd
Singuesi . .
Shansjani
Singuesi . .
Dangerously
wounded Dec. 4th.
7
List of Wounded. — Southern Force.
Name.
Corps.
Date of
Casualty.
Place.
Remarks.
Mr. F. C. Selous . .
Sergt.-Major R. Codrington
Corpl. F. A. Ransom
Sergt. Dempsey . .
,, Robinson
Farrier Corpl. G. D. Newton
L. Corpl. W. Williams . .
Trooper W. Shannahan . .
H. Middleton ..
Sergt. A. C. Pyke . .
One Native Driver
Khama's Force
■
Scout
B. B. P
Raaf 's Rangers
B. B. p..." ;.■
1893.
Nov. 2nd
Dec. 4th
Dec. i2th
Nov. 2nd
Singuesi . .
Shangani
Singuesi . .
Slightly,
Severely.
Slightly.
Severely.
Slightly.
Dangerously.
I
71
Mashonaland Force.
Europeans, killed, or died of wounds ..
„ died from other causes
Colonial Native, killed
Mashona Contingent, killed
Europeans, wounded
Colonial Natives or Coolies, wounded . .
Mashona Contingent ,,
Summary of Casualties.
Southern Force.
42 Europeans, killed . .
7 Khama's Force, killed
I
30 Europeans, wounded
— 80 Colonial Native ,,
12 Khama's Force ,,
31 Total casualties in both Forces — officers, men,
— 45 and natives ..
A considerable number of trek oxen were shot also.
List of horses killed and wounded : —
Mashonaland Force 65 | Southern Force, including 3 mules
In addition to this a large number of horses had to be left on the road, owing to their weakness.
T 2
158
CHAPTER XVm.
THE RHODE SI AN ROLL CALL.
The character of the troops — Their esprit de corps and stamina — The Administrator — The
Commanding Officer— Sir J. C. Willoughby, Bart. — Major Hamilton Browne — Captain
Finch — Captain Heany — Captain Spreckley — Captain Moberley — Captain Kennedy —
Adjutant Kennelly — Captain Bastard — Captain Napier — Captain Delamere — Captain
Reid — Captain White — Captain Donovan — The other officers,
It is difficult to speak too highly of the manner in which the campaign
was conducted alike by officers and men. In particular the
Administrator's forethought and decision were admirable. It is easy
now, looking back upon a successful issue, to underrate his
difficulties. Dr. Jameson really felt, and a good many others,
taking their tone from him, confidently expressed, a certainty
of victory; but an important and well-informed section of the
colonial press and public were far from sanguine upon the subject.
The troops, few in number, were, at the commencement of the rainy
season, advancing upon a savage foe, whose military strength was
known to be formidable, and whose traditional ferocity lent a terror to
their very name. Arms and ammunition, horses, equipment, food
supplies : all had to be procured at the shortest possible notice. But the
end was success, and a success unparalleled in British native wars.
That this was so may be attributed not merely to the ability,
energy, and care of the leading officers, but in great measure also to the
extraordinary personnel of the whole of the troops. For not only were
the men who formed the columns very considerably above the average
in the accidents of birth, education, and physique — they were equally
remarkable in point of character, reputation, and position. To illustrate
this statement it is only necessary to note what an exceedingly large
proportion of the members of the expedition had passed through our
leading schools and universities, and what a number of the rank and file
held a very considerable interest in the country. Equally conspicuous were
TJic Rhodcsian Roll Call. 277
the calmness and cool courage with which the officers and troopers — mere
lads in some cases — faced fire for the first time ; or, as we have already
recounted, met death with unflinching firmness. From first to last the
Mashonalanders showed that they possessed a rare amount of that
pluck and spirit which has made our nation great and honoured. That
is the fact, and it can be accounted for. The handful of men who
vanquished Lobengula had overcome still more formidable enemies
to the development of the country ; they were the fittest who had
survived all the troubles, dangers, and difficulties which had followed
close upon each other since the occupation in 1890. The weaklings had
succumbed to the hardships and privations endured, the faint-hearted
had turned back from the fight and gone back to the creature comforts of
civilized regions. Those who stayed to see the end were of strong
character and fine physique, men not easily daunted by danger or
difficulty, nor lightly turned from a set purpose ; whose stout frames and
stouter hearts were alike "in utrumque paratus."
The command of this fine body of irregular troops was offered
(under conditions which he himself recounts on other pages) to Major
P. W. Forbes by the Administrator. The circumstances were unique,
and called for a leader who possessed the knowledge only to be gained
in the regular forces, with an adaptability and resourcefulness of character
which could develop new methods under new phases of warfare.
Major Forbes, an officer in the Inniskilling Dragoons, was at the time
filling a magisterial appointment in Mashonaland, and knew the men
and the country. He had also had some experience of natives while
serving with his regiment in Zululand. Dr. Jameson's justification for
appointing him to the chief command exists in the signal success
which attended the operations of the columns — a success which was
achieved in the face of most serious difficulties and discouragements,
which was as finally effective as it was rapid, and which has not been
paralleled in South Africa since the defeat of Dingaan and Umziligazi
by the Dutch voortrekkers. Including even the dire loss of Major
Wilson's party on the Shangani, no South African native war of similar
importance has been concluded with such small loss of life ; and that this
was so may be very largely attributed to the commanding officer's
painstaking vigilance and unrelaxing carefulness The whole scheme of
278
The Downfall of Lobengnla,
the campaign was devised and carried out with conspicuous ability,
and Major Forbes issues from a severe ordeal with a distinguished
record of service under difficult and exceptional conditions of warfare.
Major Patrick William
Forbes, Commanding the British
South Africa Company's Forces
in Matabeliland throughout the
war, is the son of Mr. Alexander
Clark Forbes, and was born at
Whitchurch, Oxon, on August 31st,
1 86 1. He was educated at Rugby
and Sandhurst, and obtained a
commission in the Inniskilling
Dragoons, in which he now holds
the rank of Captain. He went out
to South Africa in 1880, and was
seconded for the British South
Africa Company's service in No-
vember, 1889. He was second in
command of the British South
Africa Company's Police when they
entered Mashonaland, and became
major in the Police in May, 1890, which rank he has held ever since.
When the advance into Matabeliland was determined upon, he received
the command of all the Company's forces. He raised and commanded
the Salisbury Column, and on their junction with the Victoria division
took command of the combined columns. The Tuli force (Raafs
Rangers) would also have been under his control had the w^ar not been
finished before the arrival of the latter at Buluwayo. Before the dis-
bandment of the British South Africa Company's Police Major Forbes
secured Manica to the Company by his action at Mutassa's Kraal on
November 15th, 1891.^ He had served for five or six years among the
Zulus with his regiment, and before the commencement of hostilities was
in command of the volunteers at Salisbury and resident magistrate there.
He was known to and by almost everyone in the country, where his
earnestness and strength of character had made him universally respected.
Major P. \V. Forbes.
The Rhodesian Roll Call. 279
The post of Senior Military Adviser on the staff of His
Honour the Administrator is held by Major Sir John CHRISTOPHER
WiLLOUGHBY, Bart., late Captain in the Royal Horse Guards. Sir
John Willoughby is one of the Pioneers of British Zambesia, having been
attached to the staff of Lieutenant-Colonel Pennefather, commanding the
Pioneer Expedition in 1890. Since that date he has taken an active
and zealous interest in the development of the country, into which he
has brought a large amount of capital, and in whose prosperity he
is heavily concerned. He has formed two powerful companies
(Willoughby's Expedition Syndicate and the Mashonaland Develop-
ment Company), both of which, under his excellent management, are
flourishing. Sir John Willoughby went through the campaign with the
Administrator until the occupation of Buluv^^ayo, and subsequently
accompanied the Column sent under the command of Captain Heany
to relieve Major Forbes after the loss of Major Wilson's party. He
holds the local rank of Major in the British South Africa Company's
military service, and in his official capacity has done very useful and
effective work. Sir John Willoughby, of Baldon House, near Oxford,
Berwick Lodge, near Bristol, and Fulmer Hall, Slough, Bucks, was born
in Westbourne Terrace, London, and is the only surviving son of the
late Sir John Pollard Willoughby, Bart. He was educated at Eton,
where he evinced a special taste for modern languages, winning prizes
for proficiency in Italian and French. He was captain of the Eton
shooting team which won the Ashburton Shield in 1878. At a later
date his sporting instincts were concentrated upon racing, and he
succeeded in running a dead-heat for the Derby with one of his horses.
Sir John is very popular in Rhodesia, where his whole-hearted en-
deavours to open up the country are viewed with much appreciation,
and where his unassuming character is much liked. He returns to
England for a well-earned holiday at about the end of the year.
Major Hamilton Browne, who for a time at the commencement
of the campaign acted as Staff Officer to Major Forbes, has served in
the Maori War, and was formerly in the Royal Engineers. He spent
his earlier life in New Zealand, but afterwards campaigned in several
other parts of the world. He took part in the Zulu and most of the
other recent South African wars, including the Boer war and the
28o
The Downfall of Lobengula,
Warren Expedition. He was at one time Major and Adjutant of the
Diamond Fields Horse, a volunteer corps which has done good service
in the colonial wars, and was subsequently Chief Staff Officer in the
Mashonaland Volunteers. The post of Staff Officer was subsequently-
taken by Captain Finch, but Major Browne remained with the column
until the close of the war, taking part in the various engagements.
Major Forbes' chief staff officer
was Captain Alan George Finch,
late Lieutenant in the ist Life Guards.
Captain Finch's connection with
South Africa dates from 1890, since
when he has been engaged in
Mashonaland in investing in gold
properties and real estate. When the
war broke out he volunteered his
services, and at first acted as remount
officer for the forces, afterwards
accompanying Major Forbes as staff
officer, and ultimately returning to
England with him. Mr. Finch is the
eldest son of Mr. George H. Finch,
M.P., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Oakham,
Rutland. He was educated at Eton,
after which he spent some years in
travel, and in 1884 obtained a com-
mission in the ist Life Guards, leaving the service in 1890. Mr. Finch
has also been a traveller in various parts of Europe and America,
having visited Ecuador and Columbia, among other places, and the
Andes.
Major Forbes' Personal Staff" included Captain J. H. Kennedy,
who has just returned to this country for a holiday, after serving
with the Chartered Forces throughout the war. He was for many
years in the Civil Service of the Colony of the Caps of Good Hope,
and subsequently resided for some time in Johannesburg. At present,
under the British South Africa Company, he holds the appoint-
ment in Mashonaland of Master of the High Court at Salisbury,
Captain Alan G. Finch.
The Rhodesian Roll Call.
281
Captain J. H. Kennedy.
and Chief Accountant in the
Chartered Company's territory.
He volunteered for service with
the Salisbury Column in Mata-
beliland at the commencement
of the recent war, and joined
that Column as quartermaster,
with the rank of captain, in
which capacity he served until
the arrival of the joint Columns
at Buluwayo, when he assumed
the duties of Chief Commissariat
Officer. He has been favourably
mentioned in reports both from
Dr. Jameson, the Administrator,
and Major Forbes, commanding
the Combined Columns, and
took an active part in the two
engagements with the Matabeli.
Captain Kennedy was, at the time of joining the Salisbury Horse, one
of the chief officials of the Chartered Company, and at the head of a
very important department, yet he was quite ready to join the field
force in any capacity whatever, having placed himself entirely in the
hands of the officer commanding that force. Such an example had an
excellent effect upon the other volunteers.
Mr. C. M. Acutt, the interpreter and guide, is a member of a
well-known Natal family, and was particularly selected on account of his
acquaintance with the Zulu and other native languages.
Mr. p. L. Chappe, the Acting- Veterinary Surgeon and Trumpeter,
served in the Zulu War, and did good work of a miscellaneous
character throughout the recent campaign, being energetic and ready
to turn his hand to any duty. Mr. T. E. Tanner, Orderly Officer
and Galloper, is a New Zealander by birth. He entered Mashonaland
in the British South Africa Compan3'''s Police, and became magistrate's
clerk (to Major Forbes) at Buluwayo.
Captain J. A. L. Campbell, late R.A., was Ordnance Store Officer.
282
The Downfall of Lobengula.
In referring to the other officers who led the British South Africa
Company's forces in the campaign, those of the three cohimns will be
mentioned in the order in which they are named in Major Forbes'
report. Taking first the Salisbury Horse, it will be seen by referring to
the earlier pages of the commanding officer's account of the campaign
that the senior ("A") Troop was offered to and promptly accepted
by Captain Maurice Heany, who
is a Pioneer of Pioneers in British
Zambesia — one of the famous trinity,
Johnson, Heany, and Borrow — who did
such splendid work in 1890, who were
the first genuine miners in the country,
and one of whom, poor Borrow, died
in maintaining his hard-earned rights-
Captain Heany is an American by birth
but has been for sixteen years in the
outlying portions of South Africa —
usually a good bit ahead of civilisation,
and has taken part in every South
African war — the Basuto campaign ex-
cepted— since he landed in the country.
He served in Carrington's Horse in the
Warren Expedition, and afterwards in
the Bechuanaland Border Police with
his two friends and partners, Major
Johnson and Captain Borrow. Leaving the Bechuanaland Border
Police the three formed a syndicate in Cape Town — the Northern
Goldfields Pioneer Syndicate — which secured from Lobengula a con-
cession to work what are now the Mazoe Goldfields. This however
was afterwards rescinded, but the syndicate was ultimately exceedingly
successful, and acquired from Khama a valuable concession, which
was placed upon a working basis as the Bechuanaland Explora-
tion Company, of which Captain Heany was for some years general
superintendent. The idea of the Bechuanaland Trading Association
originated with him, and he became, after its flotation, its general
superintendent. When Mr. Rhodes decided upon the occupation of
Captain Maurice Heany.
The RJwdesian Roll Call. 283
Mashonaland, the three friends resigned from the service of the
Bechuanaland Exploration Company, and entered that of the Chartered
Company, being entrusted with the organisation and equipment
of the Pioneer Corps, in which Captain Heany was senior Captain.
When the Pioneers were disbanded, the firm of Johnson, Heany, and
Borrow was formed, and did splendid work in opening up routes and
developing the mining districts. Just before the Massi-Kessi incident
Captain Heany, in opening up the east coast trade route, was taken
prisoner by the Portuguese and sent down to Beira. Later on, its
operations having become exceedingly large, the firm was placed on a
broader basis as F. Johnson and Co., Limited, with a capital of ^^ 200,000,
and Captain Heany was appointed one of the resident managing
directors. When the Matabeli war broke out he took part in the
raising and equipping of the Salisbury Horse, and was appointed
senior Captain of the same in command of "A" Troop. He is
exceedingly popular throughout Mashonaland and Matabeliland, where
his generosity and kindness of heart are almost proverbial. Speaking
of him and of his partners Mr. Selous, in his last and exceedingly
interesting book, says : —
So much has been written concerning the march up to Mashonaland, and
the composition of the force that took part in it, that it would be mere repetition
were I to say very much on the subject. The whole force of police and
pioneers was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pennefather, of the 6th
(Inniskilling) Dragoons ; but the pioneers, one company of whom were always
in advance to prepare the road, were commanded by Mr. Frank Johnson.
Everyone in South Africa has heard of Frank Johnson and Co.— the Co. being
Messrs. Heany and Borrow. All three names are household words in Mashona-
land. Johnson and Borrow are two fine young Englishmen, and Heany is an
American ; and all three are brimming over with enthusiasm and energy, and are
possessed of that dogged perseverance and untiring patience which has already
won half the world for the Anglo-Saxon race. They are the men who raised
and equipped the Pioneer Corps, with an admirable attention to every detail ot
outfit ; and ever since the occupation of Mashonaland they have been the life
and soul of the country. In 1891 they tried to open up a transport road to the
east coast. Owing to the tse-tse fly this enterprise was a failure, and cost the
firm a large portion of the money they had won by the successful conduct of the
Pioneer Force. All honour to them for the valiant attempt they made to
284 The Downfall of Lobengula.
overcome what proved to be insuperable difificulties. " It is not in mortals to
command success." During the hard times experienced by the Pioneers in
the first rainy season after the occupation of Mashonaland, Heany and Borrow
(Johnson had gone down to Cape Town to prepare for the opening up of the
east coast route from Beira) endeared themselves to all classes of the community
by their kindness to all who were in distress ; and I think all old Pioneers will
join me in wishing luck to Johnson, Heany, and Borrow, and hoping they will
live to reap the reward their pluck and perseverance so richly deserve.
Lieutenant W. Bodle (" A " Troop, Salisbury Horse) had been
before the war a sub-inspector of Police. He is an old campaigner,
having formerly served in the Cape Mounted Rifles, and also in the
Zulu and Basuto Campaigns, entering Mashonaland as regimental
sergeant-major of the British South Africa Company's Police. He is
now in command of the Company's Police at Buluwayo, with the rank
of inspector. During the war he was senior lieutenant in Captain
Heany's Troop and rendered useful service throughout the war.
Lieutenant Frank Elliott Lockner (" A " Troop, Salis-
bury Horse) had served in the Natal Mounted Police, in the Warren
Expedition, and Bechuanaland Border Police. In 1889 he was sent
by Mr. Rhodes to negotiate on behalf of the British South Africa
Company a concession with Lewanika, King of the Barotsi, in which
object he was successful. After the occupation of Mashonaland he
devoted himself to mining (being at one time in partnership with the
late Mr. E. Burnett), but when the war broke out volunteered and
went through the campaign with the rank of junior lieutenant.
Lieutenant Tvndale-Biscoe, R.N. (" A " Troop, Salisbury
Horse) is an officer in the Royal Navy, who has distinguished
himself in the Egyptian campaign in command of machine guns,
gaining the D.S.O. He entered the country in command of the
Pioneer Force's machine guns, and subsequently devoted himself to
mining. During the campaign he was attached to " A " Troop,
Salisbury Horse, in charge of the galloping Maxim, and rendered
excellent service throughout the campaign.
" B " Troop of the Salisbury Horse was led by the late Captain
Henry J. Borrow, whose senior lieutenant, Mr. Snodgrass, is a
New Zealander by birth, and had previously seen service in American
The Rliodesian Roll Call.
285
native wars and in the Maori campaign. He was engaged in business
at Salisbury until the war commenced.
Lieutenant Reid (" B " Troop, Salisbury Horse), formerly a
non-commissioned officer in the Inniskilling Dragoons, entered Mashona-
land as troop sergeant-major in the British South Africa Company's
Police, and subsequently settled in business in the country. Volun-
teering when the war broke out, he was appointed second lieutenant
under Captain Borrow.
The "B" Troop Maxim was entrusted to Mr. LLEWELLYN, who
was appointed lieutenant. He was formerly in the Royal Navy, and
had seen a considerable amount of service on the African Coasts.
The command of " C " Troop of
the Salisbury Horse was offered to and
at once accepted by Captain John
A. Sprecklev, who is one of the most
popular men between Capetown and
Fort Salisbury. Captain Spreckley, who
is an old friend of the three well-known
pioneers, Major Johnson, Captain
Heany, and the late Captain Borrow,
was born at Fulbeck, Lincolnshire, was
educated at Derby School, and went out
to South Africa twelve years ago. His
first occupation was that of ostrich
farming in the Eastern Province of the
Cape Colony, but in 1886 he entered
the Bechuanaland Border Police. A
year afterwards he joined his friends,
Messrs. Johnson, Heany and Borrow,
as a member of the Expedition des-
patched to Lobengula's country by the Northern Goldfields Syndicate,
and with them penetrated as far north as the present site of Salis-
bury. On his return to civilized regions he entered the Cape Civil
Service, but resigned to go to the Witwatersrand goldfields, where he
was engaged in mining business, and was, as his high spirits and genial
disposition made him, as everywhere, a general favourite. In the
Captain John A. Spreckley.
286
The Downfall of Lobeiigula,
depression which followed the " boom" of 1889 and 1890, Mr. Rhodes
made his plans for the occupation of Mashonaland, and Mr. Spreckley
rejoined many old comrades as Quartermaster in the Pioneer Force.
Since the occupation he has been one of the chief mining officials
of the country, having held the offices of Mining Commissioner at Lo
Mogunda's, Mazoe, and Umtali, being wonderfully popular with all
classes at those places during the time he held these appointments.
On the breaking out of the Matabeli War, he relinquished his post at
Umtali and reported himself for volunteer service at Salisbury, and was
actively engaged, with the rank of Captain, in raising a troop for the
Salisbury Horse. He went through the campaign with that Force, and
at its close conducted back to Salisbury the men sent there to be
disbanded, this being a most trying and onerous march, owing to its
being carried out in the midst of the rainy season. Captain Spreckley,
who is now Mining Commissioner at Victoria, is described by Captain
Heany as being " gifted with a wonderful flow of animal spirits, bright
humour, and untiring energy. All these have stood him in good
stead. He is deservedly popular with everybody, and counts his friends
in the country by hundreds."
Mr. Laing, Senior Lieutenant
"C" Troop, was formerly in the
Cape Colony Military Service and
had been through most of the re-
cent South African wars, including
the Zulu and Basuto Campaigns.
Up to the outbreak of the war he
was engaged in mining business
on behalf of the South African
Trust and Finance Company.
Mr. Thomas J. Chrtstison,
Junior Lieutenant " C " Troop,
was born in Forfarshire, Scotland,
and went to South Africa in 1883.
On the formation of the Cape
Town Highlanders he became
Lieut. Thomas J. Christison. Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant,
The Rhodesian Roll Call. 287
being subsequently promoted to a Captaincy and appointed Adjutant
of the Regiment. He resigned in 1889 and joined the British South
Africa Company's Pioneer Force, serving under Captain Heany ("A"
Troop). On arriving at Salisbury he was appointed to the Civil
Staff, and soon after obtained the position of Mining Commissioner
there. In 1891 (May) he volunteered for service in Manica during
the trouble with the Portuguese, returning to his duties in Salisbury,
where he remained till the Matabeli war broke out. He then joined
"C" Troop, Salisbury Horse, as Lieutenant and went through the
campaign. He was appointed Mining Commissioner at Buluwayo
till the end of March this year, when he was allowed six months' leave.
Mr. Christison is returning in September to resume his duties in the
Mines Office, Salisbury, where he has been appointed a Justice of the
Peace for the district.
The artillery of the Salisbury Horse, together with the dismounted
men forming " D " Troop, were placed under the command of Captain
MOBERLEY, late Captain and Battery-Adjutant of the Royal Artillery,
and therefore a competent and experienced officer. Captain Moberley
had entered Mashonaland with the Pioneers, and was subsequently on
the staff of the Company's Volunteer Forces. Throughout the campaign
he rendered particularly useful plucky service. At Imbembesi the fire
was very hot round the Gardner, and Trooper Calcraft was killed while
serving it. Captain Moberley, himself grazed by the same bullet,
stepped into his place, and the gun did not cease firing. At the close
of the war he was sent down to Pondoland by Mr. Rhodes in view of
possible trouble in connection with the Civil War between the native
chiefs and the resultant annexation of the country, being attached to
the Cape Mounted Rifles in command of the Maxim gun.
Under Captain Moberley Mr. Tennant had charge of the seven-
pounder gun, with the rank of lieutenant. He had formerly served in
the late force of the Cape Artillery (now the Artillery Troop of the
Cape Mounted Rifles) and rendered good service throughout the
campaign.
Mr. J. Carden, assistant remount officer of the Salisbury Horse
and galloper to the commanding officer, was, when the war broke
out, sub-inspector of police.
2 88 The Downfall of Lobengula.
Of the Medical Staff, Dr. Edgelow, the principal Medical Officer,
was the District Surgeon at Salisbury when the war broke out, and had
formerly been Resident Physician at Lorenco Marques to the Delagoa
Bay Railway Company. Dr. J. Stewart was the Assistant Medical
Officer attached to the Salisbury Horse.
Captain J. W. Nesbitt, a son of Major Nesbitt, well known in
the Cape Colony, organised and commanded a contingent of the Salisbury
colonial natives and coolies, who urged that they were subjects of Her
Majesty and begged for permission to fight in her service against the
Matabeli. They did excellent work and were of the greatest use in laager-
ing, etc., during the campaign, saving the whites a great many additional
hardships. Several were killed in the different engagements. Chief among
this contingent must be mentioned John Grootboom, a Cape native,
of whom one of the officers says there never was a native like him. He
was ready to face absolutely any risks, and appeared to be ignorant of
the nature of fear. He was always prepared to undertake the most
dangerous mission at a moment's notice — as for instance when, taking
his life in his hands, he set out from Buluwayo to take a summons to
surrender to the fugitive Lobengula. What makes his courage still more
conspicuous is that he was fully alive to the dangers he was facing ; and
it has been said of him, " He was all pluck right away through."
The Salisbury scouts, in charge of Captain O. G. Williams,
who, as already recounted, met his death early in the campaign,
were Messrs. Gerald Paget, J. Murray Gourlay, and Ifah Williams.
Mr. Gerald Cecil Stewart Paget is a son of General Lord
Alfred Henry Paget, C.B., and was born in 1854. He commenced
to travel at a very early age, and for some time was engaged in cattle
ranching in America. In May, 1893, Mr. Paget went to South Africa
with Captain Gwynyth Williams and Captain H. J. Borrow, driving
up with the former and Mr. Hirsch from Johannesburg to Salisbury.
The party arrived at Victoria in July just at the time of the Victoria
incident. Mr. Paget proceeded to Salisbury, and when the cam-
paign commenced volunteered for service against the Matabeli. Mr.
Paget went through the whole campaign, and a very interesting
account of the general operations was supplied by him on his
arrival in England to the " Times," appearing in the issue of
The Rhodesian Roll Call.
289
Mr. Gerald C. S. Paget.
2 1st December, 1893, of that news-
paper. Mr. Paget was the first man
to come through to the Cape and to
England with news of the fighting.
He rode the first 250 miles from Bulu-
wayo to Palapye in five days, the
greater part of the way alone, and
suffered much privation from want of
sleep. From Palapye he travelled by
trotting ox waggon five days and
nights, changing from every ten to
fifteen miles in order to get down
quickly to Vryburg, the whole distance
being about 500 miles. He came
straight through to Cape Town, saw
Sir Henry Loch, handed him the first
despatches from Buluwayo in the
morning, and caught the afternoon
boat, reaching England in thirty-three days after leaving Buluwayo.
Mr. J. Murray Gourlay, who ren-
dered signal services during the war
among those who are called the "eyes
and ears " of a military force, has
assisted in the task of supplying this
work with some most valuable photo-
graphs made during the campaign.
Mr. Ifah Williams, who is the
second son of General Owen Wil-
liams, had been ranching in Mexico
before he came out to South Africa
to join his brother. He arrived by the
East Coast route just as the expedi-
tion started, but at once volunteered
and joined the Columns at Charter.
Among the wounded may be
mentioned Trooper Mostyn
u
Trooper Mostyn William Barnard.
290
TJie Downfall of Lobengiila.
William Barnard, born in London January 28th, 1871, the fifth
son of the late Colonel Barnard, Grenadier Guards and 96th Regiment ;
and grandson of the late Sir Henry Barnard, K.C.B., who died in
command at Delhi during the Indian Mutiny. He went out to South
Africa in August, 1890, and joined the British South Africa Company's
Police as trooper, serving till the disbandment of that force. He then
joined the Mashonaland Mounted Police, and served throughout the
Matabeli War as a volunteer attached to " A " Troop, Salisbury
Horse, under Captain Heany. He was present at the two chief
battles (Shangani and Imbembesi), and the intermediate skirmishes.
He was shot in the knee at the latter engagement, and after leaving
hospital at Buluwayo was granted six months' sick leave to England.
To Mr. Ralph
Cecil Batley we are
indebted for a number
of photographs which
have been reproduced
or utilised in this book,
and which were taken
in Matabeliland by his
friend Mr. J. Murray
Gourlay, well known
as one of the scouts
of the Chartered Com-
pany's forces. Mr. Batley
went into the country
\
Mr. R. C. Batley.
in March, 1893, on a
shooting expedition in
the north of Mash-
onaland. When the
Matabeli troubles began he was in the "fly" district, but at once
returned and joined Captain Borrow's troop of the Salisbury Horse.
He went all through the campaign as a corporal and was one of the
first to enter Buluwayo. He served throughout the last patrol in
pursuit of the King, but was invalided back to Buluwayo three days
before the disaster to Major Wilson's party. Mr. Batley, an old
The Rhodesian Roll Call.
291
Cambridge man, was one o{ the
many University and public school
men in the Salisbury Horse.
The Hon. Maurice Ray-
mond GiFFORD, a brother of
Lord Gififord, V.C., is well known
in Mashonaland and Matabeliland
as the manager of the Bechuana-
land Exploration Company. He
was born at Ampney Park,
Gloucester, on May 5th, 1859, and
was educated privately. On the
completion of his education he
entered the Merchant Service, and
was on board the training ship
'Worcester" for three years. In
1878 he entered the service of the
The Hon. M. R. Gifford.
British Steam Navigation Company, in which he remained until
1882, visiting many parts of the globe. In the last-named year he
happened to be on the Red Sea at the time of the outbreak of the
Egyptian war, and acted as assistant correspondent to the *' Daily
Telegraph " at the time of the engagement of Tel-el-Kebir. He
afterwards went to Canada, where he fought as a trooper in Lord
Minto's forces (in " French's Scouts "') sent to crush the Riel rebellion
in the north-west, receiving the medal and clasp. On his return from
Canada, he went to South Africa and accepted the management of
the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, and was at Khama's chief
town when war was declared against the Matabeli. He at once
volunteered to serve in Major Forbes' Column. He was the last
white man who spoke to the late Captain Gwynyth Williams, and
had a very narrow escape himself, not only on this, but on another
occasion, when he shot the Matabeli who had killed the late
Mr. E. Burnett.
Sergeant Robert T. Coryndon is a Cape Colonist by birth, and
was born in 1870. He was educated at an English public school —
Cheltenham. On his return to South Africa, he joined the Bechuanaland
U 2
292
The Downfall of Lobengula.
Sergeant Robert T
Border Police, afterwards transferring
into the British South Africa Com-
pany's Police, and thence into the
Pioneer Corps, with which he entered
Mashonaland in 1890, On the 30th
September the Pioneers were dis-
banded, and Mr. Coryndon entered
the Chartered Company's Survey
Office. In the winter of 1892, he
went on a hunting expedition up to
the Zambesi (Zumbo). On his way
back with a Mr. Eyre, he came
across the white rhinoceros, then
supposed to be extinct ; and two
specimens were shot by Mr. Eyre.
In the ensuing dry season he
again went hunting in north-eastern
Mashonaland, having been commis-
sioned to shoot a couple of white
rhinoceri for the Rothschild collec-
tion, and in this quest he was
successful. On the outbreak of
hostilities Mr. Coryndon returned
to Salisbury, and joined the Salis-
bury Horse as a sergeant. He
recently came to England for a
short holiday, but has since returned
to the Tanganyika district to resume
his occupation as a big game hunter.
Sergeant W. Hacker, who
acted as sergeant throughout the
campaign, was an Australian colonist
of many years' standing. After
returning to this country he was
attracted by very good reports to
South Africa, and went out, prin-
Sergeant W. Hacker.
The Rhodesian Roll Call.
293
cipally with the object of Kaffir trading in Johannesburg, in the early
part of 1891. He left for Mashonaland just in front of Lord Randolph
Churchill's Expedition, and remained there trading until the war broke
out. He at once volunteered and was attached to the Artillery with
the local rank of sergeant, serving one of the seven-pounder guns
throughout the war.
Trooper H. N. Fife
Scott, who is the second son
of Mr. Fife J. Scott, a well-
known Newcastle merchant, went
out some six years ago to
Johannesburg. He left the
Transvaal to join the Pioneer
Expedition of the Chartered
Company with his elder brother,
Mr. Fife J. Scott, jun. Mr. Fife
Scott continued in the service
of the Company until the
troops were disbanded, when
he commenced prospecting
and developing on his own
account. As a Trooper of Cap-
tain Heany's Troop (Salisbury
Horse) he marched toBuluwayo,
and when the stampede of horses
took place at Imbembesi was one of those who, following Sir John
Willoughby, Captain Borrow, and another trooper, left the cover cf the
laager to stop the stampede and secure the horses. He also served with
Major Forbes' patrol, during which exposure brought on an acute attack
of malarial fever, and on returning to camp was immediately invalided
home, carrying Dr. Jameson's despatches to Palapye on the way.
The organisation and command of the Victoria Horse were
entrusted to MAJOR ALLAN WiLSON, who was supported by a
number of excellent officers, eight of whom fell before the close of the
war. Of Major Wilson's staff, ADJUTANT Kennelly had formerly
served in the Bechuanaland Border Police, Captain AND OUARTER-
Trooper H. N. Fife Scott.
294
The Downfall of Lobengula.
MASTER Harry Greenfield was killed on the Shangani with so large
a number of his brother officers, and Major Wilson's first orderly officer,
Lieutenant Bowen, only escaped sharing his fate by the fact that he
had a particularly good horse, and was left behind to keep him fresh
to carry down the news of the anticipated capture of the King. Mr.
Bowen, who was a close friend of Major Wilson, is a son of the Right
Hon. Sir George Ferguson Bowen, P.C., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., late
Governor of Queensland, New Zealand, Victoria, Mauritius, etc.,
and a son-in-law of the Bishop of Derry. He was fresh from
Australia when he went into Mashonaland as a Pioneer, and was an
official of the British South Africa Company when the war broke out.
He is now Mining Commissioner at Fort Salisbury, The other galloper
was Lieutenant Chalk, now a sub-inspector in the Company's Police.
Lieutenants Ware and Browne acted as Pioneers for the
Column throughout the campaign. The former is one of the Pioneers
of Northern Zambesia — an old-time up-country trader, who has passed his
life in the Lake N'gami and Barotse countries, or as a miner in the river
diggings near Kimberley. Some years ago he obtained a concession
of a large tract of the Barotse country from the Chief Lewanika, which
he afterwards ceded to the Chartered
Company. He chanced to be at Vic-
toria when the war broke out, and
went through the campaign in charge
of a number of road-making natives
who, prior to the crossing of the
Shangani River by the Salisbury and
Victoria Columns, generally kept
ahead with the scouts. Both the
Pioneers did most useful work in the
campaign. The latter is a son of Lord
Richard Browne, and is an engineer
by profession, being engaged on survey
work before the war.
The captain and junior lieutenant of
No. I Troop (Capt. Fitzgerald and
Lieut. A. B. Hakris. Mr. Hughes) were killed with Major
The Rhode sian Roll Call. 295
Wilson. The senior lieutenant of the Troop, Mr. A. B. HARRIS, was born
in Bradford, Yorkshire, on November nth, 1867, and was educated at
Shrewsbury and Hertford College, Oxford. Before going out to South
Africa (in March, 1891), he held a commission in the third Battalion
of the 4th Royal Lancaster Regiment. He is engaged in business in
Mashonaland, where he has again returned after a brief holiday spent
in England since the war.
No. 2 Troop of the Rangers was entrusted to Captain BASTARD,
R.N., who was engaged in mining at Victoria when the hostilities
commenced. He rendered excellent service throughout the campaign,
and at its close remained at Buluwayo, where he is still engaged in his
former occupation.
His lieutenant was Mr. Woolls Sampson, formerly in the
Bechuanaland Border Police and subsequently a professional mine
manager at Johannesburg and elsewhere. He is now engaged in
mining business in the Matabeliland goldfields.
No. 3 Troop was led by Captain Napier, one of the i^w survivors
of Major Wilson's party, who owes his life to the fact that he was
sent back to Major Forbes to ask for reinforcements. He is, we are
informed, a Natal colonist by birth, and was engaged in business at
Victoria until the commencement of the campaign, during which he
rendered a good account of himself.
His first lieutenant, Mr. WILLIAMS, had formerly served in the
regular forces, and was engaged in business in Victoria until the war
broke out. No information is to hand as to the second lieutenant,
Mr. Stoddart.
No. 4 Troop was commanded by Captain Judd, who was killed
on the Shangani. His first lieutenant, Mr. Robert Beale, is an
ex-sergeant-major of the Bechuanaland Border Police, and came into
Mashonaland as lieutenant in the Pioneer Expedition. When this was
disbanded, he was elected first lieutenant of the Salisbury Volunteers
(the Mashonaland Horse), in which fine body the late Captain Borrow
held a troop. For several years he has been in Mashonaland
engaged in road-making, is very well known in the country, and has
been a most energetic and useful pioneer. The second lieutenant of the
troop was Mr. Hofmeyr, killed on the Shangani.
296 The Downfall of Lobengula.
The dismounted men, of whom there were about 250, armed with
rifles and bayonets, were placed under the command of Captain
Delamere, well-known in the old Cape wars and who had been farming
near Victoria, with Lieutenant W. Keppel Stier (formerly in the
Cape Mounted Rifles and Pioneer Expedition) as first lieutenant.
Lieutenant Stier was at the outset of the campaign a corporal in the
Salisbury Horse, but obtained his discharge from Major Forbes and
joined the Victoria Contingent. As to the second lieutenant, Mr,
Robinson, no information has been received.
The artillery of the Rangers was entrusted to the late Captain
Lendy, R.A., who on the junction of the columns took chief
command of the guns. He was assisted by Captain Reid, who
worked one of the Maxims with the greatest precision, possessed
an expert knowledge of its mechanism, and rendered good service
throughout the campaign. His lieutenant, Mr. RIXON, died under
circumstances narrated in the last chapter.
Perhaps no single feature con-
tributed more to the success of the
^^■M^^^ campaign than the manner in which
J|^BQ|PHHll> the scouting operations were conducted.
Jj^K The difficult nature of the unknown
^Hl .<«««■» ;^£ country to be traversed, the disparity
^^^ "-"iP^ y^ of the numbers of the natives and
. the whites, made it fatal to allow the
f^ i^^lw former to come within assegai range,
and rendered every precaution against
surprise a paramount necessity. There
were in all about sixty men employed
in scouting duty. These formed a
/'' cordon about ten miles away from
the main body, equivalent to about
r an hour's notice of the neighbour-
hood of the enemy. The chief com-
Captain the Hon. C. J. White. mand of the scouting parties of the
combined Salisbury and Victoria
Columns was on their junction entrusted to CAPTAIN THE Hon.
The Rhodesiait Roll Call. 297
C. J. White, who carried out the important and difficult duties
attaching to the post with conspicuous effectiveness, and earned the
respect of both officers and men for his zeal and energy. Captain
White, who was born in June, i860, is the third son of Baron Annaly.
He was educated at Eton, and in 1879 entered the Longford Rifles
Mihtia, joining the 7th Royal FusiHers (City of London Regiment)
in 1881. After serving in England until 1884, he exchanged into
the foreign Battalion, then quartered at Bellary in Madras. On his
return home in 1886, he served as adjutant to the Depot of the
Royal Fusiliers at Aldershot for eighteen months, and proceeded for
the second time to India in 1887. He obtained his company in the
home Battalion in 1889, and remained in England until the spring of
1 89 1, when he was seconded with a view to taking service with the
British South Africa Company. He has served with the Company for
the last three years (during the last in command of their Police),
until the commencement of the war, when he volunteered to serve in
any capacity. After the war Captain White, who came home for a
brief period of rest and change, decided to settle in the country under
the British South Africa Company. He therefore retired from Her
Majesty's Service in May, 1894, and returned to South Africa to
resume his duties as Chief Commissioner of Police in Rhodesia.
Lieutenant Dollar, of the Victoria Scouts, who was farming in
Mashonaland when war was decided upon, was selected for scouting
work, owing to his possessing an unusually good knowledge of the veld
and of native languages. He was placed in chief charge of the scouts
under the first organisation, and rendered excellent service throughout
the campaign.
Li connection with the scouting the names of BURNHAM, Ingram
(two Californians now settled in Mashonaland), and VAVASOUR especiall}'
call for mention. Their services were simply invaluable, and they were
always to the fore when any exceptionally difficult or dangerous
scouting duty had to be performed. Burnham and Ingram, who had
been miners and prospectors in America and who had seen hai'd work
on the Western plains, were at Victoria when the war broke out.
Vavasour had lived for some time at Buluwayo and knew the country
thereabouts, and therefore volunteered to go with Burnham and
298 The Downfall of Lobengula.
Ingram when they made their famous and daring reconnaissance towards
Buluwayo. There were two other Victoria scouts, Mayne (who with
Burnham and Ingram escaped from tlie ill-fated Wilson Patrol, bearing
messages to the commanding officer) and POSSELT, both of whom did
very useful and hazardous work.
Lieutenant Brabant, in charge of the Victoria Native Con-
tingent, is the son of Colonel Brabant, well known in the Cape as a
power among the natives. Following the example of his father, he had
acquired considerable influence over the natives around Victoria. On
the declaration of war he organised a corps of Mashonas, notoriously the
most useless, lazy, and unreliable among natives, and got a great deal of
exceedingly useful work — such as bushing up the laagers, collecting fuel,
scouting, etc. — out of material which would have been absolutely
worthless, or worse, in other hands.
Another body of natives was under charge of Mr. Quested. He
had a thorough knowledge of natives and their customs, and possessed
great influence among those round Victoria, a number of whom he found
readily responded to his call for volunteers for service in the campaign.
It was his contingent that received the first attack at the battle of
Shangani, where he managed to make a plucky stand with his natives
for some time. He was wounded in the arm and side, and had his
thumb shot off, and about forty or fifty of his men were killed. He then
came into the laager, after making — considering the material — a very
good fight. Mr. Quested, who is now convalescing, entered Mashona-
land in the Pioneer Force, and was afterwards in the service of Messrs.
Johnson, Heany, and Borrow. His force was very useful in scouting
work. A like command was held by Mr. Arnold, very much the
same stamp of man, who also rendered excellent service.
Captain C. H. W. Donovan, who accompanied the Victoria
Rangers as a volunteer unattached, has just returned from South
Africa — where he has had a number of interesting and varied ex-
periences. He was on a hunting expedition in that country when he
heard of the Matabeli raid at Victoria. He volunteered and served with
the Artillery under Captain Lendy, R.A., taking part in all the en-
gagements previous to the occupation of Buluwayo. He also went
forward with the Patrol sent after Lobengula, returning from the
The Rhodesian Roll Call.
299
Captain C. H. \V. Donovan.
Bubye River with despatches from Major
Forbes for the Administrator. He was
then sent on with despatches and mails by
Dr. Jameson to Capetown and England,
The latter he reached on the last day of
December, having left Major Forbes
eighty miles north of Buluwayo on the
afternoon of November 19th, and so
beating the record for that journey.
Captain C. H. W. Donovan is now in the
Army Service Corps, but formerly held
a lieutenant's commission in the 4th
Dragoon Guards. He has seen a good
deal of service, having been in Egypt
in 1885, up the Nile with the Heavy
Camel Regiment, receiving the medal
and clasp of the Khedive's Star. Sub-
sequently, he spent eighteen months
on the West Coast of Africa, taking
part in the two expeditions in the Tambacca country (1892),
for which he received the medal and clasp. He was A.D.C. to the
Administrator of Sierra Leone (Sir W. H. Quayle-Jones), and was on
leave from the West Coast when he went to South Africa to hunt,
meeting with splendid sport in the Mozambique country, between the
Lundi and Sabi Rivers. He joined the 4th Dragoon Guards in August,
1882, and the Army Service Corps in February, 1887. Captain Donovan
is the second son of the late Mr. Richard Donovan, J. P., D.L., of
Ballymore Camolin, Co. Wexford, Ireland, and was born at Pole Hore,
in the same county, on June 26th, i860. He was educated at Clifton
College. He is now engaged in writing a book dealing with his sporting
and military experiences in South Africa.
The transport arrangements were entrusted to Captain A. B.
KiRTON, v/ho was killed with Major Wilson on the Shangani.
Last, but by no means least among the officers of the little army,
must be mentioned BiSHOP Knight-Bruce, late Bishop of Bloem-
f ontein, and now Bishop of Mashonaland, whose courage in sharing the
;oo
TJie Downfall of Lobeng?ila.
perils of the campaign appealed in a particularly direct manner to his
flock, and whose presence as one of the columns forms a very emphatic
contradiction, were that needed, to the ridiculous allegations that the
war was one of conquest and not of self-protection.
Major Forbes and; his Staff.
Photo by Vebenham, Southsca.'\
Mr. PHILIP B. S. WREY, A.M.Inst.C.E.
{Consnltwg Engineer lo the Mashon aland Agency Company.)
CHAPTER XIX.
THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF MASHONALAND.
By Philip B. S. Wrey, A.M.I.C.E.
A land of promise — A succession of gardens — Climatic conditions — The question of markets —
A comparison with Johannesburg in its early days — Labour and fuel — The native
population — The administration — A final conclusion.
Asked what one's opinion of Mashonaland is to-day, and its future
prospects, there can be but one answer. It is a country full of
promise, and its prospects are most excellent and encouraging.
Of course, those who expect a country of the size and distance from
civilisation as is Mashonaland to be changed in a year or so from a wild,
uncultivated area into a territory full of the conveniences of a long-
established colony, must lay themselves open to many disappointments.
But people who do not look for the impossible cannot help being struck
with the rapid strides that have been made in the civilising of the
country. The three main townships — Salisbury, Victoria, and Umtali —
are not, as many suppose, mere collections of huts, but consist of
well-laid-out streets, properly surveyed, and the houses erected on the
stands are in nearly all cases built of burnt bricks and roofed with
iron sheeting. A friend remarked to me, that he supposed, " unless we
shot game of some sort, we had no meat whatsoever to live on " ; he
would, indeed, be surprised to see the excellent and varied menus
provided by any one of the numerous hotels in either of the three
towns ; and should he wish to feed in his own house, he would find
butchers' shops in any town where, for sixpence a pound, he could obtain
most excellent beef or mutton. Again, the excellent system of mail
coaches renders travelling a matter of simplicity, and the post and tele-
graph services are indeed a credit to a country three-and-a-half years
old. The route taken by some of the mail coaches through the low-lying
302 The Doivnfall of Lobengiila.
country between TuH and Victoria, and from thence along the watershed
of the country to Salisbury, does not convey to the traveller anything
of the grand country lying on either side of this watershed. But one
has only to ride across country, say from Victoria to Umtali, to be
satisfied that the prospects of Mashonaland, from an agricultural point of
view, are all that can be desired. Natives, as a rule, are very good
judges of soil, and it is seldom, unless compelled so to do, that they will
ever farm anywhere but where the country is fertile. The whole
distance, covering about i6o miles, may be said to be one succession
of small groups of gardens, growing all kinds of produce, such as
maize and various growths of millet, rice, and tobacco. In the
neighbourhood of Salisbury, either in the Mazoe or Umtali directions,
land is now being energetically farmed, and it is no exaggeration
to say that exceptionally fine wheat, oats, mealies, and tobacco are
being grown. Most of these crops are grown on the highland country,
but at a lower elevation tea and coffee have been tried as an ex-
periment, and the results are most encouraging. Grapes have also
been planted with equal success.
Matabeliland appears to be the better country for stock raising, and
the reason is not far to seek. The Mashonas possess extremely few
sheep or cattle, for the yearly raids of the Matabeli decimated their
herds. The captured cattle have been always driven into Matabeliland,
where, forming an ever-increasing herd, they have kept the pasture short
and sweet, changing it from the strong sour grass into the short, sweet
veld so well suited for sheep and cattle. Stock Mashonaland with cattle
and the same result will be seen, for I am confident the soil in the two
districts is identical. On all sides of the main watershed of the country
the various districts are well watered, affording ample scope for irrigation
if required.
The climate of the high plateau land of Mashonaland and Matabeli-
land is most excellent, no great maximum of heat or cold being main-
tained, and even in the height of summer the mid-day sun is always
tempered with a cool breeze. The changes of temperature are neither so
rapid nor so great as in many other parts of Africa. It is, of course, on
this plateau that the townships are built, and farming operations carried
on. The low-lying country, covered as it is in many parts with forest
The Position and Pj'ospects of Mashonaland. 303
and swampy ground, is most unhealthy for fully five months in the
year, and malarial fever is a certainty to anyone who remains any length
of time in those parts. It will take years before this improves, but of
course it must be remembered that many parts of Africa which are now
inhabited and civilised have been equally unhealthy, but are now com-
paratively free from malaria. The yearly rains maybe said to commence
early in December, and to last, with certain periods of intercession, until
the following April. The amount of rainfall varies considerably, some
years being far greater than others.
Of course it may be argued that it is not much good having
excellent soil and energetic colonists to farm it, unless there be a
market for your produce. This is very true, but I maintain that there
is a market already in the country. Not a large one, perhaps, but fully
extensive enough to absorb the crops of a considerable number of farmers,
who, from the very nature of their ground, cannot individually produce
any very big amount for the first few years of occupation. Take for
example wheat. At the present time the price of imported flour is about
^5 a bag of 200-lbs. Granted the population is not a large one at
present, yet the yearly consumption must be considerable, and the price
per bag must yield heavy profits to the local grower. In maize there is
even now a large market. The various mining companies take large
supplies of both it and millet upon which to feed their native labour. The
coaching company absorbs a large stock every month for feeding its
mules, and the Chartered Company and private individuals for feeding
their horses. Oats, or forage as it is commonly known, grows luxuriantly,
and from sixpence to a shilling a bundle can be readily obtained in any
one of the towns. Stock-rearing, in a country where transport by
means of the ox-waggon must be in vogue for many years to come, is
bound to be a profitable business, and as the population of the country
increases, so do I expect to see large tracts of land utilized for breeding
on a large scale.
Of course the main cause of the increase in population will be due
to mining operations, and I should now like to say a few words as to
prospects in this direction.
Everyone knows the old saying, " Distant hills always appear the
greenest," and there is no greater truism when the subject concerned is
304 The Downfall of Lobcngula.
gold mining. In 1890, when the Pioneer forces first entered Mashonaland,
Johannesburg was under a heavy financial cloud, and many were only
too glad to start afresh for a country whose prospects had been so
glowingly painted by travellers and hunters. Everyone remembers the
rumours of the wonderfully rich reefs said to exist in the country, and
there was much wild talk about eclipsing the marvellous output of Johan-
nesburg mines, and of the rapidity with which the lost fortunes were again
to be made. The first year of occupation was, indeed, a hard one for all
concerned. An extremely heavy rainy season, to commence with, ren-
dered prospecting a matter of great difficulty, and the transport of the
necessaries of life almost an impossibility. Men became sick and down-
hearted ; a thorough reaction set in, and no word was bad enough with
which to describe the country. The disappointment to many was the
finding that they had quartz reef formations to contend with in place
of the bedded lodes of Johannesburg, rendering prospecting and
development a far more difficult and expensive operation than the mere
quarrying they had been accustomed to. Again, on closer inspection,
the distant hills did not prove to be any greener than those previously
met with, and where men had talked of ounces they had to content
themselves with pennyweights. As time went on these pessimistic views
of the country again underwent a change. Prospectors went further
afield, new strikes became more frequent, and the results of development
in many cases proved most successful. Many capitalists in the country
took over properties, and mining was rapidly pushed ahead. The
success attending this work was such that in the latter part of 1892
and early months of 1893, several companies were floated in London to
thoroughly explore and develop certain reefs.
The unfortunate series of events culminating in what is known as
the Matabeli war effectually paralysed all work, and it was only in one
or two cases that development was continued. Where, however, such
work was carried on, the results were most encouraging. The reefs not
only held in depth, but their quality, though in places extremely variable,
maintained its average. Everyone knows that quartz reef mining is an
acute form of speculation, and Mashonaland will prove no exception
to this rule. Disappointments are bound to be frequent, but I feel
assured there is a large amount of gold to be obtained, affording lucrative
The Position and Prospects of MasJionaland. 305
employment to a large number of men, and that the country abounds
in what may be termed excellent mining possibilities.
Now that the Matabeli question is settled once and for all, the capital
at present in the country will vigorously develop the reefs owned by the
various companies, and fresh European money will purchase many of
the numerous reefs already found, and only awaiting further funds to
open them up. In many cases it will be found that, although the assay
value retains its average when the lode is sunk on, yet the gold gradually
becomes less free and more and more enveloped in sulphides. The many
recent scientific discoveries for the proper treatment of refractory ores will
gradually overcome any difficulty that may arise to commence with in
dealing with them. Labour is distinctly cheap, fuel is plentiful, and the
circumstances under which gold mining can be carried on will be
decidedly favourable, so soon as transport is cheapened and facilitated,
and the malaria existing in most parts of the low-lying country has begun
to disappear. By this time there are several batteries either crushing or
in course of erection ; I am in hopes of seeing many more coming
into the country, and anticipate seeing a steady yearly increase in the
output.
From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that the mining
prospects of Mashonaland are decidedly encouraging, and that the
working of this industry will necessitate a population which will absorb
the increasing produce of the country, and thereby obviate any tendency
to glut the market, with consequent lowering of prices and profits to
the farmer and stock-breeder. News from Matabeliland coming home by
every mail leads one to believe that the promise of fresh discoveries of
gold reefs are most satisfactory, and already a large amount of capital
and energy is being devoted to this fresh field for enterprise.
In a country full of promise to the mining and farming community,
trade and commerce must in like manner have their share in prosperity,
and I have no hesitation in saying that the prospects of merchants and
storekeepers are most excellent. Most thoroughly do they deserve good
profits, for their enterprise in transporting the many and varied require-
ments, such as a community like that in Mashonaland demands, is a
very serious undertaking, necessitating a large expenditure of capital.
Business men are not as a rule philanthropists, and I consider one of the
X
3o6 The Downfall of Lobengula.
best signs of the future success of the country is the fact that so much
capital has been sunk by them already, with full confidence of receiving
good returns for their outlay.
In speaking on the subject of trade and its future, one must not
forget what excellent prospects the native population affords. Now that
the country is settled, the natives will soon find out the advantages to
be derived from working for the white man, and receiving his money for
their labour. And although at present a down-trodden and impecunious
race, there can be no doubt the Mashonas will improve immensely under
the civilising influence of our rule. They are a people, also, who will
very soon appreciate the small luxuries of life, such as coffee, sugar, and
European clothing ; and this taste gradually increasing, will in time
create a very large field for commercial enterprise.
It will be readily understood that, no matter how good the pros-
pects, mineral, agricultural, or pastoral, of a country may be, unless its
administration be well looked after, it will never be a success. No
one but those who have lived in Mashonaland for the last three
years or so can have any conception of the difficulties that must
have been met with in the administering of the country. The new
townships to be laid out, farms to be beaconed off", the sale and
registration of titles to both stands and farms, the organisation of a
proper staff of magistrates and officials, the institution of courts of law
and all legal matters connected therewith, the enrolling and subsequent
controlling of an efficient body of police in the country, the proper
supervision of all mining areas, registration of claims, conserving of
woods and forests, the undertaking and proper carrying out of an
efficient weekly mail connecting Mashonaland with the Cape Colony,
the construction and maintenance of telegraphic communication with
the Colony and England, the building of good substantial public ofl'ices
— all these and many other details not only have " to be done," but
actually have " been done," in a country which was, four years ago, a
wild stretch of uncivilised and almost unexplored veld.
Too much praise cannot be given to Dr. Jameson, who, with his
able staff, has administered the country since the autumn of 1891. It
would, indeed, be difficult to find a man so well adapted to the position
he holds, and his infinite tact and ready resource have much to
The Position and Prospects of Mashonaland. 307
do with his success as an administrator. In no instance were his
powers more clearly shown than during the time previous to the
declaration of war against the Matabeli. And, before closing, I would
like to add my testimony towards proving that, far from forcing on the
w^ar, it was only after every effort to maintain peaceful relations with
Lobengula had failed, that Dr. Jameson was compelled to recommend
the course of action finally adopted.
Having briefly discussed the position of Mashonaland to-day, and
its prospects from a farming, mining, and commercial point of view,
I hope I have made it clear that I consider it a country which offers
good scope for all branches of enterprise. Any man going there must
be prepared to face many difficulties, much discomfort, and if he travels
in the low country, a certainty of fever. But on the other hand, though
large fortunes will not be rapidly made, I am certain that any steady
man possessing a profession or trade cannot fail to improve his position ;
and should he have command of capital, it is a country offering far
better prospects for commercial enterprise than can be had in more
civilised, but at the same time more crowded, parts of South Africa.
A Mashona Piano.
X 2
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ZAMBESI A.
The extent of our latest territorial acquisitions — Northern Zambesia — The gold areas — The
value of real estate — Terms of settlement with the Colonial Office — Mr. Rhodes'
views on the fiscal policy of the Empire — Railways, telegraphs, and coach services —
Native labour.
Stay- AT-HOME, incurious Britons are strangely unacquainted with the
outlying portions of that vast empire of which these islands form so
small a part. What Englishman of average intelligence and education
could, for instance, be trusted to write, without reference, anything that
could be described as a correct and briefly comprehensive account of
our Australian or Canadian dominions, or of the vast and populous
satrapy which was won for us by the resourceful genius of Robert Clive
and Warren Hastings ? How many really grasp the importance of the
fact that within the last four years a few British " adventurers " — the
term is officially applied to the founders of that most conservative of
institutions, the Bank of England — have added to the empire a territory
which is eight times the size of Great Britain herself, equal in area to the
combined extents of the United Kingdom, France, Austria, and Italy,
and larger than our East Indian possessions .'' Still less is it generally
understood that of British Zambesia hundreds of thousands of square
miles are fertile, well-watered, well-timbered, endowed with a pleasant
and healthful sub-tropical climate — all in the most emphatic sense of
these phrases — and that, moreover, immense stretches of country are
highly mineralised. Yet this is so. There is probably no healthier
country in South Africa than the enormous upland region called
Matabeliland, which possesses the finest pasturage between the Zambesi
and the southern littorals of our Cape dependencies. In addition to
this, the countries of the Matabeli and Mashona are known to be
auriferous ; indeed, they are believed to be richly so. It is, however, still
too early to pronounce upon this matter with the certainty born of actual
The Settlement and Administration of Zambesia. 309
results. Systematic crushing has ah-eady commenced at some of the
mines, and within the next six months more definite data will either
confirm or disappoint the hopeful anticipations entertained. In the
meantime it may be noted that important economic adjuncts in the
form of coalfields have been discovered near Salisbury and Bulu-
wayo. Other minerals are known to exist in various parts of the
country, but the limits of this volume will not permit any detailed
reference to their character. The occasion may be utilised, however, to
take a bird's-eye view of the territories of the British South Africa
Company as a whole ; to take some brief note
__-,,.,.,-„. Qf |.]^gjj. resources, prospects, and of the con-
siderable progress made in the task of their
development since the historic occupation
of Mashonaland.
The Crocodile or Limpopo River.
A wide reach on the
Limpopo River.
The Chartered Com-
pany's sphere extends over
an approximate area of three-
quarters of a million square
miles. This enormous territory is sectioned off by the Zambesi River
into two main divisions, to which the names of NORTHERN and
Southern Zambesia have been respectively suggested.
Northern Zambesia is defined to be the territory which, with the
exception of Nyasaland, has been declared by Her Majesty's Govern-
ment to be within the field of operations of the Charter of the British
3IO The Downfall of Lobengitla.
South Africa Company. It is, in accordance with the terms of the
Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, bordered on the east by a line starting
from the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa at the point of the parallel
of the confluence of the Rivers Rovuma and M'Sinje, Following the
shore southwards as far as the parallel of latitude 13*^ 30' south, it
proceeds in a south-easterly direction to the eastern shore of Lake
Chiuta, which it follows. Thence the boundary line runs in a direct
line to the eastern shore of Lake Kilwa or Shirwa, which it follows
to its south-easternmost point. From that point the line proceeds in
a direct line to the easternmost affluent of the River Ruo, and thence
follows that affluent, and subsequently the centre of the channel of
the Ruo, to its confluence with the River Shire. From the confluence
of the Ruo and Shire the boundary follows the centre of the channel
of the latter river to a point just below Chiwanga ; thence runs due
westward until it reaches the watershed of the Zambesi and the Shire
Rivers. Following that watershed and afterwards the watershed
between the former river and Lake Nyasa, it reaches parallel 14'' of
south latitude. From parallel 14*^ it runs in a south-westerly direction
to the point where south latitude 15'^ meets the River Aroangwa or
Loangwa, and follows the mid-channel of that river to its junction
with the Zambesi.
On the west Northern Zambesia is bordered by a line following
the centre of the channel of the Upper Zambesi, starting from the
Katima Rapids up to the point where it reaches the territory of the
Barotse kingdom. That territory remains within the British sphere ;
but its exact limits to the westward, which will constitute the boundary
between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence, are yet to
be decided by a joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission.
In the early part of 1891, Her Majesty's Government extended
the field of operations of the Charter of the British South Africa
Company, so as to include the whole of the British sphere north of the
Zambesi, except Nyasaland. Under the latter name are included
certain districts in the Lake Nyasa region where British missionaries
had been settled for over fifteen years, and the African Lakes Company
had been at work for the same period. These, in 1889, were declared
to be within the British sphere of influence. On the 14th of May, 1891,
The Settlement and Administration of Zambesia. 311
north of
except
Southern
that better
which in-
shonaland
Hland, to-
ing one of
provinces
Africa. In
ation it
ately to the
British
Bechuanaland, to the north
and north-west of the Trans-
vaal Republic, to the west of
the Portuguese province of
Mozambique, and to the east
of the German sphere in South
West Africa. In addition to
this, it may also be mentioned
that the British South Africa
Company is deeply concerned
in the development of the
these districts were pro-
claimed a Protectorate of
Great Britain under the name
of the British Central Africa
Protectorate, The Protecto-
rate is administered by Her
Majesty's Commissioner, who
also practically exercises ad-
ministrative authority on be-
half of the British South
Africa Company, over the
whole sphere of influence
the Zambesi,
Barotseland.
Zambesia is
known region
eludes Ma-
and Matabe-
gether form-
the fairest
of South
point of situ-
lies immedi-
north of
A Hunting Party at Shashi River.
3^2 The Doiunfall of LobengiLla,
Bechuanaland Protectorate, having acquired from the Chief Khama
a concession of the entire mineral rights throughout his extensive
dominions.
The development of the mineral areas of these vast countries
has been taken in hand by the Company and numerous more or
less affiliated concerns with conspicuous energy and determination,
and with results which are, under all the untoward circumstances
(among which the Matabeli war may be classed), equally sur-
prising. Gold mining centres, some already of considerable import-
ance, have already been established at Victoria, Manica, Hartley
Hill (Salisbury), Mazoe, Lo Mogundi, Kaiser Wilhelm, and elsewhere
in Mashonaland.
The number of claims which had been registered in the following
Mining Districts there before the end of July, 1894, were approxi-
mately:— Umfuli, 7,590; Mazoe, 6,510; Victoria, 6,150; Lo Mogundi,
2,600; Salisbury, 3,560; Manica. 10,150; total, 34,560. Since the
occupation of MatabeliJand discoveries of gold bearing districts have
rapidly succeeded each other, finds having been made at Buluwayo,
Sebakwe, Gwelo, Matopo, Bembesi, Balingwe, Umswizwe and Selukwe.
Altogether, on the 21st July, 1894, 12,000 claims were reported as
registered in these Mining Districts of Matabeliland. The foregoing
substantial results had been achieved in three years. What has been
done in Matabeliland seems still more phenomenal, seeing that the
Chartered Company's troops only marched into Buluwayo on November
3rd of last year (1893).
Apart from mining operations, townships have been established at
Salisbury, Victoria, Umtali, Hartley Hill, and Mazoe in Mashonaland ;
and at Buluwayo and Gwelo in Matabeliland. Real estate has already
reached a considerable value, as may be gauged from the fact that in
July, 1893, 348 "stands," or town lots, were sold for ;^i 7,786. Three
other large auction sales of stands at Buluwayo, Gwelo, Salisbury,
Victoria, Umtali, and Mazoe, have recently taken place, or are to be held
in July to September of the current year, and an indication of values
is afforded by the upset price, which ranges from ;^40 for town lots (per
stand) to ^loo for residential sites. In all probability the upset prices
will be considerably exceeded, as in the past ; but even on the basis of
The Sett ieme Jit and Administration of Zambesia.
6^3
the upset figure the stands would realise ;^93,56o * This sum — to-day
the' purchase-price of a few acres — would, ten years ago, have acquired
the whole of the Witwatersrand and every then known concession in
Zambesia, affording a typical instance of the kaleidoscopic changes which
have transfigured South Africa — still practically a virgin country —
during recent years.
Upon the disbanding of the Chartered Company's Forces immediate
steps were taken to ensure the proper administration of Matabeliland,
and the opportunity was afforded to revise the whole scheme of the
government of Southern Zambesia. The chief points to be settled were
connected with the natives ; the devising of a proper legal system
adapted to the native codes and customs, and the allocation of habitable
areas sufficient for the needs of the black population. But several
important side issues were raised in view of possible political contin-
gencies. It will be apparent to even the most cursory reader of it that
the agreement ultimately arrived at between Her Majesty's Government
and the British South Africa Company makes complete provision
for the protection of the native interests involved, and for proper
legislation in that connection. The following is the full text of the
agreement in question : —
Clause i. — The territories referred to in this Memorandum are those parts
of South Africa bounded by British Bechuanaland, the German Protectorate, the
Rivers Chobe and Zambesi, the Portuguese Possessions, and the South African
Republic, within which the British South Africa Company, in this Memorandum
referred to as " the Company," carries on operations under and by virtue of Her
Majesty's Charter of October 29th, 1889: save and except the territories defined
in the third section of the Proclamation of the High Commissioner of September
27th, 1892, and known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Clause 2. — The administration of the Government of the said territories
shall be conducted by the Company in accordance with its Charter, and under an
Administrator and a Council of four members composed of a Judge and three
other members. Any two members shall form a quorum.
Clause 3. — The Administrator shall be appointed by the Company with
the approval of the Secretary of State, and may be removed either by the
Secretary of State or by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of
* Since the above was written, 535 stands at Buluwayo and Gwelo were sold on August
1st for ^52,592. This result, though not unexpected, created a deep impression as the evidence
of unprecedented progress in a new country.
314 The Doiunfall of Lobengiila.
State. He shall, unless sooner removed, hold his ofifice for a term of three
years, and after the end of that term shall continue to hold his ofifice until
his successor is appointed. An Administrator whose term of office has
expired may be re-appointed. The Company may appoint an Acting Adminis-
trator, of whom the Secretary of State approves, to act as Administrator during
the absence on leave or incapacitating illness of the Administrator. When
there is no Administrator or Acting Administrator present in the said territories
and capable of acting, the duties and powers of the Administrator shall devolve
on the Judge.
Clause 4. — The Judge shall be appointed by the Company Avith the ap-
proval of the Secretary of State, and may be removed only by the Secretary of
State. He shall be a member of the Council ex officio.
Clause 5. — The members of the Council, other than the Judge, shall be
appointed by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of State, and may
be removed by the Company. On the expiration of two years from the first
appointment of members, and on the expiration of every succeeding period of
two years, one member of the Council shall retire from office. The first two
members to retire shall be determined by agreement, or, in default of agreement,
by lot. Subsequently, the member shall retire who shall have been longest in
office without re-appointment. A retiring member may be re-appointed, and
shall hold his office until the appointment of his successor.
Clause 6. — When the Administrator or the Judge or other member of the
Council resigns, is removed, or dies, the Company shall, within nine months of
his resignation, removal, or death, appoint a successor of whom the Secretary of
State approves, and if they fail to do so the appointment may be made by the
Secretary of State. A member of the Council (other than the Judge) appointed
under this clause shall hold office so long only as the person in whose stead he
is appointed would have been entitled to hold office.
Clause 7. — The salaries of the Administrator and of the Judge shall be
paid' by the Company ; the salaries shall be fixed by the Company, with the
approval of the Secretary of State, and shall not be increased or diminished
save with his approval.
Cl.-^use 8. — The Administrator shall, as representative of the Company,
administer the government of the said territories, but shall take the advice of his
Council on all questions of importance affecting the government of the said
territories. If in cases of emergency it shall be impracticable to assemble a
quorum, the Administrator may take action alone, but he shall report such action
to the Council at its next meeting.
Clause 9.— If the Administrator dissents from the opinion of the Council,
or the Majority of the Council, he may overrule their opinion ; but in such case
he shall report the matter forthwith to the Company, with the reasons for his
action, and in every such case any member of the Council who dissents may
The Settlemeiit and Administration of Zambesia. 315
require that the reasons for his dissent shall be recorded and transmitted to the
Company. The Company may rescind the decision of the Administrator,
whether made with or without or against the advice of the Council.
Clause 10. — It shall be lawful for the Administrator, with the concurrence
of at least two members of the Council, and with the approval of the High
Commissioner, to frame and issue Regulations ; and every such Regulation,
after it has received the approval of the High Commissioner, shall on its
promulgation have the force of law. Provided that either the Secretary of State
or the Company may veto any such Regulation at any time within twelve months
of the date of approval by the High Commissioner. In case of the exercise of
such veto, the Regulation shall be of no force and effect save as to any act done,
right acquired, or liability incurred thereunder before the exercise of the said
veto has been communicated to the Administrator and public notice of the same
has been given by him.
Clause ii. — A Regulation approved and promulgated as aforesaid may
suspend any provision of any Ordinance of the Company which shall be specified
therein, but every such Regulation shall itself be subject to repeal or amendment
by Ordinance of the Company.
Clause 12. — Neither the Company nor the Administrator in Council can
by Ordinance, or Regulation, or otherwise, amend or repeal any Order made by
Her Majesty in Council, nor, except with the previous consent of the High Com-
missioner, any Proclamation issued by such High Commissioner under the
authority of an Order made by Her Majesty in Council.
Where an Ordinance of the Company, or Regulation of the Administrator in
Council, is in any respect repugnant to the provisions of an Order made by Her
Majesty in Council, or, except in the case of previous consent above specified, of
a Proclamation issued by the High Commissioner under such an Order, it shall
be read subject to such Order or Proclamation, and shall, to the extent of such
repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain absolutely void and inoperative.
Clause 13. — The power of making Ordinances, granted to the Company
under clause 10 of its Charter, shall be deemed to include the power of imposing
by such Ordinances all such taxes as may be necessary for the order and good
government of the said territories and for the raising of revenue therein, and also
the right to impose and to collect Customs duties.
Clause 14. — The Company may by Ordinance empower, or the Adminis-
trator in Council may by Regulation empower, any local municipal body or other
local authority to levy municipal rates and taxes, and to prescribe and enforce
moderate money penalties for breach of local regulations.
Clause 15. — The Judge shall have jurisdiction over all causes, both civil
and criminal, and shall hold courts at such places as may be from time to time
prescribed by Proclamation of the High Commissioner or by Ordinance of the
Company. The procedure, rules, and regulations of the said courts shall be the
3i6 The Downfall of Lobengula.
same, as far as is applicable, as the procedure, rules, and regulations of the
Supreme Court of the Cape Colony. If and when the Parliament of the Cape
Colony shall express its assent thereto, Her Majesty's Government will advise
the issue of an Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890,
providing that appeals from the decision of the Judge shall lie to the said
Supreme Court.
Clause i6.^The said territories shall be divided by the Company into
magisterial districts. There shall be an appeal in all civil and criminal cases
from the decision of the magistrate of any district to the Judge upon the same
terms and conditions, and subject to the limitations, rules, and regulations, as far
as possible, which regulate appeals in the Cape Colony ; and all criminal cases
that would, if the same had been tried by a Resident Magistrate in the said
Colony, be liable to review by a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be liable to
review by the Judge.
Clause 17. — All civil and criminal cases, whether between native and
native, or between native and non-native, or between non-native and non-native,
shall be cognisable by the courts of the Judge and magistrates within the
respective jurisdictions assigned to such courts.
Clause 18. — In civil cases between native and native the said courts shall
decide the said cases in accordance with native law, in so far as the said law is
not repugnant to principles of morality, or to any law or ordinance in force in the
said territories ; provided that in any suit in which the effect or consequence of
any marriage contracted according to native law or custom shall be involved, any
such marriage contracted by a native in the lifetime of one or more other wives
of the said native, married to him according to the said law or custom, may be
recognised and regarded as in all civil respects and for all civil purposes a valid
marriage, in so far as such polygamous marriages are recognised by the said
native law or custom. In all civil cases between natives, any magistrate or the
Judge may call to his assistance two native assessors to advise him upon native
law and customs, but the decision of the case shall be vested in the magistrate or
Judge alone. Subject as aforesaid, the same procedure shall, as far as possible,
"be observed as though the said cases had been tried in the Cape Colony.
Clause 19. — All criminal cases, whether between native and native, or
between native and non-native, or between non-native and non-native, shall be
dealt with in accordance with the laws applicable to non-natives, and the same
procedure, as far as possible, shall be observed as though the said cases had been
tried in the Cape Colony.
Clause 20. — The magistrates shall be appointed by the Company with the
approval of the High Commissioner, and shall thereupon enter on office, but the
appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Secretary of State. The
magistrates may be removed either by the Secretary of State, or by the Company
with the approval of the Secretary of State.
Clause 21. — The High Commissioner may suspend the Judge or any
The Settle7nent and Administration of Zambesia. 317
magistrate from ofifice for misconduct, but shall immediately report to the
Secretary of State the grounds of such suspension. The Secretary of State may
either confirm or disallow the suspension.
Clause 22. — Fines levied upon native chiefs or tribes for misconduct or
'•rebellion may only be imposed by the Administrator in Council, and every such
case shall be forthwith reported to the High Commissioner.
Clause 23. — Natives shall not be subjected to any exceptional legislation
save as regards liquor, arms, and ammunition and as regards the title to and
occupation of land as hereinafter referred to in Clause 27 and as regards any
other matter which the x\dministrator in Council may, with the approval of the
High Commissioner and the assent of the Secretary of State, subsequently by
Regulation define ; provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent a hut
tax being imposed by legislative authority in respect of the occupation of huts
by natives.
Clause 24. — A Commission shall be appointed to deal with all questions
as to native settlements in the portion of the said territories termed ]\Iatabeli-
land. It shall be called the " Land Commission," and shall be composed of
three persons, namely, the Judge, one member appointed by the Secretary of
State, and one member appointed by the Company.
Clause 25. — Any decision of the Land Commission shall, on sufficient
cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, be subject to
revision by him, if within twelve months from the date of the award being
received by him he shall give notice of his intention to proceed to such revision.
Clause 26. — The Land Commission shall continue for such time as may
be approved by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Company ; after
which time all the powers and duties of the said Commission shall become and
be vested in the Judge alone.
Clause 27. — The land Commission shall, as regards the portion of the said
territories termed Matabeliland, assign to the natives now inhabiting the said
portion land sufficient and suitable for their agricultural and grazing require-
ments, and cattle sufficient for their needs.
Clause 28. — The Company shall retain the mineral rights in, over, or under
all land so assigned to natives ; and, if the Company should require any such
land for the purpose of mineral development, it shall be lawful for the Company
to make application to the Land Commission, and upon good and sufficient
cause shown, the Commission may order the land so required, or any portion
thereof, to be given up, and assign to the natives concerned just compensation
in land elsewhere, situate in as convenient a position as possible, and, as far as
possible, of equal suitability for their requirements in other respects.
Clause 29. — In like manner, should any land assigned to natives be required
for sites for townships, railways, or for any public works, then upon application
to the Land Commission, and upon good and sufficient cause being shown that
o
1 8 The Dozunfall of Lobengula,
the land is required' for any of the above purposes, the Commission may order
the land so required, or any portion thereof, to be given up, and assign to the
natives concerned just compensation in land elsewhere, situate in as convenient
a position as possible, and, as far as possible, of equal suitability for their
requirements in other respects.
Clause 30. — No removal of natives from any kraal, or from any portion of
land assigned by the Land Commission, shall take place to another locality,
except after due inquiry made upon the spot and with the authority of the said
Commission.
Clause 31. — The land to be assigned to natives shall include a fair and
equitable portion of springs or permanent water and of grazing and arable land.
Clause 32. — The Land Commission shall have power to appoint a subordi-
nate court, to be called the " district land court," in each magisterial district, con-
sisting of the magistrate of the district and two assessors to be appointed by the
Land Commission. The said district land courts shall report or make recommen-
dation to the Land Commission on all questions which shall be remitted to them
by the Land Commission. The Land Commission may confirm or disallow,
with or without amendments, any recommendation of such district land courts.
Clause 33. — Natives shall have the right to acquire and hold and dispose of
landed property in the same manner as persons who are not natives, and in all
respects such property shall be liable in the usual manner for any obligations for
which such property shall be liable. But these provisions shall not apply to land
assigned under Clause 2 7; and no contract for alienating or encumbering a native's
land shall be valid unless it is made before a magistrate and attested by him, after
satisfying himself that the native understands the bargain.
Clause 34. — Persons who may be appointed to such offices as may be de-
signated in a Proclamation or Proclamations by the High Commissioner, shall
not (except in the case of an acting apppointment) have any interest, either
direct or indirect, in the commercial undertakings or shares of the Company.
The offices to be designated in the said Proclamations shall be such as may be
agreed upon by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Company.
Clause 35. — The armed forces of the Company shall not, without the
permission of Her Majesty's Government, act outside the limits defined in
Clause I of this Memorandum.
Clause 36. — The cost of any inquiry which the Secretary of State may
think it necessary to institute into the administrative or judicial system established
in the said territories, shall be borne by the Company. The Company shall like-
wise provide such payment as may be agreed upon between Her Majesty's
Government and the Company, to the member of the Land Commission
appointed by the Secretary of State.
Clause 37. — None of the provisions in this Memorandum contained shall
be construed so as in any way to diminish or detract from the powers conferred
The Settlement and Administration of Zai^tbesia. 319
upon Her Majesty's Secretary of State or High Commissioner by Her Majesty's
Order in Council of May 9th, 1891, or by the Charter incorporating the
Company ; but the said provisions shall be considered as subsidiary to, and in
augmentation of, the powers so conferred : and nothing herein contained shall
be construed so as in any way to diminish or detract from the powers granted
to the Company by its Charter.
Executed in London this 23rd day of May A.D. 1894.
Signed on behalf of The Common Seal of British South Africa \
Her Majesty's Company was affixed hereto, pursuant \ \^^y.rQ^^
Government, to a Resolution of the Boardof Directors v -p '
Henry B. Loch, passed and dated the 23rd May, 1894, \ ' Directors
High Comi7iissioner . in the presence of /
Herbert Canning,
Secretary.
Of the matters dealt with in the foregoing, the first is the method of
the administration, which is to be carried on by the Administrator,
advised but not controlled by a Council of Advice consisting of a Judge
and three other members. All the members of this are to be appointed
by the Company, but their nomination is subject to the approval of the
Secretary of State. The judicial member of the Council has already
been appointed in the person of Mr. JOSEPH ViNTCENT, whose office is
only second in importance to that of the Administrator, whose duties, in
case of absence or death, and should there be no acting Administrator,
devolve upon him. He may only be removed by the Secretary
of State. The new Chief Justice in Matabeliland is the eldest son
of the Hon. L. A. Vintcent, Member of the Legislative Assembly of
the Cape Colony, and was born at Mossel Bay, November 9th,
1 861, He was educated at the Diocesan College, Rondebosch,
Charterhouse, and Trinity Hall, Cambridge. He afterwards qualified
for the Bar, and after returning to the Cape was admitted as an
advocate to the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony. In 1885 he
went to practice in the High Court at Vryburg, British Bechuanaland,
and was subsequently appointed Crown Prosecutor of the Colony.
He remained in Bechuanaland until he received his present important
appointment. At a farewell banquet given in his honour before
leaving Vryburg, Sir Sidney Shippard, Administrator of British
Bechuanaland, referred in the most eulogistic terms to his services, and
320 The Dozvnfall of Lobengtda.
said that no more efficient Public Prosecutor could have been found ;
and added that Mr. Rhodes could not have made a happier choice if he
had searched the whole of the Cape Colony. In a sporting country such
as South Africa eminently is, some mention of the athletic career of
any member of the Vintcent family is naturally looked for. The name
of Mr. C. A. Vintcent is too well-known in sporting circles throughout
South Africa to need mention. Another brother, Mr. Louis Vintcent,
who was one of the Pioneer Force, and who died of fever shortly after
the occupation, also achieved a reputation as a good all-round athlete.
The new judge did well at cricket and football at Charterhouse, and at
Cambridge got his " blue " for Association football, and obtained a fair
amount of success as a cricketer. While studying for the Bar he played
for London in nearly all the Association matches of the day, and for
the Old Carthusians when at their best. He was said to have been sure
of international honours, but at this point damaged his knee so badly
that he had to give up the game entirely.
The remaining three members have not yet been appointed. It will
be observed that the Administrator has power to act even in opposition
to the advice of a majority of his Council, and is only subject to the
authority of the Company, which in turn is under the supreme authority
of the High Commissioner representing Her Majesty's Government.
The land rights of the natives are protected by a Land Commission
consisting of three members : the Judge, one appointed by the Company,
and one — this is a somewhat important proviso — appointed directly by
the Secretary of State. In purely native cases the native law is followed
where it does not clash with the morals of civilised communities ; but
here again an important exception is very properly rnade by the official
recognition of polygamy among the natives. The stipulation providing
that " if and when the Parliament shall express its consent thereto "
appeals from the decision of the Judge — the present supreme legal
authority in British Zambesia — shall lie to the Supreme Court of the
Cape Colony, is important as showing the grooves along which the
Rhodesian legal system, the framework of which is designed to follow
as closely as possible the judicial system of the Cape Colony,
is expected to run. This is noticeable in the clause (No. 19)
which provides that in all criminal cases the procedure of the Cape
The Settlement ajtd Administration of Zambesia. 321
Colony shall be followed. The only exceptional legislation to which
the natives are to be subjected is in respect to liquor, arms, and
ammunition, with regard to which it is to be hoped that Mr. Rhodes'
policy of total prohibition of alcoholic liquors among the natives will be
carried out in its full stringency. Only in this way can the physique
and self-respect of the natives be kept up to anything like a satisfactory
level. By a further clause the necessities of the Matabeli in respect of
cattle and land for farming, grazing, or dwelling purposes, are met by a
clause providing that the Land Commission shall satisfy the wants of
the natives of Matabeliland in this respect. When this agreement, of
which the salient points were agreed upon by Sir Henry Loch and
Mr. Rhodes in consultation, was being framed by the Colonial Office on
the one side and the Board of Directors of the Company on the other,
Mr. Rhodes wished that it should contain a stipulation that the British
South Africa Company should, in perpetuum, pledge itself never to
impose duties upon British goods higher than those levied by the Cape
Colony ; and also a stipulation that the produce of that Colony should
be always admitted free into the territories of the Company. These
provisions, however, were rejected upon grounds which are stated in a
letter from the Marquis of Ripon, of which a copy is appended hereto,
together with a copy of the letter embodying Mr, Rhodes' views. The
following is the text of the letter, dated 22nd May, 1894, sent by the
British South Africa Company, embodying Mr. Rhodes' views, and of
Lord Ripon's reply.
Sir, — In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant,
and the draft of the proposed Memorandum as to the administration of
Matabeliland and Mashonaland, my Directors desire me to say, for the
information of the Right Hon. the Secretary of State, that they accept
the Memorandum as fairly and adequately meeting the present
conditions of the territories, and are prepared to affix the Seal of the
Company to a copy.
I am instructed at the same time to lay before Her Majesty's
Government the grounds upon which Mr. Rhodes desired Clause 13 to
take a different form to that now settled.
The clause in the Agreement runs : —
The power of making Ordinances, granted to the Company under
Y
32 2 The Downfall of Lobengtila.
Clause lo of its Charter, shall be deemed to include the power of imposing by
such Ordinances all such taxes as may be necessary for the order and good
government of the said territories and for the raising of revenue therein, and
also the right to impose and to collect Customs duties.
Mr. Rhodes wished the following proviso to be added : —
Provided that if Customs dues are levied, then in so far as Customs dues
on British goods are concerned, they shall not exceed the duties thereon
according to the tariff at present in force in the South African Customs Union ;
and provided further that the produce of the Colony of the Cape of Good
Hope shall pass free into the Chartered territories the subject of this
Memorandum,
The following remarks were forwarded as embodying Mr. Rhodes'
reasons for this addition : —
It must be remembered that this Agreement contains the prin-
ciples of the constitution for the Chartered territories, and Mr. Rhodes
thinks that it is a wise provision that the Customs duties on British
goods should not exceed the present Cape tariff, which is a reasonable
one, and is imposed for the purpose of revenue and not for pro-
tection, and not with the view of making prohibitive tariffs against
British manufactures. He thinks it is a pity that when responsible
government was given to the Colonies, provision was not made at the
time that duties imposed upon British goods should not exceed a
certain amount. Such an arrangement would have been a fair return
by the Colonists to the Mother Country for the heavy expenditure she
had incurred in founding their settlements, and at the same time
would have been a salutary check against the introduction of the prin-
ciples of extreme protection, the results of which to the ordinary
community are, that all the necessaries of life are made infinitely
dearer, and in addition to this, such an Agreement would have been
one of the strongest ties between the Mother Country and her
Colonies. Mr. Rhodes objects to the proviso extending to goods
from Foreign States, as he wishes, in case the United States and other
European Powers continue their policy of excluding British manu-
factures from their countries, to reserve power and right to consider
the advisability of meeting them in the same spirit. He says it must
be noted that the amendments proposed in the McKinlay tariff are in
the direction of admitting raw products on a freer basis, but still very
high tariffs are kept against foreign manufactures, the object being to
keep out British manufactured goods, and by increasing the supply of
raw materials— which are lacking in the United States — to compete
with manufactured British goods in the outside markets of the world.
Mr. Rhodes thinks, therefore, that the arrangement suggested by him
— which is a just one — should be made to apply only to British goods ;
■-■- . and as to the rest of the world the question should be left open, so
The Settle?nent mid Administration of Zambesia. 323
that we are free to consider the situation. If the unfriendly attitude
of Foreign Powers against British goods continues, the English people
may have to reconsider the question of tariff, and in the future have to
consider the advisability of imposing tariffs against ; those countries
which treat their manufactures in a hostile manner. Mr. Rhodes does
not now ask for the Company the right of imposing a differential
tariff, but says, in return for the benefit that we have received from the
Mother Country let us make it a portion of our constitution that
British goods shall never pay a tariff exceeding the present tariff in
force in the Cape Colony. This tariff is not a prohibitive or pro-
tective one, but is merely for the purpose of revenue, and under it
British goods receive the utmost fair play. Mr. Rhodes wishes this
tariff to become, in so far as British goods are concerned, a portion of
the constitution of the Chartered Company's territories, i.e., that we
shall not have the power to impose a higher tariff on British goods, as
that would be in the direction of a protective or prohibitive tariff.
The proviso respecting " British goods," Mr. Rhodes points out,
gives the Company no power to impose any differential rate — and
therefore the argument of interference with the general fiscal policy of
Her Majesty's Government falls to the ground — as the Ordinance
imposing the dues would be subject to the approval of Her Majesty's
Government ; ]Mr. Rhodes prefers the clause with the insertion of the
words " British goods," because it would then bind the Company in
the future never to put an excessive rate upon British manufactures,
and leaves — as it should do — the rest of the question open. Mr.
Rhodes says the provision that our tariff on British goods should not
exceed the present Cape tariff was suggested by himself in the
interests of the English people, who are daily perceiving that the only
return made them by the Colonies and States that they have founded,
for all the blood and treasure they have spent, is, that the present
occupants place hostile and prohibitive tariffs against their goods,
thereby removing the only existing benefit to the British manufacturer.
Mr. Rhodes wishes to guard against a repetition of this in the
Chartered Company's territories. It rests with Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, he says, whether they will support him in this idea, and if they
reject it the onus of rejection lies with them ; but, he says, " they will
agree with me that the msertion of the words ' British goods ' is
. immaterial to the Charter, and dictated solely in the interests of the
English people." The latter part of the suggested proviso has been
objected to, as giving a preferential right to the products of the Cape
Colony ; but Mr. Rhodes would point out that this has already been
arranged for in the present " Cape Customs Union," in which the
products of the Cape and Orange Free State pass free. It is highly
probable that the Chartered territories will in the future desire to join
the " Cape Customs Union," just as the present Government has
allowed Her Majesty's Protectorate of Bechuanaland to enter the
Y 2
324 7 he Downfall of Lobengttla.
same Union. In this Customs Union it is provided that the products
of the territories shall pass free between each other, and under this
clause they have a preferential rate against goods imported from other
territories. It will be seen, therefore, that the objection made against
the latter portion of this clause, that Her Majesty's Government could
not propose to Parliament special preferential rights of free import for
the Cape Colony, applies with equal force to the action of Her
Majesty's Government in sanctioning the Bechuanaland Protectorate
joining the Cape Customs Union.
It is to be observed that the whole proviso proposed by Mr. Rhodes
would not have run counter to Her Majesty's Treaty obligations, to
which, oi course, the fiscal arrangements in Matabeliland and
Mashonaland would be subject, and would have had a free trade rather
than a protective tendency.
Against such a proposal it may be urged that this agreement for
the administration of the territories of the British South Africa
Company is of a more or less temporary character, and that such a
provision could be subsequently either inserted or expunged. It is,
however, considered that if such a provision had been contained in the
first instrument of government, it would have had a great effect in
shaping the policy of the community upon which a constitution is now
being conferred.
The provision would no doubt have a great effect upon the future
fiscal policy of South Africa, but it was on account of its bearing upon
the future of the British South Africa Company and the territories
under its control, that my Board wished to press the proposed proviso
upon Her Majesty's Government. Lord Ripon will appreciate how
much the success of such an enterprise as the Company has undertaken
depends upon the good will, support, and sympathy of the community
at home. His Lordship is also well aware that in many quarters there
is a feeling that Chartered Companies in general are a source of
weakness and embarrassment in the Empire, carrying with them no
counterbalancing advantages. This Company, which is placed in the
position of founders, as it were, of what it is hoped will prove a wealthy
and prosperous country, wished to take the first opportunity of
acknowledging its debt to the Mother Country, and of providing on its
part that within its territories the produce of English labour should not
be subjected to a hostile protective tariff.
The Settlement and Administration of Zainbesia. 325
My Directors regret that Her Majesty's Government has been
unable to adopt the proviso so strongly advocated by Mr. Rhodes, but
they do not further press the point, and are ready, as stated, to seal
and complete the agreement forthwith.
I am, &c.,
(Signed) HERBERT CANNING,
Secretary,
The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Colonial Office, Downing Street, S.W.
The following is the Marquis of Ripon's reply, dated nth June,
1894:—
Sir,
I have laid before the Marquis of Ripon your letter of the 22nd
ultimo, recording the acceptance by the British South Africa Company
of the Memorandum of Settlement respecting the affairs of Mashonaland
and Matabeliland, but putting on record the reasons why Mr. Rhodes,
with the support of his colleagues, desired that a proviso should be
added to Clause 13 of the Memorandum!, dealing with the taxation of
British and Cape goods.
The Memorandum having been duly executed without the proviso,
it now only remains for Lord Ripon to notice the nature of that proviso,
and the reasons which you have set forth as having influenced Mr.
Rhodes in desiring its adoption, and to explain what were the con-
siderations which prevented him from accepting the proposal made by
Mr. Rhodes.
In the first place the proviso is, in Lord Ripon's opinion,
unnecessary. The Company can only impose taxation by Ordinance,
and such Ordinances are subject to disallowance by the Secretary of
State: consequently no Customs Duties could be levied which the
Secretary of State was not prepared to sanction. There is therefore no
reason to fear that the Company would be allowed, so long as the
Memorandum remains in force, to im.pose excessive duties.
Instead of acting as a restriction on the imposition of duties by the
British South Africa Company, the proposed proviso would have tended
to hinder. the Secretary of State \\\ the free exercise of his power to
326: ,■ The Downfall of Lobengula.
control, inasmuch as if he were at any time to desire to prevent the
levying of Customs Duties in excess of what he thought proper, but not
in excess of those levied under the tariff at present in force within the
South African Customs Union, the Company might have objected that
the wording of the proviso implied that they would be permitted to
impose without check any duties they pleased, so long as they were
not greater than those raised by the Customs Union. Lord Ripon is
not prepared to bind himself or his successors to permit, as a matter of
course, Customs Duties to be levied up to that amount.
The Customs Tariff of the Company must, in his Lordship's
opinion, be regulated by the circumistances of the time, by the require-
ments of the administration of the Company's territory, and by the
relation which its Customs receipts bear to the other sources of taxation
which may be available ; and the Company may rest assured that
neither the present nor any future Secretary of State, so long as he
possesses the powers conferred on him by the Charter and Memorandum
of Settlement, will allow any Customs Duties to be levied in excess
of what is necessary, and that he will not fail to protect " the best
interests of the English people."
If the Company's territory should hereafter pass into the condition
of a self-governing Colony, the inhabitants will enjoy all the freedom
which that status involves.
But altogether apart from this, the proposal, in Lord Ripon's
opinion, lies entirely outside the scope of such an instrument as the
Memorandum. Indeed, it is stated in your letter that " the insertion of
the words ' British goods ' is immaterial to the Charter " ; which is taken
to mean that the insertion of the proviso was proposed, not as a matter
material to the settlement of the questions immediately affecting the
administration of the Company's territories, but as embodying the
general principle of fiscal policy indicated in your letter. The principles
and objects of that policy are well known, and they have been advocated
by various persons in this country for some time. But whatever may
be their merits or demerits, the adoption of this policy would involve a
departure from the course pursued now for many years by the British
Government, and it would be altogether out of the question for Her
Majesty's Government to inaugurate such a change indirectly, and as it
The Settlement and Administration of Zambesia. 327
were by a side wind, in a document of the nature of the Memorandum,
which calls for no such provision, and to the purposes of which it is
admittedly immaterial. It is not necessary to say more in explana-
tion of the grounds upon which Lord Ripon, although desirous of
meeting Mr, Rhodes' wishes as far as possible, has felt bound to
decline to accept the proviso which the Directors were anxious to
introduce.
But there are other portions of your letter which seem to his
Lordship to call for some further observations. One reason stated
in favour of the proviso is that the policy of this country in giving
complete fiscal and financial freedom to the Colonies has been mis-
taken, and that when self-government was given to them it ought
to have been accompanied by conditions preventing them from
taxing British goods beyond a certain limit. Whether it would at
any time have been practicable or expedient to impose any limit,
in the manner suggested, on the financial freedom of the self-
governing Colonies may well be doubted.
The particular proposal now under consideration is not a proposal
to prohibit protection in general, but to prohibit anything like protective
duties on British goods, thus leaving a presumption that the Company
should be free so far as may be possible to impose what duties it pleases
on foreign goods, and the proposal is supported by the suggestion that
the Mother Country herself may very possibly hereafter depart from her
own Free Trade policy by levying protective or prohibitive duties on
foreign goods. Upon this it is only necessary to observe that the Home
Government and Parliament have, in the interests of the people of this
country, consistently refrained for many years from all attempts to
either nurse, fetter, or interfere with the free action and development of
its commerce by protective duties, whether upon colonial or on foreign
goods, and there are at present no signs that this policy is likely to be
abandoned.
Lord Ripon does not doubt that the Directors of the British South
Africa Company desire to retain the good will, support, and sympathy
of the community at home in the task which they have undertaken, but
the fiscal policy which they now advocate is not the one which has
eommended itself for the last half century to the large majority of the
2,2S The Doiv}ifall of Lobengula.
people of this country, and, as has been shown above, the Memorandum
as finally agreed upon provides ample securities that in the territories
of the British South Africa Company the produce of British labour will
not be liable to be subjected to a hostile Protective Tariff.
I am, &c.,
(Signed) R. H. Meade.
The Secretary of the
British South Africa Company.
The above correspondence is chiefly interesting as embodying the
views of the present Cape Ministry upon the fiscal policy of the Empire,
and as being one of the efforts lately made by individual colonies to
place themselves in closer touch with other portions of the British
dominions. The logical force of the attitude assumed by the Colonial
Office with respect to this particular matter is much weakened by the
fact that the suggested provisoes were rather in the direction of free trade
than of protection, and also by the fact that Her Majesty's Government
has already permitted the inhabitants of the Bechuanaland Protectorate
to range themselves within the Cape Customs Union.
The chief cause which has militated against the more rapid
development of Mashonaland has been the difficulty of transport.
Formerly the cost of carrying machinery from the coast to Fort
Salisbury was prohibitive. That obstacle, however, has been ener-
getically grappled with, and is being rapidly overcome. Matabeliland
is to be opened up by a railway from the south, and both Mashonaland
and Matabeliland by a line from the eastern seaboard. Already
considerable progress has been made with both lines. In the first year
the British South Africa Company extended the Cape Colony Railway
from Kimberley to Vryburg, the Cape Government having since taken
over this section of the line. Arrangements have also been made with
the Bechuanaland Railway Company, Limited (incorporated in May,
1893), to extend the Cape system from Vryburg to Palapye (a distance
of 400 miles). The first section to Mafeking (lOO miles) is nearing
completion, the rails having now (August^ 1894), been laid to within
fifteen miles of Mafeking.
On the east seventy-five, miles of the Beira line, starting from
The Settlement and Administratioyi of Zauibesia. 329
extension
telegraph
wards
king, a
819 miles.
of corn-
has proved
mous util-
effic lent
tion of the
during the
esti mate
of the business transacted
with the department b}' pri-
vate persons (Cape Govern-
ment messages being carried
free) may be founded upon the
fact that the line is already
returning some 4 per cent,
upon the cost of its construc-
tion. So successful indeed has
the experiment proved that it
has been decided to extend
the system northward into
Fontesvilla, were opened in
October, 1893, and the line
is being extended to Chi-
moio, a further distance of
forty-three miles. This ex-
tension will, it is believed, be
completed by not later than
December, 1894.
At an early period in its
history as a white settlement,
Mashonaland was connected
with the outside world by an
of the Cape
system north-
from Mafe-
distance of
This means
munication
to be of enor-
ity in the
ad minis tra-
country, and
war. Some
of the volume
l^HjjJPI
^K '^■m^^^^^^M
^ fcfii
^^m
^^^^I^b9k~' '-'i
^^^H
BRH
^^^hHH^^' ^
n
Eland Shcoting— A Water Buck fkom Lake 'Ngami.
33Qr, '^^^^ Downjail of Lobengiila.
Nyasaland, thence via 'Lake Tanganyika to Uganda, and, if and when
possible, across the Egyptian Soudan. This will bring an immense and
hitherto hardly accessible central African region into immediate and close
communication with the civilised world. It will do much towards the
establishment of law and order in the wild districts traversed, will develop
their commerce^ [and will undoubtedly pave the way for the proper
and effective opening up of the Lakes route as a great central African
trade route. Meantime the telegraph poles have already been
laid from. Salisbury to Zomba in Nyasaland (a distance of 400
miles) b}^ the African Transcontinental Telegraph Company, an under-
taking which chiefly owes its funds to Mr. Rhodes' munificence and
public spirit. A branch telegraph line from Palapye into Matabeliland
has also been rapidly pushed forward. A station was opened to
Mangwe on the 25th April, 1894, and Buluwayo itself was reached in
July, 1894 — within nine months from its occupation by the combined
columns. The distance of io8A^ miles from Tati to Buluwayo was
completed in the short time of 133 days, and at the cost of under
Proper arrangements for the conveyance of mails and passengers in
Mashonaland and Matabeliland have also been made, and regular
services have been contracted for as follows : —
Palapye to Tati; time occupied, 25 hours
Tati to Buluwayo; time occupied, 33 hours ...
Buluwayo to Falisbury ; time occupied, 5 days
Chimoio to Salisbury ; time occupied, 84 hours
Tuli to Buluwayo; time occupied 48 hours ...
During the dry season there is, in addition to the above, a weekly
service each way with oxen between Tuli and Victoria, the time occupied
being 84 hours. The latest time tables for the mail and passenger service
of Mashonaland and Matabeliland are inserted, as in addition to their own
inherent interest, they may prove of utility for purposes of reference to
those corresponding with persons resident in Mashonaland and
Matabeliland, or for intending travellers to those interesting and
attractive countries.
90
miles,
150
))
260
•)
223
))
200
O O T
The Settlenunt and Adiniuistralioii of Zanibesia.
TIME TABLE OF MAIL AND PASSENGER SERVICE.
BuLUWAYO TO Salisbury
Approximate
Depart. Arrive. Iji^tance.
Buluwayo Tuesday 3 a.m. Salisbury Saturday 3 a.m. 260 miles.
return.
Salisbury Monday 6 p.m. Buluwayo Friday 6 p.m. 260 ,,
Salisbury to Chimoio.
Depart. arrive. Approx. Dist.
Salisbury Tuesday 6 a.m. Umtali Wednesday 6 p.m. i49j niiles.
Umtali Thursday 6 a.m. Chimoio Friday 6 p.m. 73 ,,
RETURN.
Chimoio Tuesday 6 a.m. Umtali Wednesday 6 p.m. 73 ,,
Umtali Thursday 6 a.m. Salisbury Friday 6 p.m. i49i j>
TuLi TO Buluwayo.
Depart. Arrive. Approx. Dist.
Tuli Monday 10 a.m. Buluwayo Wednesday 10 a.m. 200 miles.
return.
Buluwayo Thursday 6 p.m. Tuli Saturday 6 p.m. 200 „
Cape Town to Buluwayo via Palapye.
Depart. Arkivf. Afprox. Dist.
Cape Town Thursday 9 p.m. Mafeking Sunday 6.30 p.m. 871 miles.
Mafeking Monday noon. Palapye Saturday 10 a.m. 293 „
Palapye Saturday 10 a.m. Tati Sunday 6 p.m. 90 ,,
Tati Sunday 6 p.m. Buluwayo Tuesday 10 am.* 150 „
return.
Buluwayo Saturday 8 a.m. Tati Sunday midnight. 150 ,,
Tati Monday i a.m. Palapye Tuesday 5 a.m. 90 ,,
Palapye Tuesday 5.30 a.m. Mafeking Sunday 5 a.m. 293 ,,
Mafeking Sunday 5.30 a.m. Cape Town Wednesday i p.m. 871 ,,
Cape Town to Tuli via Pretoria {connecting with Tuli-Buluwayo Service.)
Depart. Arrive. Approx. Dist.
Cape Town Sunday 9.m. Pretoria Wednesday 7.30 a.m. 1,031 miles.
Pretoria Thursday 5 a.m. Pietersburg Friday 9 p.m.
Pietersburg Saturday 3 a.m, Hendrikzdal Sunday noon.
Hendrikzdal Sunday noon. Tuli Sunday 8 p.m.
RETURN.
Tuli Sunday 4 a.m. Hendrikzdal Sunday noon.
Hendrikzal Sunday i p.m. Pietersburg Monday Noon.
Pietersburg Monday 9 p.m. Pretoria Wednesday 6 p.m.
Pretoria Wednesday 8.30 p.m Cape Town Saturday 6.40 a.m. 1,031 ,,
*/\o hours' allowance. Tuesday 3 a.m. contract time.
Postage and Revenue Stamps, Southern Zamdesia.
?£Jf.E
f^RTTig5"P^
B.CtA. B:C':i
Postage Stamps, Kokthern Zambesia.
334 ■^^'■^ DoiLmfall of Lobeiigtda,
'■'- Comparatively unimportant, but interesting as an evidence of the
trade and development of the Rhodesian colonies, is the British South
Africa Company's issue of postage and revenue stamps. Two sets of the
postage stamps, one of Southern Zambesia (Mashonaland and Matabeli-
land), and the other of Northern Zambesia (Nyasaland), have been
photographed to form an accompanying illustration hereto. The
Southern Zambesia issue, which dates from 1891, originally included only
the id., 6d., and is. values, but it now ranges from |d. to £\o, and is
available indiscriminately for postage or revenual purposes. The
aggregate face value is ^19 17s. Qd. There is also an issue of registered
letter envelopes and post cards — inland (id.), international (i^d.), and
reply (id. on each half). The issue designed for Northern Zambesia
also dates from 1891, when Mr. H. H. Johnston went out to Nyasaland,
and is distinguished by the over-printed letters "B.C. A." (British Central
Africa). The postage issue includes stamps having face values ranging
from id. to _^io (total values ^^19 los. 3d.), registered letter envelopes,
and postcards of i|d. and 2^d. each. The revenue issue of Nyasaland,
also inaugurated in 1S91, has stamps of an entirely different and oblong
pattern, ranging in face value from is. to £,^0, with a total value of
£%6 1 8s. Up to August, 1893, ^^"78,000 worth of stamps had been sent
out, and as an interesting indication of the increasing business of the
country it may be mentioned that since that date no less than 785,026
postage stamps have been issued. The design of the- stamps is handsome
and effective, consisting of the Compan3''s arms above its proud motto :
'■Justice, Freedom, Commerce." It may be of interest to philatelists
to know that an issue of postage stamps of a somewhat new design is,
we believe, contemplated in the ensuing }-ear.
To touch upon one more point, and that point an all-important one.
Dr. Jameson reported at the end of June last: — "As a proof of the
peaceable state of the countr)' and the satisfied feeling of the natives,
I may state that there is abundant labour to be obtained at Buluwayo,
and by the large number of prospectors no^v distributed through the
country; and there is less complaint of want of labour than we have
experienced during the last three years in Mashonaland."
Within the next {q.\m months Dr. Jameson (whose portrait, taken
ten years ago, appears on a preceding page) will for a brief space
COLONEL F. W. RHODES, D.S.O.
The Settlement and Administration of Zambesia. 335
return to Europe for a well-earned holiday, leaving the onerous duties
of his official position in the hands of Colonel Francis W. Rhodes as
Acting-Administrator. A brief allusion to that officer's distinguished
career has been made in preceding pages, but it may be added that
Colonel Rhodes is understood to have considerable administrative
capacity ; and the deep interest which he has displayed in the
development of Uganda, the opening up of the Lakes Route, and other
important African questions, justifies the confidence placed in him.
As the book goes to press, Mr. James Dawson, who was of late
years Lobengula's chief adviser, has reached England after a lengthy
residence in South Africa. Mr. Dawson had great influence, which he
always used in a proper way, over the King, and it was he who brought
down Lobengula's indunas (two of whom were unfortunately killed) to
Tati. He is a Scotchman, and began his career many years ago as a
trader at Khama's capital, Palachwe, but afterwards removed to
Buluwayo, where he went into partnership with the late Mr. James
Fairbairn. Proverbially hospitable, he is enterprising, able, and
cultured, and universally popular up-country. After re-entering
Buluwayo he volunteered to go to the King, who was then believed
to be on the Shangani, with the object of inducing him to
surrender — a most dangerous mission, especially in view of the Tati
incident. Mr. P. Riley, another up-country trader, also volunteered,
and the two went on in ignorance of the King's death, ultimately
discovering the remains of Wilson and his comrades on the spot
where they fell. Before returning, however, they materially assisted
in the work of pacification by inducing 'Mjan, and the other leading in-
dunas who had followed the King, to come in and offer their submission.
Mr. Dav/son is much trusted by Dr. Jameson, who thinks very highly of
his character and abilities. Of the other Buluwayo traders, the late
Mr. James Fairbairn was an Edinburgh man. He and Mr, Usher,
a Cape colonist, were the only two whites left in Buluwayo when
Mr. Dawson went down with the indunas to Tati, and the forces on
their arrival were considerably astonished to find that their lives had
been spared. After the occupation of Buluwayo Mr. Fairbairn rendered
very valuable service — knowing so many of the native chiefs — in
inducing them -to come in and lay down their arms.
ADVERTISEMENTS.
Price 3d. Subscription (Post Free) 15s., or £1 is. od. Abroad.
Upe Hfrican IRet^ieS,
EVERY SATURDAY.
THE ONLY ANGLO-AFRICAN JOURNAL
CIRCULATING ALL OVER
AFRICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND EUROPE.
Conducted by H. RIDER HAGGARD and W. A. WILLS.
♦♦♦♦♦♦-♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦-♦♦
Political, Social, Mining, Financial Shipping,
and Commercial Intelligence.
Reliable Statistics and Information comtected njith the Sont/i African
Diamond, Gold, Coal, Ccpper, a)id Silver Mining hidustries.
The most trustworthy Journal for Investors, and all those
interested in the South African Industries.
LADIES' LETTERS FROM PARIS & LONDON.
THE VERY BEST MEDIUM FOR ADVERTISERS.
Advertisement TaiiTcn application to the Publishers,
10, BASINGHALL STREET, LONDON, E.G.
ADVERTISEMENTS,
DOUBLE-ROOF RIDGE TENT.
tt^
Benjamin Edgington's
XTents anb ©utfits
For AFRICA AND THE TROPICS,
DOUBLE-ROOF RIDGE TENT,
MADE FROM A SPRCIAL CANVAS, 'IRKATEl) BY THE COPPER
ROT-PROOF PROCESS.
AS SUPPLIED TO
MR. H. M. STANLEY. Capt. STAIRS, R.E. MR. H. H. JOHNSTONE.
Lieut. WISSMANN. Sir F. De WINTON. Bishop HANNINGTON.
Rev. Mr. ASHE. Rev. Mr. COMBER. The CONGO STATE GOVERNMENT^
The imperial BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY, &c.
Surgeon-Major Parke wrote, March 28, 1893:
" I lived under canvas almost continuously from 1882 until we emerged from Africa with
Emin Pasha in December, 1889. Unquestiotmbly yours are the hrsi Tents made."
PRICE LIST ON APPIICATION.
Strong Camp Bedsteads, Chairs, and Camp Furniture of all kinds.
LIGHT, SIMPLE, TRESTLE COT.
STRONG .*c COMPACT.
For Price Lists and Particulars, address —
BENJ!i. EDGINGTON, Limited, 2, DUKE STREET (foot of London Bridge), S.E,
A
ADVERTISEMENTS.
ROWLAND WARD & CO.,
l_ I .\l 1 1 h- 1 ),
Naturalists to the Court,
By Special Appointment to His Royal Hii:;hness the Prince of J J ales, His Royal
Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, and the Courts of Europe.
"THE JUNGLE," i66, PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.,
practical anb artistic ^ayibcrmists.
Designers of Trophies
of Natural History,
Preservers and Adapters
of all Specimens of
Animal Life. Natural
Features of Animals
adapted in Original
Designs for Decorative
Purposes, and every-
day uses. Furriers and
Plumassiers, and Col-
lectors in Natural His-
tory.
THE SPORTSMAN'S HANDBOOK
To Practical Collecting, Preserving, and Artistic Setting up of Trophies and Specimens
P.y ROWLAND WARD, F.Z.S. jj. 6d. By Post, js. qd.
HORN MEASUREMENTS,
WEIGHT,
LENGTH, Etc.
THE GREAT GAME OF THE WORLD.
Beingr a Record for the Use of SPORTSMEN and NATURALISTS.
By ROWLAND WARD, F.Z.S. Price 21s. By Post, 21s. 6d.
TRAVEL AND ADVENTURE
SOUTH-EAST AFRICA.
Bv EREDERICK COURTENEY SELOUS, C.M.Z.S.
WITH NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAP. PRICE 25s. NET.
London
ROWLAND WARD AND CO., Ltd.
THE "JUNGLE," iG6, PICCADILLY.
ADVERTISEMENTS.
Charles Lancaster,
sport withthe golindian
;^c
(^PP^ICE Fi^O[^27£
ASPECIALITY
Non-fouling :^
-Smooth Oval bore
imMmm
o^^^^--^**..^. BALlf^HdTotjN' ,J^j$^^^^^
Without CHOICE bomnc. or cr^ooved kifliNg theheby fREVENTiNOLEAoiHo.
ANO UNDUE KECOIL S HOOTI N C FKOM BOTH BAPvR^ELS SHOT OF ALL S IZ ES ^
AS WELL AS A GUH. L HOLLOW POINTED SOLID Of^STEEL TIPPED CONNICAL /
BULLETS ACCUKATLY TO lOOYAROS G H AS L.ANC A STER. 151 hiEW BO M D ^" S
i5i, NEW BOND ST., LONDON, W.
ADVERTISEMENTS.
Natal Direct Line.
Taking GOODS and PASSENGERS
For NATAL, DELAGOA BAY, BEIRA, CHINDE, AND EAST
AFRICAN PORTS.
Sail every Three Weeks from the East India Docks, ea/Zino- alternately at
Las Palmas and Teneriffe.
Also a monthly direct line between Cape Colony, Natal, East Africa, ami India (Madras
2nd Calcutta), and a through service for passensjers and ravcro between China, Japan, and
South African Ports, via Calcutta.
All Steamers have splendid accommodation for Cabin Passengers at moderate rates, are
t'ltted throughout wiih the Electric Light, and carry a Surgeon and Stewardess. Saloons on
deck, two-l)erth State rooms, of whirh inspection is invited. — Return tickets issued.
/•'or Freis;hl or rns.un;;', apply lo /tie Oioi/rrs,
BULLARR KING & CO., i4, ST MARY AXE. LONDON.
AGKXCIES—
MAI3KAS Parry & Co.
Calcutta ... Anderson, Wright & Co.
IION'(', KoNi;, &c. Dodwell, Carlill Sc Co.
Capf, Town- Viiwell & Co.
Port Elizabeth ... Keith & Co.
Delagoa Bay I.. Cohen & Co.
Head Office for South Africa:— KING & SONS, Durban. Natal
THE MOZAMBIQUE COMPANY.
Gold Miners and Prospectors are informed that the
TERRITORIES of this Company are THROWN OPEN TO
PROSPECTORS of all Nations.
Mining Claims, 330 ft. x 330 ft., 10/- Per Month.
Copies of the Company's Mining Regulations, which are more liberal than
thof:e nf the Transvaal, can be obtained on application to : —
The Department of Mines, The Mozambique Company, Beira,
East Africa.
The London Office of the Mozambique Company, Broad Street House,
Old Broad Street, E.C.
Dr. AIagin, Ph.D., M.E., National Bank Buildings. Johannesburg ;
and
C. J- Alford, Mining Commissioner of the Mozambique Company,
" Umtali, East Africa.
By Order of the
London Office: MOZAMBIQUE COMPANY.
Broad Street House, Old Broad Street, K.C.
ADVF.RTISEMENTS.
UNION
LINE
SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD & DIAMOND FIELDS & MASHONALAND.
Cape of Good Hope, Natal, & East African Royal Mail Service.
ESTABLISHED 1S53.
WEEKLY DEPARTURES FROM SOUTHAMPTON.
Foris called a^— Lisbon, Madeira and Teneriffe (Canary Islands), CAPE TOWN, Mossel
Bay, PORT ELIZABETH, EAST LONDON, NATAL, Delagoa Bay, Inhambane, BEIRA,
Chinde, Quillimane, Mozambique, Ibo, and Zanzibar.
St. Helena and Ascension called at at intervals.
"UNION LINE" EXPRESS FROM WATERLOO EVERY SATURDAY.
Return Tickets Issued. Free Rail Tickets London and Plymouth to Southampton for
Passengers. Cheap Railway Tickets for Passengers' Friends.
Surgeon and Stewardesses carried. Electric Light, Refrigerators, &'c.
FOR HANDBOOK AND ALL INFORMATION, APPLY TO —
THE UNION STEAM SHIP COMPANY, LIMITED,
Canute Road, SOUTHAMPTON; 14, Cockspur Street, LONDON, S.W. ; and
South African House, 94 to 96, Bishopsgate Street Within, LONDON, E.G.
CASTLE LINE ROYAL MAIL SERVICE
WEEKLY SAILINGS
FOR THE GOLDFIELDS OF SOUTH AFRICA.
LONDON, SOUTHAMPTON. MADEIRA, GRAND CANARY, CAPE COLONY,
NATAL, DELAGOA BAY, BEIRA, MADAGASCAR, AND MAURITIUS.
THROUGH BOOKINGS FROM THE CONTINENT.
The Royal Mail Steamers of
THE CASTLE MAIL PACKETS COMPANY, LIMITED,
Leave London every alternate Friday, and sail frtnn Southampton on the following day,
with Mails, Passengers, and Cargo, for Cape Colony and Natal, calling at Madeira.
Intermediate Steamers are despatched every 14 days from London and Southampton,
for Cape Colony, Natal, Delagoa Bay, &c., via Grand Canary, thus forming a weekly
service from London and Southampton.
Passengers and Cargo are taken every fortnight for Delagoa Bay and Beira (Pungwe
River) and every tour weeks for St. Hklena, Madagascar, and l\L\UKnTUS.
Return Tickets issued for ALL PORTS. Handbook of intormalion for Passengers gratis
on application. I^oading Berth — E.ist India Dock Basin, Blackwall, K. /'Vee Railway
Tickets are granted /rom London to Southampton. Experienced Surgeons and Stewardesses on
every Steamer. Superior Accommodation. Excellent Cuisine.
DONaIX)~OTRRIE~^ CO.,
London — i, 2, 3 and 4, Feuchurch Street, l^.C. ; Manchester — 15, Cross Street;
Liverpool — 25, Castle Street ; Glasgow — 40, St. Enoch Square.
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
H^SS
A
5597